Papers by Colm Shanahan
Irish Theological Quarterly, Jun 26, 2019
I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of my supervisor, Prof. Vasilis Politis. His ... more I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of my supervisor, Prof. Vasilis Politis. His sound advice, keen insights, and unwavering belief in the project here undertaken have been invaluable to me. Additionally, the level of support that he always offered so readily was more in keeping with that of a close friend than a supervisor. As a supervisor, his ability to actualise one's potential is his most defining characteristic; he has a unique ability to present one with comments that challenge one to reply with the full weight of one's creative insights delivered within the most formalised and technical language. Also, I must acknowledge all of the ceaseless help and support that my wife provided me with during the writing of this Ph.D. She is a true source of inspiration to me, who somehow retains the ability to motivate me and, at the same time, re-infuse my self-belief where and when such is required. There are no words that would convey my debt to her: she encouraged me to return to education to undertake both my B.A. and MLitt, and to complete this Ph.D.; she has always supported me in every way possible. Finally, I wish to thank the Philosophy Department at Trinity College Dublin for providing me with the funding required to undertake and complete this Ph.D. I also wish to acknowledge the encouragement I received from the research communityboth staff and graduate studentsin the Department. 1.4.1 A Note on Akrasia 1.5 Conclusion Chapter Two: Alcibiades, Akrasia, and the Fetish for Falsity 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Socrates-Diotima: The Labours of Eros and Treacherous Love 2.3 Alcibiades' Treacherous Love and Akrasia 2.4 The Easy Good and Inverted Intellectualism 2.4.1 Reflecting on Alcibiades and the 'Socrates Example' 2.5 Conclusion Chapter Three, The Republic: Akrasia and the Limits of Knowledge 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Parts and Rule of the Soul 3.2.1 The Appetitive Part: Understanding the Limits of its Knowledge 3.2.2 The Spirited Part: No Shame without the Rational Part 3.2.3 The Rational Part: Motivational Neutrality and the Possibility of Akrasia 3.3 The Freedom of the Neutrality of Reason Embodied: The Case of Alcibiades 3.4 Conclusion Chapter Four, Valuing the Lesser Good: The Currency of the Cave 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Allegory of the Cave and Akrasia 4.2.2 Commitment to Goods and the Significance of Turning the Soul 4.3 The Cave: How Final is the Escape? 4.4 Commitment to Weakness: Reason Ruled and the Whole of Vice 4.4.1 The Power of Destruction 4.5 The Implausibility of Good-Independent Desires: Rationally Mediated Goods 4.6 Conclusion Chapter Five: Learning to Live with the Lesser 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Need for Reason to Live with the Lesser Good 5.2.1 Hubris' Rational Entitlement to its Good 5.3 Socrates' Akrasia: Grounding Erotic Motivation in Reason 5.3.1 The Damage of the Old Good 5.4 The Phaedrus: A Stronger Delivery of the Argument 5.4.1 The Cause of Akrasia: Two Points of Departure from SV 5.5 Conclusion Conclusion Works Cited with the latter dialogues, here listed, Plato comes to reject both the idea that knowledge is the sufficient condition of virtue and the idea that no one can act against their known greater good (I refer to the conjunction of these two claims as SV). While I will discuss Plato's turning away from SV (that is, the conjunction of the claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue and the claim that that no one can act against their known greater good), I will outline my thesis on foot of what I take to be his dissatisfaction with SV. Crucially, this dissatisfaction is to be found in the Protagoras, a dialogue in which Plato seems to be holding SV. As I will show, even within Plato's formulation of SV, he casts at least a shadow of doubt. Due to the constraints of this thesis, I shall not answer the question of whether or not Plato actually held SV, such that he can be thought to later reject it. Rather, I will simply take it to be the case that when he advances SV, he gives us enough to conclude that he is doing so with caution. 2 Rather than labouring this thesis with questions regarding the chronology of the dialogues, I will take the Protagoras and Meno to have been written prior to the Symposium, Republic and Phaedrus. Additionally, since the Protagoras outlines SV in a cautionary way, I will suspend consideration of whether or not the Meno is written after the Protagoras, and so it
International journal of the Platonic tradition, Nov 14, 2019
I will argue that, due to the level of attention given to comparing and contrasting Socratic Inte... more I will argue that, due to the level of attention given to comparing and contrasting Socratic Intellectualism with the Republic, the question of the possibility of akrasia in Plato’s thought has not yet been adequately formulated. I will instead be focusing on Plato’s Symposium, situating Alcibiades at its epicentre and suggesting that his case should be read as highlighting some of Plato’s concerns with Socratic Intellectualism. These concerns arise from the following position of Socratic Intellectualism: knowing the greater good will necessarily entail doing good, and will thereby remove the motivational content of prior knowledge of what is good. Through Alcibiades, Plato explores the possibility of a negative reaction to knowledge of the greater good. Importantly, rather than simply arising as a result of being overcome by the passions, Alcibiades’ negative reaction assumes that rational freedom is required to reject the greater good (virtue) in favour of the lesser.
The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 2019
I will argue that, due to the level of attention given to comparing and contrasting Socratic Inte... more I will argue that, due to the level of attention given to comparing and contrasting Socratic Intellectualism with the Republic, the question of the possibility of akrasia in Plato’s thought has not yet been adequately formulated. I will instead be focusing on Plato’s Symposium, situating Alcibiades at its epicentre and suggesting that his case should be read as highlighting some of Plato’s concerns with Socratic Intellectualism. These concerns arise from the following position of Socratic Intellectualism: knowing the greater good will necessarily entail doing good, and will thereby remove the motivational content of prior knowledge of what is good. Through Alcibiades, Plato explores the possibility of a negative reaction to knowledge of the greater good. Importantly, rather than simply arising as a result of being overcome by the passions, Alcibiades’ negative reaction assumes that rational freedom is required to reject the greater good (virtue) in favour of the lesser.
I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of my supervisor, Prof. Vasilis Politis. His ... more I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of my supervisor, Prof. Vasilis Politis. His sound advice, keen insights, and unwavering belief in the project here undertaken have been invaluable to me. Additionally, the level of support that he always offered so readily was more in keeping with that of a close friend than a supervisor. As a supervisor, his ability to actualise one's potential is his most defining characteristic; he has a unique ability to present one with comments that challenge one to reply with the full weight of one's creative insights delivered within the most formalised and technical language. Also, I must acknowledge all of the ceaseless help and support that my wife provided me with during the writing of this Ph.D. She is a true source of inspiration to me, who somehow retains the ability to motivate me and, at the same time, re-infuse my self-belief where and when such is required. There are no words that would convey my debt to her: she encouraged me to return to education to undertake both my B.A. and MLitt, and to complete this Ph.D.; she has always supported me in every way possible. Finally, I wish to thank the Philosophy Department at Trinity College Dublin for providing me with the funding required to undertake and complete this Ph.D. I also wish to acknowledge the encouragement I received from the research communityboth staff and graduate studentsin the Department. 1.4.1 A Note on Akrasia 1.5 Conclusion Chapter Two: Alcibiades, Akrasia, and the Fetish for Falsity 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Socrates-Diotima: The Labours of Eros and Treacherous Love 2.3 Alcibiades' Treacherous Love and Akrasia 2.4 The Easy Good and Inverted Intellectualism 2.4.1 Reflecting on Alcibiades and the 'Socrates Example' 2.5 Conclusion Chapter Three, The Republic: Akrasia and the Limits of Knowledge 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Parts and Rule of the Soul 3.2.1 The Appetitive Part: Understanding the Limits of its Knowledge 3.2.2 The Spirited Part: No Shame without the Rational Part 3.2.3 The Rational Part: Motivational Neutrality and the Possibility of Akrasia 3.3 The Freedom of the Neutrality of Reason Embodied: The Case of Alcibiades 3.4 Conclusion Chapter Four, Valuing the Lesser Good: The Currency of the Cave 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Allegory of the Cave and Akrasia 4.2.2 Commitment to Goods and the Significance of Turning the Soul 4.3 The Cave: How Final is the Escape? 4.4 Commitment to Weakness: Reason Ruled and the Whole of Vice 4.4.1 The Power of Destruction 4.5 The Implausibility of Good-Independent Desires: Rationally Mediated Goods 4.6 Conclusion Chapter Five: Learning to Live with the Lesser 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Need for Reason to Live with the Lesser Good 5.2.1 Hubris' Rational Entitlement to its Good 5.3 Socrates' Akrasia: Grounding Erotic Motivation in Reason 5.3.1 The Damage of the Old Good 5.4 The Phaedrus: A Stronger Delivery of the Argument 5.4.1 The Cause of Akrasia: Two Points of Departure from SV 5.5 Conclusion Conclusion Works Cited with the latter dialogues, here listed, Plato comes to reject both the idea that knowledge is the sufficient condition of virtue and the idea that no one can act against their known greater good (I refer to the conjunction of these two claims as SV). While I will discuss Plato's turning away from SV (that is, the conjunction of the claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue and the claim that that no one can act against their known greater good), I will outline my thesis on foot of what I take to be his dissatisfaction with SV. Crucially, this dissatisfaction is to be found in the Protagoras, a dialogue in which Plato seems to be holding SV. As I will show, even within Plato's formulation of SV, he casts at least a shadow of doubt. Due to the constraints of this thesis, I shall not answer the question of whether or not Plato actually held SV, such that he can be thought to later reject it. Rather, I will simply take it to be the case that when he advances SV, he gives us enough to conclude that he is doing so with caution. 2 Rather than labouring this thesis with questions regarding the chronology of the dialogues, I will take the Protagoras and Meno to have been written prior to the Symposium, Republic and Phaedrus. Additionally, since the Protagoras outlines SV in a cautionary way, I will suspend consideration of whether or not the Meno is written after the Protagoras, and so it
Classics Ireland, 2020
In this article, I argue that, while Plato undoubtedly highlights many ways in which reason is be... more In this article, I argue that, while Plato undoubtedly highlights many ways in which reason is beneficial for the soul, in the Republic he also points towards another avenue, one in which reason can lean towards harmful ends. Drawing on a close reading of Republic 518e-519a and 590c, I present an analysis of the democratic man as a weaker soul type. In so doing, I seek to show how reason can opt for such harmful ends. Furthermore, I argue, contra Scott and Johnstone, that reason surrenders to appetitive rule in the soul of the democrat, and in so doing can cause the spirited part to do likewise. Thus, reason is ruled by appetite which will result in the curtailment of rational and spirited ends. I hold, therefore, that the democratic man is a pointed example of how the rational part of the soul can be harmful.
Irish Theological Quarterly
International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 2019
I will argue that, due to the level of attention given to comparing and contrasting Socratic Inte... more I will argue that, due to the level of attention given to comparing and contrasting Socratic Intellectualism with the Republic, the question of the possibility of akrasia in Plato’s thought has not yet been adequately formulated. I will instead be focusing on Plato’s Symposium, situating Alcibiades at its epicentre and suggesting that his case should be read as highlighting some of Plato’s concerns with Socratic Intellectualism. These concerns arise from the following position of Socratic Intellectualism: knowing the greater good will necessarily entail doing good, and will thereby remove the motivational content of prior knowledge of what is good. Through Alcibiades, Plato explores the possibility of a negative reaction to knowledge of the greater good. Importantly, rather than simply arising as a result of being overcome by the passions, Alcibiades’ negative reaction assumes that rational freedom is required to reject the greater good (virtue) in favour of the lesser.
An Ethics of/for the Future?, 2014
Drawing on the Symposium, Phaedrus, and Republic, I argue that Plato takes the desire to know to ... more Drawing on the Symposium, Phaedrus, and Republic, I argue that Plato takes the desire to know to be related to the self-interested desire for one's own good. However, the manner in which knowledge is attained - through dialogue and education - can motivate one to move beyond self-interest and thereby leads to the emergence of a desire to assist others in obtaining their good. Rather than retreating from the physical world, Plato's ethics suggests that, for the embodied soul, the task of seeing the Forms is most readily achievable by directly engaging with others in the world.
Philosophia, 2012
In this piece I outline how Plato's conception of virtue, in the Symposium, casts the literal act... more In this piece I outline how Plato's conception of virtue, in the Symposium, casts the literal act of teaching one's beloved as the primary concern of the philosopher. I develop my line of thinking with direct reference to the work of Frisbee Sheffield.
Book Reviews by Colm Shanahan
Irish Theological Quarterly, 2019
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Papers by Colm Shanahan
Book Reviews by Colm Shanahan