The distinction between the mental operations of abstraction and exclusion is recognized as playi... more The distinction between the mental operations of abstraction and exclusion is recognized as playing an important role in many of Descartes’ metaphysical arguments, at least after 1640. In this paper I first show that Descartes describes the distinction between abstraction and exclusion in the early Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in substantially the same way he does in the 1640s. Second, I show that Descartes makes the test for exclusion a major component of the method proposed in the Rules. Third, I argue that in Rule 14 the exclusion-abstraction distinction is connected to a theory of distinctions, which includes a notion of real distinction as essentially tied to the imagination. This sheds light on Descartes’ development in and after the Rules.
Descartes is notorious for holding a strong anti-vacuist
position. On his view, according to the ... more Descartes is notorious for holding a strong anti-vacuist position. On his view, according to the standard reading, empty space not only does not exist in nature, but it is logically impossible. The very notion of a void or vacuum is an incoherent one. Recently Eric Palmer has proposed a revisionist reading of Descartes on empty space, arguing that he is more sanguine about its possibility. Palmer makes use of Descartes’ early correspondence with Marin Mersenne, including his commentary on Galileo’s Two New Sciences. I argue that Palmer’s reading is mistaken, and that it relies on an understandable but faulty inference—i.e., that if Descartes considers the implications of an opposing view, he must find it at least coherent. Descartes, as I show from his correspondence and other texts, uses a variety of persuasive strategies, and levels charges of different logical strength, against positions which he takes to be incoherent. Thus we cannot infer from the fact that Descartes argues, e.g., that something is a superfluous theoretical entity, that he admits that entity’s coherence. He often chooses to argue a weaker thesis against an opponent so that he can use an argument to which the opponent is more likely to agree.
There are long-standing debates in Descartes scholarship surrounding the metaphysics of extended ... more There are long-standing debates in Descartes scholarship surrounding the metaphysics of extended substance. Some of the central topics involved are the real and modal distinctions, nominalism versus Platonism about the essence of extended things, and the unity or multiplicity (and divisibility or indivisibility) of extended substance. In the recent literature, a group of scholars—Thomas Lennon (2007), Kurt Smith (2010), and then Smith and Alan Nelson (2010)—favors a reading of Descartes as a monist about extended substance and an idealist (or even a transcendental idealist) about finite bodies. Other commentators, including Marleen Rozemond and Calvin Normore in recent papers, are loosely united by the claims that Descartes was a pluralist about extended substance and a realist about particular bodies (Rozemond 2011; Schmaltz 2009; Normore 2008; Slowik 2001; Stuart 1999; Des Chene 1996). My topic here is Descartes's account of the concept of space and its relationship to body. Because the discussion of place and space is closely connected with motion and divisibility, the texts concerning space are important for interpreting Descartes's metaphysics of the material world, and they show up frequently in that literature. My claim here is that a careful interpretation of the concept of space in Descartes's Principles of Philosophy supports the second kind of reading of the metaphysics of extension: there are many extended substances that are really distinct, and these particular parts of matter are real as opposed to phenomenal.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2011
Introduction. 1.. The Problem of the First-Person Point-of-View. 2.. . Epistemic Position and the... more Introduction. 1.. The Problem of the First-Person Point-of-View. 2.. . Epistemic Position and the First Meditation. 3.. Imagining Mind and Body. 4.. The Idea of a Supreme Being. 5.. Truth and Imprecision in the Fourth Meditation. 6.. Another Proof of the Existence of God. 7.. ...
The distinction between the mental operations of abstraction and exclusion is recognized as playi... more The distinction between the mental operations of abstraction and exclusion is recognized as playing an important role in many of Descartes’ metaphysical arguments, at least after 1640. In this paper I first show that Descartes describes the distinction between abstraction and exclusion in the early Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in substantially the same way he does in the 1640s. Second, I show that Descartes makes the test for exclusion a major component of the method proposed in the Rules. Third, I argue that in Rule 14 the exclusion-abstraction distinction is connected to a theory of distinctions, which includes a notion of real distinction as essentially tied to the imagination. This sheds light on Descartes’ development in and after the Rules.
Descartes is notorious for holding a strong anti-vacuist
position. On his view, according to the ... more Descartes is notorious for holding a strong anti-vacuist position. On his view, according to the standard reading, empty space not only does not exist in nature, but it is logically impossible. The very notion of a void or vacuum is an incoherent one. Recently Eric Palmer has proposed a revisionist reading of Descartes on empty space, arguing that he is more sanguine about its possibility. Palmer makes use of Descartes’ early correspondence with Marin Mersenne, including his commentary on Galileo’s Two New Sciences. I argue that Palmer’s reading is mistaken, and that it relies on an understandable but faulty inference—i.e., that if Descartes considers the implications of an opposing view, he must find it at least coherent. Descartes, as I show from his correspondence and other texts, uses a variety of persuasive strategies, and levels charges of different logical strength, against positions which he takes to be incoherent. Thus we cannot infer from the fact that Descartes argues, e.g., that something is a superfluous theoretical entity, that he admits that entity’s coherence. He often chooses to argue a weaker thesis against an opponent so that he can use an argument to which the opponent is more likely to agree.
There are long-standing debates in Descartes scholarship surrounding the metaphysics of extended ... more There are long-standing debates in Descartes scholarship surrounding the metaphysics of extended substance. Some of the central topics involved are the real and modal distinctions, nominalism versus Platonism about the essence of extended things, and the unity or multiplicity (and divisibility or indivisibility) of extended substance. In the recent literature, a group of scholars—Thomas Lennon (2007), Kurt Smith (2010), and then Smith and Alan Nelson (2010)—favors a reading of Descartes as a monist about extended substance and an idealist (or even a transcendental idealist) about finite bodies. Other commentators, including Marleen Rozemond and Calvin Normore in recent papers, are loosely united by the claims that Descartes was a pluralist about extended substance and a realist about particular bodies (Rozemond 2011; Schmaltz 2009; Normore 2008; Slowik 2001; Stuart 1999; Des Chene 1996). My topic here is Descartes's account of the concept of space and its relationship to body. Because the discussion of place and space is closely connected with motion and divisibility, the texts concerning space are important for interpreting Descartes's metaphysics of the material world, and they show up frequently in that literature. My claim here is that a careful interpretation of the concept of space in Descartes's Principles of Philosophy supports the second kind of reading of the metaphysics of extension: there are many extended substances that are really distinct, and these particular parts of matter are real as opposed to phenomenal.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2011
Introduction. 1.. The Problem of the First-Person Point-of-View. 2.. . Epistemic Position and the... more Introduction. 1.. The Problem of the First-Person Point-of-View. 2.. . Epistemic Position and the First Meditation. 3.. Imagining Mind and Body. 4.. The Idea of a Supreme Being. 5.. Truth and Imprecision in the Fourth Meditation. 6.. Another Proof of the Existence of God. 7.. ...
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Papers by Joseph Zepeda
position. On his view, according to the standard reading, empty space not
only does not exist in nature, but it is logically impossible. The very notion of
a void or vacuum is an incoherent one. Recently Eric Palmer has proposed a
revisionist reading of Descartes on empty space, arguing that he is more
sanguine about its possibility. Palmer makes use of Descartes’ early
correspondence with Marin Mersenne, including his commentary on Galileo’s
Two New Sciences. I argue that Palmer’s reading is mistaken, and that it relies on
an understandable but faulty inference—i.e., that if Descartes considers the
implications of an opposing view, he must find it at least coherent. Descartes,
as I show from his correspondence and other texts, uses a variety of
persuasive strategies, and levels charges of different logical strength, against
positions which he takes to be incoherent. Thus we cannot infer from the fact
that Descartes argues, e.g., that something is a superfluous theoretical entity,
that he admits that entity’s coherence. He often chooses to argue a weaker
thesis against an opponent so that he can use an argument to which the
opponent is more likely to agree.
position. On his view, according to the standard reading, empty space not
only does not exist in nature, but it is logically impossible. The very notion of
a void or vacuum is an incoherent one. Recently Eric Palmer has proposed a
revisionist reading of Descartes on empty space, arguing that he is more
sanguine about its possibility. Palmer makes use of Descartes’ early
correspondence with Marin Mersenne, including his commentary on Galileo’s
Two New Sciences. I argue that Palmer’s reading is mistaken, and that it relies on
an understandable but faulty inference—i.e., that if Descartes considers the
implications of an opposing view, he must find it at least coherent. Descartes,
as I show from his correspondence and other texts, uses a variety of
persuasive strategies, and levels charges of different logical strength, against
positions which he takes to be incoherent. Thus we cannot infer from the fact
that Descartes argues, e.g., that something is a superfluous theoretical entity,
that he admits that entity’s coherence. He often chooses to argue a weaker
thesis against an opponent so that he can use an argument to which the
opponent is more likely to agree.