Papers by Mohamed-Imtiyaz Abdul-Razak
Journal of Governance, Security & Development
A sizable portion of Sinhala-Buddhists, including monks, supported the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna ... more A sizable portion of Sinhala-Buddhists, including monks, supported the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led National People's Power (NPP) in the recent September 2024 presidential election. The results indicate that the JVP captured a significant share of votes from Mahinda Rajapaksa's traditional Sinhala-Buddhist base. A key political symbol of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideology is the preservation of the unitary state structure introduced during British colonial rule. Emerging in the late 1960s as a radical leftist political entity, the JVP initially advocated for social justice and antiimperialism. However, over time, the socio-political dynamics among Sinhala-Buddhists have shaped the party's ideology and its relationship with the Buddhist clergy. This commentary examines the interactions between the JVP, Buddhist monks, and Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony, highlighting their mutual influence on Sri Lanka's political landscape.
Journal of Asian and African studies, Feb 17, 2024
Since the late-19th century, for political expediency, the Sri Lankan Muslims have used Islam as ... more Since the late-19th century, for political expediency, the Sri Lankan Muslims have used Islam as a marker of identity difference which has suffered due to the tensions of religious and ethnic identity markers. Unlike Tamils and Sinhalese ethnic groups, Sri Lanka Muslim elites did not choose language as their primary identity marker but sought to differentiate themselves based on the practices and traditions of Islamic faith. These tensions have manifested in several ways, however, following the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, there has been a great strain placed on Muslim representation as questions have been asked as to whether the religious identity has laid the foundations for the radicalization of the Muslims, especially in the wake of global Islamophobia and concerns about security. Therefore, it is important to answer questions related to Islamic identity manifestation in Sri Lanka: What is the role of an Islamic religious identity in radicalizing Sri Lankan Muslims? Why did Sri Lanka become a convenient place for IS’ activities? Did religious identity alone cause the radicalization of some Muslims? This article would attempt to answer these questions by (1) revisiting the Muslim community’s identity formation before the independence, (2) explaining Islamic identity in the post-independence Sri Lanka and the political representation to win votes and mobilize support during the ethnic civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese, and (3) analyzing factors that contributed to the radicalization of Muslims, and Islam. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the article attempts to situate Sri Lanka Muslims’ identity formation in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and reconciliation. Using answers from interviews conducted through Zoom, WeChat, and WhatsApp, the article assesses the behavior of Sri Lanka Muslims in the face of the 2019 terrorist attack by some Muslims. The article finds that religious identity alone is not sufficient to trigger violence, as evidence suggests that underlying socio-economic as well as political grievances produce polarization and radical actions. We argue that long-standing arguments tying radical actions solely to religion may require substantial revision and need to be situated within a wider frame of national reconciliation especially if it does not consider existing contexts
World Affairs , 2024
Sri Lanka's postindependence history suggests that continuous efforts by the Sinhala-Buddhist pol... more Sri Lanka's postindependence history suggests that continuous efforts by the Sinhala-Buddhist politicians to reject decentralization created anxiety and distrust among minorities. The state used both Sinhala language and Buddhism to accommodate Sinhala-Buddhist interests and provide cultural security to Sinhala-Buddhists who feared that the Sinhala race, Buddhism, and heritage would be threatened with destruction by the Tamil and Muslim separatists and extremists. The state forced the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which demanded a separate state for North and Eastern Tamils, to silence its guns in May 2009. The military defeat of the LTTE did not produce any democratization of the island. Sinhala-Buddhist extremist forces turned their eyes on Sri Lankan Muslims, whose elites attached to major political parties supported the war against the LTTE. This study examines the politicization of the Sinhala language and Buddhism in Sri Lanka before and after the civil war between the LTTE and the state dominated by the Sinhala-Buddhists. It argues that Sinhala political elites willingly took measures to centralize power. The major result of centralization is the birth of the stateseeking, but authoritarian LTTE. It will also provide some useful analysis to examine postwar tensions between the Muslims and the Sinhala-Buddhist extremists. Finally, I discuss some solutions to fight the rising authoritarianism to help Sri Lanka enjoy the fruits of modernization and democracy.
Journal of Asian and African Studies
Since the late-19th century, for political expediency, the Sri Lankan Muslims have used Islam as ... more Since the late-19th century, for political expediency, the Sri Lankan Muslims have used Islam as a marker of
identity difference which has suffered due to the tensions of religious and ethnic identity markers. Unlike
Tamils and Sinhalese ethnic groups, Sri Lanka Muslim elites did not choose language as their primary identity
marker but sought to differentiate themselves based on the practices and traditions of Islamic faith. These
tensions have manifested in several ways, however, following the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, there has been
a great strain placed on Muslim representation as questions have been asked as to whether the religious
identity has laid the foundations for the radicalization of the Muslims, especially in the wake of global
Islamophobia and concerns about security. Therefore, it is important to answer questions related to Islamic
identity manifestation in Sri Lanka: What is the role of an Islamic religious identity in radicalizing Sri Lankan
Muslims? Why did Sri Lanka become a convenient place for IS’ activities? Did religious identity alone cause
the radicalization of some Muslims? This article would attempt to answer these questions by (1) revisiting
the Muslim community’s identity formation before the independence, (2) explaining Islamic identity in the
post-independence Sri Lanka and the political representation to win votes and mobilize support during the
ethnic civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese, and (3) analyzing factors that contributed to the radicalization
of Muslims, and Islam. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the article attempts to situate Sri Lanka
Muslims’ identity formation in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and reconciliation. Using answers from interviews
conducted through Zoom, WeChat, and WhatsApp, the article assesses the behavior of Sri Lanka Muslims
in the face of the 2019 terrorist attack by some Muslims. The article finds that religious identity alone is
not sufficient to trigger violence, as evidence suggests that underlying socio-economic as well as political
grievances produce polarization and radical actions. We argue that long-standing arguments tying radical
actions solely to religion may require substantial revision and need to be situated within a wider frame of
national reconciliation especially if it does not consider existing contexts
Journal of Governance, Security & Development
Sri Lankan Muslims form a small (less than 10% of the population) but peaceful community within S... more Sri Lankan Muslims form a small (less than 10% of the population) but peaceful community within Sri Lanka’s ethnopolitical landscape. However, the rise of intolerance against the non-mainstream schools of thought, such as Sufism, and violent movements among Muslims as a defensive mechanism during the Sri Lanka government’s war against the Tamil Tigers and after the war in 2009, mainly against Sinhala-Buddhist targets, radically questioned the peaceful nature of Sri Lankan Muslims. This paper attempts to provide some notes on (a) Sri Lanka Muslim elites’ quest for identity formation by intensely resorting to the Islamic faith and values and rejecting the Tamilian identity among Muslims whose mother is mainly Tamil, and (b) the growth of Islamic seminaries among Sri Lankan Muslims or ‘Moors’ as a result of the elites’ construction of Islamic identity for Sri Lankan Muslims. The paper uses both primary and secondary sources to understand the complex ethnoreligious development among Mus...
Journal of Governance, Security & Development
On 9 July 2022, angry citizens protesting economic mismanagement stormed the Sri Lanka President&... more On 9 July 2022, angry citizens protesting economic mismanagement stormed the Sri Lanka President's palace in Colombo. Four days later, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, amid a deepening crisis and widespread protests there, escaped to the neighboring island nation of the Maldives and flew into Singapore from there the following evening. The primary objective of this paper is to provide some initial thoughts on the factors that led to the Aragalaya (struggle). Thus, this article attempts to understand the major sources that gave birth to Janatha Aragalaya, commonly named by Sri Lankans as the #GotaGoHome protest movement, the significance of the movement and some suggestions to build a democratic and peaceful Sri Lanka. The article will first provide some primary information about the island’s demographics and socio-economic conditions and then discuss the causes that gave birth to the protest movement. This section will also explain why the state and its institutions, suc...
Journal of Governance, Security and Development , 2023
On 9 July 2022, angry citizens protesting economic mismanagement stormed the Sri Lanka President'... more On 9 July 2022, angry citizens protesting economic mismanagement stormed the Sri Lanka President's palace in Colombo. Four days later, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, amid a deepening crisis and widespread protests there, escaped to the neighboring island nation of the Maldives and flew into Singapore from there the following evening. The primary objective of this paper is to provide some initial thoughts on the factors that led to the Aragalaya (struggle). Thus, this article attempts to understand the major sources that gave birth to Janatha Aragalaya, commonly named by Sri Lankans as the #GotaGoHome protest movement, the significance of the movement and some suggestions to build a democratic and peaceful Sri Lanka. The article will first provide some primary information about the island’s demographics and socio-economic conditions and then discuss the causes that gave birth to the protest movement. This section will also explain why the state and its institutions, such as security forces, did not use violence against the movement. To prepare the article, the author interviewed Sri Lankans who participated in the Aragalaya. Conversations were held in Tamil, Sinhala, and English throughout the protests from 12 April to 17 July via WhatsApp and Facebook messengers.
Keywords: Sri Lanka; Protest movement; Democracy; Dynastic politics; Peace
Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, 2023
In the post-war Sri Lanka, extremist forces among Muslims have emerged as significant “violence-m... more In the post-war Sri Lanka, extremist forces among Muslims have emerged as significant “violence-making” agencies. Extremist forces’ rise poses serious threats to peaceful coexistence and stability in Sri Lanka. The literature on the state fragility-terrorism nexus, by focusing exclusively on whether state fragility is a cause of terrorism provide us good insights on states’ inability to be an impartial agency to deliver good services and justice. The role of state fragility as a condition of the emergence of extremist forces is one of the major trends in Sri Lanka since impendence. This chapter provides some useful notes on the state failure to be a neutral agency in deeply divided Sri Lanka. The chapter argues that there is a strong relationship between state fragility in the post-war Sri Lanka and the rise of extremist forces among Muslims in the post-war Sri Lanka. Although the empirical basis of this research includes a single country, the analytical framework developed in this paper has possible implications for studying a larger number of countries in economically and politically unstable democracies.
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2021
Sri Lanka’s ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as t... more Sri Lanka’s ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, and the government of Sri Lanka comprising the majority of the Sinhalese Buddhist community came to a bloody end in May 2009. Muslims, whose political and civil society elite had largely supported the Sri Lankan state and security forces, welcomed the end of the war and the defeat of the Tamil Tigers given the history of the community with the LTTE. The expectations by the Muslims (and other communities) that peace would return to the country, were quickly dashed as it appeared that a new extremist Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movement targeting religious minorities especially the Muslims would emerge as the country grappled with post-war reconciliation. The rise of anti-Muslim rhetoric, hate speech, and incitement to violence against the community has pushed some Muslims to think that they have become the new focus for Sinhala-Buddhist extremists in the wake of the defe...
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2022
A new wave of attacks by Sinhala-Buddhist extremist elements against the Muslim community in Sri ... more A new wave of attacks by Sinhala-Buddhist extremist elements against the Muslim community in Sri Lanka started following the brutal end of the ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sinhala-Buddhist-dominated Sri Lanka security forces in 2009. Easter Sunday terrorist attacks in 2019 by some Muslims polarized Sri Lanka and contributed to the compromise of the country’s security. Sri Lankan Muslims often claim they are a peaceful community and thus have no serious interests in violent mobilization. But the evidence would basically contradict Muslims’ claim of a peace-loving community. The Easter Sunday terrorist attacks did not take place in any vacuum. This paper will situate some key developments in the violent mobilization of Sri Lanka during the war against the LTTE. The primary goal of such an attempt is to read the growing religious conservative and violent trends among Muslims between 1977 and 2009. In understanding the growing religious co...
Social Science Research Network, 2021
The article examines the impending regulations with regard to Burqa and the closure of Madrasas i... more The article examines the impending regulations with regard to Burqa and the closure of Madrasas in Sri Lanka.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
The article examines the current crisis and conflicts in the Xinjiang region among Uigurs. It map... more The article examines the current crisis and conflicts in the Xinjiang region among Uigurs. It mapping out fundamental questions attached to the Uighur national question and thus mapping out some solutions to the Uigur national question.
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development
The ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka is a well-known issue of the international political arena. Desi... more The ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka is a well-known issue of the international political arena. Desire to maintain the unitary state structure of the country, while weakening the political solution to the deadly ethnic civil war in Sri Lanka, aggravated the ethnic tensions between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, the dominant majority ethnic group. This paper attempts to look at how the Sinhalese political elites in their quest for a power attempted to consolidate the unitary structure of the island since country's independence in 1948, and it argues that Sinhalese unwillingness to share the power with the Tamils led the Tamils to lose trust in the state and its institutions and thus, gave birth to the violent Tamil political movements including that of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The paper is by exploring the process of the origin (pre-independent era) and consolidation (post-independent era) of the unitary structure, attempting to identify major root causes of the ethnic conflict presently known to us today.]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
... political solution for the ethnic crisis. He, in his interview on September 12, 2007 to Inder... more ... political solution for the ethnic crisis. He, in his interview on September 12, 2007 to Inderjit Badwar, said that he would not seek a political solution beyond the current unitary ... minorities.” 63 Moreover, Alan Keenan, who appeared in the initial hearing of the case for the massacre ...
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2013
Organized religions often play a significant role in the political affairs of any country when po... more Organized religions often play a significant role in the political affairs of any country when political actors carefully employ them to pursue power. Buddhism is the major religion on the island of Sri Lanka, and often it becomes a powerful symbol for Sinhala-Buddhist politicians. This study examines the interaction between Buddhism and politics in Sri Lanka, and will attempt to examine the religious factors in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict between the two nations; namely, Tamil and Sinhala. It will examine how the politicization of Buddhism helped Sinhala political elites and leaders in their quest for power, reinforcing religious and ethnic tensions, and finally will discuss some solutions to de-religionize the state structure to help Sri Lanka enjoy the fruits of modernization and democracy.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
This paper examines the postwar Sri Lankan conditions among Sri Lanka Muslims, also known as Moor... more This paper examines the postwar Sri Lankan conditions among Sri Lanka Muslims, also known as Moors. The article will attempt to argue that state concessions to Muslim political leaders who supported the successive Sri Lanka's ruling classes from independence through the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, have meant an isolation of the community from the other two main ethnic communities. The concessions that the Muslim community has won actively helped the Muslim community to be proactive in their religious practices and t hus paved the way for exclusive social and political choices. The rise of Islamic movements and mosques in the post-1977 period galvanized Muslims. In time this isolation has been reinforced by socio-religious revival among Muslims whose ethnic identity has been constructed along the lines of the Islamic faith by Muslim elites. Despite this revival it has been clear that the Muslim community has been reluctant to use Islamic traditions and principles for peace building, which could have helped to ease tensi ons, brought about by the 30 year old ethnic conflict. On the other hand this paper will briefly discuss some reactions from the majority Sinhalese to Islamic revival as well as some issues between the Tamils and Muslims and the reintegration of Muslims in the North. Finally, some pragmatic ways to
Journal of Third World Studies, 2008
Abstract: This study examines ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The major thesis is that politicizati... more Abstract: This study examines ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The major thesis is that politicization of ethnic distinctions by major political parties has fuelled an ethnic violence and conflict in Sri Lanka. The study employs an interactive approach to understand violence of both parties. ...
South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 2011
The ethnic civil war between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities that ravaged Sri Lanka in the la... more The ethnic civil war between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities that ravaged Sri Lanka in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and which ended in May 2009 has attracted great interest from scholars of ethnic identity. Both the Tamil and Sinhalese ethnic groups employ language-Tamil and Sinhalese-as their primary ethnic marker to support their distinct ethnic formations. As for the Muslims, while the vast majority living in the north and east share many things with the Tamils there including the Tamil language, Muslims in the south have divergent interests based more on trade and commerce. Under a predominantly southern leadership, the Muslims who speak the Tamil language with some borrowed Arabic words seek a social formation based on religion to win a distinct ethnic recognition-distinct from the Tamil ethnic group. The result has been a deep rift between the Muslims and the Tamils, making a permanent solution to Sri Lanka's problems elusive. These issues have been relatively under-researched. This study looks at Sri Lankan Muslim identity and the Muslims' relations with Tamils. In particular it interrogates some aspects of the identity discourse developed over the years by the south-centred Muslim elites who align with the Sinhalese political class. We argue that the Tamils' northern leadership has been insensitive to Muslims-that they have played into the hands of the Colombo government by persecuting Muslims in their midst on the pretext of responding to government-instigated violence among local Muslim youths.
Asian Ethnicity, 2015
ABSTRAThis study attempts to understand the recent mobilization against the Sri Lankan
Muslim co... more ABSTRAThis study attempts to understand the recent mobilization against the Sri Lankan
Muslim community by Sinhala-Buddhist organizations. In doing so, it adds to the
discussion about the relationship between second-order minorities and the state and
how identities can be manipulated pre- and post-conflict. States, led by majority ethnic
groups, may choose to work with second-order minorities out of convenience in times
of crisis and then dispose of them afterwards. The article will attempt to look critically
at some state concessions to Muslim political leaders who supported successive Sri
Lanka’s ruling classes from the independence through the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in
2009. It will also examine the root causes of the Sinhala-Buddhist anti-Muslim
campaigns. Finally, it will discuss grassroots perspectives by analysing the questionnaire on the anti-Islam/Muslim campaign that was distributed to youth, students,
unemployed Muslims and workers in the North-Western and Western provincesCT
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Papers by Mohamed-Imtiyaz Abdul-Razak
identity difference which has suffered due to the tensions of religious and ethnic identity markers. Unlike
Tamils and Sinhalese ethnic groups, Sri Lanka Muslim elites did not choose language as their primary identity
marker but sought to differentiate themselves based on the practices and traditions of Islamic faith. These
tensions have manifested in several ways, however, following the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, there has been
a great strain placed on Muslim representation as questions have been asked as to whether the religious
identity has laid the foundations for the radicalization of the Muslims, especially in the wake of global
Islamophobia and concerns about security. Therefore, it is important to answer questions related to Islamic
identity manifestation in Sri Lanka: What is the role of an Islamic religious identity in radicalizing Sri Lankan
Muslims? Why did Sri Lanka become a convenient place for IS’ activities? Did religious identity alone cause
the radicalization of some Muslims? This article would attempt to answer these questions by (1) revisiting
the Muslim community’s identity formation before the independence, (2) explaining Islamic identity in the
post-independence Sri Lanka and the political representation to win votes and mobilize support during the
ethnic civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese, and (3) analyzing factors that contributed to the radicalization
of Muslims, and Islam. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the article attempts to situate Sri Lanka
Muslims’ identity formation in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and reconciliation. Using answers from interviews
conducted through Zoom, WeChat, and WhatsApp, the article assesses the behavior of Sri Lanka Muslims
in the face of the 2019 terrorist attack by some Muslims. The article finds that religious identity alone is
not sufficient to trigger violence, as evidence suggests that underlying socio-economic as well as political
grievances produce polarization and radical actions. We argue that long-standing arguments tying radical
actions solely to religion may require substantial revision and need to be situated within a wider frame of
national reconciliation especially if it does not consider existing contexts
Keywords: Sri Lanka; Protest movement; Democracy; Dynastic politics; Peace
Muslim community by Sinhala-Buddhist organizations. In doing so, it adds to the
discussion about the relationship between second-order minorities and the state and
how identities can be manipulated pre- and post-conflict. States, led by majority ethnic
groups, may choose to work with second-order minorities out of convenience in times
of crisis and then dispose of them afterwards. The article will attempt to look critically
at some state concessions to Muslim political leaders who supported successive Sri
Lanka’s ruling classes from the independence through the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in
2009. It will also examine the root causes of the Sinhala-Buddhist anti-Muslim
campaigns. Finally, it will discuss grassroots perspectives by analysing the questionnaire on the anti-Islam/Muslim campaign that was distributed to youth, students,
unemployed Muslims and workers in the North-Western and Western provincesCT
identity difference which has suffered due to the tensions of religious and ethnic identity markers. Unlike
Tamils and Sinhalese ethnic groups, Sri Lanka Muslim elites did not choose language as their primary identity
marker but sought to differentiate themselves based on the practices and traditions of Islamic faith. These
tensions have manifested in several ways, however, following the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, there has been
a great strain placed on Muslim representation as questions have been asked as to whether the religious
identity has laid the foundations for the radicalization of the Muslims, especially in the wake of global
Islamophobia and concerns about security. Therefore, it is important to answer questions related to Islamic
identity manifestation in Sri Lanka: What is the role of an Islamic religious identity in radicalizing Sri Lankan
Muslims? Why did Sri Lanka become a convenient place for IS’ activities? Did religious identity alone cause
the radicalization of some Muslims? This article would attempt to answer these questions by (1) revisiting
the Muslim community’s identity formation before the independence, (2) explaining Islamic identity in the
post-independence Sri Lanka and the political representation to win votes and mobilize support during the
ethnic civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese, and (3) analyzing factors that contributed to the radicalization
of Muslims, and Islam. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the article attempts to situate Sri Lanka
Muslims’ identity formation in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and reconciliation. Using answers from interviews
conducted through Zoom, WeChat, and WhatsApp, the article assesses the behavior of Sri Lanka Muslims
in the face of the 2019 terrorist attack by some Muslims. The article finds that religious identity alone is
not sufficient to trigger violence, as evidence suggests that underlying socio-economic as well as political
grievances produce polarization and radical actions. We argue that long-standing arguments tying radical
actions solely to religion may require substantial revision and need to be situated within a wider frame of
national reconciliation especially if it does not consider existing contexts
Keywords: Sri Lanka; Protest movement; Democracy; Dynastic politics; Peace
Muslim community by Sinhala-Buddhist organizations. In doing so, it adds to the
discussion about the relationship between second-order minorities and the state and
how identities can be manipulated pre- and post-conflict. States, led by majority ethnic
groups, may choose to work with second-order minorities out of convenience in times
of crisis and then dispose of them afterwards. The article will attempt to look critically
at some state concessions to Muslim political leaders who supported successive Sri
Lanka’s ruling classes from the independence through the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in
2009. It will also examine the root causes of the Sinhala-Buddhist anti-Muslim
campaigns. Finally, it will discuss grassroots perspectives by analysing the questionnaire on the anti-Islam/Muslim campaign that was distributed to youth, students,
unemployed Muslims and workers in the North-Western and Western provincesCT