In The Romantic Absolute, Dalia Nassar explores the treacherous philosophical territory between K... more In The Romantic Absolute, Dalia Nassar explores the treacherous philosophical territory between Kant and Hegel, which is the reserve of the early romantics: the poet Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), the classicist Friedrich Schlegel, and the boy-philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Danger lurks here. Without a reliable guide, the reader can quickly tumble into crevasses of incomprehension. Nassar provides such a guide. With articulate verve, she shows how the romantics construed nature and mind as identical, how in Schelling's terms nature was the poetry of mind and mind the outgrowth of nature. Following a careful path through thickets of disputing critics, she illuminates the darker areas of German romanticism and protects the reader from sliding into the slough of despond."-Robert J. Richards, University of Chicago
International Journal of Philosophical Romanticism, 2023
Sometimes when I check my social media account, I see other academics asking for tips to expand o... more Sometimes when I check my social media account, I see other academics asking for tips to expand our teaching canon-and most often, the respective replies reference this very volume: Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century. Even though just published, a lot of researchers and especially instructors are already putting it to good use, expanding our students' awareness of the rich history of philosophy that we for so long neglected to reflect on properly. Our forgetfulness is due mostly to the still formative work of late nineteenth century authors of the history of German literature and philosophy who intentionally excluded the contributions of women writers (most instructive on this exclusion is Ruth Whittle's study Gender, Canon, and Literary History, De Gruyter, 2013), but also the current, relentless streamlining of course design. Little do we remember that even before the nineteenth century, in the lifetime of Maria Sibylla Merian (1647-1717), women could not only get a decent education, but they could also become leaders in trade, silk production, or in other areas. Thus, not always and everywhere have women been strictly excluded from 'public life', and hence there is no reason why all of them should have been hiding in the long nineteenth century. This present volume is the perfect handbook to expand the canon of any 19 th and early 20 th course on European philosophy in exactly this area. With the exception of Madame de Staël, it contains leading voices of German and Austrian women intellectuals who made significant, albeit often overlooked, contributions to contemporaneous debates. And even if Madame de Staël's influence in France might also be notable, her works, in particular On Germany, left an impression on those she described as well. Given that she herself was an expatriate, she might have become something like a German by popular acclaim; ultimately, her perspective on Germany shows how sympathetic outsiders saw the famous land of poets and thinkers, and how these same poets and thinkers came to see themselves.
Studies in history and philosophy of science, Aug 1, 2016
In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with t... more In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodologica...
Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode’s 1805 “Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)” ... more Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode’s 1805 “Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)” as a creative adaptation of Schelling’s philosophy of nature, this article proposes that “Idea of the Earth” furnishes a moral account of the human relation to the natural world, one which does not map onto any of the more well-known romantic or idealist accounts of the human-nature relation. Specifically, I argue that “Idea of the Earth” responds to the great Enlightenment question concerning the human vocation, but from a distinctive romantic-idealist angle. I begin by demonstrating the influence of Fichte’s 1800 Vocation of Humanity on Günderrode’s thinking, which involves an investigation of both Fichte’s text and Günderrode’s critical response to it. I then turn to “Idea of the Earth” where I analyse Günderrode’s understanding of nature and the self in light of her critique of Fichte, and thereby distinguish her position from Fichte’s and from the position espoused by her fellow rom...
In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Phil... more In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals...
In 1796 Friedrich Schiller famously declared that there are two kinds of poets, those who “will b... more In 1796 Friedrich Schiller famously declared that there are two kinds of poets, those who “will be nature” and those who “will seek lost nature.” He called the former “naïve,” identified them with ancient writers, and described their works as more concrete and sensuously immediate. The latter he termed “sentimental” poets, poets of the modern era, whose estrangement from nature went hand in hand with their greater emphasis on reflection and freedom. For Schiller, however, Goethe presented a strange paradox: a modern poet who was nonetheless naïve. The notion that Goethe’s poetry and his approach to the natural world in general are “naïve” has stuck, and become the accepted view of Goethe as both poet and thinker. Indeed, Goethe seems to have agreed with his friend’s characterization, writing some years later that while Schiller “preached the gospel of freedom,” he, Goethe, “defended the rights of nature” (MA 12, 97). In turn, Goethe was often critical of philosophical abstractions, because they had no sense for the concrete, and even declared himself to lack possession of the “organ” necessary for philosophy (MA 12, 94). However, in spite of Goethe’s self-proclaimed incapacity for philosophical reflection, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Not only did he seriously engage with Spinoza, Kant, Schelling, andHegel, but he was also in dialogue with some of themost influential thinkers of the time, including Jacobi, Herder, and Niethammer. Most significantly, his encounter with Schiller did not – as might appear – result in a rejection of philosophy or a refusal to undertake critical enquiry. The opposite was the case: Goethe and Schiller’s famous 1794 meeting prompted Goethe to offer more systematic explications of his methodology and undertake further study of Kantian philosophy. Nonetheless, Goethe’s views were decisively different from those of the philosophers who surrounded him, and this difference concerned the role of sensibility in knowledge. In his Maxims and Reflections, Goethe writes that “we are adequately equipped for all our genuine earthly needs if we will trust our senses, and develop them in such a way that they continue to prove worthy of our confidence” (MA 17, 918). And again, he remarks that “the senses do not deceive; it is judgment that deceives” (MA 17, 917). In deep contrast to his contemporaries, who were largely concerned with establishing pure forms of thought, elaborating their relationships, and, as Fichte put it, offering a “pragmatic history of the spirit,” Goethe was convinced that sensible knowledge must be incorporated into philosophy, and more strikingly, that sensibility provides the foundation for all knowledge.
Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode's 1805 "Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)" ... more Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode's 1805 "Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)" as a creative adaptation of Schelling's philosophy of nature, this article proposes that "Idea of the Earth" furnishes a moral account of the human relation to the natural world, one which does not map onto any of the more well-known romantic or idealist accounts of the human-nature relation.
The aim of this chapter is to offer insight into what it would
mean to bridge the methodological ... more The aim of this chapter is to offer insight into what it would mean to bridge the methodological gap between the human and natural sciences, by examining one of the most interesting, yet under-studied, episodes in the history of philosophy and science: Herder’s and Goethe’s “science of describing.” Through the use of various artistic devices, Herder and Goethe developed a methodology that enabled them to better understand natural forms and gain insights into the relations between these forms––thereby paving the way for the study of living forms, i.e., biology. In addition to developing a systematic account of their methodology, the chapter will consider its relevance for contemporary attempts to overcome the gap between the human and natural sciences.
Over the last few years, historians of science have turned their attention to the ways in which t... more Over the last few years, historians of science have turned their attention to the ways in which the study of history, human languages and cultures influenced the development of various natural-scientific disciplines. Two claims have emerged from this research: the first is a critique of previous histories of science, which anachronistically applied the late nineteenth-century division of the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften onto earlier centuries, and thereby overlooked the mutual influence the two fields exerted on one another. The second is that it was primarily the methodological practices and insights of the humanistic disciplines that influenced certain natural-scientific fields. My aim in this paper is to expand this investigation into the relationship between the human and natural sciences, looking at the eighteenth century, and, in particular, the way in which the emerging study of historical and literary texts (hermeneutics) played a role in the development of the discipline of geography. To do this, I trace a crucial line of influence from Herder to Alexander von Humboldt, and point to the ways in which Herder's study of literary texts, and his reflections on methodology, paved the way for Humboldt's bio-geography.
Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significanc... more Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significance for Kant's critical philosophy have become increasingly central questions. Scholars have argued that epigenesis is a key factor in the development of Kant's understanding of reason as self-grounding and self-generating. Building on this work, our claim is that Kant appealed to not just any epigenetic theory, but specifically Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's account of generation, and that this appeal must be understood not only in terms of self-organization, but also in terms of the demarcation of a specific domain of inquiry: for Blumenbach, the study of life; for Kant, the study of reason. We argue that Kant adopted this specific epigenetic model as a result of his dispute with Herder regarding the independence of reason from nature. Blumenbach's conception of epigenesis and his separation of a domain of the living from the non-living lent Kant the tools to demarcate metaphysics, and to guard reason against Herder's attempts to naturalize it.
In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the p... more In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life.
In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Phil... more In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori “metaphysics of nature” and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant.
A detailed, research-based introduction to the special section of the Goethe-Yearbook 22, 2015, w... more A detailed, research-based introduction to the special section of the Goethe-Yearbook 22, 2015, which I co-edited with Luke Fischer. We explicate some of Goethe's most central ideas about nature, and the human relation to/place within nature, consider the significance of his thought and his methodology for contemporary environmental philosophy and the environmental humanities in general, situating him within the context of both fields, and address both his theoretical, scientific writings and his practice as a scientist and observer of nature.
I consider Friedrich Schlegel as a philosopher, and argue that Schlegel’s philosophical views mus... more I consider Friedrich Schlegel as a philosopher, and argue that Schlegel’s philosophical views must be understood in relation to his emphasis on history and historical knowledge and his claim that philosophy must emerge from and in relation to life. Thus, in deep contrast to two influential interpretations of Schlegel--Hegel’s view of Schlegel’s philosophy as a poetic exaggeration of the Fichtean subject and the postmodern view of Schlegel as a deeply sceptical anti-idealist--I contend that Schlegel sough to develop a historically-informed philosophy and maintained that it is only through concrete knowledge of political and social realities that we can understand the nature of morality and achieve moral progress. Furthermore, I argue that Schlegel did not entirely forego the possibility of systematic knowledge, but developed a new conception of systematicity based on his understanding of living or organic beings.
Since Bill McKibben’s 1989 book, The End of Nature, it has become commonplace to pronounce the ‘e... more Since Bill McKibben’s 1989 book, The End of Nature, it has become commonplace to pronounce the ‘end’ of that which, for many decades, we called nature. Although in many instances the reiterations of the end of nature do not agree with McKibben’s reasoning — instead, offering reasons quite contrary to his — they concur on the premise that nature is not a plausible or desirable concept for environmental thought or activism. Alongside this growing trend in environmental philosophy, a number of studies have recently appeared which reconsider the environmental significance of romanticism. While an environmental interest in romanticism is not surprising, it is very surprising given the increasingly pervasive critique of the idea of nature. After all, for the romantics, nature (not the environment, or ecology, or biodiversity) was the most significant and central concern. In this chapter, I offer an environmental reappraisal of romanticism, which takes account of the recent critiques of the idea of nature. My goals are historical and systematic. First, I seek to assess the validity of the environmentalist critique of the romantic conception of nature by distinguishing different traditions or strands within romantic thought. I argue that within romanticism, we find a tradition that emphasizes empirical experience, careful observation and methodological inquiry, and offers a conception of nature that cannot be criticized as an idealized or abstracted transcendental entity. Second, I consider the systematic significance of this “romantic empiricism,” and argue that while an abstract or idealized notion of nature is indeed problematic, a concrete conception that is achieved through the mutually supportive work of observation and reflection is essential for environmental thought. In particular, I contend that it is only on the basis of the kind of careful empirical observation and rigorous ontological account of nature that we find in the work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe that an environmental ethic is possible. In Goethe’s approach, we find a notion of epistemological responsibility or obligation that offers the first step toward developing a sustainable environmental ethic.
In this paper, I trace a ‘leading thread’ from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to Goethe that involve... more In this paper, I trace a ‘leading thread’ from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to Goethe that involves a shift from a conceptual framework, in which a priori concepts furnish necessity and thereby science, to a framework in which sensible experience plays a far more significant and determining role in the formation of knowledge. Although this shift was not enacted by Kant himself, his elaboration of organic unity or organisms paved the way for this transformation. By considering both the methodological difficulties that Kant encounters in his attempt to articulate the structure of organisms and Goethe’s response to these difficulties, my goal is to locate a specific trajectory in the history of nineteenth century philosophy, in which empirical experience and sensibility play a far more significant role than otherwise acknowledged
In The Romantic Absolute, Dalia Nassar explores the treacherous philosophical territory between K... more In The Romantic Absolute, Dalia Nassar explores the treacherous philosophical territory between Kant and Hegel, which is the reserve of the early romantics: the poet Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), the classicist Friedrich Schlegel, and the boy-philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Danger lurks here. Without a reliable guide, the reader can quickly tumble into crevasses of incomprehension. Nassar provides such a guide. With articulate verve, she shows how the romantics construed nature and mind as identical, how in Schelling's terms nature was the poetry of mind and mind the outgrowth of nature. Following a careful path through thickets of disputing critics, she illuminates the darker areas of German romanticism and protects the reader from sliding into the slough of despond."-Robert J. Richards, University of Chicago
International Journal of Philosophical Romanticism, 2023
Sometimes when I check my social media account, I see other academics asking for tips to expand o... more Sometimes when I check my social media account, I see other academics asking for tips to expand our teaching canon-and most often, the respective replies reference this very volume: Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century. Even though just published, a lot of researchers and especially instructors are already putting it to good use, expanding our students' awareness of the rich history of philosophy that we for so long neglected to reflect on properly. Our forgetfulness is due mostly to the still formative work of late nineteenth century authors of the history of German literature and philosophy who intentionally excluded the contributions of women writers (most instructive on this exclusion is Ruth Whittle's study Gender, Canon, and Literary History, De Gruyter, 2013), but also the current, relentless streamlining of course design. Little do we remember that even before the nineteenth century, in the lifetime of Maria Sibylla Merian (1647-1717), women could not only get a decent education, but they could also become leaders in trade, silk production, or in other areas. Thus, not always and everywhere have women been strictly excluded from 'public life', and hence there is no reason why all of them should have been hiding in the long nineteenth century. This present volume is the perfect handbook to expand the canon of any 19 th and early 20 th course on European philosophy in exactly this area. With the exception of Madame de Staël, it contains leading voices of German and Austrian women intellectuals who made significant, albeit often overlooked, contributions to contemporaneous debates. And even if Madame de Staël's influence in France might also be notable, her works, in particular On Germany, left an impression on those she described as well. Given that she herself was an expatriate, she might have become something like a German by popular acclaim; ultimately, her perspective on Germany shows how sympathetic outsiders saw the famous land of poets and thinkers, and how these same poets and thinkers came to see themselves.
Studies in history and philosophy of science, Aug 1, 2016
In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with t... more In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodologica...
Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode’s 1805 “Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)” ... more Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode’s 1805 “Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)” as a creative adaptation of Schelling’s philosophy of nature, this article proposes that “Idea of the Earth” furnishes a moral account of the human relation to the natural world, one which does not map onto any of the more well-known romantic or idealist accounts of the human-nature relation. Specifically, I argue that “Idea of the Earth” responds to the great Enlightenment question concerning the human vocation, but from a distinctive romantic-idealist angle. I begin by demonstrating the influence of Fichte’s 1800 Vocation of Humanity on Günderrode’s thinking, which involves an investigation of both Fichte’s text and Günderrode’s critical response to it. I then turn to “Idea of the Earth” where I analyse Günderrode’s understanding of nature and the self in light of her critique of Fichte, and thereby distinguish her position from Fichte’s and from the position espoused by her fellow rom...
In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Phil... more In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals...
In 1796 Friedrich Schiller famously declared that there are two kinds of poets, those who “will b... more In 1796 Friedrich Schiller famously declared that there are two kinds of poets, those who “will be nature” and those who “will seek lost nature.” He called the former “naïve,” identified them with ancient writers, and described their works as more concrete and sensuously immediate. The latter he termed “sentimental” poets, poets of the modern era, whose estrangement from nature went hand in hand with their greater emphasis on reflection and freedom. For Schiller, however, Goethe presented a strange paradox: a modern poet who was nonetheless naïve. The notion that Goethe’s poetry and his approach to the natural world in general are “naïve” has stuck, and become the accepted view of Goethe as both poet and thinker. Indeed, Goethe seems to have agreed with his friend’s characterization, writing some years later that while Schiller “preached the gospel of freedom,” he, Goethe, “defended the rights of nature” (MA 12, 97). In turn, Goethe was often critical of philosophical abstractions, because they had no sense for the concrete, and even declared himself to lack possession of the “organ” necessary for philosophy (MA 12, 94). However, in spite of Goethe’s self-proclaimed incapacity for philosophical reflection, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Not only did he seriously engage with Spinoza, Kant, Schelling, andHegel, but he was also in dialogue with some of themost influential thinkers of the time, including Jacobi, Herder, and Niethammer. Most significantly, his encounter with Schiller did not – as might appear – result in a rejection of philosophy or a refusal to undertake critical enquiry. The opposite was the case: Goethe and Schiller’s famous 1794 meeting prompted Goethe to offer more systematic explications of his methodology and undertake further study of Kantian philosophy. Nonetheless, Goethe’s views were decisively different from those of the philosophers who surrounded him, and this difference concerned the role of sensibility in knowledge. In his Maxims and Reflections, Goethe writes that “we are adequately equipped for all our genuine earthly needs if we will trust our senses, and develop them in such a way that they continue to prove worthy of our confidence” (MA 17, 918). And again, he remarks that “the senses do not deceive; it is judgment that deceives” (MA 17, 917). In deep contrast to his contemporaries, who were largely concerned with establishing pure forms of thought, elaborating their relationships, and, as Fichte put it, offering a “pragmatic history of the spirit,” Goethe was convinced that sensible knowledge must be incorporated into philosophy, and more strikingly, that sensibility provides the foundation for all knowledge.
Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode's 1805 "Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)" ... more Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode's 1805 "Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)" as a creative adaptation of Schelling's philosophy of nature, this article proposes that "Idea of the Earth" furnishes a moral account of the human relation to the natural world, one which does not map onto any of the more well-known romantic or idealist accounts of the human-nature relation.
The aim of this chapter is to offer insight into what it would
mean to bridge the methodological ... more The aim of this chapter is to offer insight into what it would mean to bridge the methodological gap between the human and natural sciences, by examining one of the most interesting, yet under-studied, episodes in the history of philosophy and science: Herder’s and Goethe’s “science of describing.” Through the use of various artistic devices, Herder and Goethe developed a methodology that enabled them to better understand natural forms and gain insights into the relations between these forms––thereby paving the way for the study of living forms, i.e., biology. In addition to developing a systematic account of their methodology, the chapter will consider its relevance for contemporary attempts to overcome the gap between the human and natural sciences.
Over the last few years, historians of science have turned their attention to the ways in which t... more Over the last few years, historians of science have turned their attention to the ways in which the study of history, human languages and cultures influenced the development of various natural-scientific disciplines. Two claims have emerged from this research: the first is a critique of previous histories of science, which anachronistically applied the late nineteenth-century division of the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften onto earlier centuries, and thereby overlooked the mutual influence the two fields exerted on one another. The second is that it was primarily the methodological practices and insights of the humanistic disciplines that influenced certain natural-scientific fields. My aim in this paper is to expand this investigation into the relationship between the human and natural sciences, looking at the eighteenth century, and, in particular, the way in which the emerging study of historical and literary texts (hermeneutics) played a role in the development of the discipline of geography. To do this, I trace a crucial line of influence from Herder to Alexander von Humboldt, and point to the ways in which Herder's study of literary texts, and his reflections on methodology, paved the way for Humboldt's bio-geography.
Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significanc... more Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significance for Kant's critical philosophy have become increasingly central questions. Scholars have argued that epigenesis is a key factor in the development of Kant's understanding of reason as self-grounding and self-generating. Building on this work, our claim is that Kant appealed to not just any epigenetic theory, but specifically Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's account of generation, and that this appeal must be understood not only in terms of self-organization, but also in terms of the demarcation of a specific domain of inquiry: for Blumenbach, the study of life; for Kant, the study of reason. We argue that Kant adopted this specific epigenetic model as a result of his dispute with Herder regarding the independence of reason from nature. Blumenbach's conception of epigenesis and his separation of a domain of the living from the non-living lent Kant the tools to demarcate metaphysics, and to guard reason against Herder's attempts to naturalize it.
In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the p... more In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life.
In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Phil... more In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori “metaphysics of nature” and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant.
A detailed, research-based introduction to the special section of the Goethe-Yearbook 22, 2015, w... more A detailed, research-based introduction to the special section of the Goethe-Yearbook 22, 2015, which I co-edited with Luke Fischer. We explicate some of Goethe's most central ideas about nature, and the human relation to/place within nature, consider the significance of his thought and his methodology for contemporary environmental philosophy and the environmental humanities in general, situating him within the context of both fields, and address both his theoretical, scientific writings and his practice as a scientist and observer of nature.
I consider Friedrich Schlegel as a philosopher, and argue that Schlegel’s philosophical views mus... more I consider Friedrich Schlegel as a philosopher, and argue that Schlegel’s philosophical views must be understood in relation to his emphasis on history and historical knowledge and his claim that philosophy must emerge from and in relation to life. Thus, in deep contrast to two influential interpretations of Schlegel--Hegel’s view of Schlegel’s philosophy as a poetic exaggeration of the Fichtean subject and the postmodern view of Schlegel as a deeply sceptical anti-idealist--I contend that Schlegel sough to develop a historically-informed philosophy and maintained that it is only through concrete knowledge of political and social realities that we can understand the nature of morality and achieve moral progress. Furthermore, I argue that Schlegel did not entirely forego the possibility of systematic knowledge, but developed a new conception of systematicity based on his understanding of living or organic beings.
Since Bill McKibben’s 1989 book, The End of Nature, it has become commonplace to pronounce the ‘e... more Since Bill McKibben’s 1989 book, The End of Nature, it has become commonplace to pronounce the ‘end’ of that which, for many decades, we called nature. Although in many instances the reiterations of the end of nature do not agree with McKibben’s reasoning — instead, offering reasons quite contrary to his — they concur on the premise that nature is not a plausible or desirable concept for environmental thought or activism. Alongside this growing trend in environmental philosophy, a number of studies have recently appeared which reconsider the environmental significance of romanticism. While an environmental interest in romanticism is not surprising, it is very surprising given the increasingly pervasive critique of the idea of nature. After all, for the romantics, nature (not the environment, or ecology, or biodiversity) was the most significant and central concern. In this chapter, I offer an environmental reappraisal of romanticism, which takes account of the recent critiques of the idea of nature. My goals are historical and systematic. First, I seek to assess the validity of the environmentalist critique of the romantic conception of nature by distinguishing different traditions or strands within romantic thought. I argue that within romanticism, we find a tradition that emphasizes empirical experience, careful observation and methodological inquiry, and offers a conception of nature that cannot be criticized as an idealized or abstracted transcendental entity. Second, I consider the systematic significance of this “romantic empiricism,” and argue that while an abstract or idealized notion of nature is indeed problematic, a concrete conception that is achieved through the mutually supportive work of observation and reflection is essential for environmental thought. In particular, I contend that it is only on the basis of the kind of careful empirical observation and rigorous ontological account of nature that we find in the work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe that an environmental ethic is possible. In Goethe’s approach, we find a notion of epistemological responsibility or obligation that offers the first step toward developing a sustainable environmental ethic.
In this paper, I trace a ‘leading thread’ from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to Goethe that involve... more In this paper, I trace a ‘leading thread’ from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to Goethe that involves a shift from a conceptual framework, in which a priori concepts furnish necessity and thereby science, to a framework in which sensible experience plays a far more significant and determining role in the formation of knowledge. Although this shift was not enacted by Kant himself, his elaboration of organic unity or organisms paved the way for this transformation. By considering both the methodological difficulties that Kant encounters in his attempt to articulate the structure of organisms and Goethe’s response to these difficulties, my goal is to locate a specific trajectory in the history of nineteenth century philosophy, in which empirical experience and sensibility play a far more significant role than otherwise acknowledged
The origins of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and its relation to his transcendental philosophy hav... more The origins of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and its relation to his transcendental philosophy have for a long time intrigued historians of philosophy. For one, Schelling’s philosophy of nature seems wholly at odds with his earlier transcendental philosophy. Furthermore, the claims that Schelling makes in the Naturphilosophie are not only complex but also, from the perspective of transcendental philosophy, appear to be highly problematic. In attempting to understand the relation between Schelling’s philosophy of nature and his earlier writings, historians of philosophy have thus emphasized a break in his development. For this reason, Schelling’s writings before 1797 are considered to bear little or no relation to his writings on Naturphilosophie. The goal of this paper is to revise the common view of Schelling’s development, by showing that his first systematic works offer significant insights into the way in which he comes to understand the meaning and goal of his philosophy of nature. In particular, I show that Schelling’s appropriation and critique of Kant’s table of categories provides an essential step toward the development of his Naturphilosophie.
Übergänge - diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters "Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie", Jun 2013
This paper seeks to answer one of the most controversial and obscure aspects of Schelling’s philo... more This paper seeks to answer one of the most controversial and obscure aspects of Schelling’s philosophy, namely, his notion of intellectual intuition and its place within his philosophy of nature, or Naturphilosophie. What does Schelling mean by intellectual intuition in the philosophy of nature, and how does it relate to and differ from other versions of intellectual intuition, such as those elaborated by Fichte and Kant?
I argue that Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition developed out of his encounter with—and ultimate critique of—Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. It is in this encounter that Schelling begins to elaborate a productive conception of intellectual intuition, which he nevertheless considered to be apt for a philosophical account of nature. This means, first, that Schelling’s notion of intuition was not developed through an appropriation of Fichte’s conception of intuition as an act of consciousness. It also means that, for Schelling, the notion of “archetypal cognition” as elaborated by Kant in Section 77 of the third Critique was only one aspect or part of intellectual intuition. In addition, intuition must be “productive” or “constructive.” I go on to specify Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition in the Naturphilosophie, explicating how he justifies it and detailing its relation to his account of philosophical “construction.”
At a time of increased interest in the philosophy of German romanticism, and of growing concern w... more At a time of increased interest in the philosophy of German romanticism, and of growing concern with environmental destruction, it is surprising—if not troubling—that little to no dialogue has taken place between the study of German romantic philosophy and environmental philosophy. On the one hand, the key interpreters of philosophical romanticism have paid no attention to the philosophical foundations and implications of the German romantic understanding of nature and of humanity’s place within the natural world. On the other, environmental philosophers continue to rely on older (mis-)interpretations of romanticism, and base their understanding of the romantic movement on British romantic poetry (rather than philosophy). The goal of this paper is to broach a dialogue between these two increasingly significant, yet out of touch, currents within philosophy.
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Books by Dalia Nassar
Papers by Dalia Nassar
mean to bridge the methodological gap between the human
and natural sciences, by examining one of the most
interesting, yet under-studied, episodes in the history of
philosophy and science: Herder’s and Goethe’s “science of
describing.” Through the use of various artistic devices,
Herder and Goethe developed a methodology that enabled
them to better understand natural forms and gain insights into
the relations between these forms––thereby paving the way for
the study of living forms, i.e., biology. In addition to developing
a systematic account of their methodology, the chapter will
consider its relevance for contemporary attempts to overcome
the gap between the human and natural sciences.
mean to bridge the methodological gap between the human
and natural sciences, by examining one of the most
interesting, yet under-studied, episodes in the history of
philosophy and science: Herder’s and Goethe’s “science of
describing.” Through the use of various artistic devices,
Herder and Goethe developed a methodology that enabled
them to better understand natural forms and gain insights into
the relations between these forms––thereby paving the way for
the study of living forms, i.e., biology. In addition to developing
a systematic account of their methodology, the chapter will
consider its relevance for contemporary attempts to overcome
the gap between the human and natural sciences.
I argue that Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition developed out of his encounter with—and ultimate critique of—Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. It is in this encounter that Schelling begins to elaborate a productive conception of intellectual intuition, which he nevertheless considered to be apt for a philosophical account of nature. This means, first, that Schelling’s notion of intuition was not developed through an appropriation of Fichte’s conception of intuition as an act of consciousness. It also means that, for Schelling, the notion of “archetypal cognition” as elaborated by Kant in Section 77 of the third Critique was only one aspect or part of intellectual intuition. In addition, intuition must be “productive” or “constructive.” I go on to specify Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition in the Naturphilosophie, explicating how he justifies it and detailing its relation to his account of philosophical “construction.”