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Sarah Sawyer

University of Sussex, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Korea University, Republic of Korea

herman cappelen

The University of Hong Kong

Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas - Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Harvard University

Mirela Fus-Holmedal

Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky

Macquarie University

Dartmouth College

University of Alberta

Monash University

University of Oslo

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Papers by Sarah Sawyer

Talk and Thought

Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, 2020

This chapter provides an externalist account of talk and thought that clearly distinguishes the t... more This chapter provides an externalist account of talk and thought that clearly distinguishes the two. It is argued that linguistic meanings and concepts track different phenomena and have different explanatory roles. The distinction, understood along the lines proposed, brings theoretical gains in a cluster of related areas. It provides an account of meaning change which accommodates the phenomenon of contested meanings and the possibility of substantive disagreement across theoretical divides, and it explains the nature and value of conceptual engineering in a way that addresses recent prominent concerns.

[Review] Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne (2018) Narrow Content

Bo believes that snow is white; Hilary hopes that the plane will land safely; Frankie fears that ... more Bo believes that snow is white; Hilary hopes that the plane will land safely; Frankie fears that winter has come too soon. Such sentences attribute thoughts to thinkers. The content of the thoughts attributed are specified by the relevant 'that'-clauses: that snow is white; that the plane will land safely; that winter has come too soon. The central question with which Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne are concerned in their recent book Narrow Content is whether the contents of a subject's thoughts are fully determined by properties 'internal' to her, or whether they depend in part on 'what is going on in the outside world' (p. 3

Kinds of Kinds: Normativity, Scope and Implementation in Conceptual Engineering

New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering, M.G.Isaac, S. Koch & K. Scharp (eds). Synthese Library. Forthcoming

In this paper I distinguish three kinds of kinds: traditional philosophical kinds such as truth, ... more In this paper I distinguish three kinds of kinds: traditional philosophical kinds such as truth, knowledge, and causation; natural science kinds such as spin, charge and mass; and social kinds such as class, poverty, and marriage. The threefold taxonomy I work with represents an idealised abstraction from the wide variety of kinds that there are and the messy phenomena that underlie them. However, the kinds I identify are discrete, and the threefold taxonomy is useful when it comes to understanding claims about the normativity, scope, and implementation of conceptual engineering. In particular it reveals: first, that conceptual engineering in a broad sense is not distinctively normative; but second, that there is a distinctive normativity present in conceptual engineering in the narrow sense of amelioration; third, that conceptual engineering in the narrow sense of amelioration is only possible for terms that refer to kinds whose grounds we can change; and fourth, that the amelioration of such kind terms can be brought about as a result of changing the grounds of those kinds. The overall aim is to draw attention to the differences between kinds of kinds to make sense of the diverse and often conflicting claims in the conceptual engineering literature, both from its proponents and from its detractors. The hope is that paying attention to the differences between kinds of kinds will provide a better understanding of the landscape.

The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism*

Philosophical Perspectives, 2005

Thinking about morality

Beliefs involve, and hence depend on, concepts. The belief that stars are exploding balls of hot ... more Beliefs involve, and hence depend on, concepts. The belief that stars are exploding balls of hot gas involves the empirical concept star. The belief that nine is a square number involves the mathematical concept square number. The belief that equality is a fundamental value involves the moral concept equality. But what exactly is a concept? Concepts are the building-blocks of thoughts, just as words and expressions are the building-blocks of sentences. Crucially, concepts are acquired in the context of a shared world, and hence anchor our individual thoughts to that shared world. The concept star, for example, is acquired initially, perhaps as a child, in the context of someone pointing to stars in the night sky. A more theoretical understanding of stars may develop later, but of course a theoretical understanding will develop in different ways depending on contingent factors such as how interested one is in the subject matter, how well informed or competent one’s teachers are, what...

Minds and Morals

Philosophical Issues, 2014

Philosophy Society and at the SIFA Graduate Conference held at the University of Cagliari. Thanks... more Philosophy Society and at the SIFA Graduate Conference held at the University of Cagliari. Thanks to audiences on both occasions. Particular thanks go to Michael Morris for characteristically helpful comments on an earlier draft. 2 Notable exceptions are to be found in Majors and Sawyer (2007), and Greenberg (2009). 3 There is a sense in which perceptual representation is more fundamental still. However, I leave perceptual representation to one side in this paper and focus instead on conceptual representation because the connection with the other debates only emerges at the conceptual level. Arguments in favour of the world-dependence of perceptual content parallel a strand of argument in favour of the world-dependence of conceptual content. See Burge (1986b), (1986c) and (1988). See also Davies (1991) and (1992).

Concept Pluralism in Conceptual Engineering

Inquiry, 2021

In this paper, I argue that an adequate meta-semantic framework capable of accommodating the rang... more In this paper, I argue that an adequate meta-semantic framework capable of accommodating the range of projects currently identified as projects in conceptual engineering must be sensitive to the fact that concepts (and hence projects relating to them) fall into distinct kinds. Concepts can vary, I will argue, with respect to their direction of determination, their modal range, and their temporal range. Acknowledging such variations yields a preliminary taxonomy of concepts and generates a meta-semantic framework that allows us both to accommodate the full range of cases and to identify a proper subset of concepts for special ameliorative consideration. Ignoring such variations, in contrast, leads to a restricted meta-semantic framework that accommodates only a subset of the particular projects while generating implausible accounts of others.

Internalism and Externalism in Mind

J. Garvey, ed. Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (London: Continuum), 2011

This companion is aimed at specialists and non-specialists in the philosophy of mind and features... more

Truth and Objectivity in Conceptual Engineering

Inquiry, 2020

This paper is forthcoming in a special issue of Inquiry edited by Henry Jackman. Paradigm cases ... more This paper is forthcoming in a special issue of Inquiry edited by Henry Jackman.

Paradigm cases of conceptual engineering involve topic preservation through semantic change. The challenge (known as Strawson's challenge) is to explain how this is possible. In previous work, I have responded to the challenge by advocating an externalist metasemantic framework that distinguishes the linguistic meaning of a term from the concept the term expresses. In this paper I argue that the topics of interest to conceptual engineers are underpinned by objective properties and that in conceptual engineering we aim for truth. I then go on to argue against proposals by Herman Cappelen and by Derek Ball.

Concepts, Conceptions and Self-Knowledge

Erkenntnis, 2019

Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, ... more Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a conscious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.

The Role of Concepts in Fixing Language: A Critique of Cappelen

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020

This is a contribution to a symposium on Herman Cappelen’s book, Fixing Language. It will appear,... more

The Nature of Content: A Critique of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne

Inquiry, 2020

This is a contribution to the symposium on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne's book, Narrow Content.It wi... more

Talk and Thought

In Burgess, Cappelen & Plunkett eds. Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).., 2020

This book is available Open Access online. Please click the link below. This paper provides an e... more This book is available Open Access online. Please click the link below.

This paper provides an externalist account of talk and thought that clearly distinguishes the two. It is argued that linguistic meanings and concepts track different phenomena and have different explanatory roles. The distinction, understood along the lines proposed, brings theoretical gains in a cluster of related areas. It provides an account of meaning change which accommodates the phenomenon of contested meanings and the possibility of substantive disagreement across theoretical divides, and it explains the nature and value of conceptual engineering in a way that addresses recent prominent concerns.

Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri

Analysis, 2018

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in ... more Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premises widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. In this paper, I argue that Yli-Vakkuri's argument depends on premises which are such that, on standard formulations of internalism, they cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously. The argument does not, therefore, constitute a proof of externalism.

Subjective Externalism

Theoria, 2018

In this paper I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective ex... more In this paper I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realisation that opens up the conceptual space for subjective externalism.

The Importance of Concepts

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018

Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in su... more Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in subject matter; some meaning shift is not. In this paper I argue that an account of linguistic meaning can accommodate the first kind of case, but that a theory of concepts is required to accommodate the second. Where there is stability of subject matter through linguistic change, it is concepts that provide the stability. The stability provided by concepts allows for genuine disagreement and ameliorative change in the context of conceptual engineering.

Contrastive Self-Knowledge and the McKinsey Paradox

In S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2015

In this paper I argue that understanding self-knowledge as contrastive provides a solution to the... more

Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism Part II: A Further Response to Aikin and Dabay

Social Epistemology: Review and Reply Collective, 2015

A subject S’s contrastive knowledge of the proposition that she thinks that p requires a set of p... more A subject S’s contrastive knowledge of the proposition that she thinks that p requires a set of positively contrasting concepts and a set of negatively contrasting concepts. In this paper, I defend the claim that only anti-individualism can allow for negatively contrasting concepts by providing an explicit definition of a negatively contrasting concept and showing that individualistically individuated concepts fail to satisfy the definition. Consequently, contrastive self-knowledge entails anti-individualism.

Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism: A Response to Aikin and Dabay

Social Epistemology: Review and Reply Collective, 2014

I have argued previously that contrastive self-knowledge entails anti-individualism. In this pape... more

Contrastive Self-Knowledge and the McKinsey Paradox

S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2015, 2015

In this paper, I argue that a contrastive account of self-knowledge clarifies the extent to which... more

Talk and Thought

Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, 2020

This chapter provides an externalist account of talk and thought that clearly distinguishes the t... more This chapter provides an externalist account of talk and thought that clearly distinguishes the two. It is argued that linguistic meanings and concepts track different phenomena and have different explanatory roles. The distinction, understood along the lines proposed, brings theoretical gains in a cluster of related areas. It provides an account of meaning change which accommodates the phenomenon of contested meanings and the possibility of substantive disagreement across theoretical divides, and it explains the nature and value of conceptual engineering in a way that addresses recent prominent concerns.

[Review] Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne (2018) Narrow Content

Bo believes that snow is white; Hilary hopes that the plane will land safely; Frankie fears that ... more Bo believes that snow is white; Hilary hopes that the plane will land safely; Frankie fears that winter has come too soon. Such sentences attribute thoughts to thinkers. The content of the thoughts attributed are specified by the relevant 'that'-clauses: that snow is white; that the plane will land safely; that winter has come too soon. The central question with which Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne are concerned in their recent book Narrow Content is whether the contents of a subject's thoughts are fully determined by properties 'internal' to her, or whether they depend in part on 'what is going on in the outside world' (p. 3

Kinds of Kinds: Normativity, Scope and Implementation in Conceptual Engineering

New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering, M.G.Isaac, S. Koch & K. Scharp (eds). Synthese Library. Forthcoming

In this paper I distinguish three kinds of kinds: traditional philosophical kinds such as truth, ... more In this paper I distinguish three kinds of kinds: traditional philosophical kinds such as truth, knowledge, and causation; natural science kinds such as spin, charge and mass; and social kinds such as class, poverty, and marriage. The threefold taxonomy I work with represents an idealised abstraction from the wide variety of kinds that there are and the messy phenomena that underlie them. However, the kinds I identify are discrete, and the threefold taxonomy is useful when it comes to understanding claims about the normativity, scope, and implementation of conceptual engineering. In particular it reveals: first, that conceptual engineering in a broad sense is not distinctively normative; but second, that there is a distinctive normativity present in conceptual engineering in the narrow sense of amelioration; third, that conceptual engineering in the narrow sense of amelioration is only possible for terms that refer to kinds whose grounds we can change; and fourth, that the amelioration of such kind terms can be brought about as a result of changing the grounds of those kinds. The overall aim is to draw attention to the differences between kinds of kinds to make sense of the diverse and often conflicting claims in the conceptual engineering literature, both from its proponents and from its detractors. The hope is that paying attention to the differences between kinds of kinds will provide a better understanding of the landscape.

The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism*

Philosophical Perspectives, 2005

Thinking about morality

Beliefs involve, and hence depend on, concepts. The belief that stars are exploding balls of hot ... more Beliefs involve, and hence depend on, concepts. The belief that stars are exploding balls of hot gas involves the empirical concept star. The belief that nine is a square number involves the mathematical concept square number. The belief that equality is a fundamental value involves the moral concept equality. But what exactly is a concept? Concepts are the building-blocks of thoughts, just as words and expressions are the building-blocks of sentences. Crucially, concepts are acquired in the context of a shared world, and hence anchor our individual thoughts to that shared world. The concept star, for example, is acquired initially, perhaps as a child, in the context of someone pointing to stars in the night sky. A more theoretical understanding of stars may develop later, but of course a theoretical understanding will develop in different ways depending on contingent factors such as how interested one is in the subject matter, how well informed or competent one’s teachers are, what...

Minds and Morals

Philosophical Issues, 2014

Philosophy Society and at the SIFA Graduate Conference held at the University of Cagliari. Thanks... more Philosophy Society and at the SIFA Graduate Conference held at the University of Cagliari. Thanks to audiences on both occasions. Particular thanks go to Michael Morris for characteristically helpful comments on an earlier draft. 2 Notable exceptions are to be found in Majors and Sawyer (2007), and Greenberg (2009). 3 There is a sense in which perceptual representation is more fundamental still. However, I leave perceptual representation to one side in this paper and focus instead on conceptual representation because the connection with the other debates only emerges at the conceptual level. Arguments in favour of the world-dependence of perceptual content parallel a strand of argument in favour of the world-dependence of conceptual content. See Burge (1986b), (1986c) and (1988). See also Davies (1991) and (1992).

Concept Pluralism in Conceptual Engineering

Inquiry, 2021

In this paper, I argue that an adequate meta-semantic framework capable of accommodating the rang... more In this paper, I argue that an adequate meta-semantic framework capable of accommodating the range of projects currently identified as projects in conceptual engineering must be sensitive to the fact that concepts (and hence projects relating to them) fall into distinct kinds. Concepts can vary, I will argue, with respect to their direction of determination, their modal range, and their temporal range. Acknowledging such variations yields a preliminary taxonomy of concepts and generates a meta-semantic framework that allows us both to accommodate the full range of cases and to identify a proper subset of concepts for special ameliorative consideration. Ignoring such variations, in contrast, leads to a restricted meta-semantic framework that accommodates only a subset of the particular projects while generating implausible accounts of others.

Internalism and Externalism in Mind

J. Garvey, ed. Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (London: Continuum), 2011

This companion is aimed at specialists and non-specialists in the philosophy of mind and features... more

Truth and Objectivity in Conceptual Engineering

Inquiry, 2020

This paper is forthcoming in a special issue of Inquiry edited by Henry Jackman. Paradigm cases ... more This paper is forthcoming in a special issue of Inquiry edited by Henry Jackman.

Paradigm cases of conceptual engineering involve topic preservation through semantic change. The challenge (known as Strawson's challenge) is to explain how this is possible. In previous work, I have responded to the challenge by advocating an externalist metasemantic framework that distinguishes the linguistic meaning of a term from the concept the term expresses. In this paper I argue that the topics of interest to conceptual engineers are underpinned by objective properties and that in conceptual engineering we aim for truth. I then go on to argue against proposals by Herman Cappelen and by Derek Ball.

Concepts, Conceptions and Self-Knowledge

Erkenntnis, 2019

Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, ... more Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a conscious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.

The Role of Concepts in Fixing Language: A Critique of Cappelen

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020

This is a contribution to a symposium on Herman Cappelen’s book, Fixing Language. It will appear,... more

The Nature of Content: A Critique of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne

Inquiry, 2020

This is a contribution to the symposium on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne's book, Narrow Content.It wi... more

Talk and Thought

In Burgess, Cappelen & Plunkett eds. Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).., 2020

This book is available Open Access online. Please click the link below. This paper provides an e... more This book is available Open Access online. Please click the link below.

This paper provides an externalist account of talk and thought that clearly distinguishes the two. It is argued that linguistic meanings and concepts track different phenomena and have different explanatory roles. The distinction, understood along the lines proposed, brings theoretical gains in a cluster of related areas. It provides an account of meaning change which accommodates the phenomenon of contested meanings and the possibility of substantive disagreement across theoretical divides, and it explains the nature and value of conceptual engineering in a way that addresses recent prominent concerns.

Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri

Analysis, 2018

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in ... more Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premises widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. In this paper, I argue that Yli-Vakkuri's argument depends on premises which are such that, on standard formulations of internalism, they cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously. The argument does not, therefore, constitute a proof of externalism.

Subjective Externalism

Theoria, 2018

In this paper I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective ex... more In this paper I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realisation that opens up the conceptual space for subjective externalism.

The Importance of Concepts

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018

Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in su... more Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in subject matter; some meaning shift is not. In this paper I argue that an account of linguistic meaning can accommodate the first kind of case, but that a theory of concepts is required to accommodate the second. Where there is stability of subject matter through linguistic change, it is concepts that provide the stability. The stability provided by concepts allows for genuine disagreement and ameliorative change in the context of conceptual engineering.

Contrastive Self-Knowledge and the McKinsey Paradox

In S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2015

In this paper I argue that understanding self-knowledge as contrastive provides a solution to the... more

Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism Part II: A Further Response to Aikin and Dabay

Social Epistemology: Review and Reply Collective, 2015

A subject S’s contrastive knowledge of the proposition that she thinks that p requires a set of p... more A subject S’s contrastive knowledge of the proposition that she thinks that p requires a set of positively contrasting concepts and a set of negatively contrasting concepts. In this paper, I defend the claim that only anti-individualism can allow for negatively contrasting concepts by providing an explicit definition of a negatively contrasting concept and showing that individualistically individuated concepts fail to satisfy the definition. Consequently, contrastive self-knowledge entails anti-individualism.

Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism: A Response to Aikin and Dabay

Social Epistemology: Review and Reply Collective, 2014

I have argued previously that contrastive self-knowledge entails anti-individualism. In this pape... more

Contrastive Self-Knowledge and the McKinsey Paradox

S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2015, 2015

In this paper, I argue that a contrastive account of self-knowledge clarifies the extent to which... more