Kobi Michael
Tel Aviv University, Institute for National Security Studies, Senior Researcher and former Strategic Assessment editor in chief
Prof. Kobi Michael is a senior research fellow at INSS and Strategic Assessment editor in chief and a visiting Prof. at the International Centre for Policing and Security South Wakes University. Among his primary research interests are security studies, conflict resolution, intelligence, civil-military relations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Address: personal web https://www.kobimichael.com/
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on issues of national security, and to present a structured theoretical framework
that can explain their mutual interactions and effects. The goal is to integrate
the various interpretations presented in the articles of this special issue, which is
devoted to demography and national security.
Israel is a unique and important test case for examining the interface between
demography and national security, as a country that since its establishment has
been strikingly demographically inferior to its surroundings, in a challenging and
complex security situation, and subject to ongoing existential threats. Israel is a
small nation state that survives in a situation of entrenched and ongoing ethnic
national-religious conflict with the Palestinians, while a consistently relatively
large minority of some 20% of its citizens are identified as part of the Palestinian
people, with whom Israel is in conflict.
We will explore the demographic impact on Israel’s national security through
four main dimensions, which indicate the close links between demography and
security (demography in Israel, demography between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean, demography within the regional context, and the demography
of Diaspora Jewry). A theoretical model is also proposed, which apart from the
explanation it provides for demographic impact (the independent variable), lays
the foundation for further discussion of the possible effects of mediating variables
on demography.
methodological limitations, reveals fundamental differences in the findings in relation to
similar questions asked across the different polls. This analysis especially highlights the
dialectic expressed in the criticism of Hamas and the dissatisfaction with its functioning; the
decline in the popularity of Yahya Sinwar (before he was killed) and Hamas alongside
increased support for Hamas compared to Fatah; and the support for continuing the armed
struggle led by Hamas. Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip is more critical of Hamas than
Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem and views the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and
Abu Mazen more positively. This may lay the groundwork for eliminating Hamas’s regime in
the Gaza Strip and gaining support for an alternative civilian regime to Hamas.
However, the findings of the polls indicate a solid psychological foundation of support for
the armed struggle and broad opposition to a two-state solution. Mirror images regarding
the level of support for a two-state solution can also be found in the Israeli public. This
suggests that the validity of the two-state paradigm has declined at present, and it is
doubtful whether it will become valid again in the foreseeable future unless a fundamental
change occurs in the conditions and moods of both populations.
The proposed hostage deal for Israel is a strategic risk and a moral and ethical error. The IDF’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi corridor would allow Hamas to renew its military buildup.
The return of hundreds of thousands of Gazans to the northern part of the Gaza Strip will bring thousands of terrorists with them. They do not need to bring weapons with them, as there are vast stockpiles of weapons in northern Gaza that the IDF has not yet located and destroyed.
Statements by senior military officials regarding the IDF’s ability to operate again in these areas as needed are presumptuous and disconnected from reality. To resume fighting, Israel would have to sacrifice the lives of its best soldiers and risk crisis with the US and the international community.
Only continued military pressure by Israel can increase the chances that Hamas will bend and might release the remaining hostages.
different approach than what has been accepted in the past. In part, the establishment of two or three Palestinian cities (such as Rawabi, north of Ramallah), and the subsequent replication of this model in the Gaza Strip as a component of designing a new regional architecture, could provide an answer to a series of challenges. The successful implementation of the proposed megaproject will encourage additional projects of similar
scale and significance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, laying the foundation for changing the Palestinian and regional system, beyond just the Palestinian system itself.
The poll results point to a worrying phenomenon among the Palestinian public: an armed struggle consciousness, support for the Hamas, weakness of the Palestinian Authority and support of the October 7 atrocities – as part of the collective psychological foundations of this population. Palestinian society upholds the idea of the elimination of the State of Israel by means of violence and terror, and of realizing the right of return as a goal that is more important than the establishment of an independent and functioning Palestinian state achieved by peaceful means. Therefore, any progress towards the vision of two nation states, peacefully living side by side, requires deep and profound change in the collective psychological foundations of Palestinian society and its leaders. The poll results show that we still have a long way to go and are still very far from the hoped-for change.
The widespread political support of Hamas and its leaders among the Palestinian public signals an in-depth problem in Palestinian psychological foundations and requires rethinking as to whether the Palestinians are primed for the establishment of an independent, responsible, functioning and peace-seeking state.
An independent entity does not necessarily mean an independent state as currently presumed. There may be other creative models, certainly under the conditions of a new regional architecture that will undoubtedly generate currently uncharted new opportunities.
The question of humanitarian aid has also been linked to the issue of “the day after” and has accordingly impeded Israel’s continued waging of the war, particularly with regards the preparations for a military campaign in Rafah, which forms a crucial prerequisite for achieving the war’s objectives and ending it.
For the humanitarian aid to reach its proper destination, Hamas’s military and government capabilities across the entire strip must be eradicated. This necessitates Israeli control of the area, which would also make it clear to the people that the era of Hamas rule in Gaza is now over.
In the current state of affairs, the only reasonable, relevant and effective option seems to be the establishment of a provisional Israeli military government, initially in the north of the strip and later, as the circumstances may allow, also in the center camps and Khan Younis area.
Establishing a military government would serve three key purposes: First, it would provide the civilian population with the humanitarian aid it requires and would do so other than through UNRWA or Hamas, thereby preventing that aid from falling into Hamas’s hands or being looted by the masses. Second, it would debilitate Hamas and send a clear signal to the people of Gaza that Hamas is no longer an option for governing the strip after the war. Third, it would lay the groundwork and set the stage for introducing an international-regional administration that will assume the responsibility for administering the area and the population and for initiating the process of the strip’s rehabilitation, while also mentoring and training a local civilian administration unaffiliated and unassociated with Hamas.
This process should optimally form part of a broader, more long-term vision, where a prospective alliance is to be based on the establishment of a new regional architecture providing both the Palestinians and Israel with new horizons.
establishing a temporary military administration in the Strip
important for Israel to consider an extraordinary move, which would turn the table and shift the responsibility onto Hamas—by making an offer that includes an end to the fighting in Gaza, the end of Hamas’s governing power in Gaza, the release of the hostages being held by Hamas, and the release by Israel of Palestinian prisoners. In all likelihood, Hamas would
reject the proposal, but then responsibility for the continued fighting would fall on its shoulders. Just making this proposal could serve as leverage to pressure Hamas from the public, the Palestinian Authority, Arab countries, and the international community.
regarding the nature of the supervision’s failure
or success, which “lies not in the nature of its
assessment against the test of reality, but in
the fact that it encourages competition over
the interpretation. Competition is a mechanism
that incentivizes research to excel, sharpen
and progress, and clarify to itself and its
consumers the mask of assumptions and
difficulties upon which it rests”
while weighing and refining the organization’s suspension and attrition
strategy. Their goal is to bring an end to the war while ensuring the survival
of Hamas as both a military and governmental entity within the Gaza Strip;
that to them would be the essence of victory. The more optimistic the Hamas
leadership becomes, the less inclined it is to demonstrate flexibility or
consider proposals that could potentially end the war, signaling the demise
of their military and governmental presence in the Gaza Strip. This perceived triumph for Hamas would signify entrenchment of a troublesome situation
not just in the Gaza Strip, but across all fronts of the resistance axis against Israel in an effort orchestrated by Iran. This strategy poses a serious challenge to Israel, creating a persistent war of attrition and hindering Israel's ability to realize its sovereignty and secure its civilian population in communities along its borders. Therefore, it is imperative that Israel thwart Hamas' strategy and dismantle its capabilities.
on issues of national security, and to present a structured theoretical framework
that can explain their mutual interactions and effects. The goal is to integrate
the various interpretations presented in the articles of this special issue, which is
devoted to demography and national security.
Israel is a unique and important test case for examining the interface between
demography and national security, as a country that since its establishment has
been strikingly demographically inferior to its surroundings, in a challenging and
complex security situation, and subject to ongoing existential threats. Israel is a
small nation state that survives in a situation of entrenched and ongoing ethnic
national-religious conflict with the Palestinians, while a consistently relatively
large minority of some 20% of its citizens are identified as part of the Palestinian
people, with whom Israel is in conflict.
We will explore the demographic impact on Israel’s national security through
four main dimensions, which indicate the close links between demography and
security (demography in Israel, demography between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean, demography within the regional context, and the demography
of Diaspora Jewry). A theoretical model is also proposed, which apart from the
explanation it provides for demographic impact (the independent variable), lays
the foundation for further discussion of the possible effects of mediating variables
on demography.
methodological limitations, reveals fundamental differences in the findings in relation to
similar questions asked across the different polls. This analysis especially highlights the
dialectic expressed in the criticism of Hamas and the dissatisfaction with its functioning; the
decline in the popularity of Yahya Sinwar (before he was killed) and Hamas alongside
increased support for Hamas compared to Fatah; and the support for continuing the armed
struggle led by Hamas. Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip is more critical of Hamas than
Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem and views the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and
Abu Mazen more positively. This may lay the groundwork for eliminating Hamas’s regime in
the Gaza Strip and gaining support for an alternative civilian regime to Hamas.
However, the findings of the polls indicate a solid psychological foundation of support for
the armed struggle and broad opposition to a two-state solution. Mirror images regarding
the level of support for a two-state solution can also be found in the Israeli public. This
suggests that the validity of the two-state paradigm has declined at present, and it is
doubtful whether it will become valid again in the foreseeable future unless a fundamental
change occurs in the conditions and moods of both populations.
The proposed hostage deal for Israel is a strategic risk and a moral and ethical error. The IDF’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi corridor would allow Hamas to renew its military buildup.
The return of hundreds of thousands of Gazans to the northern part of the Gaza Strip will bring thousands of terrorists with them. They do not need to bring weapons with them, as there are vast stockpiles of weapons in northern Gaza that the IDF has not yet located and destroyed.
Statements by senior military officials regarding the IDF’s ability to operate again in these areas as needed are presumptuous and disconnected from reality. To resume fighting, Israel would have to sacrifice the lives of its best soldiers and risk crisis with the US and the international community.
Only continued military pressure by Israel can increase the chances that Hamas will bend and might release the remaining hostages.
different approach than what has been accepted in the past. In part, the establishment of two or three Palestinian cities (such as Rawabi, north of Ramallah), and the subsequent replication of this model in the Gaza Strip as a component of designing a new regional architecture, could provide an answer to a series of challenges. The successful implementation of the proposed megaproject will encourage additional projects of similar
scale and significance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, laying the foundation for changing the Palestinian and regional system, beyond just the Palestinian system itself.
The poll results point to a worrying phenomenon among the Palestinian public: an armed struggle consciousness, support for the Hamas, weakness of the Palestinian Authority and support of the October 7 atrocities – as part of the collective psychological foundations of this population. Palestinian society upholds the idea of the elimination of the State of Israel by means of violence and terror, and of realizing the right of return as a goal that is more important than the establishment of an independent and functioning Palestinian state achieved by peaceful means. Therefore, any progress towards the vision of two nation states, peacefully living side by side, requires deep and profound change in the collective psychological foundations of Palestinian society and its leaders. The poll results show that we still have a long way to go and are still very far from the hoped-for change.
The widespread political support of Hamas and its leaders among the Palestinian public signals an in-depth problem in Palestinian psychological foundations and requires rethinking as to whether the Palestinians are primed for the establishment of an independent, responsible, functioning and peace-seeking state.
An independent entity does not necessarily mean an independent state as currently presumed. There may be other creative models, certainly under the conditions of a new regional architecture that will undoubtedly generate currently uncharted new opportunities.
The question of humanitarian aid has also been linked to the issue of “the day after” and has accordingly impeded Israel’s continued waging of the war, particularly with regards the preparations for a military campaign in Rafah, which forms a crucial prerequisite for achieving the war’s objectives and ending it.
For the humanitarian aid to reach its proper destination, Hamas’s military and government capabilities across the entire strip must be eradicated. This necessitates Israeli control of the area, which would also make it clear to the people that the era of Hamas rule in Gaza is now over.
In the current state of affairs, the only reasonable, relevant and effective option seems to be the establishment of a provisional Israeli military government, initially in the north of the strip and later, as the circumstances may allow, also in the center camps and Khan Younis area.
Establishing a military government would serve three key purposes: First, it would provide the civilian population with the humanitarian aid it requires and would do so other than through UNRWA or Hamas, thereby preventing that aid from falling into Hamas’s hands or being looted by the masses. Second, it would debilitate Hamas and send a clear signal to the people of Gaza that Hamas is no longer an option for governing the strip after the war. Third, it would lay the groundwork and set the stage for introducing an international-regional administration that will assume the responsibility for administering the area and the population and for initiating the process of the strip’s rehabilitation, while also mentoring and training a local civilian administration unaffiliated and unassociated with Hamas.
This process should optimally form part of a broader, more long-term vision, where a prospective alliance is to be based on the establishment of a new regional architecture providing both the Palestinians and Israel with new horizons.
establishing a temporary military administration in the Strip
important for Israel to consider an extraordinary move, which would turn the table and shift the responsibility onto Hamas—by making an offer that includes an end to the fighting in Gaza, the end of Hamas’s governing power in Gaza, the release of the hostages being held by Hamas, and the release by Israel of Palestinian prisoners. In all likelihood, Hamas would
reject the proposal, but then responsibility for the continued fighting would fall on its shoulders. Just making this proposal could serve as leverage to pressure Hamas from the public, the Palestinian Authority, Arab countries, and the international community.
regarding the nature of the supervision’s failure
or success, which “lies not in the nature of its
assessment against the test of reality, but in
the fact that it encourages competition over
the interpretation. Competition is a mechanism
that incentivizes research to excel, sharpen
and progress, and clarify to itself and its
consumers the mask of assumptions and
difficulties upon which it rests”
while weighing and refining the organization’s suspension and attrition
strategy. Their goal is to bring an end to the war while ensuring the survival
of Hamas as both a military and governmental entity within the Gaza Strip;
that to them would be the essence of victory. The more optimistic the Hamas
leadership becomes, the less inclined it is to demonstrate flexibility or
consider proposals that could potentially end the war, signaling the demise
of their military and governmental presence in the Gaza Strip. This perceived triumph for Hamas would signify entrenchment of a troublesome situation
not just in the Gaza Strip, but across all fronts of the resistance axis against Israel in an effort orchestrated by Iran. This strategy poses a serious challenge to Israel, creating a persistent war of attrition and hindering Israel's ability to realize its sovereignty and secure its civilian population in communities along its borders. Therefore, it is imperative that Israel thwart Hamas' strategy and dismantle its capabilities.
militaries of the industrial democracies are undergoing fundamental change. Some of these assertions have been formulated as slogans such as the “Revolution in Military Affairs,” the advent of a “Postmodern Military,” or the matchless emergence of “effects-based and net-centric
operations.” Other, more reflective, contentions have centered on the emergence of “New Wars,” “Other Wars,” or new “Western Ways of Waging War.” While these arguments have been the focus of intense criticism and discussion, they nevertheless underscore the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the armed forces of the industrial democracies have undergone very significant transformations. As of yet, however, no systematic scholarly attempt has been carried out linking
these changes to Peace Support Operations (PSOs), those operations with major state-building components that demand broad and coherent cooperation between military forces and civilian entities. It is this lacuna that our volume seeks to fill.
This document presents the findings of a research project of the Institute of National Security Studies, whose objective was to analyze the security and strategic threats and challenges to Israel according to a list of plausible scenarios in the Palestinian arena (including the continuation of the current regime) and present the possible Israeli responses to the challenges and threats, while elaborating on the limitations and implications of the response, repercussions of the challenges, and threats to the feasibility of advancing toward a reality of two states for two peoples.
The project identified the security threats and the responses and analyzed and presented the implications according to six different scenarios in the Palestinian arena. The team developed a number of key insights relating to the broad security context and the links between the security aspects and the political, religious, social, and economic aspects of Israel’s strategic environment. The research validates some of the insights that predate this research study, weakens, or refutes other insights, and helps develop valuable new insights.
המזכר תרחישים בזירה הישראלית—פלסטינית: האתגרים האסטרטגיים והמענים
האפשריים מציג תוצר של מחקר שבוצע במכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי במטרה לבחון את האיומים והאתגרים הביטחוניים והאסטרטגיים הניצבים בפני ישראל, בהתייחס לשורה של תרחישים אפשריים בזירת הסכסוך הישראלית—הפלסטינית. המחקר התמקד בהצגת האתגרים האסטרטגיים לישראל בכל אחד מהתרחישים ובמאפייני המענה הישראלי האפשרי לאתגרים.
במזכר מוצגים שישה תרחישים: א. המשך המצב הקיים )ניהול הסכסוך(; ב. שתי מדינות בהסדר; ג. מהלכים ישראליים להיפרדות מהפלסטינים; ד. סיפוח גושי ההתיישבות ושטחי C ; ה. מדינה אחת עם זכויות מלאות לפלסטינים; ו. מדינה אחת עם זכויות מוגבלות לפלסטינים.
במרבית התרחישים, עולה באופן מובהק שלישראל יש אינטרס חיוני בקיומה של רשות
פלסטינית אחראית, יציבה ומתפקדת, שעמה מתקיים שיתוף פעולה ביטחוני, המבוסס
על אינטרסים חופפים נגד הטרור ונגד חמאס. עוד עולה במחקר כי התחזקות המאפיינים המדינתיים של הרשות הפלסטינית מהווה גורם מרסן בהקשרים ביטחוניים עתידיים.
בסיכומו של דבר, התרחישים מתכנסים לשני מצבי סיום אפשריים — שתי מדינות )ריבונות פלסטינית מלאה, או ריבונות פלסטינית מוגבלת(, או מדינה אחת )עם שוויון זכויות לכל אזרחיה, או ללא שוויון זכויות(. המשך המצב הקיים, וכן תרחישי סיפוח, משמעותם בסבירות גבוהה גלישה למציאות של מדינה אחת – בלי הצהרת כוונות וללא בירור המשמעויות.
הביטחון בישראל. יחסי הגומלין בין התחום האזרחי לתחום הביטחוני באים לידי ביטוי גם
בממד הטריטוריאלי, כאשר חולשת הפיקוח האזרחי נובעת מהיעדר תפישת-על מדינתית
המשקללת את כל צורכי השימוש בקרקע. מדיניות שימושי הקרקע של הדרג האזרחי אינה
ברורה די צורכה, ולעומת זאת, לדרג הצבאי ולמערכת הביטחון יש משנה סדורה יותר
והמפגש בין הדרגים מתאפיין אפוא בעליונות תכנונית ותפישתית של הדרג הצבאי
והביטחוני. ייצוג המערכת הצבאית והביטחונית במערכות התכנון האזרחית לעומת היעדר
ייצוג אזרחי במערכת התכנון הצבאית היא א-סימטריה בולטת. ארגוני מגזר שלישי הצליחו
בשנים האחרונות להביא לצמצום של האוטונומיה של המערכת הצבאית בכל הנוגע לתכנון
המרחב ולמאפייני הפיקוח האזרחי המוסדי.
מנגנון הפיקוח האזרחי הוא שצריך להנחות את עקרונות עיצוב המרחב, ויעד זה מעלה את
השאלות הבאות: (1 (כיצד לשפר את הדיון הציבורי עם גופי התכנון של מערכת הביטחון
על צורכי החברה האזרחית לעומת צורכי צה"ל ומערכת הביטחון? (2 (איזה גורם ממלכתי
יכריע במחלוקות בהן מוטל חיסיון על שיקולי מערכת הביטחון? (3 (האם אפשר ליצור
תוכנית ארצית סטטוטורית של שימושי קרקע ביטחוניים, שתשלב ביניהם ובין הצרכים
האזרחיים? (4 (האם יצירת שינוי בהתנהלות הקרקעית של הצבא ומערכת הביטחון דורשת
שינוי חקיקתי או תכנוני? (5 (כיצד לקיים שיח אזרחי על היבטים של האוטונומיה של צה"ל
ושל המונופול שיש לו בשטחים כה רבים בישראל?
בחלוף חמישים שנה מאז המלחמה, יש אפשרות וצורך לבחון את האירועים הקשורים בה ישירות ואת השלכותיה ארוכות הטווח בהסתכלות רחבה ושקולה יותר מאשר בתקופה שמיד לאחריה. למידת העבר והפקת תובנות מהמלחמה ותוצאותיה גם מאפשרות לנתח את האתגרים הביטחוניים והמדיניים המורכבים הניצבים לפתחה של מדינת ישראל בעת הנוכחית וגם להעריך את אלה הגלומים בתרחישים עתידיים.
במלאות 50 שנים למלחמה בחר המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי לפרסם קובץ מאמרים המוקדש למלחמה ולקחיה. קובץ זה כולל מאמרים מפרי עטם של חוקרים מהמכון ומחוצה לו. המאמרים עצמם מוקדשים לבחינת מגוון רחב של סוגיות, מהתחום המדיני, הצבאי וכן מתחום יחסי צבא-חברה בישראל. מאמרים אלה, כשהם מקובצים יחדיו, מציגים תמונה מקיפה ומעמיקה של מלחמת ששת הימים, תוצאותיה והשלכותיה.
The second point refers to the possible impact of PSOs on military transformation. Thus, perhaps the way to think about future developments is not so much on the way that military transformation influences peace-related missions but rather on the way the latter effect the former. Some of these effects have to do with career structures within the military, military education, or the links between the armed forces and external entities. For such institutionalization to take place, there will be a continued need for entrepreneurs for change within the security establishment, perhaps for a political champion, and for doctrinal developments (that is, mainstreaming of new ideas into military doctrine). By offering this volume on military transformation and PSOs we are also, of course, participating in current debates about these issues. The various contributions to this book, and the volume as a whole, should be seen as interrogating and questioning current trends from a variety of perspectives. And that, after all, is our aim.
הקובץ הזה מחזיק תשעה עשר מאמרים שכתבו עשרים ושלושה מבכירי החוקרים במכון וכותבים אורחים. אלה מתמודדים עם המסמך הצה"לי הייחודי בכמה מישורים ומזוויות שונות ודנים במה שמצוי בו כמו גם במה שאינו מצוי בו. לצד הבחינה והניתוח מוצגות גם הצעות להרחבת המהדורה העתידית של "אסטרטגיית צה"ל".
המאמרים בקובץ הזה עוסקים בשלושה נושאים מרכזיים: היחסים המורכבים בין הדרג הצבאי לדרג המדיני בהקשר של אתגרי הביטחון של ישראל במרחב, בניין הכוח הצבאי והפעלתו אל מול האיומים המתפתחים וכן היחסים המיוחדים בין צה"ל לחברה הישראלית.
קובץ המאמרים הזה נפתח בדברי הקדמה של מי שהיה רמטכ"ל צה"ל ושר הביטחון, משה (בוגי) יעלון ומסתיים בפרק הסיכום של עמוס ידלין, ראש המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי: אסטרטגיית צה"ל – שבחים, הרהורים וערעורים.
החריף מצבן. הטלטלה הערבית קיעקעה את ההיגיון הגיאו־פוליטי המסדר של המרחב הערבי, הכולל
שלטון מרכזי סמכותי וגבולות ברורים. חולשת השלטון המרכזי הובילה להתרחבותם של אזורי הספר
ולטשטוש הגבולות – דבר שהקל על ארגוני ג'האד ועל גורמים זרים לחדור לתחומי המדינות האלה,
להתבסס בהן צבאית ופוליטית, לגייס תמיכה מקומית ולקרוא תיגר על השלטון המרכזי ולערער
בשיטתיות את המבנה המדינתי.
המדינות הכושלות אינן רק בעיה מקומית, אלא אתגר אזורי ובינלאומי בשל אי־היציבות שהן מייצאות
לסביבתן הקרובה והרחוקה ומעצם הפיכתן לזירת עימות בין גורמים אזוריים ובינלאומיים. ואכן במהלך
העשורים האחרונים ניסתה המערכת הבינלאומית להתמודד עם תופעת המדינות הכושלות באמצעות
מבצעי התערבות הומניטריים ומבצעים לשיקום מדינות, אך ברוב המקרים נכשלו המבצעים האלה.
כיום מתקשה הקהילה הבינלאומית לגבש הסכמות לשם התערבות נחושה ומחויבת שתזכה לתמיכתן
של המעצמות ושל מועצת הביטחון של האו"ם. התוצאה היא מלחמות וטרגדיות אנושיות בהיקפים
שכמותם לא ידע המזרח התיכון זה מאות שנים.
מטרת הספר הזה היא להציג את תמונת המציאות האזורית במזרח התיכון מהזווית של תופעת
המדינה הכושלת, לעמוד על הסיבות ועל המאפיינים לתופעה הזאת בכל אחת מהמדינות הערביות
ולהתפשטותה במרחב ולהעריך את משמעויותיה ואת השלכותיה בהקשר האזורי והבינלאומי בכלל
ובהקשר של ישראל בפרט.
community regarding the delegitimization challenge, analyzes relevant
tensions, difficulties, and problems, and highlights the unique issues that the intelligence community must address. Areas where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which is responsible for advocacy efforts, including the positive branding of Israel – has a comparative advantage are beyond the scope of this article. We address a number of central questions: is delegitimization, in fact, an intelligence challenge? What is the essence of this challenge, and what is its unique nature? How should the intelligence community deal with the intelligence challenge (with an emphasis on ethical issues)? What are the barriers and obstacles facing the intelligence community in dealing with the challenge, and how should it handle them? How should the intelligence community relate to civilian bodies involved in the struggle against delegitimization?
delegitimization campaign (with BDS as its central and prominent
characteristic) by comparing it to similar challenges Israel has faced in the past. While delegitimization in its current form is more complex and welldeveloped than previous challenges, the underlying rationale is similar and involves three levels: Israel’s right to exist as a nation-state, Israel’s right to self-defense, and Israel’s right to explain its actions. On the first level, Israel’s opponents make great efforts to deny the legitimacy of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people by presenting it as a colonialist project born from the original injustice done to the native Palestinian population. The second level includes the efforts of Israel’s opponents to deny its right to defend itself against terrorism by condemning its responses as disproportionate, contrary to international law, and in blatant violation of basic Palestinian human rights. Finally, the third level constitutes the efforts made to deny Israel’s right to explain its actions either by boycotting and removing Israel from international forums or by assisting the media whose coverage of Israel is biased for various reasons and prefers not to emphasize or at times even present the Israeli position.
weakness of civil society in Arab countries. The period of upheaval has effectively only added to this weakness. In the absence of a strong and developed civil society, it appears that Arab societies in the crumbling countries will find it difficult to institute processes to rebuild functioning states. The region will continue to suffer from chronic instability, which will also be exported to the international system.
hostility to Israel, could exacerbate Israel’s standing in the international
arena, negatively affect its political and military freedom of action, and
perhaps even damage its economy. Therefore, the topic is relevant to the
country’s national security and requires a systemic response.
The delegitimization phenomenon relies on a conceptual infrastructure and
a network of groups and activists located in many countries around the world.
It is marked by sweeping criticism of Israel’s policies as well as political,
cultural, and economic activism against Israel. The boycott, divestment,
and sanctions (BDS) movement has succeeded in disseminating an idea that
is multidimensional (academic, economic, legal, cultural, diplomatic, and
media-related) to political and public spheres in the West.
product of the region’s chronic structural instability. Over the last century,
the Middle East experienced four major upheavals, each of which led to
the formation of a political structure at odds with the social framework
that was based primarily on ethnic, tribal, or religious affiliations. This
incompatibility inevitably eroded the legitimacy of the various regimes and
heightened the potential for opposition and subversion. In most cases, the
nation-state model survived, thanks to an authoritarian rule dependent on
effective security and intelligence services.
של אי־יציבות מבנית כרונית של המרחב, שחווה במאה השנים האחרונות ארבע
מהפכות עיקריות. כל אחת מארבע המהפכות הובילה לעיצובו של מבנה כוח פוליטי
שלא הלם את המבנה החברתי, המושתת מעיקרו על בסיס עדתי, שבטי או דתי. אי־
ההלימה הובילה לשחיקת לגיטימציה של המשטרים ולפוטנציאל גבוה של התנגדות
וחתרנות כלפיהם. ברוב המקרים שרד מודל מדינת הלאום בשל שלטון אוטוריטרי,
שנשען על מנגנוני ביטחון ומודיעין יעילים.
שבריריות המודל הפוליטי באה לידי ביטוי בקושי של המשטרים, ברוב המדינות
הערביות, להתמודד עם גלי ההדף של הטלטלה הערבית, בהיחלשות השלטון המרכזי
ובהאצת תהליכי כישלון מדינתי. האסלאם הפוליטי, שייצג את האידאולוגיה המתחרה
העיקרית לאידאולוגיה הלאומית, כשל במבחן הראשון שבו נדרש לעמוד )האחים המוסלמים במצרים(. עם סילוקו הותיר חלל רעיוני, שאותו מיהרו לנסות למלא
תנועות אסלאמיות סלפיות־ג'האדיות, שניצלו את התנאים שנוצרו בעקבות הכישלון
המדינתי שהתפשט במרחב. הבולטת מבין התנועות הללו הייתה דאע"ש, שהובילה
להקמתה של 'המדינה האסלאמית'.
operation and its fulfillment. Without understanding their context, operations will meet with serious difficulties in ensuring their relevance and protecting actors in the conflict theater.
Moreover, the context of a second generation peacekeeping operation is far more complex than that of a traditional military operation. It is, therefore, important to discern the right kind of
intelligence needed for peacekeeping, to grasp its rationale and to understand how it is achieved.
left its mark on the Middle East and has entirely changed the logic
underlying its structure. Alongside the spillover of intrastate conflicts
from failed states, we are witnessing the growing phenomenon
of non-state actors, mostly Jihadi terror organizations, alongside
intervention of external entities that escalates the intrastate
confrontation and, as a result, the failed state becomes even weaker.
These two interwoven processes eventually lead to the rapid
undermining of regional stability and international order and has
the potential to drag the entire system into a chaotic and bloody future.
On the other hand, it might also be an opportunity to change
the political order and system in such a way as to facilitate more
stabilization of the region based on an alternative political model,
one more suitable to the local political culture.
right whose importance has increasingly been recognized in recent years, as well as its interfaces with other fields that influence it and are affected by it. The article establishes a conceptual and theoretical foundation and aims to serve as a basis for developing methodologies and operating concepts within the intelligence community in the field of cognition, while relying on existing conceptualizations within the field. The article reveals the scope of the discussion and addresses the open questions, which will expand the knowledge base that the Israeli intelligence community has developed as a result of its practical experience in this field.
האחרונות להכרה הולכת ומתרחבת בחשיבותו, וכן בממשקים בינו ובין יתר המרחבים
המשפיעים עליו ומושפעים ממנו. המאמר מניח תשתית מושגית ותיאורטית ונועד
להוות מסד לפיתוח מתודולוגיות ותפיסות הפעלה בקהילת המודיעין בתחום התודעה,
תוך הישענות על ההמשגות המופיעות בו. הוא מצביע על מרחבי הדיון ועל שאלות
פתוחות, שעיסוק בהן ירחיב את בסיס הידע שברשות קהילת המודיעין הישראלית
כתוצאה מהתנסותה המעשית בתחום זה.
in particular developments with the potential to help thaw the deadlock and policy recommendations to facilitate realization of this potential. Proposed measures can both help remove obstacles to upgraded relations between Israel and pragmatic Arab countries, and encourage the expansion of these relations to the public stage.
אי־היציבות השוררת ברחבי המזרח התיכון לשטחה. אף ניתן לטעון שעלה בידי
ישראל לרתום לשירות האינטרסים שלה חלק מההתפתחויות במזרח התיכון, ובכלל
זאת מתחים בין מדינות וארגונים באזור. אי־היציבות ובמיוחד המתח בין המדינות
הסוניות הפרגמטיות לבין איראן יצרו קרבת אינטרסים עם ישראל, ועל בסיס זה נוצר
שיתוף פעולה בין אותן מדינות לישראל, הגם שבשלב זה הוא מוגבל לתחום הביטחוני,
ומתקיים בדרך כלל מתחת לפני השטח. תקרת הזכוכית שבה נתקלים היחסים מקורה
בקשיים להניע תהליך מדיני אפקטיבי בין ישראל לפלסטינים. זאת, משום שאף כי
מבחינת הממשלות במדינות הערביות הפרגמטיות, וגם מבחינת טורקיה, הנושא
הפלסטיני אינו בראש סדר היום, הסוגיה חשובה לציבור הרחב במדינות אלו והיא
עלולה להוות רקע למחאה עממית ולהתלקחות. המחשה לכך ניתן היה למצוא בתגובתן
של ממשלות ערביות להצבת המגנטומטרים בהר הבית, בעקבות פיגוע שאירע בשער
העלייה להר ביולי 2017 . מהלך זה פגע במיוחד ביחסים בין ירדן לישראל, בעת שהיו
חיוביים בעליל. המדינה הערבית היחידה שלא הביעה התנגדות לצעד שנקטה ישראל
הייתה ערב הסעודית, שאף הכירה בחשיבותו למאבק בטרור.
פרק זה יתמקד במגמות בזירה הישראלית־פלסטינית, בהתפתחויות שגלום בהן
פוטנציאל להפשרת הקיפאון בזירה זו ובהמלצות למדיניות שתסייע לממש פוטנציאל
זה, וכך גם יתאפשר להסיר מן הדרך מכשולים לשדרוג הקשרים בין ישראל למדינות
ערביות פרגמטיות, ולהעבירם לשלב הפומבי והרחב יותר של היחסים.
נושאיים: מדיני־ביטחוני, צבאי ויחסי חברה־צבא בישראל.
בהקדמה זו נדונים נושאים שביטוייהם השונים שלובים ברבים ממאמרי הקובץ, על שלושת השערים המרכיבים אותו. נושאים אלה הם האתגר הצבאי־ביטחוני הניצב בפני ישראל, כפי שהתפתח מאז מלחמת ששת הימים ועל רקע תוצאותיה המדיניות והטריטוריאליות; סוגיית הסכסוך הישראלי־פלסטיני, שתוצאות המלחמה העלו אותה על סדר היום האזורי והבינלאומי וגם הציפו אותה למרכז השיח בחברה
הישראלית עצמה; שאלות לגבי היחסים בין הדרג האזרחי־מדיני ובין הדרג הצבאי, שעלו בעקבות המלחמה ונותרו על הפרק בעשורים הבאים.
Kaunert, the scholar and his mentor, adds a
further layer to the theoretical foundation of
security or securitization. In this context, the
book’s contribution is dual in nature. Together
with a theoretical expansion of the components
of the concept, referring to both the definition
of extreme means and the types of audience,
which can certainly be seen as an innovation,
the authors have selected case studies—such
as the Six-Day War—and have applied to them
the principles of securitization in their latest
In their selection of essentially military
security case studies, which in any case were
perceived as severe security threats, the authors
stretch the definitions and the conceptual
foundation of securitization to extremes that
make the concept, its uniqueness, and its
significance superfluous. The conceptual and
theoretical development of securitization by
the Copenhagen School and its successors was
intended to provide an analytical tool to explain
the way in which leaders seek to legitimize the
use of extraordinary and extreme measures in
order to deal with problems that are civilian by
nature. The theoretical foundation provides
the explanation through the idea of security
argumentation and the conceptualization
of an essentially civilian problem, by means
of the same argumentation, as a severe and
even existential security threat (for example,
problems of migration, crime, and so forth).
Given the existence of a serious or existential
threat, it is essential to adopt extraordinary and
extreme measures, including those that affect
individual rights. If, as the authors propose,
security threats, which in any case are conceived
through security argumentation, can also
undergo securitization, the unique contribution
of the concept with reference to essentially
civilian problems becomes superfluous. In my
opinion, there is a logical failure in the very idea
of securitizing a security problem, unless this
controversial claim of theirs is the foundation
for theoretical disputes that can sharpen and
improve the existing theoretical foundation,
and in this sense “a sword’s blade can only be
sharpened against another one.”
The book is divided into seven central
chapters, and the main points are covered in a
long and detailed preface that gives a very clear
presentation of the claims and innovations in the
book. The first chapter presents the literature
on the subject of securitization, referring to
prominent milestones in the development of
the theory and the most prominent scholars in
and broadest conceptualization.