... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections ... more ... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections to Lewis are offered by Harman ('Desired Desires', in CW Morris and RG Frey (eds), Value, Welfare and Morality ... Boyd [5, p. 195] builds epistemic elements into the very definition of reference. ...
Many traditional arguments against moral facts were based on the assumption that, as a matter of ... more Many traditional arguments against moral facts were based on the assumption that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, moral judgments express attitudes, give reasons for action, or m0tivate.l According to some, no facts can necessitate such attitudes or reasons. According to others such facts, even if possible, would be "metaphysically queer."2 Either way, the idea that moral judgments express true factual statements was called into serious doubt. A priori considerations of this sort play a lesser role in recent debates. For once, the view that there are any necessary connections between moral facts and reasons or motives for action is now less popular.3 In addition, even those who endorse this view try to resolve the dispute over moral facts without engaging the issue of internalism. Gilbert Harman, for example, seems sympathetic to the views implying that "To think t h a t you ought to do something is to be motivated to do it" (1977, p. 33). Yet his central argument against moral facts has nothing to do with this internalist dictum. Rather, it emphasizes the following asymmetry between science and ethics: you need to make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the occurrence of the observations that support a scientific theory, but you do not seem to need to make assumptions about any moral facts to explain the occurrence of the so-called moral observations. .. . In the moral case, it would seem that you need only make assumptions about the psychology or moral sensibility of the person making the moral observation. In the scientific case, theory is tested against the world.' Notice an important difference between this empiricist argument and the more traditional attacks on moral facts. Rather than emphasizing various a priori considerations it Stefan Sencerz received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester. He teaches at Wayne State University, dwells in the heart of Detroit, listens to jazz, and loves playing chess. He has published papers, in English and in Polish, on various ethical and metaethical issues and on Descartes.
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la meilleure explication du phenomene de conversion moral... more L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la meilleure explication du phenomene de conversion morale releve de l'internalisme ethique. Rejetant la position de R. Werner qui affirme la superiorite theorique du realisme ethique, l'A. montre qu'on ne peut identifier le jugement moral aux croyances factuelles, c'est-a-dire aux conversions scientifiques
In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that ... more In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that is based on two factors: on the level of mental development of a being who is affected and on the significance of the interests that are affected. I argue that this view accommodates two different sets of moral intuitions. On one hand, it explains why, in general, humans have the special moral standing that is typically attributed to us. On the other hand, it also allows us to accommodate much of our intuition about how animals ought to be treated. In addition, this view is supported also by plausible general theoretical considerations. Subsequently, I explore some implications of this view for some real-life examples of our interactions with animals, especially, for the practice of raising them for food using industrial methods. I argue that this practice is morally wrong and that the correct approach is to adopt a (nearly) plant-based lifestyle.
Powinności wobec zwierząt i zwierzęce prawabibliografia wybrana Niniejsza bibliografia nie jest k... more Powinności wobec zwierząt i zwierzęce prawabibliografia wybrana Niniejsza bibliografia nie jest kompletna. Po pierwsze, ponieważ koncentruje się wokół kwestii moralnych, w zasadzie nie uwzględnia prac traktujących o ludzkiej i zwierzęcej naturze. Z tego powodu pominięto tak podstawowe skądinąd prace, jak np. część V Rozprawy o metodzie Descartesa: tegoż list do Markizy Newcastel (23 novembre 1646, w: Ch. Adam, P. Tannery (ed.), Oeuvr.es de Descartes t. IV, Paris 1897-1913) czy tegoż list do H. More'a (5 fevrier 1649, tamże, t. V). (Wszystkie trzy prace są przedrukowane w antologii Regana i Singera, poz. 123 niniejszej bibliografii. Stanowisko Descartesa analizuje J. Cottingham, A Brute to the Brutes? : Descartes' Treatment of Animals, "Philosophy"', Pomiędzy teologami nie ma zgody co do tego, jak należy I'Ozumieć nakaz panowania 1 nad zwierzętami. Zob. 121, 185. b) Rodz. 2:15. "Jahwe Bóg wziął zatem człowieka umieścił go w ogrodzie Eden, aby uprawiał i doglądał go". c) Rodz. 9:1-4. "Po czym Bóg pobłogosławił Noego i jego synów,. mówiąc do nich: « Bądźcie płodni i mnóżcie się , abyście zaludnili ziemię. Wszelkie zaś zwierzę na ziemi i wszelkie ptactwo powietrzne niechaj się was boi i lęka. Wszystko co się porusza na ziemi, i wszystkie ryby morskie zostały bowiem oddane wam we władanie. Wszystko, co się porusza i żyje, jest przeznaczone dla was na pokarm, tak jak rośliny zielone daję wam wszystko. Tylko Illie wolno wam jeść mięsa z krwią życia»" d) Rodz. 9:8-17. Bóg zawiązuje przymierze z Noem, ze wszystkimi jego potomkami potomkami potomków, i ze wszystkimi zwierzętami. Zob. 4b. IV w. p.n.e.
In her very interesting paper, "Peter Singer on Expendability," L. A. Kemmerer reexamines Peter S... more In her very interesting paper, "Peter Singer on Expendability," L. A. Kemmerer reexamines Peter Singer's utilitarian argument implying that some being are replaceable and the implications of this argument for the issue of treating animals. I attempt to defend Singer, and more generally utilitarianism (including the principle of replaceability), against these objections. I argue that, given a utilitarian outlook, some animals are indeed replaceable. But I also argue that few animals are replaceable in practice.
Zwierzęta i ludzie jako istoty równe: odpowiedź Reganowi W swoim artykule Prawa i krzywda zwierzą... more Zwierzęta i ludzie jako istoty równe: odpowiedź Reganowi W swoim artykule Prawa i krzywda zwierząt 1 Tom Regan analizuje i odrzuca trzy próby odpowiedzi na pytanie, jak należy traktować zwierzęta. Jego zdaniem problemu tego nie rozwiązują w należyty sposób ani Kant, ani autorzy stojący na gruncie stanowiska "zwalczania okrucieństwa", ani utylitaryzm. Wadą pierwszego rozwiązania jest to, iż zupełnie ignoruje cierpienie i niedole zwierząt. Wadą drugiego-przedstawicielem jest John Locke-to, że miesza kwestie dotyczące stanu umysłu sprawcy danego czynu z kwestiami dotyczącymi wartości samego czynu. Wadą trzeciego, zajmowanego m.in. przez Petera Singera, ma być to, że nie tylko nie dostarcza podstaw, aby moralnie zdyskwalifikować typowe sposoby wykorzystywania zwierząt, lecz co gorsza może w istocie dostarczyć podstaw, aby w interesie grupy wykorzystywać zarówno zwierzęta, jak i ludzi. Pozytywne rozwiązanie, jakie proponuje Regan, wygląda następująconależy przypisać zwierzętom prawa, w tym prawo, by nie być krzywdzonym, i to prawa, które nie dałyby się sprowadzić do ' wartości konsekwencji, jakie dotyczą jednostek. Jest to rozwiązanie, które ma uniknąć obiekcji uderzających w pozostałe. Jeśli ktoś został przekonany przez krytyczne argumenty Regana (a moim zdaniem przynajmniej w odniesieniu do stanowisk Locke'a, a i Kanta są to argumenty trafne i przekonujące), a nie został przekonany przez jego pozytywny argument, łatwo może odnieść wrażenie, że nie istnieje dobry sposób rozwiązania problemu powinności wobec zwierząt. A niestety można wysunąć zasadnicze obiekcje pod adresem pozytywnego rozwiązania Regana 2 • 1 T. Regan, Prawa i krzywda zwierząt, w niniejszym tomie "Etyki". 2 Stanowisko Regana krytykuje W. A.iken. Zob. jego Zwier z ęta i prawa: w odpowiedzi Reganowi, w niniejszym tomie "Etyki". Sądzę jednak, że jego krytyka jest nietrafna. Nie uwzględnia bowiem faktu, iż przyrodzona wartość, jaką mają
In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls... more In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls occupy a special position in the sphere of moral concern. First, I place these arguments in their historical and cultural contexts. Next, I formulate several conditions of adequacy that all such arguments must satisfy. Subsequently, I distinguish two different general kinds of such arguments: Inclusionary arguments attempt to use the immortality of soul as a criterion for either including someone into a sphere of morality while excluding others or, at least, for elevating someone's position within this sphere. Modifying arguments attempt to strengthen or weaken moral considerations that already apply to a being included into the sphere of morality. I argue that, although some modifying arguments may fulfill all conditions of adequacy, they have very little practical importance.
The view that all human beings have immortal souls. and that this supports our special dignity or... more The view that all human beings have immortal souls. and that this supports our special dignity or value, is one deeply rooted in Western culture. Our culture has been dominated by Christianity for several hundred years, and this view is an essential part of the Christian tradition. Together with other parts of this tradition. e.g.. some views about the fate of the soul. the inferiority of animals. etc.. it seems to have had a strong motivational force. As Peter Singer expresses the point: Christianity hrought into the Roman world the idea of the uniqueness of man. which it inherited from the Jewish tradition hut inhisted upon with still greatercmphasis hecauw of the importance it placed on man's immortal soul. Man. and man alone ofall beings li\ing on earth. was destined for a life after his bodily death. With this came the distinctively Christian idea of the sanctity ol all human lile.' The importance of the idea of the uniqueness of man is, of course. more than merely historical. Surprisingly enough. many moral arguments for this uniqueness still resemble the traditional Christian view. R. G. Frey, for instance, wrote recently that one of"the best defenses"of the claim that babies and severely mentally-enfeebled people d o have rights is the religious argument based on the assumption that all human beings possess immortal souls. If this argument is rejected. on the ground that. eben if they possess immortal souls. beings must also possess rationality in order tu have rights, or on the ground that thcre is no good evidence for the existence of such souls. then neither babies nor the severely menlallyenfeebled possess rights. O n the other hand. the religious argument docs separate both from Fido. who is not conceded a n immortal soul by the argument's proponents.' Similarly, Richard Wasserstrom. a leading American philosopher of law and morals, acknowledges the interest of philosophers and theologians in the assumption that human beings have souls. Discussing the moral status of the human fetus. he remarks that Srqfan Srncerz is completing his Ph.D. thesis ar the UniverJity q / Rochester on jusrlfi'cation in ethics by appealing t o inruitions. He has published, both in Polish and in English, on justifcation in ethics and on moral problems involved in the treatmenl qf animal.,.
Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, Nov 19, 2019
This paper discusses the Indirect Duties View implying that, when our actions have no negative ef... more This paper discusses the Indirect Duties View implying that, when our actions have no negative effects on humans, we can treat animals any way we wish. I offer several criticisms of this view. Subsequently, I explore some implications of rejecting this view that rise in the contexts of animal research and veterinarian ethics. Keywords Moral status of animals • Duties to animals • Indirect duties view • Aquinas • Kant • Research ethics • Veterinarian ethics Preliminaries: The Concept of Moral Standing Let us assume, for the sake of this paper, the following: (MS) A being has a moral standing (and thus is included into a sphere of morality) if and only if the moral status of our actions (i.e., whether or not they are obligatory, right, permissible, wrong, forbidden, and so on) intrinsically depends on how this being is affected. 1
This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative f... more This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative force in moral reasoning and hence do not count in ethical justification. In the second, I answer some possible objections to my case. I Appeals to Moral Intuitions and "No Credibility "Argument Philosophers today use the term "moral intuition" to refer to a certain kind of moral judgment which people hold about particular actions, situations, individuals, etc.; such judgments need not be self-evident or indubitable, but they must be maintained sincerely and not result from any inference or derivation from developed moral principles or theories.' Although many philosophers do refer to such judgments in the process of vindicating, refuting, or adjusting moral principles and theories, it is still open to question whether such a procedure can be justified. Since moral intuitions may result from selfinterest, self-deception, historical or cultural accident, hidden class bias, and so on, a method based on an appeal to such judgments may be "no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices".2 A number of authors have proposed recently a procedure which includes an appeal to moral intuitions but is intended to avoid the objection that they are simply prejudices. The proponents of this procedure claim, first, that these judgments are carefully selected, or filtered, and therefore considered; and second, that the full justification of any moral proposition results from coherence produced in a triple set of beliefs held by a person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories.3 Thus, the initially chosen moral intuitions are not assumed to be incorrigible but are treated rather as the provisional starting points, subjects to some further possible revisions. In this essay, I
In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that ... more In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that is based on two factors: on the level of mental development of a being who is affected and on the significance of the interests that are affected. I argue that this view accommodates two different sets of moral intuitions. On one hand, it explains why, in general, humans have the special moral standing that is typically attributed to us. On the other hand, it also allows us to accommodate much of our intuition about how animals ought to be treated. In addition, this view is supported also by plausible general theoretical considerations. Subsequently, I explore some implications of this view for some real-life examples of our interactions with animals, especially, for the practice of raising them for food using industrial methods. I argue that this practice is morally wrong and that the correct approach is to adopt a (nearly) plant-based lifestyle.
Journal for the Study of Religious Experience , 2022
Teachings about śūnyatā-emptiness play a central role in Mahayana Buddhism. They are also among t... more Teachings about śūnyatā-emptiness play a central role in Mahayana Buddhism. They are also among the most difficult teachings to grasp. At the same time, the game of basketball and the rituals surrounding it are sometimes hard to appreciate by those who are not already basketball aficionados; they tend to miss the philosophical, spiritual, and even mystical aspects of the game (and of sports in general). I argue in this essay that the language and rituals surrounding the game of basketball provide ‘windows’ to what Buddhists call śūnyatā. Thus, these language and rituals help us to understand phenomenology of meditative states as well as the related metaphysics and epistemology developed in the context of Mahayana Buddhism (especially Zen Buddhism). In turn, the language and rituals developed within the tradition of Zen help us to understand what sometimes happens on the basketball court.
Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics, 1986
This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative f... more This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative force in moral reasoning and hence do not count in ethical justification. In the second, I answer some possible objections to my case. I Appeals to Moral Intuitions and "No Credibility "Argument Philosophers today use the term "moral intuition" to refer to a certain kind of moral judgment which people hold about particular actions, situations, individuals, etc.; such judgments need not be self-evident or indubitable, but they must be maintained sincerely and not result from any inference or derivation from developed moral principles or theories.' Although many philosophers do refer to such judgments in the process of vindicating, refuting, or adjusting moral principles and theories, it is still open to question whether such a procedure can be justified. Since moral intuitions may result from selfinterest, self-deception, historical or cultural accident, hidden class bias, and so on, a method based on an appeal to such judgments may be "no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices".2 A number of authors have proposed recently a procedure which includes an appeal to moral intuitions but is intended to avoid the objection that they are simply prejudices. The proponents of this procedure claim, first, that these judgments are carefully selected, or filtered, and therefore considered; and second, that the full justification of any moral proposition results from coherence produced in a triple set of beliefs held by a person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories.3 Thus, the initially chosen moral intuitions are not assumed to be incorrigible but are treated rather as the provisional starting points, subjects to some further possible revisions. In this essay, I
In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls... more In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls occupy a special position in the sphere of moral concern. First, I place these arguments in their historical and cultural contexts. Next, I formulate several conditions of adequacy that all such arguments must satisfy. Subsequently, I distinguish two different general kinds of such arguments: Inclusionary arguments attempt to use the immortality of soul as a criterion for either including someone into a sphere of morality while excluding others or, at least, for elevating someone's position within this sphere. Modifying arguments attempt to strengthen or weaken moral considerations that already apply to a being included into the sphere of morality. I argue that, although some modifying arguments may fulfill all conditions of adequacy, they have very little practical importance.
... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections ... more ... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections to Lewis are offered by Harman ('Desired Desires', in CW Morris and RG Frey (eds), Value, Welfare and Morality ... Boyd [5, p. 195] builds epistemic elements into the very definition of reference. ...
... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections ... more ... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections to Lewis are offered by Harman ('Desired Desires', in CW Morris and RG Frey (eds), Value, Welfare and Morality ... Boyd [5, p. 195] builds epistemic elements into the very definition of reference. ...
Many traditional arguments against moral facts were based on the assumption that, as a matter of ... more Many traditional arguments against moral facts were based on the assumption that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, moral judgments express attitudes, give reasons for action, or m0tivate.l According to some, no facts can necessitate such attitudes or reasons. According to others such facts, even if possible, would be "metaphysically queer."2 Either way, the idea that moral judgments express true factual statements was called into serious doubt. A priori considerations of this sort play a lesser role in recent debates. For once, the view that there are any necessary connections between moral facts and reasons or motives for action is now less popular.3 In addition, even those who endorse this view try to resolve the dispute over moral facts without engaging the issue of internalism. Gilbert Harman, for example, seems sympathetic to the views implying that "To think t h a t you ought to do something is to be motivated to do it" (1977, p. 33). Yet his central argument against moral facts has nothing to do with this internalist dictum. Rather, it emphasizes the following asymmetry between science and ethics: you need to make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the occurrence of the observations that support a scientific theory, but you do not seem to need to make assumptions about any moral facts to explain the occurrence of the so-called moral observations. .. . In the moral case, it would seem that you need only make assumptions about the psychology or moral sensibility of the person making the moral observation. In the scientific case, theory is tested against the world.' Notice an important difference between this empiricist argument and the more traditional attacks on moral facts. Rather than emphasizing various a priori considerations it Stefan Sencerz received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester. He teaches at Wayne State University, dwells in the heart of Detroit, listens to jazz, and loves playing chess. He has published papers, in English and in Polish, on various ethical and metaethical issues and on Descartes.
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la meilleure explication du phenomene de conversion moral... more L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la meilleure explication du phenomene de conversion morale releve de l'internalisme ethique. Rejetant la position de R. Werner qui affirme la superiorite theorique du realisme ethique, l'A. montre qu'on ne peut identifier le jugement moral aux croyances factuelles, c'est-a-dire aux conversions scientifiques
In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that ... more In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that is based on two factors: on the level of mental development of a being who is affected and on the significance of the interests that are affected. I argue that this view accommodates two different sets of moral intuitions. On one hand, it explains why, in general, humans have the special moral standing that is typically attributed to us. On the other hand, it also allows us to accommodate much of our intuition about how animals ought to be treated. In addition, this view is supported also by plausible general theoretical considerations. Subsequently, I explore some implications of this view for some real-life examples of our interactions with animals, especially, for the practice of raising them for food using industrial methods. I argue that this practice is morally wrong and that the correct approach is to adopt a (nearly) plant-based lifestyle.
Powinności wobec zwierząt i zwierzęce prawabibliografia wybrana Niniejsza bibliografia nie jest k... more Powinności wobec zwierząt i zwierzęce prawabibliografia wybrana Niniejsza bibliografia nie jest kompletna. Po pierwsze, ponieważ koncentruje się wokół kwestii moralnych, w zasadzie nie uwzględnia prac traktujących o ludzkiej i zwierzęcej naturze. Z tego powodu pominięto tak podstawowe skądinąd prace, jak np. część V Rozprawy o metodzie Descartesa: tegoż list do Markizy Newcastel (23 novembre 1646, w: Ch. Adam, P. Tannery (ed.), Oeuvr.es de Descartes t. IV, Paris 1897-1913) czy tegoż list do H. More'a (5 fevrier 1649, tamże, t. V). (Wszystkie trzy prace są przedrukowane w antologii Regana i Singera, poz. 123 niniejszej bibliografii. Stanowisko Descartesa analizuje J. Cottingham, A Brute to the Brutes? : Descartes' Treatment of Animals, "Philosophy"', Pomiędzy teologami nie ma zgody co do tego, jak należy I'Ozumieć nakaz panowania 1 nad zwierzętami. Zob. 121, 185. b) Rodz. 2:15. "Jahwe Bóg wziął zatem człowieka umieścił go w ogrodzie Eden, aby uprawiał i doglądał go". c) Rodz. 9:1-4. "Po czym Bóg pobłogosławił Noego i jego synów,. mówiąc do nich: « Bądźcie płodni i mnóżcie się , abyście zaludnili ziemię. Wszelkie zaś zwierzę na ziemi i wszelkie ptactwo powietrzne niechaj się was boi i lęka. Wszystko co się porusza na ziemi, i wszystkie ryby morskie zostały bowiem oddane wam we władanie. Wszystko, co się porusza i żyje, jest przeznaczone dla was na pokarm, tak jak rośliny zielone daję wam wszystko. Tylko Illie wolno wam jeść mięsa z krwią życia»" d) Rodz. 9:8-17. Bóg zawiązuje przymierze z Noem, ze wszystkimi jego potomkami potomkami potomków, i ze wszystkimi zwierzętami. Zob. 4b. IV w. p.n.e.
In her very interesting paper, "Peter Singer on Expendability," L. A. Kemmerer reexamines Peter S... more In her very interesting paper, "Peter Singer on Expendability," L. A. Kemmerer reexamines Peter Singer's utilitarian argument implying that some being are replaceable and the implications of this argument for the issue of treating animals. I attempt to defend Singer, and more generally utilitarianism (including the principle of replaceability), against these objections. I argue that, given a utilitarian outlook, some animals are indeed replaceable. But I also argue that few animals are replaceable in practice.
Zwierzęta i ludzie jako istoty równe: odpowiedź Reganowi W swoim artykule Prawa i krzywda zwierzą... more Zwierzęta i ludzie jako istoty równe: odpowiedź Reganowi W swoim artykule Prawa i krzywda zwierząt 1 Tom Regan analizuje i odrzuca trzy próby odpowiedzi na pytanie, jak należy traktować zwierzęta. Jego zdaniem problemu tego nie rozwiązują w należyty sposób ani Kant, ani autorzy stojący na gruncie stanowiska "zwalczania okrucieństwa", ani utylitaryzm. Wadą pierwszego rozwiązania jest to, iż zupełnie ignoruje cierpienie i niedole zwierząt. Wadą drugiego-przedstawicielem jest John Locke-to, że miesza kwestie dotyczące stanu umysłu sprawcy danego czynu z kwestiami dotyczącymi wartości samego czynu. Wadą trzeciego, zajmowanego m.in. przez Petera Singera, ma być to, że nie tylko nie dostarcza podstaw, aby moralnie zdyskwalifikować typowe sposoby wykorzystywania zwierząt, lecz co gorsza może w istocie dostarczyć podstaw, aby w interesie grupy wykorzystywać zarówno zwierzęta, jak i ludzi. Pozytywne rozwiązanie, jakie proponuje Regan, wygląda następująconależy przypisać zwierzętom prawa, w tym prawo, by nie być krzywdzonym, i to prawa, które nie dałyby się sprowadzić do ' wartości konsekwencji, jakie dotyczą jednostek. Jest to rozwiązanie, które ma uniknąć obiekcji uderzających w pozostałe. Jeśli ktoś został przekonany przez krytyczne argumenty Regana (a moim zdaniem przynajmniej w odniesieniu do stanowisk Locke'a, a i Kanta są to argumenty trafne i przekonujące), a nie został przekonany przez jego pozytywny argument, łatwo może odnieść wrażenie, że nie istnieje dobry sposób rozwiązania problemu powinności wobec zwierząt. A niestety można wysunąć zasadnicze obiekcje pod adresem pozytywnego rozwiązania Regana 2 • 1 T. Regan, Prawa i krzywda zwierząt, w niniejszym tomie "Etyki". 2 Stanowisko Regana krytykuje W. A.iken. Zob. jego Zwier z ęta i prawa: w odpowiedzi Reganowi, w niniejszym tomie "Etyki". Sądzę jednak, że jego krytyka jest nietrafna. Nie uwzględnia bowiem faktu, iż przyrodzona wartość, jaką mają
In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls... more In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls occupy a special position in the sphere of moral concern. First, I place these arguments in their historical and cultural contexts. Next, I formulate several conditions of adequacy that all such arguments must satisfy. Subsequently, I distinguish two different general kinds of such arguments: Inclusionary arguments attempt to use the immortality of soul as a criterion for either including someone into a sphere of morality while excluding others or, at least, for elevating someone's position within this sphere. Modifying arguments attempt to strengthen or weaken moral considerations that already apply to a being included into the sphere of morality. I argue that, although some modifying arguments may fulfill all conditions of adequacy, they have very little practical importance.
The view that all human beings have immortal souls. and that this supports our special dignity or... more The view that all human beings have immortal souls. and that this supports our special dignity or value, is one deeply rooted in Western culture. Our culture has been dominated by Christianity for several hundred years, and this view is an essential part of the Christian tradition. Together with other parts of this tradition. e.g.. some views about the fate of the soul. the inferiority of animals. etc.. it seems to have had a strong motivational force. As Peter Singer expresses the point: Christianity hrought into the Roman world the idea of the uniqueness of man. which it inherited from the Jewish tradition hut inhisted upon with still greatercmphasis hecauw of the importance it placed on man's immortal soul. Man. and man alone ofall beings li\ing on earth. was destined for a life after his bodily death. With this came the distinctively Christian idea of the sanctity ol all human lile.' The importance of the idea of the uniqueness of man is, of course. more than merely historical. Surprisingly enough. many moral arguments for this uniqueness still resemble the traditional Christian view. R. G. Frey, for instance, wrote recently that one of"the best defenses"of the claim that babies and severely mentally-enfeebled people d o have rights is the religious argument based on the assumption that all human beings possess immortal souls. If this argument is rejected. on the ground that. eben if they possess immortal souls. beings must also possess rationality in order tu have rights, or on the ground that thcre is no good evidence for the existence of such souls. then neither babies nor the severely menlallyenfeebled possess rights. O n the other hand. the religious argument docs separate both from Fido. who is not conceded a n immortal soul by the argument's proponents.' Similarly, Richard Wasserstrom. a leading American philosopher of law and morals, acknowledges the interest of philosophers and theologians in the assumption that human beings have souls. Discussing the moral status of the human fetus. he remarks that Srqfan Srncerz is completing his Ph.D. thesis ar the UniverJity q / Rochester on jusrlfi'cation in ethics by appealing t o inruitions. He has published, both in Polish and in English, on justifcation in ethics and on moral problems involved in the treatmenl qf animal.,.
Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, Nov 19, 2019
This paper discusses the Indirect Duties View implying that, when our actions have no negative ef... more This paper discusses the Indirect Duties View implying that, when our actions have no negative effects on humans, we can treat animals any way we wish. I offer several criticisms of this view. Subsequently, I explore some implications of rejecting this view that rise in the contexts of animal research and veterinarian ethics. Keywords Moral status of animals • Duties to animals • Indirect duties view • Aquinas • Kant • Research ethics • Veterinarian ethics Preliminaries: The Concept of Moral Standing Let us assume, for the sake of this paper, the following: (MS) A being has a moral standing (and thus is included into a sphere of morality) if and only if the moral status of our actions (i.e., whether or not they are obligatory, right, permissible, wrong, forbidden, and so on) intrinsically depends on how this being is affected. 1
This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative f... more This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative force in moral reasoning and hence do not count in ethical justification. In the second, I answer some possible objections to my case. I Appeals to Moral Intuitions and "No Credibility "Argument Philosophers today use the term "moral intuition" to refer to a certain kind of moral judgment which people hold about particular actions, situations, individuals, etc.; such judgments need not be self-evident or indubitable, but they must be maintained sincerely and not result from any inference or derivation from developed moral principles or theories.' Although many philosophers do refer to such judgments in the process of vindicating, refuting, or adjusting moral principles and theories, it is still open to question whether such a procedure can be justified. Since moral intuitions may result from selfinterest, self-deception, historical or cultural accident, hidden class bias, and so on, a method based on an appeal to such judgments may be "no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices".2 A number of authors have proposed recently a procedure which includes an appeal to moral intuitions but is intended to avoid the objection that they are simply prejudices. The proponents of this procedure claim, first, that these judgments are carefully selected, or filtered, and therefore considered; and second, that the full justification of any moral proposition results from coherence produced in a triple set of beliefs held by a person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories.3 Thus, the initially chosen moral intuitions are not assumed to be incorrigible but are treated rather as the provisional starting points, subjects to some further possible revisions. In this essay, I
In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that ... more In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that is based on two factors: on the level of mental development of a being who is affected and on the significance of the interests that are affected. I argue that this view accommodates two different sets of moral intuitions. On one hand, it explains why, in general, humans have the special moral standing that is typically attributed to us. On the other hand, it also allows us to accommodate much of our intuition about how animals ought to be treated. In addition, this view is supported also by plausible general theoretical considerations. Subsequently, I explore some implications of this view for some real-life examples of our interactions with animals, especially, for the practice of raising them for food using industrial methods. I argue that this practice is morally wrong and that the correct approach is to adopt a (nearly) plant-based lifestyle.
Journal for the Study of Religious Experience , 2022
Teachings about śūnyatā-emptiness play a central role in Mahayana Buddhism. They are also among t... more Teachings about śūnyatā-emptiness play a central role in Mahayana Buddhism. They are also among the most difficult teachings to grasp. At the same time, the game of basketball and the rituals surrounding it are sometimes hard to appreciate by those who are not already basketball aficionados; they tend to miss the philosophical, spiritual, and even mystical aspects of the game (and of sports in general). I argue in this essay that the language and rituals surrounding the game of basketball provide ‘windows’ to what Buddhists call śūnyatā. Thus, these language and rituals help us to understand phenomenology of meditative states as well as the related metaphysics and epistemology developed in the context of Mahayana Buddhism (especially Zen Buddhism). In turn, the language and rituals developed within the tradition of Zen help us to understand what sometimes happens on the basketball court.
Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics, 1986
This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative f... more This essay consists of two parts. In the first, I argue that moral intuitions have no probative force in moral reasoning and hence do not count in ethical justification. In the second, I answer some possible objections to my case. I Appeals to Moral Intuitions and "No Credibility "Argument Philosophers today use the term "moral intuition" to refer to a certain kind of moral judgment which people hold about particular actions, situations, individuals, etc.; such judgments need not be self-evident or indubitable, but they must be maintained sincerely and not result from any inference or derivation from developed moral principles or theories.' Although many philosophers do refer to such judgments in the process of vindicating, refuting, or adjusting moral principles and theories, it is still open to question whether such a procedure can be justified. Since moral intuitions may result from selfinterest, self-deception, historical or cultural accident, hidden class bias, and so on, a method based on an appeal to such judgments may be "no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices".2 A number of authors have proposed recently a procedure which includes an appeal to moral intuitions but is intended to avoid the objection that they are simply prejudices. The proponents of this procedure claim, first, that these judgments are carefully selected, or filtered, and therefore considered; and second, that the full justification of any moral proposition results from coherence produced in a triple set of beliefs held by a person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories.3 Thus, the initially chosen moral intuitions are not assumed to be incorrigible but are treated rather as the provisional starting points, subjects to some further possible revisions. In this essay, I
In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls... more In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls occupy a special position in the sphere of moral concern. First, I place these arguments in their historical and cultural contexts. Next, I formulate several conditions of adequacy that all such arguments must satisfy. Subsequently, I distinguish two different general kinds of such arguments: Inclusionary arguments attempt to use the immortality of soul as a criterion for either including someone into a sphere of morality while excluding others or, at least, for elevating someone's position within this sphere. Modifying arguments attempt to strengthen or weaken moral considerations that already apply to a being included into the sphere of morality. I argue that, although some modifying arguments may fulfill all conditions of adequacy, they have very little practical importance.
... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections ... more ... (C03) Moral facts are sufficiently epistemically accessible to normal ... Further objections to Lewis are offered by Harman ('Desired Desires', in CW Morris and RG Frey (eds), Value, Welfare and Morality ... Boyd [5, p. 195] builds epistemic elements into the very definition of reference. ...
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Papers by Stefan Sencerz