How does precarious work entail social vulnerabilities and moral complicities? Theorists of prec... more How does precarious work entail social vulnerabilities and moral complicities? Theorists of precarity pose two challenges for analysing labour conditions in Asia. Their first challenge is to distinguish the new kinds of social vulnerability which constitute precarious work. The second is to assign moral responsibility in the social network that produces vulnerability in depoliticised and morally detached ways. In this article, the social and normative dimensions of precarious work are connected through a conceptual investigation into how Singapore allocates responsibility for managing temporary migrant labour. First, it analyses how various management strategies, driven by globalisation and government deregulation, increase worker vulnerabilities. These strategies intensify relations of dependence, disempowerment and discrimination, which the workers may accommodate or resist in limited ways. Second, it assesses why the strategies leave the state, employers, agents and others complicit in producing the vulnerabilities. These actors enable, collaborate with, or condone the production of precarity. Their complicity is complicated by varying support or resistance to reforms. The result is a novel conceptual scheme for analysing the complicit network behind precarious work, which can be used in other sites of precarity where some are complicit in the vulnerability of others.
Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, 2018
How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial conscious... more How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial consciousness? I assess a trajectory in recent debates on artificial consciousness, in which metaphysical and explanatory challenges to the possibility of building conscious machines lead to epistemological concerns about the multiplicity underlying 'what it is like' to be a conscious creature or be in a conscious state. First, I analyse earlier challenges which claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot arise, or cannot be built, in machines. These are based on Block's Chinese Nation and Chalmers' Hard Problem. To defuse such challenges, theorists of artificial consciousness can appeal to empirical methods and models of explanation. Second, I explain why this naturalistic approach produces an epistemological puzzle on the role of biological properties in phenomenal consciousness. Neither behavioural tests nor theoretical inferences seem to settle whether our machines are conscious. Third, I evaluate whether the new challenge can be managed through a more fine-grained taxonomy of conscious states. This strategy is supported by the development of similar taxonomies for biological species and animal consciousness. Although it makes sense of some current models of artificial consciousness, it raises questions about their subjective and moral significance.
What is special about the philosophy of history when the history is about science? I shall focus ... more What is special about the philosophy of history when the history is about science? I shall focus on an impasse between two perspectives – one seeking an ideal of rationality to guide scientific practices, and one stressing the contingency of the practices. They disagree on what this contingency means for scientific norms. Their impasse underlies some fractious relations within History and Philosophy of Science. Since the late 1960s, this interdisciplinary field has been described, variously, as an “intimate relationship or marriage of convenience”, a “marriage for the sake of reason”, a “troubling interaction”, a “precarious relationship”, or one at risk of “epistemological derangement”.
My paper has three aims. First, I characterise two idealised perspectives in this impasse: the sublimers and subversives. Then I describe a curious dynamic in which each perspective accuses the other of, simultaneously, claiming too little and too much. Subliming is dismissed for being scholastic, and condemned for being imperialist. Subverting is disparaged for being merely sociological, then criticised for being irrational or relativist. Here I draw on and extend the analyses of science studies in Kitcher (1998), Zammito (2011) and others. Second, I argue that sublimers and subversives often talk past each other. Their mutual dismissals and condemnations arise partly because each perspective misconstrues the other’s claims. Each fails to see that the other is interested in different problems and interprets concepts differently. Third, I suggest that my analysis clarifies some current disagreements and old debates about contingency in science. It may also apply to debates on the contingency of norms in non-scientific realms.
Review of A.J. Vetlesen, 'A Philosophy of Pain'. London: Reaktion Books, 2009. Veltesen offers a... more Review of A.J. Vetlesen, 'A Philosophy of Pain'. London: Reaktion Books, 2009. Veltesen offers an eclectic study of pain, mixing philosophical and cultural analysis. I divide his chapters roughly into three overlapping parts. These make sense of pain as an isolating experience, a shared aspect of the human condition, and a cultural phenomenon. Part I probes the pain which results from torture, chronic illness, and psychological trauma. Through these, Vetlesen provides a conceptual analysis of how pain changes our normal connections to the world, including to other humans. Part II is a phenomenological description of how pain is experienced. From it, he draws existentialist conclusions about our responsibility and vulnerability in the world. Part III develops a model of how pain circulates within society and how culture transforms this pain. He uses it to interpret two aspects of western culture: its violence and valorisation of choice.
Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Jan 1, 2011
Most philosophical accounts of scientific models assume that models represent some aspect, or som... more Most philosophical accounts of scientific models assume that models represent some aspect, or some theory, of reality. They also assume that interpretation plays only a supporting role. This paper challenges both assumptions. It proposes that models can be used in science to interpret reality. (a) I distinguish these interpretative models from representational ones. They find new meanings in a target system’s behaviour, rather than fit its parts together. They are built through idealisation, abstraction and recontextualisation. (b) To show how interpretative models work, I offer a case study on the scientific controversy over foetal pain. It highlights how pain scientists use conflicting models to interpret the human foetus and its behaviour, and thereby to support opposing claims about whether the foetus can feel pain. (c) I raise a sceptical worry and a methodological challenge for interpretative models. To address the latter, I use my case study to compare how interpretative and representational models ought to be evaluated.
How do micro cases lead us to surprising macro claims? Historians often say that the micro level ... more How do micro cases lead us to surprising macro claims? Historians often say that the micro level casts light on the macro level. This metaphor of ‘casting light’ suggests that the micro does not illuminate the macro straightforwardly; such light needs to be interpreted. In this essay, I propose and clarify six interpretive norms to guide micro-to-macro inferences.
I focus on marginal groups and monsters. These are popular cases in social and cultural histories, and yet seem to be unpromising candidates for generalization. Marginal groups are dismissed by the majority as inferior or ill-fitting; their lives seem intelligible but negligible. Monsters, on the other hand, are somehow incomprehensible to society and treated as such. First, I show that, by looking at how a society identifies a marginal group and interacts with it, we can draw surprising inferences about that society’s self-image and situation. By making sense of a monster’s life, we can draw inferences about its society’s mentality and intelligibility. These will contest our conception of a macro claim. Second, I identify four risks in making such inferences—and clarify how norms of coherence, challenge, restraint, connection, provocation, and contextualization can manage those risks. My strategy is to analyze two case studies, by Richard Cobb, about a band of violent bandits and a semi-literate provincial terrorist in revolutionary France. Published in 1972, these neglected studies show Cobb to be an inventive and idiosyncratic historian, who created new angles for studying the micro level and complicated them with his autobiography. They illustrate how a historian’s autobiographical, literary and historiographical interests can mix into a risky, and often rewarding, style.
I report on a pedagogical experiment in creating an undergraduate module on everyday ethics in Si... more I report on a pedagogical experiment in creating an undergraduate module on everyday ethics in Singapore. This large cross-faculty module -- piloted in 2018 and continuing today -- promotes moral dialogues on contentious issues about inequality, meritocracy, multiculturalism, and migration. It enlists students in creating new forms of ethical understanding that are nearer to their lived experiences in Singapore. I explain how the module's design addresses some ideological, interpersonal and intrapersonal sources of conflict in the classroom. This design draws on modes of collaboration and containment adapted from my psychotherapeutic training.
I want to raise some questions about our experiences of pandemic time. I'll begin with a paradox ... more I want to raise some questions about our experiences of pandemic time. I'll begin with a paradox that arises in these experiences, a paradox about being out of sync with time. Then I'll say something about how two modes of inquiry about ourselves, phenomenology and psychotherapy, can help to make sense of this paradox.
How does precarious work entail social vulnerabilities and moral complicities? Theorists of prec... more How does precarious work entail social vulnerabilities and moral complicities? Theorists of precarity pose two challenges for analysing labour conditions in Asia. Their first challenge is to distinguish the new kinds of social vulnerability which constitute precarious work. The second is to assign moral responsibility in the social network that produces vulnerability in depoliticised and morally detached ways. In this article, the social and normative dimensions of precarious work are connected through a conceptual investigation into how Singapore allocates responsibility for managing temporary migrant labour. First, it analyses how various management strategies, driven by globalisation and government deregulation, increase worker vulnerabilities. These strategies intensify relations of dependence, disempowerment and discrimination, which the workers may accommodate or resist in limited ways. Second, it assesses why the strategies leave the state, employers, agents and others complicit in producing the vulnerabilities. These actors enable, collaborate with, or condone the production of precarity. Their complicity is complicated by varying support or resistance to reforms. The result is a novel conceptual scheme for analysing the complicit network behind precarious work, which can be used in other sites of precarity where some are complicit in the vulnerability of others.
Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, 2018
How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial conscious... more How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial consciousness? I assess a trajectory in recent debates on artificial consciousness, in which metaphysical and explanatory challenges to the possibility of building conscious machines lead to epistemological concerns about the multiplicity underlying 'what it is like' to be a conscious creature or be in a conscious state. First, I analyse earlier challenges which claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot arise, or cannot be built, in machines. These are based on Block's Chinese Nation and Chalmers' Hard Problem. To defuse such challenges, theorists of artificial consciousness can appeal to empirical methods and models of explanation. Second, I explain why this naturalistic approach produces an epistemological puzzle on the role of biological properties in phenomenal consciousness. Neither behavioural tests nor theoretical inferences seem to settle whether our machines are conscious. Third, I evaluate whether the new challenge can be managed through a more fine-grained taxonomy of conscious states. This strategy is supported by the development of similar taxonomies for biological species and animal consciousness. Although it makes sense of some current models of artificial consciousness, it raises questions about their subjective and moral significance.
What is special about the philosophy of history when the history is about science? I shall focus ... more What is special about the philosophy of history when the history is about science? I shall focus on an impasse between two perspectives – one seeking an ideal of rationality to guide scientific practices, and one stressing the contingency of the practices. They disagree on what this contingency means for scientific norms. Their impasse underlies some fractious relations within History and Philosophy of Science. Since the late 1960s, this interdisciplinary field has been described, variously, as an “intimate relationship or marriage of convenience”, a “marriage for the sake of reason”, a “troubling interaction”, a “precarious relationship”, or one at risk of “epistemological derangement”.
My paper has three aims. First, I characterise two idealised perspectives in this impasse: the sublimers and subversives. Then I describe a curious dynamic in which each perspective accuses the other of, simultaneously, claiming too little and too much. Subliming is dismissed for being scholastic, and condemned for being imperialist. Subverting is disparaged for being merely sociological, then criticised for being irrational or relativist. Here I draw on and extend the analyses of science studies in Kitcher (1998), Zammito (2011) and others. Second, I argue that sublimers and subversives often talk past each other. Their mutual dismissals and condemnations arise partly because each perspective misconstrues the other’s claims. Each fails to see that the other is interested in different problems and interprets concepts differently. Third, I suggest that my analysis clarifies some current disagreements and old debates about contingency in science. It may also apply to debates on the contingency of norms in non-scientific realms.
Review of A.J. Vetlesen, 'A Philosophy of Pain'. London: Reaktion Books, 2009. Veltesen offers a... more Review of A.J. Vetlesen, 'A Philosophy of Pain'. London: Reaktion Books, 2009. Veltesen offers an eclectic study of pain, mixing philosophical and cultural analysis. I divide his chapters roughly into three overlapping parts. These make sense of pain as an isolating experience, a shared aspect of the human condition, and a cultural phenomenon. Part I probes the pain which results from torture, chronic illness, and psychological trauma. Through these, Vetlesen provides a conceptual analysis of how pain changes our normal connections to the world, including to other humans. Part II is a phenomenological description of how pain is experienced. From it, he draws existentialist conclusions about our responsibility and vulnerability in the world. Part III develops a model of how pain circulates within society and how culture transforms this pain. He uses it to interpret two aspects of western culture: its violence and valorisation of choice.
Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Jan 1, 2011
Most philosophical accounts of scientific models assume that models represent some aspect, or som... more Most philosophical accounts of scientific models assume that models represent some aspect, or some theory, of reality. They also assume that interpretation plays only a supporting role. This paper challenges both assumptions. It proposes that models can be used in science to interpret reality. (a) I distinguish these interpretative models from representational ones. They find new meanings in a target system’s behaviour, rather than fit its parts together. They are built through idealisation, abstraction and recontextualisation. (b) To show how interpretative models work, I offer a case study on the scientific controversy over foetal pain. It highlights how pain scientists use conflicting models to interpret the human foetus and its behaviour, and thereby to support opposing claims about whether the foetus can feel pain. (c) I raise a sceptical worry and a methodological challenge for interpretative models. To address the latter, I use my case study to compare how interpretative and representational models ought to be evaluated.
How do micro cases lead us to surprising macro claims? Historians often say that the micro level ... more How do micro cases lead us to surprising macro claims? Historians often say that the micro level casts light on the macro level. This metaphor of ‘casting light’ suggests that the micro does not illuminate the macro straightforwardly; such light needs to be interpreted. In this essay, I propose and clarify six interpretive norms to guide micro-to-macro inferences.
I focus on marginal groups and monsters. These are popular cases in social and cultural histories, and yet seem to be unpromising candidates for generalization. Marginal groups are dismissed by the majority as inferior or ill-fitting; their lives seem intelligible but negligible. Monsters, on the other hand, are somehow incomprehensible to society and treated as such. First, I show that, by looking at how a society identifies a marginal group and interacts with it, we can draw surprising inferences about that society’s self-image and situation. By making sense of a monster’s life, we can draw inferences about its society’s mentality and intelligibility. These will contest our conception of a macro claim. Second, I identify four risks in making such inferences—and clarify how norms of coherence, challenge, restraint, connection, provocation, and contextualization can manage those risks. My strategy is to analyze two case studies, by Richard Cobb, about a band of violent bandits and a semi-literate provincial terrorist in revolutionary France. Published in 1972, these neglected studies show Cobb to be an inventive and idiosyncratic historian, who created new angles for studying the micro level and complicated them with his autobiography. They illustrate how a historian’s autobiographical, literary and historiographical interests can mix into a risky, and often rewarding, style.
I report on a pedagogical experiment in creating an undergraduate module on everyday ethics in Si... more I report on a pedagogical experiment in creating an undergraduate module on everyday ethics in Singapore. This large cross-faculty module -- piloted in 2018 and continuing today -- promotes moral dialogues on contentious issues about inequality, meritocracy, multiculturalism, and migration. It enlists students in creating new forms of ethical understanding that are nearer to their lived experiences in Singapore. I explain how the module's design addresses some ideological, interpersonal and intrapersonal sources of conflict in the classroom. This design draws on modes of collaboration and containment adapted from my psychotherapeutic training.
I want to raise some questions about our experiences of pandemic time. I'll begin with a paradox ... more I want to raise some questions about our experiences of pandemic time. I'll begin with a paradox that arises in these experiences, a paradox about being out of sync with time. Then I'll say something about how two modes of inquiry about ourselves, phenomenology and psychotherapy, can help to make sense of this paradox.
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Papers by Chuanfei Chin
My paper has three aims. First, I characterise two idealised perspectives in this impasse: the sublimers and subversives. Then I describe a curious dynamic in which each perspective accuses the other of, simultaneously, claiming too little and too much. Subliming is dismissed for being scholastic, and condemned for being imperialist. Subverting is disparaged for being merely sociological, then criticised for being irrational or relativist. Here I draw on and extend the analyses of science studies in Kitcher (1998), Zammito (2011) and others. Second, I argue that sublimers and subversives often talk past each other. Their mutual dismissals and condemnations arise partly because each perspective misconstrues the other’s claims. Each fails to see that the other is interested in different problems and interprets concepts differently. Third, I suggest that my analysis clarifies some current disagreements and old debates about contingency in science. It may also apply to debates on the contingency of norms in non-scientific realms.
The published version of this article is available at: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/phiccf/stf_phiccf.htm
The published version of this article is available at: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/phiccf
http://philpapers.org/rec/CHIMAI-2
The published version of this article is available at: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/phiccf/stf_phiccf.htm
I focus on marginal groups and monsters. These are popular cases in social and cultural histories, and yet seem to be unpromising candidates for generalization. Marginal groups are dismissed by the majority as inferior or ill-fitting; their lives seem intelligible but negligible. Monsters, on the other hand, are somehow incomprehensible to society and treated as such. First, I show that, by looking at how a society identifies a marginal group and interacts with it, we can draw surprising inferences about that society’s self-image and situation. By making sense of a monster’s life, we can draw inferences about its society’s mentality and intelligibility. These will contest our conception of a macro claim. Second, I identify four risks in making such inferences—and clarify how norms of coherence, challenge, restraint, connection, provocation, and contextualization can manage those risks. My strategy is to analyze two case studies, by Richard Cobb, about a band of violent bandits and a semi-literate provincial terrorist in revolutionary France. Published in 1972, these neglected studies show Cobb to be an inventive and idiosyncratic historian, who created new angles for studying the micro level and complicated them with his autobiography. They illustrate how a historian’s autobiographical, literary and historiographical interests can mix into a risky, and often rewarding, style.
Talks by Chuanfei Chin
My paper has three aims. First, I characterise two idealised perspectives in this impasse: the sublimers and subversives. Then I describe a curious dynamic in which each perspective accuses the other of, simultaneously, claiming too little and too much. Subliming is dismissed for being scholastic, and condemned for being imperialist. Subverting is disparaged for being merely sociological, then criticised for being irrational or relativist. Here I draw on and extend the analyses of science studies in Kitcher (1998), Zammito (2011) and others. Second, I argue that sublimers and subversives often talk past each other. Their mutual dismissals and condemnations arise partly because each perspective misconstrues the other’s claims. Each fails to see that the other is interested in different problems and interprets concepts differently. Third, I suggest that my analysis clarifies some current disagreements and old debates about contingency in science. It may also apply to debates on the contingency of norms in non-scientific realms.
The published version of this article is available at: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/phiccf/stf_phiccf.htm
The published version of this article is available at: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/phiccf
http://philpapers.org/rec/CHIMAI-2
The published version of this article is available at: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/phiccf/stf_phiccf.htm
I focus on marginal groups and monsters. These are popular cases in social and cultural histories, and yet seem to be unpromising candidates for generalization. Marginal groups are dismissed by the majority as inferior or ill-fitting; their lives seem intelligible but negligible. Monsters, on the other hand, are somehow incomprehensible to society and treated as such. First, I show that, by looking at how a society identifies a marginal group and interacts with it, we can draw surprising inferences about that society’s self-image and situation. By making sense of a monster’s life, we can draw inferences about its society’s mentality and intelligibility. These will contest our conception of a macro claim. Second, I identify four risks in making such inferences—and clarify how norms of coherence, challenge, restraint, connection, provocation, and contextualization can manage those risks. My strategy is to analyze two case studies, by Richard Cobb, about a band of violent bandits and a semi-literate provincial terrorist in revolutionary France. Published in 1972, these neglected studies show Cobb to be an inventive and idiosyncratic historian, who created new angles for studying the micro level and complicated them with his autobiography. They illustrate how a historian’s autobiographical, literary and historiographical interests can mix into a risky, and often rewarding, style.