Drafts by Ilja Viktorov
The paper investigates the policy pursued by the Swedish Employers' Confederation regarding the w... more The paper investigates the policy pursued by the Swedish Employers' Confederation regarding the wage-earner funds issue, and how this policy was related to the dissolution of the Swedish wage bargaining model during the crisis of Fordism. The primary findings of this paper are that the funds were not the main reason behind SAF's decision to dismantle the Swedish model of industrial relations. It was not ideological tensions between the Swedish business community and labour movement that caused the unprecedented controversy of the wage-earner funds debate, but rather the underlying economic upheavals and clashing interests between the Swedish employers on the question of wage formation.
Books by Ilja Viktorov
Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis
The Crisis of Fordism and Wage-Earner Funds in Sweden: PhD thesis in Swedish, with summaries in E... more The Crisis of Fordism and Wage-Earner Funds in Sweden: PhD thesis in Swedish, with summaries in English and Russian
One of the most controversial debates in contemporary Swedish history centred on a proposal to create “wage-earner” funds. A group of experts led by Rudolph Meidner, who worked as an economist for the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), presented the first wage earner funds proposal in 1975. The proposal took up the question of ownership and economic power in the largest Swedish companies. It suggested a gradual transition of control of capital stock in these companies to specially constituted wage-earner funds owned and controlled by the unions. The debate on the funds continued until the middle of the 1980s. The final version of the wage-earner funds proposal, introduced by the Swedish Social Democratic gov-ernment in 1983, was rather modest compared to the ambitions of the first wage-earner funds projects from 1975, 1976 and 1978. The main institu-tional actors of the Swedish society were involved in this debate during the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, Swedish society witnessed a deep re-cession and break up of established patterns in the labour market. These developments were themselves related to the crisis of global Fordism, i.e. the mass production society. The aim of this thesis is to analyze how the most important institutional actors in Sweden, namely LO, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Swedish Employer Confederation (SAF), participated in and defined themselves in the wage-earner funds debate, against the background of the crisis of the Swedish Fordism.
Three theoretical approaches have been used to define Fordism in this thesis, namely the regulation school, the neo-Schumpeterian approach and the theory of industrial paradigms developed by American economist Mi-chael Piore and political scientist Charles Sabel. Fordism is conceived as a mass-production paradigm characterised by several key features on a micro level: the use of special purpose machines, the division of labour into more simplified operations and the production of standardized goods by semi-skilled workers. On a macro level, Fordism consists of the dominance of big corporations in national economy, centralisation of decision-making and stabilisation of costs and markets for mass production goods. The stabilisa-tion of wage formation and labour market institutions is central for the stability of the whole system. The crisis of Swedish Fordism on the macro level is of central relevance for this study. However, Chapter 4 discusses important aspects of the crisis of Fordism in Sweden on the micro level, connected with Swedish blue-collar workers’ discontent with the dominant social order and relations on the shop floor.
The following research questions have been addressed in the thesis:
1. Did the development of Fordism in Sweden involve inherent features that potentially led to its dissolution?
2. What factors contributed to the actualisation of the wage-earner funds problem in the early 1970s?
3. What did the active LO workers think about wage-earner funds in the 1970s? In what manner did they give their support to the radical version of the wage-earner funds proposal? How did the workers express their discon-tent with the Fordist order?
4. What kind of strategies did Swedish Social Democratic leaders use to address the opposition to wage-earner funds? In what respect did this relate to the crisis of Fordism in Sweden? In what sense did radical leftist groups in SAP influence the policy towards wage-earner funds pursued by the party leaders?
5. How did Swedish employers react to the Swedish labour movement’s initiatives concerning wage-earner funds? What kind of interdependence existed between the wage-earner funds question and the decision of the Swedish employers to leave the Swedish centralized model of industrial relations in the early 1980s? How did the economic crisis of Swedish Ford-ism influence SAF’s view towards wage-earner funds? What role did the wage-earner funds debate play in the ideological offensive launched by SAF in the late 1970s and the early 1980s?
The thesis is primarily based on investigations at LO’s archive and SAP’s archive located at the Labour Movement Archives and Library in Stockholm as well as on studies at SAF’s archive located at the Centre of Business History in Stockholm.
The study is interdisciplinary and uses methods found in Economic History, Institutional Economy, Sociology and Political Science.
Book Reviews by Ilja Viktorov
Russian infrastructure. It was hoped that this " one-time tax " would prevent a reversal of the p... more Russian infrastructure. It was hoped that this " one-time tax " would prevent a reversal of the privatization results and guarantee greater stability for the new post-Soviet business elite. However, Pu-tin rejected this plan, since he wished to keep the leading Russian businessmen under his personal control. According to Kasianov, Putin dismissed his government in 2004 because he could not tolerate Kasianov's independence and professionalism in opposing Putin's steering Russia towards an authoritarian regime. Putin supposedly feared a prime minister who was or could become a political rival. This statement is not completely reliable. Kasianov was not in a position to challenge Putin politically. Indeed, according to the Levada Center's public opinion polls of 2000–2004, the policies of Kasianov's government was always unpopular with the majority of the Russian electorate — in stark contrast to Putin's growing popularity during those same years. The lasT parT of The book, devoted to Kasianov's political activities as an op-positional politician, is rather boring and not to be trusted, with one important exception. Kasianov gives a good deal of information about his contacts with Yeltsin before his death in 2007. The former president expressed his disappointment with the policy followed by Putin on several occasions, complaining to Kasianov that Putin was reversing the democratic gains of the previous period. Yeltsin, who lived under constant surveillance, feared, Kasianov tells us, for the personal safety of his family should he make such criticism public. It is still unclear why Kasianov rejected a number of offers, made by Putin after Kasianov's dismissal in 2004, to assume important positions in the Russian administration, opting instead for a role in the opposition. Kasianov's own explanation, that he was kept from serving in Putin's government by his determination to safeguard the democratic values of the Russian people and oppose the concentration of power in the hands of Russian security services, as embodied by Putin, is hard to believe. The demolition of Yeltsin's illusory " democracy " and the concentration of power had begun long before Kasianov's dismissal in 2004 — it had been a continuous process, going on for years, yet Kasianov had not felt called upon to resign. The title of the book is rather ambitious since it does not reflect the book's contents; it is instead an indication of Russia's political future, when Putin will no longer be a leader of his country. This is not as farfetched as it may seem at first glance. The current economic crisis, which has brought insecurity and a decrease in the standards of living to the majority of Russians, may lead to a rapid decline in the popularity of Putin as the " national leader " of Russia. According to the constitution, president Medvedev has the power to dismiss Putin's government without notice or explanation, just as Putin dismissed the government of Kasianov. A group of influential liberal-minded experts at the Institute for Contemporary Development, founded under the auspices of president Medvedev, are openly discussing this alternative. These experts, who appear to be more or less active behind-the-scene politicians, share Kasianov and Kiselyov's ideological convictions. If such a development were to take place, the result could be a chain of unpredictable political events that could completely change Russia's political landscape. The liberal opposition to Putin will need a leader, one who is well-known to the Russian public and who is not compromised — as are the majority of the most influential liberals — by direct participation in the notorious privatizations of the 1990s. Under such conditions, Kasianov might be launched as the Russian liberal leader. This is the reason why this book was published towards the end of 2009, and not before , and also, probably, the reason why Kiselyov has participated in the project.
Papers by Ilja Viktorov
Baltic Worlds, 2019
In an interview with Ilja Viktorov, professor Olga Kryshtanovskaya comments on the current situat... more In an interview with Ilja Viktorov, professor Olga Kryshtanovskaya comments on the current situation around the future presidential successor in Russia and the potential political upheavals connected to this issue.
Insider trading (USA/general). In: Alena Ledeneva (ed.) The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality Understanding Social and Cultural Complexity. Volume 2. , 2018
The entry provides a brief introduction into insider trading as an informal practice in stock mar... more The entry provides a brief introduction into insider trading as an informal practice in stock markets, with emphasis on the US historical experience. Examples from Russia and Nigeria as emerging markets are also provided
This paper examines the impact of mass production on economic development in the United States an... more This paper examines the impact of mass production on economic development in the United States and Sweden between the 1930s and early 1970s. It suggests that the historical experience in both countries can be used to illustrate a possible pathway for promoting progressive development of the Russian economy. The article discusses the conditions under which mass production can promote economic growth combined with social justice in post-Soviet Russia
The article sums up briefly the reasons behind the Russian economy's slowdown after 2012 and vola... more The article sums up briefly the reasons behind the Russian economy's slowdown after 2012 and volatility in its currency market that started in autumn 2014. The Central Bank of Russia's monetary policy in form of liquidity provision to the banking sector is identified as the main factor behind the slowdown and the followed recession in 2015. An imitation of 'quantitative easing' monetary policy in an economy with undeveloped financial markets produced a negative outcome for Russia in terms of negative growth and instability of its financial system.
This article explores the expansion of the Russian state into financial markets after the 2008 gl... more This article explores the expansion of the Russian state into financial markets after the 2008 global financial crisis. The main argument is that the Russian state has been unable to pursue its own developmental agenda in the sector despite increased regulation and state takeovers. While independent private market participants were pushed aside by state-controlled financial intermediaries, the state failed to follow its own policy strategy towards establishing an international financial centre in Moscow. Instead, the Russian financial market institutions were rendered into a vehicle for inter-bank lending under control of the Central Bank of Russia. Data from Russian stock market and corporate bond market trading highlights the trend. The study also discusses the role played by informal power networks in redistribution of state-controlled resources and financial flows, and how this factor influenced the state regulation of financial markets in Russia.
This 70-page special section “Economic development in Russia” of the Swedish scholarly academic j... more This 70-page special section “Economic development in Russia” of the Swedish scholarly academic journal "Baltic Worlds" contains six peer-reviewed articles on recent developments in Russian economy, an interview with professor Andrei Yakovlev of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and introduction written by the section's academic guest editor, PhD Ilja Viktorov.
Contents:
Andrei Yakovlev. Russian economy at the crossroads, before and beyond the Ukrainian crisis, interview with Ilja Viktorov
Anton Oleinik. Price of opulence. On a constellation of interests in the European market for natural gas
Leo Granberg & Ann-Mari Sätre. Agency and development in second Russia: using opportunities in a local context
Olga Golubeva. Business climate in Russia: Swedish investors’ perspective
Susanne Oxenstierna. Prospects for institutional reform in the Russian economy
Mi Lennhag. The rise of anti-corruption demands: The Ukrainian Maidan mementot as different from everyday discussions in Russia
Alexander Abramov, Maria Chernova, Alexander Radygin. Financial markets regulation in Russia: models, evolution, efficiency
The article examines how informal networks inside the Russian state influenced the formation and ... more The article examines how informal networks inside the Russian state influenced the formation and further development of the country's financial markets during the 1990s and 2000s. The main argument is that the activities of these networks made it difficult to implement any coherent state regulation policy in the field. At the same time, rivalry between competing informal networks and different organizations contributed to institutional development and some improvements. The result was a dualist institutional structure of the Russian speculative financial markets that reproduced itself throughout the period in question. The study is based on in-depth interviews conducted at Moscow-based financial institutions.
The period of Dmitry Medvedev's presidency in 2008–2012, that is, the duumvirate of Dmitry Medved... more The period of Dmitry Medvedev's presidency in 2008–2012, that is, the duumvirate of Dmitry Medvedev as president and Vladimir Putin as prime minister, is usually referred to in Russian media as tandemocratia, or " tandemocracy ". Now, two years after Putin's comeback as president, how would you describe the experience of tandemocracy for the Russian political system? " The effect was twofold. First, we witnessed a division of power in Russia when two power centers co-existed, the Kremlin and the White House. 1 From today's perspective, it seems that both Putin and Medvedev followed the agreement they made before Medvedev won the presidential elections in 2008. Putin did not interfere in Medvedev's presidency, even though most observers believed that Putin continued to steer the country and Medvedev was just a marionette. But this was not the case. Putin granted Medvedev a degree of independence, while at the same time certain things, in accordance with their agreement, were kept outside Medvedev's control. I regularly follow the people named 'key men' (kliucheviki) in Russia. There are about 75 officials who hold key positions at the top of the Russian power hierarchy. None of these 75 key men was dismissed or replaced by Medvedev — none. Medvedev had to agree with Putin on all decisions concerning the most important appointments. Aside from that, Medvedev generally had a free hand to pursue his policy, and some things he implemented did not appeal to Putin. Nevertheless, this was indeed a division of power, though of a specifically Russian sort. Tandemocracy was a great novelty in Russian political history with its tradition of autarchy. The supreme power, usually referred to in a somewhat abstract way as 'the Kremlin', is assumed to be above the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. The same system of autarchy existed during Putin's two presidencies. But under Medvedev, it happened that the model of the absolute power was temporarily transformed. Two power centers coexisted between 2008 and 2012. " Second, this rather unclear division of power inevitably led to some degree of chaos inside the Russian political elite. One rather trivial example is the following. It might happen occasionally that meetings were scheduled at the same time in both the Kremlin and the White House, and some ministers just could not decide which meeting
Hostile takeovers and company captures have been an everyday reality in the post-Soviet Russian e... more Hostile takeovers and company captures have been an everyday reality in the post-Soviet Russian economy. This phenomenon is called “reiderstvo” in Russian, a term which is derived from the English word "raiding”. The article introduces the reader into the subject, identifies the main historical phases of "reiderstvo" during the 1990s and 2000s, provides description of a typical raiding attack and connects the "reiderstvo" phenomenon to activities of informal networks in the Russian business and state apparatus.
Conference Presentations by Ilja Viktorov
Paper presenterad vid ekonomisk-historiska mötet i Lund, 17-19 oktober 2003 Sessionen "Doktrinhis... more Paper presenterad vid ekonomisk-historiska mötet i Lund, 17-19 oktober 2003 Sessionen "Doktrinhistoria" Ilja Viktorov, Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet Under 70-80-talen diskuterades ekonomisk demokrati och blev en av de största debattfrågorna inom svensk politik, framför allt när det gällde förslaget om löntagarfonder. Medan den svenska uppfattningen av ekonomisk demokrati ligger inom den socialreformistiska idétraditionen, finns det en stor mängd alternativa syner på detta problem, bland annat inom det liberala tänkandet. Därför är det intressant att jämföra Ernst Wigforss och Robert Dahls visioner av ekonomisk demokrati. Båda är teoretiker med visioner om ett nytt samhälle i vilket maktrelationerna inom företagen ändras i grunden. De diskuterar sina framtidsbilder i ett bredare sammanhang där sådana frågor som frihet, ägande och deras samband med politisk demokrati tas upp. Wigforss betydelse som teoretikern för den svenska socialdemokratin är välkänd. En hel del av hans skrifter är ägnade åt teoretiska problem kring ekonomisk demokrati, och de mest intressanta texterna i detta avseende är "Materialistisk historieuppfattning och klasskamp" (1908), "Industriell demokrati" (1923), "Socialism i vår tid" (1952), "Efter välfärdstaten" (1956) samt "Provisoriska utopier" (1958). Hans koncept framstår generellt i boken "Ekonomisk demokrati" (1948) som egentligen är en föreläsning som Wigforss gav i Norge. Det är både svårt och lätt att skriva om Wigforss syn på ekonomisk demokrati. Å ena sidan, skapade Wigforss inte något verk där han presenterade ett sammanhängande koncept av det nya samhället. Därför får läsaren av hans böcker känslan av att han undviker att svara på de grundläggande frågor som författaren själv hade formulerat. Å andra sidan, kan återskapandet av hans betraktelse av ekonomisk demokrati förenklas, för det är klart att Wigforss hade ett sådant organiskt koncept. Visserligen han formulerade sin uppfattning relativt tidigt, nämligen redan i början på 1920-talet, och höll fast vid dem ända till sin död utan att ändra dem på något grundläggande sätt. Robert Dahl är en amerikansk internationellt känd teoretiker vars huvudinsats är forskning kring olika problem förknippade med demokrati. En av hans mest uppmärksammade böcker heter "Ett förord till ekonomisk demokrati" som är aktuellt för detta papper. Dahl börjar sitt rättfärdigande av ekonomisk demokrati med hänvisning till Alexis de Tocquevilles berömda verk "Demokrati i Amerika". Den sistnämnde ansåg att jämlikhet präglade det amerikanska samhället i början på 1800-talet och var utan tvivel en av de viktigaste förutsättningarna för demokrati, men hotade å andra sidan demokratins andra värden, nämligen frihet. 1 Dahl avvisar detta antagande med hänvisning till att i den nutida amerikanska kapitalismen är det snarare orättvisor inom förmögenhetsfördelningen som hotar både demokrati och jämlikhet. Enligt Dahl, karakteriserades det amerikanska samhället i början på 1800-talet av en jämn fördelning av egendom där majoriteten av den vita manliga befolkningen förfogade över i stort sett lika jordlotter. Denna fördelning var rent av historisk slump och ändrades dramatiskt när moderna storföretag etablerades. Det som var fördel under Tocquevilles tid, nämligen rättfärdigandet av privat egendom, förvandlades alltså till en av de största nackdelar och orättvisor som idag ifrågasätter själva fundament som Amerikas existens baseras på -demokrati. 2 Kan privat ägande betraktas som en naturlig rätt? Svaret som Dahl ger på denna fråga är klart negativt. Att påstå detta innebär att säga ingenting, skriver han. Däremot är rätten till självstyre utifrån demokratins perspektiv överlägsen i sin relation till äganderätten. Ägande kan dock vara av en stor betydelse när det gäller att garantera medborgarens rätt att utöva demokrati. Men i detta fall handlar det framför allt om relativt rimliga resurser som är nödvändiga för medborgarens liv, personliga frihet och lycka. Det är just detta som kan kallas ekonomisk frihet och har knappast något gemensamt med enorma förmögenheter. Det finns absolut inga logiska bevis, inte minst från demokratisk ynpunkt, som skulle kunna rättfärdiga storföretagens egendom. 3 Dahl poängterar alltså demokratins absoluta värde mot privat ägande och utarbetar fem kriterier som karakteriserar en fullständig demokratisk process: 1. Lika rösträtt (equal votes); 2. Effektivt deltagande;
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Drafts by Ilja Viktorov
Books by Ilja Viktorov
One of the most controversial debates in contemporary Swedish history centred on a proposal to create “wage-earner” funds. A group of experts led by Rudolph Meidner, who worked as an economist for the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), presented the first wage earner funds proposal in 1975. The proposal took up the question of ownership and economic power in the largest Swedish companies. It suggested a gradual transition of control of capital stock in these companies to specially constituted wage-earner funds owned and controlled by the unions. The debate on the funds continued until the middle of the 1980s. The final version of the wage-earner funds proposal, introduced by the Swedish Social Democratic gov-ernment in 1983, was rather modest compared to the ambitions of the first wage-earner funds projects from 1975, 1976 and 1978. The main institu-tional actors of the Swedish society were involved in this debate during the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, Swedish society witnessed a deep re-cession and break up of established patterns in the labour market. These developments were themselves related to the crisis of global Fordism, i.e. the mass production society. The aim of this thesis is to analyze how the most important institutional actors in Sweden, namely LO, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Swedish Employer Confederation (SAF), participated in and defined themselves in the wage-earner funds debate, against the background of the crisis of the Swedish Fordism.
Three theoretical approaches have been used to define Fordism in this thesis, namely the regulation school, the neo-Schumpeterian approach and the theory of industrial paradigms developed by American economist Mi-chael Piore and political scientist Charles Sabel. Fordism is conceived as a mass-production paradigm characterised by several key features on a micro level: the use of special purpose machines, the division of labour into more simplified operations and the production of standardized goods by semi-skilled workers. On a macro level, Fordism consists of the dominance of big corporations in national economy, centralisation of decision-making and stabilisation of costs and markets for mass production goods. The stabilisa-tion of wage formation and labour market institutions is central for the stability of the whole system. The crisis of Swedish Fordism on the macro level is of central relevance for this study. However, Chapter 4 discusses important aspects of the crisis of Fordism in Sweden on the micro level, connected with Swedish blue-collar workers’ discontent with the dominant social order and relations on the shop floor.
The following research questions have been addressed in the thesis:
1. Did the development of Fordism in Sweden involve inherent features that potentially led to its dissolution?
2. What factors contributed to the actualisation of the wage-earner funds problem in the early 1970s?
3. What did the active LO workers think about wage-earner funds in the 1970s? In what manner did they give their support to the radical version of the wage-earner funds proposal? How did the workers express their discon-tent with the Fordist order?
4. What kind of strategies did Swedish Social Democratic leaders use to address the opposition to wage-earner funds? In what respect did this relate to the crisis of Fordism in Sweden? In what sense did radical leftist groups in SAP influence the policy towards wage-earner funds pursued by the party leaders?
5. How did Swedish employers react to the Swedish labour movement’s initiatives concerning wage-earner funds? What kind of interdependence existed between the wage-earner funds question and the decision of the Swedish employers to leave the Swedish centralized model of industrial relations in the early 1980s? How did the economic crisis of Swedish Ford-ism influence SAF’s view towards wage-earner funds? What role did the wage-earner funds debate play in the ideological offensive launched by SAF in the late 1970s and the early 1980s?
The thesis is primarily based on investigations at LO’s archive and SAP’s archive located at the Labour Movement Archives and Library in Stockholm as well as on studies at SAF’s archive located at the Centre of Business History in Stockholm.
The study is interdisciplinary and uses methods found in Economic History, Institutional Economy, Sociology and Political Science.
Book Reviews by Ilja Viktorov
Papers by Ilja Viktorov
Contents:
Andrei Yakovlev. Russian economy at the crossroads, before and beyond the Ukrainian crisis, interview with Ilja Viktorov
Anton Oleinik. Price of opulence. On a constellation of interests in the European market for natural gas
Leo Granberg & Ann-Mari Sätre. Agency and development in second Russia: using opportunities in a local context
Olga Golubeva. Business climate in Russia: Swedish investors’ perspective
Susanne Oxenstierna. Prospects for institutional reform in the Russian economy
Mi Lennhag. The rise of anti-corruption demands: The Ukrainian Maidan mementot as different from everyday discussions in Russia
Alexander Abramov, Maria Chernova, Alexander Radygin. Financial markets regulation in Russia: models, evolution, efficiency
Conference Presentations by Ilja Viktorov
One of the most controversial debates in contemporary Swedish history centred on a proposal to create “wage-earner” funds. A group of experts led by Rudolph Meidner, who worked as an economist for the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), presented the first wage earner funds proposal in 1975. The proposal took up the question of ownership and economic power in the largest Swedish companies. It suggested a gradual transition of control of capital stock in these companies to specially constituted wage-earner funds owned and controlled by the unions. The debate on the funds continued until the middle of the 1980s. The final version of the wage-earner funds proposal, introduced by the Swedish Social Democratic gov-ernment in 1983, was rather modest compared to the ambitions of the first wage-earner funds projects from 1975, 1976 and 1978. The main institu-tional actors of the Swedish society were involved in this debate during the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, Swedish society witnessed a deep re-cession and break up of established patterns in the labour market. These developments were themselves related to the crisis of global Fordism, i.e. the mass production society. The aim of this thesis is to analyze how the most important institutional actors in Sweden, namely LO, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Swedish Employer Confederation (SAF), participated in and defined themselves in the wage-earner funds debate, against the background of the crisis of the Swedish Fordism.
Three theoretical approaches have been used to define Fordism in this thesis, namely the regulation school, the neo-Schumpeterian approach and the theory of industrial paradigms developed by American economist Mi-chael Piore and political scientist Charles Sabel. Fordism is conceived as a mass-production paradigm characterised by several key features on a micro level: the use of special purpose machines, the division of labour into more simplified operations and the production of standardized goods by semi-skilled workers. On a macro level, Fordism consists of the dominance of big corporations in national economy, centralisation of decision-making and stabilisation of costs and markets for mass production goods. The stabilisa-tion of wage formation and labour market institutions is central for the stability of the whole system. The crisis of Swedish Fordism on the macro level is of central relevance for this study. However, Chapter 4 discusses important aspects of the crisis of Fordism in Sweden on the micro level, connected with Swedish blue-collar workers’ discontent with the dominant social order and relations on the shop floor.
The following research questions have been addressed in the thesis:
1. Did the development of Fordism in Sweden involve inherent features that potentially led to its dissolution?
2. What factors contributed to the actualisation of the wage-earner funds problem in the early 1970s?
3. What did the active LO workers think about wage-earner funds in the 1970s? In what manner did they give their support to the radical version of the wage-earner funds proposal? How did the workers express their discon-tent with the Fordist order?
4. What kind of strategies did Swedish Social Democratic leaders use to address the opposition to wage-earner funds? In what respect did this relate to the crisis of Fordism in Sweden? In what sense did radical leftist groups in SAP influence the policy towards wage-earner funds pursued by the party leaders?
5. How did Swedish employers react to the Swedish labour movement’s initiatives concerning wage-earner funds? What kind of interdependence existed between the wage-earner funds question and the decision of the Swedish employers to leave the Swedish centralized model of industrial relations in the early 1980s? How did the economic crisis of Swedish Ford-ism influence SAF’s view towards wage-earner funds? What role did the wage-earner funds debate play in the ideological offensive launched by SAF in the late 1970s and the early 1980s?
The thesis is primarily based on investigations at LO’s archive and SAP’s archive located at the Labour Movement Archives and Library in Stockholm as well as on studies at SAF’s archive located at the Centre of Business History in Stockholm.
The study is interdisciplinary and uses methods found in Economic History, Institutional Economy, Sociology and Political Science.
Contents:
Andrei Yakovlev. Russian economy at the crossroads, before and beyond the Ukrainian crisis, interview with Ilja Viktorov
Anton Oleinik. Price of opulence. On a constellation of interests in the European market for natural gas
Leo Granberg & Ann-Mari Sätre. Agency and development in second Russia: using opportunities in a local context
Olga Golubeva. Business climate in Russia: Swedish investors’ perspective
Susanne Oxenstierna. Prospects for institutional reform in the Russian economy
Mi Lennhag. The rise of anti-corruption demands: The Ukrainian Maidan mementot as different from everyday discussions in Russia
Alexander Abramov, Maria Chernova, Alexander Radygin. Financial markets regulation in Russia: models, evolution, efficiency