• I’m Sam

An American Observer

  • The Middle East Crisis – Turkey

    February 18th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    Turkey is a country in West Asia, mostly in Anatolia, with a smaller part in East Thrace in Southeast Europe.  It borders the Black Sea to the north; Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran to the east; Iraq, Syria, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south; and the Aegean Sea, Greece, and Bulgaria to the west.  Turkey has a population of over 85 million people, most of whom are ethnic Turks.  The largest minority group is the Kurds.  Officially a secular state, Turkey has a Muslim-majority population.  The capital city is Ankara, which is the second-largest city.  Istanbul is its largest city and economic hub.

    Anatolia, also known as Asia Minor, is a peninsula in West Asia, mostly within Turkey.  During the Neolithic Period, Anatolia was an early hub for the development of farming, which began in the nearby Fertile Crescent.  Starting around 9,000 years ago, there was a significant migration of Anatolian Neolithic farmers into Europe, with their descendants eventually dominating parts of the continent as far west as the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles.

    Anatolia’s historical records start with clay tablets dating to around 2,000 B.C., found at modern-day Kültepe.  These tablets belonged to an Assyrian trading colony.  The Anatolian languages spoken at that time included Hattian, Hurrian, Hittite, Luwian, and Palaic.  Hattian was an indigenous language of Anatolia with no known modern connections.  The Hurrian language was also spoken in northern Syria.  Scholars tell us that Hittite, Palaic, and Luwian are among the oldest written Indo-European languages.

    Eventually, Hittite rulers replaced the Hattians; their kingdom was large and powerful.  It co-existed in Anatolia with Palaians and Luwians from 1700 to 1200 B.C.  As the Hittite kingdom fell apart, more waves of Indo-European peoples migrated from southeastern Europe, causing periods of frequent warfare.  Thracians also lived in modern-day Turkish Thrace.  Some scholars believe that the Trojan War stories in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are based on real historical events because many of Troy’s late Bronze Age layers match the accounts in the Iliad.

    The full history of Anatolia and Turkey is long, violent, and fascinating.  It’s too complex to cover everything here — so skipping ahead to the 20th century, I’ll start with the end of World War I.  The Ottoman Turks made the unlucky choice to join the Central Powers against the Allies and lost.  The Allied occupation of Istanbul (1918) and Izmir (1919) sparked the Turkish National Movement.

    Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a distinguished military commander, the Turkish War of Independence took place from 1919 to 1923.  Its goal was to overturn the Treaty of Sèvres (1920).  The treaty’s purpose was to partition the defeated Ottoman Empire, but it was never ratified.  The Treaty of Lausanne eventually replaced it.  Although signed by the Allied powers and the Ottoman government, it would have established an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan, with territories also allocated to Greece, France, and Britain.  Turkish nationalists rejected the treaty and launched a revolution.

    The Turkish Provisional Government in Ankara, which declared itself the legitimate authority of the country on April 23, 1920, started formalizing the legal transition from the old Ottoman Empire to a new Turkish Republic.  The Ankara Government fought both militarily and diplomatically.  Between 1921 and 1923, Armenian, Greek, French, and British armies were expelled.  The military and diplomatic victories of the Ankara Government led to the signing of an armistice on October 11, 1922.  Then, on November 1, 1922, the Turkish Parliament in Ankara officially abolished the Sultanate — ending 623 years of Ottoman rule.

    The Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres, resulted in the international recognition of the new Turkish state as the rightful successor to the Ottoman Empire.  On October 4, 1923, the Allied occupation of Turkey ended with the withdrawal of the last Allied troops from Istanbul.  The Turkish Republic was officially declared on October 29, 1923, in Ankara, the country’s new capital.

    Mustafa Kemal became the republic’s first president.  The Turkish Parliament bestowed upon Kemal the honorific title Atatürk (Father of the Turks).  He, in turn, introduced many reforms aimed at transforming the old, religion-based Ottoman monarchy into a Turkish nation-state governed as a parliamentary republic under a secular constitution.  For example, women gained the right to vote nationally in 1934.  But Atatürk‘s reforms sparked discontent among some Kurdish and Zaza tribes, leading to rebellions in 1925 and 1937.

    When Kemal died in 1938, İsmet İnönü became the country’s second president.  In 1939, the Republic of Hatay joined Turkey.  During World War II, Turkey remained neutral until February 23, 1945, when it joined the Allies.  Later that year, Turkey became a charter member of the United Nations.  Five years later, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe.  After sending troops to join UN forces in Korea, Turkey was invited to join NATO in 1952.

    Between 1960 and 1997, Turkey experienced several military-led coup d’états, which hindered its transition to a democratic multi-party system.  In the 1980s, the Kurdish PKK launched a series of terrorist attacks targeting civilian and military sites.  The first female prime minister of Turkey was Tansu Çiller (1993).  Starting in 2005, Turkey began negotiations with the European Union for membership, but so far, membership has not been offered.

    In 2014, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won Turkey’s first direct presidential election, but internal issues persisted.  On July 15, 2016, an unsuccessful coup attempt was thwarted.  Since then, according to the Turkish government, more than 13,000 people have been arrested and convicted for crimes against the state through the end of 2024.  In 2017, the Turkish Parliament replaced the republic with a presidential system.  The office of the Prime Minister was eliminated, and its powers and authorities were transferred to the president.

    In 2025, the PKK declared a ceasefire.

    Turkey’s proximity and deep historical ties to the Middle East mean it is profoundly affected by the region’s crises, including ongoing conflicts in Israel and Palestine, Syria, and tensions with Iran.  The effects of the crisis have affected its economy, internal security, and foreign policy.

    Economically, the crisis has caused a significant strain on Turkey, particularly in the areas of trade and energy.  In 2024 and 2025, Turkey cut trade and diplomatic relations with Israel amid the war in Gaza, which had a momentous impact on bilateral trade.  While Turkey’s trade with Israel is a small fraction of its total, the loss of this $7 billion market forced importers to seek new routes and suppliers.

    As a country that depends on energy imports, Turkey’s economy has been affected by the volatility and rising oil and gas prices caused by the Israel-Iran war and the conflicts between NATO, Russia, and Ukraine.  Damage to Iranian gas facilities after Israeli strikes in 2025 increased concerns over Turkey’s energy supply — but of course, the Turks should decide who they prefer as their main partners: Iran, Russia, and China, or the Western powers.  One wonders if their religious beliefs will interfere with common sense.

    In terms of national security challenges, the volatile situation along Turkey’s borders has led to an increase in threats from non-state actors, hostile states, rival powers, and a large influx of refugees.  Turkey continues to host the world’s largest refugee population, mainly from Syria.  Additionally, rising instability and regional conflicts, such as the Hamas-Israeli War and the aftermath of the fall of Syria’s Assad regime in late 2024, have contributed to the situation.  Israeli strikes on Iran, although possibly justified, have raised the risk of a new wave of refugees and have only worsened conditions in Turkey.

    The Turkish PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, is a militant political group that has historically conducted an armed insurgency within Turkey.  Founded in 1978 with a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the PKK initially aimed to create an independent Kurdish state.  Over time, its goals shifted to promote greater autonomy and cultural rights for the Kurdish people in Turkey.  The PKK has been labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union.

    To complicate Turkey’s relationship with its Kurdish populations further, both the U.S. and Turkey have built relationships with Iraqi Kurds through the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  Moreover, the KRG and PKK also share an interesting yet complex relationship.  In many ways, Turkey finds it easier to get along with Iraqi Kurds than with their own people, but the entire situation creates a challenge for the Turkish government.  This is also related to political instability in Syria and Iran, which emboldens the PKK (and its affiliates) and raises security concerns along the Turkish border.  In 2025, a peace deal with the PKK was complicated by the Middle East Crisis.

    Over many years, Turkish authorities have arrested dozens of citizens and accused them of spying for the Israeli Intelligence Service.  In 2025, Turkey began to see Israel as a national security threat because of its expanding unilateral military actions across the region.  Iranian diplomats often remind the Turks that the Kürecik NATO radar base in Turkey would be an early target in a conflict.

    The Middle East crisis has revealed Turkey’s military weaknesses, including its aging air force and reduced capabilities after internal purges — raising questions about Turkey’s ability to support NATO forces.

    The Middle East crisis has also prompted Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy objectives and ambitions, shifting from a regional power broker to a more pragmatic, economically focused actor aligned with Gulf states.  Since the onset of the Hamas-Israeli conflict in 2023, which Hamas initiated, Turkey’s relations with Israel have become significantly more hostile.  Despite this, Turkey has aimed to position itself as a mediator in the Gaza situation.  Additionally, along with Egypt and Qatar, it has played a key role in ceasefire negotiations and humanitarian efforts.

    To address its economic challenges and regional isolation, Turkey has restored ties with former rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE and aligned with the Gulf states’ focus on economic stability rather than military confrontation.  With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024, Turkey increased its influence while Iran lost a key ally.  However, the complex rivalry between the two countries continues to unfold in Syria and through proxies.  Of course, years of assertive foreign policy that failed to achieve its goals, combined with the burden of millions of refugees and economic instability, have weakened domestic support for President Erdoğan and his allies.

  • The Middle East Crisis – Egypt

    February 11th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    The Arab Republic of Egypt has one of the longest histories of any country, dating back to the 6th–4th millennia B.C. in the Nile Delta.  Social scientists view Ancient Egypt as a cradle of civilization; it is recognized for some of the earliest advancements in writing, agriculture, urban development, organized religion, and centralized government.  It was also a hub of early Christianity, later adopting Islam as its main faith from the seventh century A.D. to today.

    The city of Alexandria, Egypt’s former capital (and now its second largest city), was a center of global knowledge thanks to its famous Library.  Cairo became the capital of the Fatimid Caliphate in the tenth century and later the Mamluk Sultanate in the thirteenth.  Egypt then joined the Ottoman Empire in 1517, until its local ruler, Muhammad Ali, established modern Egypt as an autonomous Khedivate (Viceroyalty) in 1867.  Egypt (along with the Sudan) was occupied by the British Empire until it gained independence in 1922 as a monarchy.

    After the 1952 revolution, Egypt declared itself a republic.  Between 1958 and 1961, Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic— a temporary union that lasted until the Syrian coup d’état in 1961.  Egypt continued as the U.A.R. until it was officially dissolved by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on September 19, 1971.  Through 1973, Egypt fought several armed conflicts with Israel and intermittently occupied Gaza until 1967.

    In 1978, Egypt signed the Camp David Accords in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied Sinai, an agreement that recognized Israel as a state.  After the Arab Spring, which led to the Egyptian revolution and the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the country went through a long period of political unrest.  Its first democratic election in 2012 resulted in a short-lived government aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Mohamed Morsi, which was overthrown by a military coup in 2013.  The current government is a semi-presidential republic led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who was elected in 2014 but is widely viewed as the leader of an authoritarian regime.

    Today, modern Egypt is a developing country with the second-largest economy in Africa.  It is seen as a regional power in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Muslim world, and as a middle power globally.  Islam is the official religion, and Arabic is the official language.  Egypt is a founding member of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab League, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the World Youth Forum, and BRICS, an intergovernmental organization of emerging markets that includes ten countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the U.A.E.

    The Middle East crisis significantly affects Egypt in many ways, including economic disruptions, higher demand for internal security, humanitarian challenges, and strained diplomatic relations.  The war in Gaza and the Houthis’ attacks on Red Sea shipping have worsened the situation.

    Economics

    Since Hamas launched the war against Israel in October 2023, Suez Canal revenues have significantly declined, mainly due to Houthi attacks that began in November 2023 targeting ships in the Red Sea shipping lane with connections or trade ties to Israel.  The pivotal event was the Houthis’ seizure of the ship Galaxy Leader on November 19, 2023.  By the next month, these attacks widened to include all ships, regardless of their flag—especially those associated with the United Kingdom and the United States.  Houthis spokespersons said the attacks were carried out in solidarity with Palestinian terrorists in Gaza and would continue indefinitely.

    The attacks on the Red Sea also caused a decline in Suez Canal revenues.  Many commercial ships have rerouted around Africa, leading to significant revenue losses for Egypt, which relies heavily on these transit tolls for foreign currency.  In 2024, the estimated revenue loss exceeded $8 billion.

    There have also been declines in Egypt’s tourism industry.  Again, in 2024, Egyptian losses exceeded 30%, amounting to billions of dollars in foreign exchange.  The southern Sinai resorts have been particularly impacted by the Gaza conflict and security incidents, such as missile debris landing in the tourist city of Taba.

    Today, multiple energy shortages threaten Egypt’s stability.  As the conflict in Gaza has escalated, Israel has halted its natural gas exports, forcing Egypt to rely on more expensive liquefied natural gas and leading to domestic power outages.  These issues, along with regional trade disruptions, have caused inflation to rise and increased the cost of living for many Egyptians.

    In response to severe economic shocks, Egypt has had to avoid national bankruptcy by borrowing billions of dollars from the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and Middle Eastern Gulf states.

    Humanitarian Pressures

    Egyptian leaders oppose forcing Philistine Arabs from Gaza into the Sinai because a large wave of refugees could threaten national security by reigniting domestic insurgencies and destabilizing the border region.

    Border security and aid coordination: Egypt controls the Rafah crossing, the only entry point to Gaza not controlled by Israel.  This places Egypt at the center of international efforts to deliver humanitarian aid but also under intense pressure to balance conflicting demands from Israel, Palestinian factions, and international partners.

    The Middle Eastern conflict has deepened Egypt’s existing challenges of hosting refugee populations from other regional crises, including Syria and Sudan.  An influx of Philistine refugees would further strain Egypt’s already overburdened public services and resources.

    Diplomatic and political challenges

    The Gaza war initiated by Hamas has significantly strained the long-standing Egypt-Israel peace agreements.  Key flashpoints include Israel’s military operation in Rafah, a deadly border clash between the two militaries, and disagreements over the management of the Philadelphi Corridor.

    Egypt, along with Qatar and the United States, plays a vital role in mediating ceasefires and hostage exchanges between Israel and Hamas.  This diplomatic involvement increases Egypt’s geopolitical significance but also introduces risks, as international agreements can vanish just as quickly as they emerge.

    The Domestic Front

    Egypt’s government faces public pressure to adopt a tougher stance against Israel because of widespread pro-Philistine-Arab sentiments.  Balancing this public opinion while maintaining strategic ties with the U.S. and stability with Israel is a tricky task for Egypt’s leader. 

  • The Middle East Crisis – U.A.E.

    February 4th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    Archaeologists investigate past human life by examining the physical remains, or material culture, that people left behind, such as artifacts and structures.  Their work involves surveying, careful excavation, and detailed documentation to discover and analyze these physical clues to the past.  Archaeological analysis offers insights into the cultures, behaviors, and history of past societies.

    A related field is Paleontology — the study of Earth’s history of life through fossils, which are preserved, remains, or traces of ancient organisms.  These scientists search for and excavate fossils, perform lab analysis to identify and classify species, and aim to understand ancient ecosystems, climates, and the evolution of life.  By assembling this fossil evidence, they reconstruct past environments and help us understand current and future environmental changes.  One note: If Ross Geller can do this, it must not be too difficult.

    We must give credit to these scientists for what we know, or think we know, about ancient Mesopotamia.  Specifically, in the region of present-day United Arab Emirates, scientists tell us they have discovered tools that indicate Africans settled there, for a time, around 130,000 years ago.  We can only know this from the work of archaeologists and paleontologists because there were no written records from that time—so, no history.

    Over time, humans developed trade with other settlements across the entire region of ancient Mesopotamia, modern-day Iran, and the Harappan culture of the Indus River Valley.  These contacts continued and expanded because people desired goods that only others could provide, and they had items that others needed or wanted.

    Three thousand years ago, Mesopotamia (the area of present-day U.A.E.) had a strong trade network for copper throughout ancient Sumer, covering modern U.A.E. and Oman.

    Scientists have identified six periods of human settlement with distinctive behaviors in this region before the arrival of the Islamic period:

    • The Hafit period — 3,200 to 2,600 B.C.
    • The Umm Al Nar culture — 2,600 to 2,000 B.C.
    • The Wadi Suq culture — 2,000 to 1,300 B.C.
    • From around 1,200 B.C. to the arrival of the Islamic period in A.D. 632, encompassing three distinctive Iron Ages and the Mleiha period, the area of the U.A.E. was variously occupied by the Achaemenids and other forces, and saw the construction of fortified settlements and extensive husbandry — due in large measure to the development of irrigation systems.  Note: The Mleiha period (roughly 300 B.C. to A.D. 300) refers to the Hellenistic Era and pre-Islamic Uman Kingdom centered in the present-day U.A.E.  One should note that we refer to ancient Greece as the Hellenistic Era because the word means, “to imitate Greeks.”

    Historians propose that the spread of Islam from Medina to the northeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula may have been caused by a letter sent by Prophet Muhammad to the rulers of Oman around A.D. 630.  We lack details about this, but it raises questions about such a conclusion since Muhammad was known to be illiterate.

    The story goes that Omani rulers then traveled to Medina and converted to Islam.  They, in turn, sparked an uprising against the unpopular Sassanids, who dominated the eastern Arabian coast.  Note: The Sassanids were Persians who ruled for around 400 years after the Parthian Empire.

    After the prophet’s death, Islamic communities south of the Persian Gulf were on the verge of collapsing, prompting Caliph Abu Bakr to send an army from Medina to regain control of the region.  The campaign lasted from around 632 to 634, with the Battle of Ridda being the largest confrontation.  Historians estimate that as many as 10,000 lives were lost in this single battle.  Such significant losses among the male population likely reinforced the need for polygamous practices in ancient times.  It might also partially explain why Islamists continue to hold onto this practice today.  In A.D. 637, the port city of Julfar (near present-day Ras Al Khaimah) served as an important staging point for the Islamic invasion of the Sasanian Empire.

    In 1990, archaeologists uncovered a Christian settlement on what is now Sir Bani Yas Island, dating back to the seventh century.  The settlement appears to have been a Nestorian community around A.D. 600.  The church seems to have been peacefully abandoned around A.D. 750—an important find today because it offers a rare physical connection to the Christian legacy in this region, which is believed to have spread across the peninsula between A.D. 50 and 350 along trade routes.  This influence might also help explain why the Islamic Qur’an appears surprisingly similar to the Holy Bible in certain areas.  There is no attempt here to discredit the Qur’an in any way—only to suggest that the ancient writers may have found it easier to copy certain elements from one to create the other.  There were hardly any scholars in Islamist societies during this early period. 

    The Arabian Peninsula is a harsh and unforgiving place — its environment shaped local culture and how people lived their lives.  The tough desert conditions led to the rise of Arab tribesmen — nomadic groups who survived through various economic activities, including animal husbandry, farming, and hunting.

    The movements of these groups not only led to frequent clashes but also resulted in the establishment of seasonal and semi-seasonal settlements and centers.  Many tribal groups still exist in the U.A.E., such as Al Bu Falah of Abu Dhabi.

    With the expansion of European colonial empires, such as those of Portugal, England, and the Netherlands, foreign interests arose in the Persian Gulf region.  In the 18th century, the Bani Yas confederation was the dominant force in most of what is now Abu Dhabi.  The Northern Al Qawasim (Al Qasimi) tribe controlled maritime trade.

    The Portuguese maintained control over the coast’s settlements in the Peninsula.  They built forts after the violent 16th-century conquests of coastal towns by the Portuguese general and admiral, Afonso Albuquerque (and the Portuguese commanders who followed him), especially along the east coast of Muscat, Sohar, and Khor Fakkan.

    The southern coast of the Persian Gulf was called the Pirate Coast by the British, as boats from the Al Qawasim federation harassed British-flagged ships from the 17th to the 19th centuries.  Modern Arab historians challenge the piracy claim.  Despite a book by Sharjah Sheik Sultan Al Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, Arabs and Islamists were the largest pirates outside the Atlantic and Caribbean.

    British expeditions to safeguard their Indian trade routes led to campaigns against Ras Al Khaimah and other coastal ports— including the Persian Gulf campaign of 1809 and the more successful 1819 campaign.  The following year, Britain and several local rulers signed a maritime truce, giving rise to the term The Trucial States, which came to define the status of the coastal emirates.  A further treaty was signed in 1843; in 1853, the Perpetual Maritime Truce was established.  To this was added the so-called Exclusive Agreements, signed in 1892, which made the Trucial States a British protectorate.

    Under the 1892 treaty, the Trucial Sheiks agreed not to sell or transfer any territory—except to the British—and not to establish relations with any foreign government without British approval.  In return, the British promised to defend the Trucial Coast from all threats at sea and to assist if land attacks occurred.  British maritime policing allowed Arab pearling fleets to operate safely.  However, there was another condition: the British banned involvement in the slave trade, which caused some sheiks and merchants to lose income.

    During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the pearling industry thrived, providing both income and employment to the people of the Persian Gulf.  World War I changed everything; in the 1920s and 1930s, the post-war period brought economic depression.  With the development of cultured pearls, the industry was wiped out.  By the time World War II arrived, the pearling industry had disappeared completely — primarily due to the policies of the newly independent Indian government.

    In 1922, the British government negotiated an agreement with the Trucial States preventing them from signing concessions with foreign companies without British approval.  By that time, the British recognized the potential for developing natural resources—such as oil—following discoveries in Persia (after 1908) and Mesopotamia (after 1927).

    A British-led oil company, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), became interested in the region, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) (later known as British Petroleum (BP)) held a 24% share in IPC.  From 1935 onward, local rulers granted onshore oil concessions, but they soon realized they were not receiving the same revenues as neighboring countries.

    The initial boreholes in Abu Dhabi were drilled by Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited (PDTC) at Ras Sadr in 1950.  A 13,000-foot-deep borehole took an entire year to drill and proved to be dry.  The company’s loss was well over a million pounds sterling (£1 million).

    The British established a development office that supported small projects in the emirates.  The seven sheiks of the emirates then decided to form a council to coordinate their affairs and took over the development office.  Within two years, they created the Trucial States Council and appointed Dubai’s Sheik Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum’s lawyer as the council’s secretary-general and main legal advisor.  When the U.A.E. was formed, the council was dissolved.  The tribal nature of society and unclear borders between emirates often led to disputes, resolved either through mediation or, less frequently, force.  The Trucial Oman Scouts was a small military force used by the British to maintain peace.

    In 1953, a BP subsidiary, D’Arcy Exploration Limited, secured an offshore concession from the ruler of Abu Dhabi.  BP then partnered with the Compagnie Française des Pétroles to establish operating companies, Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited (ADMA) and Dubai Marine Areas Limited (DUMA).  Several undersea oil surveys were carried out, including one led by Jacques Cousteau, an undersea explorer.  In 1958, a floating platform rig was towed from Hamburg, Germany, and placed over the Umm Shaif pearl bed in Abu Dhabi waters, where drilling commenced.

    The first commercial oil discovery took place in March 1953, and the Trucial Coast’s first export of oil occurred in 1962.  Additional offshore discoveries were made at Zakum.  Meanwhile, onshore exploration was impeded by territorial disputes.  In 1955, the United Kingdom represented Abu Dhabi and Oman in their dispute with Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi Oasis.  Al Buraimi is an oasis city and a province in northern Oman on the border with the U.A.E.

    Interestingly, it took 12 years to reach an agreement between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia.  However, the 1974 agreement has never been ratified.  The U.A.E.’s border with Oman was ratified in 2008.

    By 1966, it became clear that the British government could no longer afford to administer and protect the Trucial States, which later became the United Arab Emirates.  On January 24, 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced his government’s decision, reaffirmed in March 1971 by Prime Minister Edward Heath, to end the treaty relationships with the seven Trucial Sheikhdoms.

    Days after Wilson’s announcement, Abu Dhabi’s ruler, Sheik Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, fearing vulnerability, tried to persuade the British to honor the protection treaties by offering to pay the full costs of keeping the British Armed Forces in the Emirates.  The British Conservative government rejected this offer.  After Labor MP Goronwy Roberts informed Sheik Zayed of the British withdrawal, the nine Persian Gulf sheikhdoms attempted to form a union of Arab emirates, but by mid-1971, they still could not agree on the terms of union, even though the British treaty relationship was set to expire in December of that year.

    Fears of vulnerability became reality the day before the U.S.-owned UAE gained independence.  An Iranian destroyer group broke formation during a Gulf exercise and sailed toward the Tunb Islands.  The islands were seized by force, and civilians along with Arab defenders were allowed to escape.  A British warship remained passive during the invasion.  A destroyer group also approached Abu Musa Island.  However, Sheik Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi had already negotiated terms with the Iranian shah, and the island was swiftly leased to Iran for $3 million annually.

    Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia claimed large areas of Abu Dhabi.  It wasn’t until 1974 that a border agreement was signed with Saudi Arabia, officially defining the boundaries between the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia.  Note: The U.A.E.’s sense of threat from Iran influenced its financial support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War.

    Originally intended to be part of the proposed Federation of Arab Emirates, Bahrain gained independence in August, and Qatar in September 1971.  When the British Trucial Sheikdoms treaty expired on December 1, 1971, both emirates became fully independent.

    On December 2, 1971, six emirates—Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Umm Al Quwain—agreed to form the United Arab Emirates.  Ras al-Khaimah joined later, on January 10, 1972.  One month later, the Federal National Council (FNC) was established—it is a 40-member consultative body appointed by the seven rulers.  The U.A.E. joined the Arab League on December 6, 1971, and the United Nations on December 9th.  It was a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council in May 1981, with Abu Dhabi hosting its first summit.

    As with other regions and countries, the Middle East Crisis impacts the U.A.E. through increased security risks, negative economic effects, and complex diplomatic challenges.  Still, for the most part, the U.A.E. has primarily maintained its usual approach — balancing its desire for stability with its efforts to normalize relations with Israel.  And, like other Middle Eastern nations, the cost of humanitarian aid to refugees has been significant.

    Regarding internal security, regional conflicts have increased the risk of extremist attacks, especially against Western and Jewish individuals and interests.  In August 2025, the U.S. and Israel issued specific travel advisories warning of dangers to Israeli and Jewish communities in the U.A.E. due to rising tensions involving Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah.  However, these threats extend beyond terrorist groups—they also include dangers from local wannabe fighters trying to demonstrate their devotion to Islam.

    Over the past ten years, despite mixed market reactions, the U.S.-U.A.E. markets have demonstrated resilience.  In 2025, Dubai’s equity benchmarks reached levels not seen since 2008.  However, increased regional tensions have caused some nervousness, leading to a slowdown in sales growth in Dubai’s non-oil private sector.  Flight cancellations and travel disruptions have occurred suddenly, impacting the aviation and tourism industries.  Still, the U.A.E. has largely maintained its reputation as a safe haven for capital during times of regional unrest, attracting some international investments. This, of course, was tested by the Iran-Israel confrontation but appears to have held.

    Diplomatically, the U.A.E. must face complex challenges, including normalizing relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords, and its rather complex trading relationship and ongoing territorial disputes with Iran.  Added to this have been the cost of humanitarian aid, including for Gaza and Yemen, which Israel (as an example) views as taking sides with a virulent enemy.  It’s extremely complex.

    As a matter of self-preservation, the U.A.E. government has a low tolerance for dissent and has focused on suppressing political Islam to prevent destabilization.  Significantly, the drive for self-preservation has influenced its foreign policy and internal security strategies in response to broader unrest across the Middle East.

    Finally, the U.A.E. has built a strong military and intelligence partnership with the United States and often supports American interests.  However, Arab rulers clearly understand that American diplomats are similar to those in the United Kingdom.  Differences exist; both Arabs and their American allies act according to their own (perceived) best interests.  For example, the U.A.E. has become frustrated with the United States’ cautious responses to a perceived Iranian threat.

  • The Middle East Crisis – Jordan

    January 28th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a country in the Southern Levant region of West Asia. It is bordered by Syria to the north, Iraq to the east, Saudi Arabia to the south, and both Israel and the Palestinian West Bank to the west. The Jordan River, which flows into the Dead Sea, runs along the country’s western border within the Jordan Rift Valley. Jordan has a small coastline along the Red Sea in its southwest, separated from Egypt by the Gulf of Aqaba. Amman is the country’s capital and largest city, as well as the most populous city in the Levant.

    The Hashemites, officially known as the royal family of the House of Hashim, have ruled Jordan since 1921. Before that, they also governed the Kingdom of Hejaz (1916–1925), the Kingdom of Syria (1920), and the Kingdom of Iraq (1958–1921). Between the 10th century and World War I, they governed the city of Mecca. During World War I, the Hashemites allied with the United Kingdom. In terms of lineage, the royal family traces back to Ali ibn Abi Talib, the great-grandfather of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.

    Suffice it to say that the history of the Hashemites is long and complicated. In essence, the Hashemites have remained a prominent part of the Middle Eastern landscape because they have been able to see through the fog of Islam and read the handwriting on the wall. When the Ottoman Empire seized Egypt in A.D. 1517, Shariff Barakat recognized a change in sovereignty and sent his son, Abu Numayy II, as a hostage to the Ottoman sultan in Cairo. Abu took the keys to Mecca with him as gifts. Because of this, the sultan confirmed Barakat and Numayy as co-rulers of the Hejaz.     

    Before World War I, Hussein bin Ali of the Hashemite Dhawu-‘Awn clan governed the Hejaz on behalf of the Ottoman sultan. For some time, the Sublime Porte had the practice of appointing the Emir of Mecca from a select group of candidates. In 1908, Hussein bin Ali was named Sharif of Mecca. However, he soon found himself increasingly at odds with the Young Turks in control at Istanbul, while he tried to secure his family’s position as hereditary emirs. Hussein bin Ali’s lineage and destined role as the Sharif of Mecca fueled his ambitions for an independent Arab kingdom and caliphate.

    When his pretensions came to the attention of the Ottoman rulers, they were prompted to invite Hussein to Istanbul as a guest of the Sultan, where officials could keep an eye on him. Hussein took along his four sons: Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zeid. It was not until after the Young Turk Revolution that he was able to return to the Hijaz and officially assume his role as Sharif.

    Among Hussein’s four sons, Abdullah was the most politically driven and became the organizer and key supporter of the Arab revolt. Abdullah received extensive military training in both Hijaz and Istanbul. He served as the deputy for Mecca in the Ottoman Parliament from 1912 to 1914. During this time, Abdullah developed a strong interest in Arab nationalism and connected his father’s desire for autonomous rule in the Hijaz to the broader goal of full Arab independence.

    In 1914, Abdullah met with the British high commissioner, Lord Kitchener, in Cairo to discuss the possibility of British support for an Arab uprising against the Turks. The idea of cooperation was raised, but neither side made a commitment. Soon after Abdullah returned to Mecca, he became his father’s foreign minister, political advisor, and one of the senior commanders of the Arab Revolt.

    Faisal, Hussein’s third son, played an active role in the revolt as a commander of the Arab army, while his father maintained overall command. The idea of an Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire was first conceived by Abdullah. Only after gradual and persistent urging did Abdullah persuade his father, the conservative Sharif of Mecca, to move from the idea of home rule for part of Arabia within the Ottoman Empire to full independence for all Arab provinces.

    Hussein recognized early in 1914 that he needed to break away from the Empire because he saw he couldn’t reach his political goals within the Ottoman system. For the Arab revolt to succeed, gaining support from another major power was essential.

    Hussein saw Arab unity as closely tied to his kingship. He aimed to control the entire Arabian Peninsula, along with Syria and Iraq, under his rule and that of his descendants. After a year of failed negotiations, Sir Henry McMahon informed the British government was willing to recognize Arab independence, but over a much smaller area than Hussein had hoped for.

    The Arab revolt, essentially an Anglo-Hashemite conspiracy, erupted in June 1916. Britain funded the revolt and provided weapons, supplies, direct artillery aid, and expert desert warfare advisors—including the now-famous T. E. Lawrence. Despite their best efforts, the Hashemites overpromised and their overly ambitious plan fell apart. Only a small number of Syrian and Iraqi nationalists joined under the Sharifan banner, while others stayed loyal to the Ottoman sultan.

    Sharif Hussein bin Ali revolted against Ottoman control during the Arab Revolt of 1916. In acknowledgment of the Hashemite contribution to the Allied effort to overthrow the Ottoman Empire, Britain pledged support for Arab independence. However, the McMahon–Hussein correspondence presented ambiguously defined territorial borders, leading to a lengthy and bitter dispute between the two sides.

    Following the First World War, recognizing that the McMahon-Hussein correspondence had become a complicated and violent situation, T. E. Lawrence was asked to draft a final agreement, which he called the Sharifian Solution. This was ultimately presented to diplomats at the Cairo Conference of 1920. Basically, the plan suggested that the three sons of Sharif Hussein become kings of the new countries created by the British across the Middle East.

    It is also true that, after the war, Great Britain had to cut spending, as is common among industrialized countries after major conflicts.  Moreover, factors beyond British control threatened the Sharifian Solution.  France, for example, removed Faisal from Syria in the summer of 1920, and without being invited, Abdullah moved into Transjordan (which had been the southern part of Faisal’s Syria) in November 1920.

    Hussein bin Ali had five sons:

    • Ali, who briefly held the throne of Hejaz before it was taken over by the Saud family in 1925.
    • Abdullah became the emir of Transjordan in 1921 and the king of Jordan in 1946, and his descendants continue to rule the kingdom, which has been known ever since as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
    • Faisal, who briefly declared himself King of the Arab Kingdom of Syria in 1920, became King of Iraq in 1921.
    • Prince Zeid bin Hussein, who moved to Jordan when his brother’s grandson, King Faisal II of Iraq, was overthrown and murdered in a coup in 1958.
    • Hassan died at a young age.

    Hussein bin Ali continued to govern an independent Hejaz, where he declared himself king, from 1916 to 1924, with the covert support of the British Foreign Office. His supporters are sometimes called Sharifians. Hussein bin Ali’s main rival in the Arabian Peninsula, the king of Najd (highlands), Ibn Saud, annexed the Hejaz in 1925 and appointed his son, Faysal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, as governor. The region was later incorporated into present-day Saudi Arabia.

    The British government granted Transjordan independence in 1921, with Abdullah as its ruler. The level of autonomy given to the Arab states by the colonial powers was an ongoing concern at the time; however, in the case of Transjordan, the independence it had was limited, with significant influence and control kept by the British government in London. Domestically, the local ruler was granted substantial power, exercised in an autocratic fashion by the Hashemite family, while remaining under the supervision of the British Resident in Amman and the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem. Abdullah was assassinated in 1951, but his descendants continue to rule Jordan today.

    In Iraq, the Hashemites governed for nearly forty years until Faisal’s grandson, Faisal II, was overthrown and executed during the 1958 Iraqi coup d’état.

    On February 7, 1999, Abdullah II ascended to the throne following the death of his father, Hussein, who had ruled for nearly 50 years. King Abdullah (b. 1962) is the 41st-generation descendant of Muhammad, the Prophet. In 1980, Abdullah became a serving officer in the Jordanian Army and later commanded the Special Forces Regiment. In 1998, Abdullah was promoted to the rank of major general. As king, he is constitutionally empowered with broad executive and legislative powers.

    After assuming the throne, Abdullah began implementing a wide range of liberal economic policies. These changes led to an economic boom for the country that lasted through 2008. He is credited with attracting more foreign investments, strengthening public-private partnerships, and laying the groundwork for Aqaba’s free-trade zone and Jordan’s growing information and communications technology sector. He also established five additional special economic zones. However, in recent years, Jordan’s economy has faced difficulties due to the impact of the Great Recession and spillovers from the Arab Spring.

    In early November 2005, al-Qaeda under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi launched a coordinated series of explosions in three hotel lobbies in Amman, killing 60 people and injuring 115. The bombings, which targeted civilians, sparked widespread outrage among Jordanians. The attack was seen as a rare event in the country, and Jordan’s internal security greatly improved afterward. Al-Zarqawi was killed by the U.S. Air Force on June 7, 2006. He did not receive his promised virgins. Since al-Zarqawi’s attack, no major terrorist incidents have occurred.

    In 2011, during the Obama administration, the so-called Arab Spring erupted, demanding economic and political reforms throughout the Arab world.  Many of these protests tore down regimes, leading some Arab nations into a period of political, economic, and civil instability.  In response to domestic unrest, King Abdullah replaced his prime minister and introduced Constitutional and Statutory reforms governing personal freedom and elections.  His proportional representation initiative re-created the Jordanian Parliament in 2016.  Consequently, Jordan was left largely unscathed from the violence that swept the region — despite an influx of 1.4 million Syrian refugees.

    On April 4, 2021, Jordanian security agents detained 19 individuals, including former Crown Prince Hamzeh bin Al-Hussein, all accused of attempting to destabilize the kingdom. Hamzeh remains under house arrest but still holds the rank of army brigadier.

    The Middle East Crisis affects Jordan in several ways, summarized below:

    • A strain caused by an economic downturn and increased pressure on humanitarian aid for a refugee population that exceeds 1.4 million Syrians.
    • The Israeli-Hamas War and Israeli-Iran War have contributed to strained finances by interrupting Jordan’s tourism industry, increasing social instability, and forcing the government to increase security throughout the nation.
    • Rising costs and unemployment: The conflict between Iran and Israel has driven up fuel prices and disrupted trade routes, increasing the cost of living for Jordanians. Meanwhile, the economy remains sluggish, with high unemployment rates further worsened by the regional turmoil.
    • Jordan’s interception of Iranian missiles in 2025, aimed at Israel, underscored the kingdom’s challenging position of maintaining crucial alliances with the West while dealing with widespread public anger over events in Gaza. Due to state-sponsored media propaganda, many Jordanians now oppose their country’s alliance with Israel, with a significant number holding strong pro-Palestinian sentiments.
    • Jordanian officials have expressed serious concerns that the forced displacement of Palestinian populations could also destabilize the region and threaten Jordan’s national security. The United States adds to these worries by publicizing proposals to move Palestinian-Arabs into Jordan, worsening their refugee issues. 
    • In April 2025, Jordanian authorities detained a militant cell suspected of links to Hamas, highlighting the risk of internal security threats arising from the conflict. 
    • Despite the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, many Jordanians remain cautious about ongoing Syrian instability, insecurity, and drug trafficking along the Syrian border.
  • The Kennedy Trump Center Springboard

    January 25th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    The John F. Kennedy – Donald J. Trump Center for the Performing Arts is funded through a public-private partnership.  The U.S. federal government (e.g., the American taxpayer) provides an annual appropriation of approximately $43-$45 million for maintenance, security, and operations.  Here, allow me to help you better understand what I just wrote: as a means of circumventing welfare payments, the American taxpayer is now funding salaries for floor cleaners, toilet scrubbers, garbage taker-outers, structural handymen, security guards, and ticket collectors.  The funding of high-level salaries for programming staff, technicians, and permanent staff comes from private donations, ticket sales, parking fees, and “other” revenues, such as those produced by the purchase of extraordinarily expensive T-shirts emblazoned with the K-T Center Logo.

    Assuming that not everyone approves of Mr. Trump’s selection of Richard Grenell as an interim director of the K-T Center, let’s now examine what Mr. Trump was thinking.  It’s actually simple enough.  Mr. Grenell was appointed to implement Trump’s Golden Age of American Art and Culture, and to eliminate un-American propaganda and “Woke” culture from K-T Center operations.  Considering the amount of tax-sourced money going into the center, a clear majority of hard-working Americans supported Mr. Trump’s involvement.  There is nothing rational or American about “Woke leftism.”

    Still, I’ve recently noticed that some bloggers are beginning to blame Donald Trump for the un-American attitudes of elitist actors, singers, musicians, and some athletes.  How does this work?  When Renee Fleming decided to boycott her pre-arranged performance at the K-T Center, some writers are arguing, “It’s all Trump’s fault.”  A more convoluted argument you will not find.

    Fleming’s behavior is simply another example of leftist strategy to disrupt American society — very much in line with the Cloward-Piven Strategy of overwhelming society — and one that the American press loves to misreport in print and televised media.

    But let’s evaluate this: regular tickets run between $28-85 (each).  Those will get the “little people” into a seat where binoculars are needed to see the stage.  If someone is wheelchair-bound, there’s a discount (with a $2.85 service charge).  Or if a patron of the arts doesn’t like having to sit next to someone who doesn’t own a Tuxedo, they can sit closer to the orchestra for around $200.00 (per ticket).  Seldom do wives appreciate their husbands taking them to the K-T Center and then leaving them to sit in the car, so if an attendee can’t afford $400.00 plus parking and restroom service fees, America’s elite would just as soon they stayed at home.

    The truth is most people who attend the K-T Center don’t pay for parking anyway; they’re chauffeured there.  Those are the elongated limos allowed to double-park on the street.  You’ve seen them.  The owners of these limos are the same people who don’t mind borrowing from the Treasury on a recurring basis.  Debt?  What debt?

    I do have some questions about what drives this country’s entertainment elites.  They love being seen in public, of course.  This is what exhibitionists do for a living when they can find work.  But while they enjoy getting big paychecks, their main goal seems to be destroying the United States of America and turning it into a sort of Soviet remake.  These bloggers I’m talking about, who claim to be conservative, are actually progressive enablers.  And, by the way, this is exactly how American Neo-Cons tricked Republicans into voting for them in the 1990s and after the turn of the century.  I’m sure my readers will remember the Bush dynasty and all their mandarins.

    In America, opinions are like buttocks: everyone has at least two.  People develop their opinions through a combination of social, psychological, and environmental factors.  These include how we were raised by our families, how media shaped our attitudes, our personal experiences, and the human urge to seek and maintain social consistency.  Essentially, our opinions are shaped by family, education, and culture.  The process is intricate, and one might realize that there is no single American culture.  An observant citizen might recall how regional differences within the United States contributed to the Civil War.  That same citizen might also observe that we Americans are on the brink of a second civil war.

    So, let’s get to it.  There are approximately 335 million people living in the United States.  About five percent of them live here illegally.  They are living here illegally because a sitting president of the United States violated his oath of office by not only refusing to uphold the laws of the United States but also working to circumvent those laws.  The people who politically supported that president aided and abetted him in his criminal endeavor.  We call these people “Democrats,” and the president I’m referring to is Joe Biden.

    The thing to remember about the people who support Joe Biden is that they have no compunction to avoid corruption or sexual aberration.  Hey, whatever it takes, ya know?  Belittling Donald Trump (and anyone who voted for him) is what they do before morning tea.  They do this to display on a more or less regular basis how deeply they oppose traditional Americana.  They favor open borders, institutional collectivism (such as requiring taxpayers to fund programs for illegal aliens), and they support and enable transsexuality, homosexuality, pedophilia, and nearly every form of sexual decadence imaginable.  They vigorously oppose and openly work against anyone who thinks differently.

    Some of the people are highly paid/very wealthy entertainers.  They are not very well educated and lack common sense.  But their wealth allows them to feel entitled to shove their political gruel down our gullets — everything from the benefits of collectivism, wealth redistribution, open borders, the benefits of sexual depravity, and the beauty of Islam.  They aren’t too much into the redistribution of their wealth, you’ll understand — only our wealth.

    One blogger underlined our situation by explaining the reflexive environment.  Found at Farmer’s Letters, an explanation of how George Soros and his money machine made a prisoner of the American Arts and Entertainment sector (and Professional Sports, too).

    A reflexive environment is one in which everyone has to talk about a particular thing.  That thing is going to be very polarizing, and there will be either one or two right ways to talk about it.  Usually, they’re going to be diametrically opposed to one another, and that means it’s a dialectical weapon.

    When George Soros famously shorted the pound sterling in September 1992, it led him to write The Alchemy of Finance.  Soros, you’ll understand, was never interested in truth; he was only interested in financial success.  In it, he developed a theory of reflexivity, positing that market participants’ biases influence market prices, which, in turn, affect fundamentals, thereby creating a feedback loop.

    The idea here is that you generate an idea and make it come true when you cause everyone to talk about it, and believe in it in a particular way.  Thus, the “current thing” exists within a reflexive environment, fueled by social media.

    By the way, social media is how Barack Obama and Joe Biden got elected to the White House.

    Now, let me turn to the professional athletes.  This odd issue began when black NFL players began demonstrating against the Sandbox Wars by “taking a knee” during the National Anthem.  I haven’t watched a football game since.  These big fat dopes couldn’t find their way out of a men’s room without a map, but want to lecture me on socio-political or socio-economic issues.

    Over several years, we somehow migrated from one embarrassment to several others.  I’m speaking now of the predatory deviants who use an athletic placement to push a far-left agenda.  Some of these morons are professional athletes, some are college peabrains — but in both instances, the net effect of their activities is that I no longer support college sports or professional teams.  One last thought: what do these professional and collegiate coaches think about?  Is it a stable American society, or winning games?  Yes — ‘Sall good.

    My bottom line?  I don’t support entertainment venues when they become part of our political dialogue — left or right.  I don’t need someone with an IQ of 40 to tell me how I should vote on any given issue.  Neither do I blame Donald J. Trump for the craziness we see almost every day from the political left.  They didn’t need any help from Trump to enter the spillway.  They did that on their own.

  • The Middle East Crisis – Lebanon

    January 21st, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    In archaeology and history, “sedentary” means living in one place for a long period, rather than, for example, being nomadic.  When we talk about sedentary people, we refer to those who were part of the development of agriculture, which allowed for permanent settlements and, in turn, led to more complex societies, technologies, and social structures.  This meaning contrasts with our modern usage, where sedentary describes someone around age 12 who weighs nearly 300 pounds because they get no exercise other than eating potato chips.

    Scientists tell us that early Lebanon was one of the world’s first settled cultures.  The people living there 14,000 years ago are now called the Natufians — although I’m not sure why, other than it is what archaeologists decided to name them.

    One of the oldest settlements in the world is located in Byblos, Lebanon.  Scientific evidence indicates the presence of settled people dating back approximately 8,800 years before Christ.  Situated in north-central Lebanon, Byblos has been home to Egyptians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Genoese, and Ottoman Turks.  Lebanon was also part of ancient Canaan, where the Phoenicians originated.  We read about the Canaanites in the Old Testament of the Bible.

    In the 9th century B.C., Phoenician colonies like Carthage in Tunisia and Cádiz flourished in the Mediterranean.  Later, the Assyrians took control of these cultures and influenced them.  The Babylonian Empire captured present-day Lebanon in the 6th century B.C., which was later incorporated into the Achaemenid Empire by Cyrus the Great, and then became part of Alexander the Great’s empire in 332 B.C.

    The region now known as Lebanon, like the rest of Syria and much of the Turkish Peninsula (Anatolia), became a major early center of Christianity within the Roman Empire.  During the late 4th and early 5th centuries, a hermit named Maron established a monastic tradition focused on monotheism and asceticism in the Mount Lebanon area.

    Those who followed Maron spread his teachings among the people living in that area, and these Christians became known as Maronites.  To avoid Roman persecution, they migrated to and settled in the mountainous regions.  During the frequent Byzantine Roman–Persian Wars (which lasted many years), the Sasanian (Middle Persian) Empire occupied present-day Lebanon until around A.D. 629.

    During the 7th century, Muslims took control of Syria from the Byzantines, including it and Lebanon into the Islamic Caliphate.

    People living in the mountainous areas, however, managed to preserve their Christian identity for years despite the regional dominance of Islam.  The relative remoteness of the Lebanese mountains made them a refuge during times of political and religious crises, serving Christians, Muslims, and various other groups and sects.

    • After Roman Anatolia fell to the Muslim Turks, the Byzantines asked the Pope in Rome for help in the 11th century.  In response, Pope Urban II launched the First Crusade in 1095 to aid the Byzantines against the Seljuk Turks and to take back the Holy Land, including Jerusalem.
    • Several reasons motivated Pope Urban to respond to the Byzantine appeal for help.  After the Turks captured Jerusalem in 1076, Muslim forces regularly terrorized Christian pilgrims by kidnapping, raping, selling Christians into slavery, and killing them outright.  This conduct angered and outraged the Christian world; the Byzantines wanted the Pope to organize protection for pilgrims and to retake Jerusalem from the Islamic forces.
    • During the Byzantine request, Pope Urban II was engaged in a power struggle with the Holy Roman Emperor, who had launched a campaign against the Pope.  By rallying European knights against a common enemy, Urban aimed to boost the papacy’s prestige and strengthen his authority across Western Europe.
    • The timing of the Byzantine request also let Pope Urban address and resolve another issue.  During that time, soldiers who weren’t fully employed often became outlaw knights — mercenaries, so to speak.  By sending these men to the Middle East, the Pope solved the problem and protected European communities from noble villains.
    • Finally, but perhaps not least, a major schism had divided the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches since A.D. 1054.  By leading a campaign to assist the Byzantines, Pope Urban hoped to bridge this gap and place the Eastern church under his authority.

    As a result, the Byzantine’s request led to a series of military campaigns conducted by nobles from France, the Holy Roman Empire (German principalities), England, the Italian states, Hungary, Spain, Scotland, and the Low Countries, including Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

    The expeditions are known as the Holy Crusades and lasted from 1095 to 1291.  Their goal was to reclaim former Byzantine Christian territories in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Syria and Roman Palestine (also called the Levant).  The First Crusade succeeded in establishing the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the County of Tripoli as Roman Catholic states along the coast.  These crusader states left a lasting impact on the region.  However, from a practical point of view, the crusaders never gained permanent control over an area with well over a million enemy troops, who faced no logistical issues.

    One of the lasting effects of the Crusades was the contact between the French and the Maronites.  Unlike most other Christian groups in the Eastern Mediterranean, which pledged allegiance to Constantinople or other local patriarchs, the Maronites declared loyalty to the Pope in Rome.  As a result, the French saw them as Roman Catholic allies.  These early interactions led to centuries of support for the Maronites from both France and Italy — even after the fall of the Crusader states in the Levant.

    In 1516, Lebanon became part of the Ottoman Empire, with governance administered indirectly through local emirs, and remained so until after the First World War.

    During that conflict (1914-1918), Lebanon suffered severe devastation when the Turkish army took direct control, disrupting supplies and confiscating crops and animals, which ultimately caused a major famine.  The death toll was estimated at around 100,000 due to starvation.

    During World War I, British and French diplomats secretly signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which designated Lebanon as a French-controlled region after the war, following the Ottoman Empire’s collapse, allowing France to influence Lebanon’s government.  Soon after the war ended, Eastern Orthodox Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek, representing Maronite Christians, successfully pushed for an expanded Lebanese territory at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, including areas with large Muslim and Druze populations.

    Since then, considering both the 20th and 21st centuries, Lebanon has been a disaster for anyone living there, as shown below.  Sources of information do not provide a definitive number of people who have died in Lebanon due to human conflict, but a brief overview of the period from 1901 to 2024 should give us some understanding of the conditions in this once-modern and cultured region of the world.

    • 1958 Lebanon crisis: This was a U.S. military intervention aimed at supporting President Camille Chamoun’s government; it caused around 4,000 deaths.
    • Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990): Official estimates range from 120,000 to 200,000 fatalities, with tens of thousands more wounded and a massive exodus of up to one million people.  All conflicts create large numbers of refugees, and these in turn cause significant problems for other countries (and their taxpayers).
    • 2006 Lebanon War: A 34-day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, this conflict resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,100 to 1,200 Lebanese people, the vast majority of whom were civilians.
    • The Syrian Civil War (2011–2024) resulted in nearly 1,000 deaths between 2012 and 2015.  Refugees from Syria worsened the situation.  In 2024, renewed fighting between Hezbollah and the Israeli military along the border caused even more casualties.
    • Note 1: Sources provide a range of casualty figures for each conflict.  The final death toll for the Lebanese Civil War, in particular, is an estimate, and specific civilian versus combatant numbers are widely debated for many conflicts.
    • Note 2: The long period from 1900 to 2024 also included many smaller conflicts, skirmishes, and other politically motivated violence.  The casualties in these smaller yet ongoing fights probably were never officially recorded.

    At present, Lebanon is suffering the worst economic crisis in decades, bringing about a cascade of political, economic, security, and humanitarian consequences, made worse by conflict spillover from neighboring countries.  Conflict along Lebanon’s southern border has been one of the most immediate and severe impacts of the regional crisis, involving:

    • Persistent hostilities: After a ceasefire in November 2024, intermittent clashes between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah have persisted, with both sides exchanging attacks near the border.
    • Civilian casualties and allegations of war crimes: The violence has caused thousands of deaths, including many children and women.  International organizations have accused Israel of potential war crimes for strikes on civilians and infrastructure, which continued into October 2025 despite the ceasefire — but the issue is that terrorists intentionally hide among civilian populations.  Human rights groups appear to overlook this reality.
    • Significant destruction: Intense fighting, including a two-month ground invasion by Israel in late 2024, caused an estimated $14 billion in damages and economic losses.  Widespread destruction of homes and agricultural assets was reported in southern Lebanon.
    • A Gaza ceasefire in October 2025 shifted international focus to the Israel-Lebanon front, raising concerns about possible escalation if disarmament talks with Hezbollah break down.

    Humanitarian sources report that the Middle East crisis has displaced over 1.2 million people within Lebanon, mostly from the south.

    • As of January 2025, 112,076 people were still displaced within Lebanon, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Syrian refugees also fled to Syria.
    • Widespread displacement has placed heavy pressure on host communities and overwhelmed the country’s already fragile public services, including the healthcare system.  Critical infrastructure—including water systems, health centers, and schools—has been damaged or destroyed.
    • Approximately one in five people in Lebanon, including residents and refugees, faced severe food insecurity in 2025.  Rising inflation has driven up food prices, and cuts in humanitarian aid have worsened the situation.
    • Lebanon remains a top host country for refugees, particularly from Syria.  Both Syrian and Palestinian refugees face higher rates of poverty and food insecurity than Lebanese nationals.  Many displaced Syrians face double displacement after being forced to flee conflict in Lebanon.

    The regional situation of the Middle East Crisis complicates Lebanon’s domestic politics and slows its progress toward reform.

    • Iran-backed Hezbollah militia(s) remain Lebanon’s most potent military force, operating largely outside of any government control.  Its paramilitary actions, undertaken in solidarity with Palestinian militants, have triggered the conflicts that destabilized the country.
    • Regional tensions deepen existing sectarian and political divides in Lebanon.  A U.S.-backed plan to disarm Hezbollah has caused divisions within the new Lebanese cabinet, with some Shia officials opposing it (which should be no surprise).
    • Lebanon remains a battleground for competing regional and international interests, with Iran backing Hezbollah and Western nations focused on preserving economic stability and shaping political outcomes.

    The regional crisis increases pressure on the Lebanese economy, which was already in a prolonged collapse — 

    • The World Bank estimated $14 billion in damage and economic losses by March 2025 from the military conflict, with reconstruction needs projected at $11 billion.  The government has stated it cannot afford reconstruction costs.
    • While there were tentative signs of economic recovery in 2025, including projected GDP growth, experts have warned that Lebanon’s overall financial health remains fragile and vulnerable to security threats.
    • Regional instability has disrupted Lebanese supply chains, deterred international tourism, and raised fuel and import costs.

    The Middle East Crisis imposes a heavy psychological and social toll on the Lebanese population —

    • Fear of war is widespread, especially in southern towns.  The loss of essential services and ongoing displacement cause significant psychological distress for families and children.
    • War damage to hundreds of schools has worsened existing educational challenges, leaving many children without consistent learning opportunities.
    • Hazardous explosives, leftover weaponry from conflicts such as unexploded ordnance, landmines, and booby traps, continue to present a persistent danger to civilians, especially in Lebanon’s southern and eastern regions.

  • The Middle East Crisis – Iraq

    January 14th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    Historic Overview

    Iraq is a country in West Asia, bordered by Saudi Arabia to the south, Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and the Persian Gulf and Kuwait to the southeast.  The population of Iraq is over 46 million, making it the 31st most populous country in the world.  Baghdad alone is home to 8 million people.

    Iraq is the land of ancient Mesopotamia, which began in the sixth millennium B.C.  The fertile plains between Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates rivers, collectively known as Mesopotamia, supported the development of the world’s earliest cities, civilizations, and empires — including Sumer, Akkad, and Assyria.  Mesopotamia was the birthplace of writing systems, mathematics, navigation, timekeeping, calendar making, astrology, the invention of the wheel, the sailboat, and a code of laws.  From the Sumerian city of Ur came Abraham, leader of the Hebrew people, whom God led out of the desert to settle in a place where God showed him, they ought to be.

    Academics have started several discussions about the origin of the name Iraq.  One of these traces back to the ancient Sumerian city of Uruk.  Today, modern Iraq mostly overlaps with the ancient region of Mesopotamia — often called the cradle of civilization.  The history of Mesopotamia goes back to the Lower Paleolithic period, with important historical milestones.  At the southern tip of Iraq, you will find the country of Kuwait, which some scholars and biblical experts suggest was the site of the Garden of Eden.  Kuwait’s location near the modern mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers seems to support this idea.  The only thing missing from that debate is proof.

    The Islamic Period

    After the Muslim conquest of Mesopotamia, Baghdad became the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and a major center of culture and learning during Islam’s golden age.  Following the Mongols’ destruction of Baghdad in 1258, Iraq was controlled by various empires, and from the 16th to the 20th century, it was governed within the Ottoman system, known as the Iraq Region.  Today, Iraq holds religious importance in Christianity, Judaism, Yazidism, and Mandaeism.

    Note: Yazata is the Avestan liturgical term for a Zoroastrian concept that has many meanings but generally signifies a divine being.  The word literally means worthy of worship or veneration and is also used for certain prayers that are considered sacred.

    Note: Mandaeism is a Gnostic, monotheistic, and ethnic religion influenced by Greek, Iranian, and Jewish traditions.  Its followers, the Mandaeans, hold in reverence figures such as Adam, Abel, Seth, Enos, Noah, Shem, Aram, and John the Baptist.

    Modern Period

    Since gaining independence in 1932, Iraq has experienced periods of notable economic and military growth along with times of instability and conflict.  Part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, Iraq was reestablished by the United Kingdom in 1921.  It became an independent kingdom in 1932.  After a coup d’état in 1958, Iraq became a republic, initially led by Abdul Karim Qasim, then by Abdul Salam Arif and Abdul Rahman Arif.

    In 1968, the Ba’ath Party gained power, establishing a one-party state under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and later Saddam Hussein, who led the war against Iran from 1980 to 1988 and then invaded Kuwait in 1990.

    In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition of military forces invaded and occupied Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein and sparking insurgency, sectarian, and civil violence.  The conflict, known as the Iraq War, ended in 2011.  From 2013 to 2017, Iraq battled another war with the rise and defeat of the Islamic State of the Levant (ISL).  Today, post-war conflicts persist, although at a much lower level, still hindered stability alongside the growing influence of Iran.  Of course, U.S. President George W. Bush deserves much of the credit for this.

    As a federal parliamentary republic, Iraq is seen as an emerging middle power.  It has a diverse population, geography, and wildlife.  Most Iraqis are Sunni Muslims, while significant minorities include Christians, Mandaeans, Yazidis, Yarsanis, and Jews.  Ethnically, Iraqis are Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyrians, and Armenians.  The official languages are Arabic and Kurdish, but other languages are spoken regionally.

    Iraq has one of the largest oil reserves in the world and a major oil and gas industry.  It is also well known for its agriculture and tourism.  Currently, with support from wealthy foreign nations, Iraq is rebuilding what George W. Bush destroyed during his war against Saddam Hussein.

    One of the main sources of public frustration in Iraq from 2019 to 2021 was the lack of reliable electricity and clean water.  The electrical grid faced systemic issues due to fuel shortages, damaged infrastructure from war, and increasing demand.  Corruption remains deeply entrenched throughout the Iraqi government, while the U.S.-backed sectarian political system has contributed to more violence and sectarian conflicts.

    During this period, Iraq experienced widespread droughts.  Nationwide protests erupted in Iraq in October 2019, demanding systemic reform, an end to the party-based quota system, disarmament of non-state militias, and a halt to foreign interference.  Despite heavy repression, hundreds of deaths, and many injuries, the movement remained united around calls for institutional reform and greater accountability.

    In 2020, Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi was ousted by popular demand.  His successor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, faced the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic during his tenure, which triggered a macroeconomic shock that caused oil prices to plummet, damaging the Iraqi economy, which heavily relies on oil.  The country also endured a prolonged drought from 2020 to 2024.

    In October 2022, the Council of Representatives elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president, and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani became his prime minister.  Since taking office in October 2022, Prime Minister al-Sudani has overseen a period of relative political, security, and economic stability.  Government officials have cited increased regional diplomacy, improved international relations, and economic diversification initiatives such as the Iraq–Europe Development Road project as key signs of recovery.

    In August 2023, al-Sudani established the Iraq Development Fund to boost the private sector and finance projects with significant social and environmental value.  By February 2025, the fund had attracted $7 billion in foreign direct investments and had signed Memoranda of Understanding with several countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan.  In May 2025, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning announced that the unemployment rate in Iraq had fallen from 17% in 2022 to 13% in 2025.  A report published in July 2025 stated that ISL “is at its weakest” in Iraq since its emergence.

    However, the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East greatly affects Iraq, impacting its internal stability, economy, and geopolitical standing.  The country has been pulled into broader regional conflicts through cross-border attacks, while also managing delicate relations with major global and regional powers, including the U.S. and Iran.

    Following the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq increased attacks on U.S. forces stationed in Iraq and Syria, as well as launching strikes toward Israel.  In response, the U.S. carried out retaliatory airstrikes within Iraqi territory in 2024, targeting militia leaders and prompting some Iraqi officials to call for a withdrawal of U.S. troops.  What some Iraqi officials did not do was address the issue of illegal militias operating inside Iraq with impunity.

    Illegal militias and the activities of regional proxies have heightened the risk that Iraq could once again become a battleground between the U.S. and Iran, which weakens the government’s ability to maintain sovereignty and economic stability.

    While some militias are officially part of the Iraqi state security forces as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), they also operate with a degree of independence and have, at times, pursued their own regional agendas, which challenge the authority of the central government.  Currently, Prime Minister al-Sudani is trying to strike a balance by managing relations with the U.S. while accommodating the demands of influential Iran-backed political factions.

    U.S. retaliatory strikes have further complicated the security relationship between these two countries.  Although a joint commission has been established to negotiate a transition of U.S. military presence, the regional crisis increases pressure to both speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops and justify their continued presence.

    Additionally, the regional crisis has worsened existing political divisions within Iraq.  For example, the federal government, the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and various political and militia groups hold different positions, reflecting competing interests and alliances.

    Like other oil-producing Arab countries, armed conflicts disrupt fragile oil industries.  Any extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran would significantly damage Iraq’s economy, which relies almost entirely on oil export revenues.  Worse still, increased regional instability and the risk of broader conflict could jeopardize critical energy and trade routes, threatening far more than just Iraq’s economy.  The escalation of fighting has led major international oil companies to evacuate expatriate staff from Iraq’s southern oilfields, creating operational uncertainty.  Some expatriates, once evacuated for safety, may not be able to return to continue their skilled work.

  • The Middle East Crisis — Kuwait

    January 7th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    An overview

    Kuwait is a city-state in West Asia and the geopolitical region known as the Middle East.  It is located at the northern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, at the head of the Persian Gulf, bordering Iraq to the north and Saudi Arabia to the south.  Its coastline stretches about 311 miles, and it shares a maritime border with Iran across the Persian Gulf.

    Most of the country’s population lives in the urban area of Kuwait City, which is the capital and largest city.  As of 2024, Kuwait has a population of 4.82 million people.  Only 1.53 million of these are Kuwaiti citizens; the remaining 3.29 million are foreign nationals from over 100 countries.

    Humans have inhabited this region for tens of thousands of years, mainly because of its location at the head of the Persian Gulf near the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.  Some scholars believe that Kuwait is where the Garden of Eden once was, but there’s no way to prove or disprove this claim since Eden’s existence, if it ever existed, was prehistoric.

    In the early 18th century, the area now known as Kuwait was under the control of the Bani Khalid tribe.  At that time, it was called the Sheikdom of Kuwait, a British protectorate since 1899.  Before oil fields were discovered in 1938, the territory had a regional trade port that became the main source of Kuwaiti wealth.  The protectorate agreements with the United Kingdom ended in June 1961, when Kuwait officially gained independence.

    From 1946 to 1982, Kuwait experienced a major period of modernization, supported by its oil income.  In the 1980s, Kuwait faced geopolitical instability and an economic crisis after the American stock market crash.  Because Kuwait supported Iraq during its war with Iran, it became the target of pro-Iranian attacks.

    Then, in 1990, largely due to the gross incompetence of U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, a Canadian national, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and annexed by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, following disputes over oil production and border boundaries.  Despite the numerous murders and rapes committed by Iraqi forces, Glaspie stated in a 2008 interview with a Lebanese newspaper that she has no regrets because “It is over.” The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait ended on February 26, 1991, after American ground forces expelled Iraqi troops during the First Gulf War.

    Present Day

    Like many other Arab states in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait is an emirate where the emir is the head of state, and the ruling Al Sabah family controls the country’s political system.  Kuwait’s official state religion is Islam, specifically the Maliki school of Sunni Islam.  Kuwait has a high-income economy supported by the world’s sixth-largest underground oil reserves.  It is a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and also belongs to the United Nations, the Arab League, and OPEC.

    Kuwait is mainly impacted by the Middle East Crisis through a cautious, diplomatic approach to regional conflicts and its vulnerability to the economic effects of instability and changing oil markets.  As a small country with a semi-democratic government, Kuwait’s security is also threatened by regional powers like Iran and internal political struggles.  In this context, Kuwait relies heavily on other powers for its physical security.

    Diplomatically, Kuwait has long used a hedging strategy to balance its relationships with rival regional powers, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia.  A hedging strategy in diplomacy is a risk-management approach where a country maintains ties with multiple, often competing, great powers at the same time to avoid relying too heavily on any one foreign power.  This involves combining cooperative and competitive actions to gain economic, political, and security benefits from different sides without forming a strict, one-sided alliance.  For example, despite past tensions, Kuwait seeks balanced relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran to prevent conflict.  Additionally, Kuwait did not fully cut off ties during periods of heightened Saudi-Iran tensions—opting for a flexible diplomatic approach to safeguard its national security.

    As it should, Kuwait consistently advocates for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.  It condemns Israeli military actions and provides humanitarian aid to Gaza, while refusing to normalize relations with Israel until a Palestinian state is established.  However, in complete fairness, the lack of recognition of Israel is normal for the Arab states.

    In October 2025, Kuwait, representing the GCC at the UN, and, as expected, warned that “Zionist violations” endanger regional security and undermine international law.  This followed a joint Arab and Muslim statement in June 2025 calling for de-escalation between Israel and Iran — even though the entire war was engineered by Iran and its proxy, Hamas in Gaza.  However, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry regularly calls for the de-escalation of regional conflicts and advocates for diplomatic solutions as its primary means of maintaining political stability.

    Currently, Kuwait’s economy relies heavily on oil, making it vulnerable to regional and global market fluctuations.  Regional political instability further increases the risk to its economic prospects.  The truth is that political instability and conflict can lead to swings in oil prices and disrupt global supply chains.

    A rentier state is a country that relies heavily on revenue from external sources, like natural resources (especially oil) or foreign aid, rather than taxing its own citizens.  This can lead to a social contract where the government provides economic benefits to citizens in exchange for political quiescence, often resulting in less democratic or more authoritarian governance.  Kuwait is a rentier state; its fiscal stability is highly sensitive to oil market developments/fluctuations.  One should also note that over 60% of Kuwait’s oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which increases geopolitical tensions between Iran and the United States, which also poses a direct threat to the Kuwaiti economy.

    Finally, internal conflicts between the royal family and Kuwait’s parliament are causing political gridlock that hampers efforts to diversify the economy.  Kuwait’s lack of institutional stability discourages foreign investment and slows down initiatives to build a nation less reliant on oil as its main source of income.  The World Bank projects that regional instability and other factors will weaken growth prospects across the Middle East in 2025 and 2026, affecting Kuwait’s efforts to develop its non-oil sector.

  • The Middle East Crisis — Qatar

    December 31st, 2025

    By Sam Huntington

    In A.D. 628, the Islamic prophet Muhammad sent a Muslim envoy to a ruler in eastern Arabia named Munzir ibn Sawa Al-Tamimi and invited him and his followers to accept Islam as their new religion. Munzir accepted the invitation, and most of the Arab tribes in the area converted to Islam. In the mid-7th century, the Muslim conquest of Persia led to the fall of the Sasanian Empire.

    During the Umayyad period (up to A.D. 750), Qatar was known for its horse and camel breeding. Later, Qatar gained an advantage from its strategic location in the Persian Gulf and developed into a hub for pearl harvesting and trading. Significant progress was made in the pearl industry during the Abbasid era (up to A.D. 1258).

    Ships traveling from Basra to India and China often stopped at Qatari ports. Archaeologists have found Chinese porcelain, West African coins, and various artifacts from Thailand and Southeast Asia. Evidence also shows that Qatari residents were quite wealthy — at least wealthy enough to afford high-quality homes and public buildings. However, when the caliphate’s prosperity declined in Iraq, the Qatari economy also suffered.

    By A.D. 1253, an Arabian dynasty known as the Usfurids controlled much of the eastern region as well as the islands of Bahrain. The Prince of Ormus took control of the region in 1320. In 1515, Manuel I of Portugal vassalized the King of Ormus (and all his holdings), and by 1521, a large part of eastern Arabia as well. In 1550, the princes of Al Hasa voluntarily submitted to the rule of the Ottoman Empire, preferring them over the Portuguese.

    By the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, the Ottoman Empire agreed to renounce its claim to Qatar and withdraw its garrison from Doha. However, with the outbreak of World War I, nothing was done to fulfill this agreement, and the garrison remained at the fort in Doha. Over time, the population of the fort decreased due to a rise in desertions. In 1915, with British gunboats in the harbor, the pro-British Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani convinced the remaining soldiers to abandon the fort. When British troops arrived the next morning, they found it deserted.

    Qatar became a British protectorate in November 1916 when the United Kingdom signed a treaty with Sheik Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani to bring Qatar under its Trucial System of Administration. Note: The Trucial States were seven sheikhdoms under the British Protectorate until 1971 — Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain.

    The treaty reserved foreign affairs and defense to the United Kingdom but allowed internal autonomy. While Abdullah agreed not to establish relations with any other power without the prior consent of the British government, the latter guaranteed the protection of Qatar from aggression by sea and offered its ‘good offices’ if there was an attack by land — although the details were left somewhat vague.

    In 1935, while agreeing to an oil concession with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Abdullah signed another treaty with the British government that promised to protect Qatar against internal and external threats. A first oil field was discovered in 1939 — its development delayed by the Second World War.

    Given India’s independence, Pakistan’s creation, and the development of oil in Qatar, British interests there shifted after the war. In 1949, appointing the first British political officer in Doha, John Wilton, marked a strengthening of Anglo-Qatari relations. Oil exports started in 1949, making oil revenues the country’s main income; the pearl trade had declined. These revenues funded the expansion and modernization of Qatar’s infrastructure.

    When Britain officially announced in 1968 that it would withdraw from the Persian Gulf in three years, Qatar joined talks with Bahrain and the seven other Trucial States to form the Federation of Arab Emirates. However, regional disputes persuaded Qatar and Bahrain to withdraw from the talks and become independent states separate from the Trucial States, which later became the United Arab Emirates.

    Under an agreement with the United Kingdom in 1971, the special treaty arrangements that conflicted with full international responsibility as a sovereign and independent state were ended. The Emir of Qatar was Ahmad bin Ali; he was deposed on February 22, 1972, by Khalifa bin Hamad.

    In 1991, Qatar played an important role in the Gulf War, especially during the Battle of Khafji, where Qatari tanks moved through the town’s streets and provided fire support for the Saudi Arabian National Guard units fighting Iraqi Army troops. Qatar also allowed coalition troops from Canada to use the country as an airbase to launch aircraft on combat air patrols. Additionally, Qatar permitted air forces from the United States and France to operate from within its territory.

    In 1995, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani took control of the country from his father, Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, with the backing of the armed forces, cabinet, neighboring states, and France. Under Emir Hamad, Qatar saw a moderate level of liberalism, including the launch of Al Jazeera television in 1996, the approval of women’s suffrage in municipal elections in 1999, women’s participation in society in 2003, the drafting of its first written constitution in 2005, and the opening of a Roman Catholic church in 2008. An unsuccessful counter-coup occurred in 1996.

    Qatar’s role as a key mediator in the Middle East has given it both influence and risk during the current crisis. The Israel-Hamas conflict has especially impacted Qatar’s diplomatic relations — notably, increasing scrutiny of its ties to the terrorist group Hamas. The crisis further worsened with Israel’s preemptive strike on Iran in September 2025.

    In September 2025, Israeli airstrikes in Doha targeted Hamas leaders — an action that Qatar condemned as a violation of its sovereignty. The incident temporarily derailed ceasefire negotiations and forced Qatar to reassess its regional mediation role. While a new ceasefire was agreed upon in October 2025, the attack severely strained relations and highlighted the risks of hosting non-state actors as negotiators.

    Qatar has long hosted the Political Bureau of Hamas, a role it maintains was established at the request of the United States to create a communication channel.  However, this relationship has drawn heavy criticism from Israel and some Western politicians, leading to increased pressure on Qatar to distance itself from the terrorist group.  After another Hamas rejection of a ceasefire deal in late 2024, Qatar temporarily suspended its mediation efforts and (reportedly) told Hamas leaders to leave — though both parties later denied the claims.

    The crisis has forced Qatar into a delicate balancing act, as it must keep its alliances intact while managing regional tensions. The 2017–2021 Gulf diplomatic crisis saw neighboring countries impose a blockade on Qatar because of its foreign policies, and ongoing instability brings back concerns over these tense relationships. In this situation, Qatar’s close ties with the U.S., China, and Turkey are vital for its security and economic stability.

    The Israeli air strike in September 2025 prompted a swift American response to reassure its ally. President Trump signed an executive order promising U.S. military protection for Qatar and announced increased military cooperation, emphasizing the importance of the Al Udeid Air Base for U.S. strategic interests.

    Regional instability and doubts about U.S. reliability have caused Gulf states, including Qatar, to strengthen their ties with non-traditional security partners like China. This issue tends to fluctuate. When America’s allies can’t trust the U.S. government to stay committed and consistent, then America appears to lack a foreign policy worth defending. The stakes are high because America’s global adversaries are also working to advance their foreign policy interests. China aims to invest in Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects, and Qatar is considering ways to open that door.

    The Israeli strike on Qatari soil marked a major escalation, revealing the country’s vulnerability to military actions by regional powers. It raises the risk that other nations hosting targeted groups could face similar attacks. One might wonder why the United States hadn’t addressed the Hamas political bureau earlier. The answer could be that, due to the pendulum effect, America’s diplomacy has become ineffective.

    Following the 2017 blockade, Qatar effectively demonstrated economic resilience by establishing new trade routes and increasing domestic production. Despite geopolitical risks, the country remains in a strong financial position. However, regional instability could impact investor confidence over the long term. 

    Qatar’s diplomatic balancing act and ties to groups like Hamas, while strategic, pose reputational risks. Israel’s criticism and repeated accusations that Qatar is funding terrorism, despite Qatar’s denials and cooperation with the U.S. on counter-terrorism, have increased scrutiny.

    Amid this regional chaos, Qatar’s continued role in facilitating humanitarian aid and hostage releases remains critical.  Its ability to stay this course will reinforce its image as a diplomatic broker — and this is essential toward maintaining its broader geopolitical strategy.

  • Another Saudi Treachery?

    December 26th, 2025

    By Sam Huntington

    In 2011, Barack Obama was President of the United States.  Key players in the Middle East saw that Obama was weak as a leader.  How weak was he?  Possibly so weak that they might have believed that if there was ever a time to advance the Sunni plan to dominate the Islamic world, Barack Obama’s presidency was it.  Mr. Obama was more than just a weak leader, however.  He was (and perhaps still is) a very confused Islamist.  Because of his weak character, Barack Obama became the prime candidate to serve as King Abdullah’s useful idiot in pushing the goals of Sunni Islam.

    In 2010, Abdullah sent armed and well-funded operatives into Syria to destabilize Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist government.  Abdullah did this because, as the leader of Sunni Islam, he strongly opposed Syrian (and Iraqi) Ba’athist ideology—a secular, nationalist, and socialist system that separates government from political theocracy.  Fundamental Islamists oppose Ba’athism because, within the strict framework of Sharia Law, Islam makes no distinction between social organization, religion, or government.

    Abdullah may have consulted Washington and briefed the American leadership on his plan to overthrow al-Assad.  If true, and the Americans implicitly approved, it would reveal the State Department’s incompetence.  War persisted in Syria from 2011 to 2024.  During that period, approximately 656,500 people died, with about 310,000 being civilians.  Over those 13 years, 6.7 million people became war refugees.

    If the refugee crisis was part of a Saudi strategy to incite chaos in the Middle East, it also significantly destabilized Western political systems, society, and religious institutions.  Western resources and those of Syria were stretched thin.  If the Saudi plan aimed to weaken secular and Christian communities, it fit the pattern of a classic Cloward-Piven operation.

    Thus, the large-scale migration of Muslims across Europe and the Americas was driven by a combination of political instability and the Saudi government’s encouragement to migrate northward from refugee camps to lands of milk and honey, without any cost to themselves.  However, Syria was not the only place experiencing armed conflict: the Afghan War continued through 2021, renewed fighting in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Syria) (ISIS) caused Iraqis to flee westward, and conflict persisted in Somalia, Lebanon, and Eritrea.

    —2015 to 2017—

    In the years after the peak of the refugee crisis, the European Union (EU) developed a more unified, yet controversial long-term strategy focused on internal controls and external cooperation.  A major agreement in March 2016 significantly reduced the flow of migrants along the Eastern Mediterranean route.  Turkey agreed to return irregular migrants arriving in Greece in exchange for financial aid, a promise of an EU resettlement plan for Syrian refugees, and other concessions.

    The EU expanded Frontex’s mandate and funding, transforming it into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in 2016.  This included enhanced search-and-rescue operations and efforts to dismantle human smuggling networks in the Mediterranean.  Additionally, the EU negotiated bilateral agreements with North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania) to prevent migrants from departing their shores – in exchange for financial aid.  Note: It wasn’t the EU funding these programs and guarantees; it was European taxpayers who paid for them through tax increases.

    The crisis also prompted reforms within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), leading to a new migration and asylum pact (finally agreed upon in 2024) – set for full implementation in 2026.  The agreement aims to streamline processing, establish a “fairer” burden-sharing mechanism (with flexible options such as financial contributions rather than relocation), and enable quicker returns for rejected applicants.  The issue with such arrangements is that they assume African or Middle Eastern refugees have a right to access European states.  Note: words and phrases like “burden sharing” and “financial contributions” easily translate into “making sure all European taxpayers pay out the nose equally” and “paying an annuity to migrants to stay home.” Good for them; bad for everyone else.

    —American Aid—

    This topic is quite complex.  The American taxpayer provided hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey for food, fresh water, shelter, and health services, making the U.S. the world’s largest contributor.  I can hear the argument now: “You Americans started this mess; you should pay the largest amount.” It would be hard to refute such an allegation.  Yet, at the same time, the U.S. government supplied arms and munitions to its favorite chess pieces, which included Saudi insurgents in Syria, and ISIS and al-Qaeda members in Libya.  One has to wonder.

    During the administrations of Barack Obama (2009 to 2017) and Joe Biden (2021 to 2025), Democrats committed the United States to resettling 10,000 Syrian refugees and granted all Syrian migrants “temporary protected status” instead of following standard immigration procedures.  Under Biden, the government launched the so-called Welcome Corps, which allowed U.S. citizens to sponsor radical Islamists, thereby expanding resettlement options.  Nothing could be more harmful to the United States and its people than this, but Democrats have never shown concern for the American homeland.

    Although President Donald J. Trump limited the number of Middle Eastern refugees entering the United States (2017–2021), Biden reversed Trump’s executive orders and reopened the door to unvetted Islamists.  When Trump resumed the presidency in 2025, he shifted policy toward significantly reducing refugee admissions and enforced travel bans from several Muslim-majority countries.

    Donald Trump’s approach to the Middle Eastern refugee situation focused on significant cuts to refugee admissions and implementing a controversial “travel ban” targeting several Muslim-majority countries.  Mr. Trump also lowered the annual cap on the total number of refugees allowed into the U.S. each fiscal year, reducing it from 110,000 (under Obama) to 50,000, then to 15,000, before leaving office in 2021.

    Under Trump, the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) was halted for 120 days to implement “extreme vetting” procedures, stopping the entire resettlement program and leaving thousands of previously approved refugees in limbo.

    Trump also announced that future refugee applications would be prioritized for those persecuted for their religion, but only if they belonged to a minority religion in their home country.  Critics attacked Trump because the prioritization favored Christian refugees over those of radical Islamism.  This suggests that Trump was more interested in protecting the United States than any Democrat in the past 16 years.

    To highlight a new focus on refugees, President Trump ended federal contracts and stopped funding for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that assist in integrating refugees into American communities, especially those who prefer not to have Islamists living in their neighborhoods.  Trump also ceased America’s contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which sends billions of dollars to Palestinian communities, where the funds are used to buy weapons and explosives to be used against Israel.

    Why is this important?

    Before the refugee crisis in Germany (2015), the total number of murders statewide was 295.  Over the following three years, the murder count rose to 373, then 405, and then 286.  In 2022, Germany reported 7,042 felony crimes nationwide.  According to Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany’s international public broadcaster, in 2024 alone, Germany experienced 13,320 rapes committed against the German people by Islamist refugees.  Under Sharia Law, rape is regarded as one of the more serious crimes that warrants severe punishment – yet, when committed against non-Muslim populations, radical Islamists and political leftists might argue that the victims had it coming.

    While I view Islam as fundamentally flawed, the problem with Islamist migration and rising crime across Europe and the United States is cultural.  Fact: Muslim boys are raised to see women as property – objects to be used and abused by any adult male, whether as punishment for challenging male authority or because many Muslim men are sociopathic dipshits.  Who really knows?

    To my knowledge, no one has thoroughly examined the issues outlined above.  It could be that Western agencies are so busy stuffing corndogs down the throats of Islamists that they haven’t had time to investigate Islamist psychopathy and related crime statistics.  What we do know is that when these people move from their home countries to ours, they bring along their non-Western, fractured cultural practices.  We also know that Muslim men are raised to use and mistreat women, and the women are brought up to accept this behavior as “their punishment” in life for being born female, including Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).  None of this makes sense to normal people, but then neither does the whole of Islam.

    Every one of those non-Western cultural abnormalities mentioned earlier now exists in Michigan’s seventh-largest city, Dearborn — the first “Arab State” in the United States.  Polygamy is illegal in the United States, but Islamists in Dearborn have found ways to bypass these laws.  Consider: Arab men continue to marry two or more women under Sharia Law.  When the second wife or subsequent wives become pregnant, they move into apartments as single mothers and enroll in state welfare programs.  It’s easier than working, but one has to wonder why Michigan state officials are allowing Islamists to get away with it.  I can’t explain it.

    Now, am I anti-Islamist?  Most certainly.  I don’t know any Muslims and have no desire to meet any.  I do not wish for any of them to be harmed in ways they have harmed so many victims of white civilization, but I have two wishes: first, that they return to their homeland and practice Islam as they choose; second, that we stay at home and refrain from interfering further in the affairs of any Middle Eastern nation.  America’s meddling has become far too costly.

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