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Samuel Arnold

Texas Christian University, Political Science, Faculty Member

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Sam Arnold (B.A. (Philosophy), Bowdoin College; M.A. (Philosophy), University of Pittsburgh; Ph.D. (Politics) Princeton University) teaches courses in political theory. His research interests include liberal egalitarianism, socialism, the division of labor and work, and consumerism. His work has appeared in the Journal of Political Philosophy, the European Journal of Philosophy, Critical Review, The Journal of Political Power, Socialism and Democracy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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University of Wisconsin-Madison

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King's College London

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Papers by Samuel Arnold

Contesting the Work Spend Cycle: The Liberal Egalitarian Case Against Consumerism

Whither Work? The Politics and Ethics of Contemporary Work, 2020

Liberal egalitarian justice requires a less unequal society, measured in terms of income and weal... more Liberal egalitarian justice requires a less unequal society, measured in terms of income and wealth. But does it also require a less consumerist society—a society less fixated on getting and spending? In this chapter I identify a number of distinctively liberal egalitarian concerns with consumerism and the work-spend cycle it spawns. I argue that consumerism potentially threatens every aspect of liberal egalitarian justice—from political equality, to equal opportunity, to economic fairness, and even to basic needs satisfaction.
My argument draws on empirical work by Juliet Schor and Robert Frank, which I discuss in section 1. I then identify, in sections 2 through 4, various ways in which the consumerist work-and-spend dynamic described by Schor and Frank threatens liberal egalitarian principles and institutions. Sections 5 and 6 address a key objection: since one person’s spending is another person’s income, isn’t consumerism actually good for the poor—hence, something liberal egalitarians ought to promote, not discourage? Section 7 summarizes the argument and notes several unresolved questions that warrant further inquiry.

Putting Liberty in its Place: Rawlsian Liberalism without the Liberalism

To be a liberal is, among other things, to grant basic liberties some degree of priority over oth... more To be a liberal is, among other things, to grant basic liberties some degree of priority over other aspects of justice. But why do basic liberties warrant this special treatment? For Rawls, the answer has to do with the allegedly special connection between these freedoms and the 'two moral powers' of reasonableness and rationality. Basic freedoms are said to be preconditions for the development and exercise of these powers and are held to warrant priority over other justice-relevant values for that reason. In the first half of the article I mount an internal critique of this Rawlsian line, arguing that it is flawed in two main ways. First, it overestimates the contribution of basic freedom to moral personality. Second, it underestimates the contribution of non-liberty resources (such as basic material necessities, but also opportunities for culture, education, leisure, and social contribution) to moral personality. In the second half of the article I repair these flaws (thus putting liberty in its proper place, if you like). The result is a new, intriguingly radical version of justice as fairness, one with surprising—yet plausible—implications for economic and gender justice.

What is arbitrary power

Republicans define domination as subjection to arbitrary power. But what is arbitrary power? We c... more Republicans define domination as subjection to arbitrary power. But
what is arbitrary power? We consider three views. According to the
first, championed recently by Frank Lovett, power is arbitrary insofar
as it is unconstrained. According to the second, advanced most
prominently by Philip Pettit in his recent work, power is arbitrary
insofar as it is uncontrolled by those subject to it. According to
the third, found (among other places) in Pettit’s early work, power
is arbitrary insofar as it is not forced to track the interests of those
subject to it. We advance several objections against each of the first
two views and offer support for the third. Pettit, we might say, got it
right the first time.

Capitalism, Class Conflict, and Domination

Capitalists have a great deal of power over workers, both at the site of production and in the re... more Capitalists have a great deal of power over workers, both at the site of production and in the realm of politics. Yet neither form of power is forced to track the interests of workers. On the contrary, capitalists are largely forced to use their power over workers in profit-maximizing ways—ways that frequently clash with the interests of workers. It follows that capitalists do not merely have power over workers; they have arbitrary power over them. But, as neo-republicanism teaches, to have arbitrary power over another is to dominate that other. Capitalists therefore dominate workers both economically and politically. This result holds even across ‘friendlier’ versions of capitalism, including those that feature robust labor market competition and unconditional income support.

Social Equality and the Duty to Participate in Personal and Political Relationships

It is commonly thought that while people should have equal opportunity to participate in processe... more It is commonly thought that while people should have equal opportunity to participate in processes of personal and political decision-making, morality does not require individuals to exercise this opportunity. Non-participation is morally neutral. Or is it? In this essay I draw on recent work in the literature on “social egalitarianism” to construct a novel defense of the duty to participate in personal and political relationships. Social egalitarianism requires that relationships display equal concern for the interests of all members. This requirement, I argue, cannot be met when some members systematically fail to participate. In the name of social equality, therefore, people must actually participate in their various relationships. This obligation applies not merely to personal but also to certain political relationships. The upshot: one has a duty to participate in at least certain kinds of political activity—a result interestingly at odds with recent work on the ethics of participation.

Market Democracy: Land of Opportunity?

John Tomasi argues that aggressively pro-market, capitalist regimes can secure fair equality of o... more John Tomasi argues that aggressively pro-market, capitalist regimes can secure fair equality of opportunity-a level playing field-even as they honor people's thick economic liberties. The trick is to rely on markets to spread prosperity and high-quality healthcare and education to all. That done, each person will have fair opportunity. Or will he? In truth, Tomasi's "market-democratic" plan cannot bring genuinely fair opportunity to all, even at the level of ideal theory. Nor can it plausibly promise to increase the "quality" of opportunity: the supply, that is, of intrinsically desirable work.

Right-wing Rawlsianism: A Critique

The Difference Principle at Work

Drafts by Samuel Arnold

Draft encyclopedia entry on socialism.

Contesting the Work Spend Cycle: The Liberal Egalitarian Case Against Consumerism

Whither Work? The Politics and Ethics of Contemporary Work, 2020

Liberal egalitarian justice requires a less unequal society, measured in terms of income and weal... more Liberal egalitarian justice requires a less unequal society, measured in terms of income and wealth. But does it also require a less consumerist society—a society less fixated on getting and spending? In this chapter I identify a number of distinctively liberal egalitarian concerns with consumerism and the work-spend cycle it spawns. I argue that consumerism potentially threatens every aspect of liberal egalitarian justice—from political equality, to equal opportunity, to economic fairness, and even to basic needs satisfaction.
My argument draws on empirical work by Juliet Schor and Robert Frank, which I discuss in section 1. I then identify, in sections 2 through 4, various ways in which the consumerist work-and-spend dynamic described by Schor and Frank threatens liberal egalitarian principles and institutions. Sections 5 and 6 address a key objection: since one person’s spending is another person’s income, isn’t consumerism actually good for the poor—hence, something liberal egalitarians ought to promote, not discourage? Section 7 summarizes the argument and notes several unresolved questions that warrant further inquiry.

Putting Liberty in its Place: Rawlsian Liberalism without the Liberalism

To be a liberal is, among other things, to grant basic liberties some degree of priority over oth... more To be a liberal is, among other things, to grant basic liberties some degree of priority over other aspects of justice. But why do basic liberties warrant this special treatment? For Rawls, the answer has to do with the allegedly special connection between these freedoms and the 'two moral powers' of reasonableness and rationality. Basic freedoms are said to be preconditions for the development and exercise of these powers and are held to warrant priority over other justice-relevant values for that reason. In the first half of the article I mount an internal critique of this Rawlsian line, arguing that it is flawed in two main ways. First, it overestimates the contribution of basic freedom to moral personality. Second, it underestimates the contribution of non-liberty resources (such as basic material necessities, but also opportunities for culture, education, leisure, and social contribution) to moral personality. In the second half of the article I repair these flaws (thus putting liberty in its proper place, if you like). The result is a new, intriguingly radical version of justice as fairness, one with surprising—yet plausible—implications for economic and gender justice.

What is arbitrary power

Republicans define domination as subjection to arbitrary power. But what is arbitrary power? We c... more Republicans define domination as subjection to arbitrary power. But
what is arbitrary power? We consider three views. According to the
first, championed recently by Frank Lovett, power is arbitrary insofar
as it is unconstrained. According to the second, advanced most
prominently by Philip Pettit in his recent work, power is arbitrary
insofar as it is uncontrolled by those subject to it. According to
the third, found (among other places) in Pettit’s early work, power
is arbitrary insofar as it is not forced to track the interests of those
subject to it. We advance several objections against each of the first
two views and offer support for the third. Pettit, we might say, got it
right the first time.

Capitalism, Class Conflict, and Domination

Capitalists have a great deal of power over workers, both at the site of production and in the re... more Capitalists have a great deal of power over workers, both at the site of production and in the realm of politics. Yet neither form of power is forced to track the interests of workers. On the contrary, capitalists are largely forced to use their power over workers in profit-maximizing ways—ways that frequently clash with the interests of workers. It follows that capitalists do not merely have power over workers; they have arbitrary power over them. But, as neo-republicanism teaches, to have arbitrary power over another is to dominate that other. Capitalists therefore dominate workers both economically and politically. This result holds even across ‘friendlier’ versions of capitalism, including those that feature robust labor market competition and unconditional income support.

Social Equality and the Duty to Participate in Personal and Political Relationships

It is commonly thought that while people should have equal opportunity to participate in processe... more It is commonly thought that while people should have equal opportunity to participate in processes of personal and political decision-making, morality does not require individuals to exercise this opportunity. Non-participation is morally neutral. Or is it? In this essay I draw on recent work in the literature on “social egalitarianism” to construct a novel defense of the duty to participate in personal and political relationships. Social egalitarianism requires that relationships display equal concern for the interests of all members. This requirement, I argue, cannot be met when some members systematically fail to participate. In the name of social equality, therefore, people must actually participate in their various relationships. This obligation applies not merely to personal but also to certain political relationships. The upshot: one has a duty to participate in at least certain kinds of political activity—a result interestingly at odds with recent work on the ethics of participation.

Market Democracy: Land of Opportunity?

John Tomasi argues that aggressively pro-market, capitalist regimes can secure fair equality of o... more John Tomasi argues that aggressively pro-market, capitalist regimes can secure fair equality of opportunity-a level playing field-even as they honor people's thick economic liberties. The trick is to rely on markets to spread prosperity and high-quality healthcare and education to all. That done, each person will have fair opportunity. Or will he? In truth, Tomasi's "market-democratic" plan cannot bring genuinely fair opportunity to all, even at the level of ideal theory. Nor can it plausibly promise to increase the "quality" of opportunity: the supply, that is, of intrinsically desirable work.

Right-wing Rawlsianism: A Critique

The Difference Principle at Work

Draft encyclopedia entry on socialism.