Papers by Catherine Eckel
The IZA World of Labor, Jun 18, 2019
In measuring risk aversion, it is important to consider carefully the purpose of the measure, the... more In measuring risk aversion, it is important to consider carefully the purpose of the measure, the costs of alternative measures, and the abilities and experiences of the target respondents. Incentivized tasks provide a more precise measure, but are costly to implement and may be difficult for some subjects to comprehend. Survey measures are easier and less costly to implement and may be better for nonfinancial domains, but may not be sufficiently precise. Overall, the evidence does not support the general belief that incentivized tasks are superior in all (or most) cases, implying that surveys may warrant increased usage in certain contexts.
The IZA World of Labor, Jun 18, 2019
In measuring risk aversion, it is important to consider carefully the purpose of the measure, the... more In measuring risk aversion, it is important to consider carefully the purpose of the measure, the costs of alternative measures, and the abilities and experiences of the target respondents. Incentivized tasks provide a more precise measure, but are costly to implement and may be difficult for some subjects to comprehend. Survey measures are easier and less costly to implement and may be better for nonfinancial domains, but may not be sufficiently precise. Overall, the evidence does not support the general belief that incentivized tasks are superior in all (or most) cases, implying that surveys may warrant increased usage in certain contexts.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019
In many principal-agent settings, the effort provided by the agent benefits a third party, such a... more In many principal-agent settings, the effort provided by the agent benefits a third party, such as a client or customer who is in need of care. In these settings the worker's pro-social motivations can substantially impact the quality of the product or service and the well-being of the client. We capture this setting by expanding the classic trust game to include three players: a principal, an agent, and a recipient who requires care. The principal can transfer resources to an agent, trusting the agent to then transfer resources to the needy recipient; the latter transfers are tripled. As in the two-player version, we find high, but variable, levels of trust and pay-it-forward reciprocity (agent transfers to target) in the baseline game. Two treatments mimic potential policy interventions intended to improve the level of care. The first provides a budget subsidy to the principal, and the second alters the effectiveness (multiplier) of the agent's transfers. Results show that the behavior of the agent does not vary by treatment, and is determined primarily by the amount received from the principal. Principals, on the other hand, do respond to the policy changes. Subsidies have little impact on the care recipient, but policies impacting the agent's efficiency increase the amount entrusted to them by principals and significantly impact the well being of the recipient. Results suggest that policies that increase the effectiveness of care workers (the agents), such as include increased worker training and reductions in administrative burden, may significantly impact the quality of work provided.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Apr 2, 2021
How can charities solicit high-capacity donors to provide the funds for matching grants and leade... more How can charities solicit high-capacity donors to provide the funds for matching grants and leadership gifts? In conjunction with one of Texas A&M University's fundraising organizations, we conducted a field experiment to study whether high-income donors respond to non-personal solicitations, as well as the effect of allowing for directed giving on high-income donors and their willingness to direct their donations towards overhead costs. We found that high-income donors are not responsive to letters or e-mails. The option to direct giving had no effect on the probability of donating or the amount donated. Our results suggest that motivating high-income donors requires more personal communication.
Social Science Research Network, 2010
One commonly-used strategy in charitable fundraising is sharing names and contact information of ... more One commonly-used strategy in charitable fundraising is sharing names and contact information of donors between organizations, even those whose missions are unrelated. The efficacy of this practice hinges on the existence of "giving types," that is, a positive correlation at the individual level between giving to one organization and to another. We run an experiment using a nonstudent sample (an artefactual field experiment) in which participants have the opportunity to donate to multiple charitable organizations. We examine the relationship between giving to one organization and giving to another. Our results support the existence of a giving type; a factor analysis demonstrates that giving decisions are driven by a single (unique) factor, and individuals who give to one organization, give significantly more to other organizations than do non-donors. Our results have important implications for the economics of charity and for fundraising practice.
Experimental Economics, Dec 11, 2017
A number of studies have shown that immigrants affect the investment decisions of individuals lef... more A number of studies have shown that immigrants affect the investment decisions of individuals left behind in their native countries, but very little is understood about why or how this occurs. We draw on competing theories of herding and externalities to explain how information is transmitted through the social network and used by its recipients. We use data from a field experiment to test these theories. In the experiment individuals send information about risky decisions to others in their social network. We examine the conditions under which that information is impactful in influencing decisions in the home country. We find strong evidence that supports herding behavior. The results provide insight, explain and predict how immigration can affect investment decisions of those in the home country, and suggest policies to leverage existing immigration patterns to increase economic development abroad.
Social Science Research Network, 2009
Previous research has demonstrated that people are not homogeneous in their social preference (co... more Previous research has demonstrated that people are not homogeneous in their social preference (common types include Nash/selfish, conditional cooperators, and pure altruists). Thus several factors become important in predicting and explaining public goods provision: social preference type, group composition and the information available about the group composition. We use an experimental design and elicit both unconditional and conditional (based on others' contribution decisions) provision strategies from each participant. We categorize subjects into social preference types and recruit selfish and conditional cooperator types for a follow-up experiment. We systematically vary the homogeneity of group composition and the information made available to subjects about group it. We examine the effects of own type, group composition and information on contributions. . We find that both group composition and information impact efficiency.
Journal of Socio-economics, Mar 1, 2004
Social Science Research Network, 2013
Do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? Our results from an asset market ... more Do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? Our results from an asset market experiment using the Smith, Suchaneck, and Williams (1988) framework show marked gender difference in producing speculative price bubbles. Using 35 markets from different studies, a meta-analysis confirms the inverse relationship between the magnitude of price bubbles and the frequency of female traders in the market. Women's price forecasts also are much lower, even in the first period. Additional analysis shows the results are not due to differences in risk aversion, personality, or math skills. Implications for financial markets and experimental methodology are discussed.
Economics Letters, Jul 1, 2017
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service... more This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. Using the Smith, Suchaneck, and Williams (1988) asset market design, we conduct single-sex markets in which either only males ore only females participate. In contrast to , participants were not aware of the fact that they trade in same-sex markets. While Eckel and Füllbrunn (2015) report a substantial gender effect, we find no difference in bubble formation comparing twelve All-male with twelve All-female markets.
Southern Economic Journal, Jul 1, 1992
Page 1. Price Discrimination with Correlated Demands* CATHERINE C. ECKEL WILLIAM T. SMITH Virgini... more Page 1. Price Discrimination with Correlated Demands* CATHERINE C. ECKEL WILLIAM T. SMITH Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, Virginia I. Introduction In this paper we analyze customer-class ...
Social Science Research Network, 2009
Our research investigates whether social preferences are stable across contexts in the field. We ... more Our research investigates whether social preferences are stable across contexts in the field. We recruit participants from a low-income urban neighborhood in Dallas, Texas. We demonstrate the stability of cooperative actions across multiple decision contexts: Choices in a laboratory VCM predict behavior in several donation experiments and self-reported measures of donations and volunteering outside the lab. These results have important implications for our ability to model a general preference for cooperation as well as for public policy regarding the voluntary provision of public goods.
The World Bank eBooks, May 1, 2012
The Impact Evaluation Series has been established in recognition of the importance of impact eval... more The Impact Evaluation Series has been established in recognition of the importance of impact evaluation studies for World Bank operations and for development in general. The series serves as a vehicle for the dissemination of findings of those studies. Papers in this series are part of the Bank's Policy Research Working Paper Series. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This paper begins with a discussion of non-experimental work in this area, and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at . The author may be contacted at [email protected]. The authors sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (through institutions and social norms), and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anti-corruption measures.
Southern Economic Journal, Jul 1, 2012
We investigate whether social preferences are stable across contexts using a field population of ... more We investigate whether social preferences are stable across contexts using a field population of low-income Americans. We develop and demonstrate a simplified, visually-based experimental methodology appropriate for this population. We show that choices in a laboratory public goods game predict giving in real donation experiments, as well as self-reported donations and volunteering outside the lab. At the same time, choices vary systematically by individual characteristics and decision context. Thus, our results provide evidence both for an underlying stable social preference and for the role of context in influencing the expression of that preference.
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Feb 1, 1985
The American Economic Review, Jun 1, 2011
People pay attention to the appearance of others, and personal characteristics can affect many ty... more People pay attention to the appearance of others, and personal characteristics can affect many types of decisions. We ask, is there informational value in a face in a situation where trust and reciprocity can increase earnings? We use a laboratory trust game experiment where subjects are unable to observe a counterpart, must observe a counterpart, or can pay to reveal a counterpart's photograph. Both senders and responders are willing to pay to observe the photos, and we show that behavior, earnings, and efficiency are affected. When subjects are “face to face,” efficiency is enhanced, and senders have higher earnings. (JEL D12, D83, Z13)
IZA world of labor, 2019
In measuring risk aversion, it is important to consider carefully the purpose of the measure, the... more In measuring risk aversion, it is important to consider carefully the purpose of the measure, the costs of alternative measures, and the abilities and experiences of the target respondents. Incentivized tasks provide a more precise measure, but are costly to implement and may be difficult for some subjects to comprehend. Survey measures are easier and less costly to implement and may be better for nonfinancial domains, but may not be sufficiently precise. Overall, the evidence does not support the general belief that incentivized tasks are superior in all (or most) cases, implying that surveys may warrant increased usage in certain contexts.
Journal of Economics and Business, Feb 1, 1987
Despite the concentration on peak-load pricing in public utility pricing theory, electric utiliti... more Despite the concentration on peak-load pricing in public utility pricing theory, electric utilities in the United States have divided consumers by customer type (residential, industrial, commercial) rather than time of use (peak, off-peak) in determining prices. In this paper a theory of customer-class pricing is developed which emphasizes the impact of demand characteristics on optimal prices and the utility's pricing incentives under regulation. It is shown that customer-class demand patterns matter in determining socially optimal prices, and that the rate-of-return regulated utility has an incentive to distort prices to manipulate demand in predictable ways.
Journal of behavioral and experimental economics, Feb 1, 2017
The use of directed giving -allowing donors to target their gifts to specific organizations or fu... more The use of directed giving -allowing donors to target their gifts to specific organizations or functions -is pervasive in fundraising, yet little is known about its effectiveness. We conduct a field experiment at a public university in which prospective donors are presented with either an opportunity to donate to the unrestricted Annual Fund, or an opportunity of donating to the Annual Fund and directing some or all of their donation towards the academic college from which they graduated. While there is no effect on the probability of giving, donations are significantly larger when there is the option of directing. However, the value of the option does not come directly from use, as very few donors choose to direct their gift.
American Journal of Health Promotion, Mar 1, 2013
Purpose-To examine the relationship between physical activity stages of change and preferences fo... more Purpose-To examine the relationship between physical activity stages of change and preferences for financial risk and time. Setting-A low-income, urban, African American neighborhood. Measures-Self-reported physical activity stages of change-precontemplation to maintenance, objectively measured BMI and waist circumference, and economic preferences for time and risk measured via incentivized economic experiments. Analysis-Multivariable ordered logistic regression models were used to examine the association between physical activity stages of change and economic preferences while controlling for demographic characteristics of the individuals. Results-Individuals who are more tolerant of financial risks (OR=1.31, p<0.05) and whose time preferences indicate more patience (OR=1.68, p<0.01) are more likely to be in a more advanced physical activity stage (e.g. from preparation to action). The likelihood of being in the maintenance stage increases by 5.6 and 10.9 percentage points for each 1 unit increase in financial risk tolerance or 1 unit increase in the time preference measure, respectively.
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Papers by Catherine Eckel