Papers by Viacheslav Kondurov
Pravovedenie, 2024
This article is dedicated to the study of the legal nature of the Fundamentals of State Policy fo... more This article is dedicated to the study of the legal nature of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values, to determine the role and influence of this strategic planning document on the legal system of the Russian Federation. The authors conclude that the mentioned Fundamentals of State Policy is a political and legal act, which, due to the specific nature of the values it establishes, has a special legal significance in the legislative system of Russia. Firstly, from a formal point of view, the Fundamentals of State Policy differs from many other strategic documents in that it was approved by a decree of the President of the Russian Federation, who, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is empowered to determine the directions of the country’s foreign and domestic policy. Second, from a substantive point of view, this strategic act appeals to values that are prior in importance and nature even to the constitutional act itself. Accordingly, they were not established by the strategic document, but were merely expressed by it. Due to the legal form, these values have been given additional tools for protection and implementation. Because of the fundamental nature of traditional values, their integral incorporation into social practices requires the broad involvement of civil society and its institutions, especially universities and research centers.
Law Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 2023
The beginning of jurisprudence is usually attributed to the 11th–12th centuries, when the school ... more The beginning of jurisprudence is usually attributed to the 11th–12th centuries, when the school of glossators created a general, scholastic-based methodological approach to the study and teaching of the Roman law. This textualistic method was later transformed by the so-called school of “commentators”, especially Bartolo da Sassoferrato. The commentators, unlike the glossators, were much more interested in particular public law questions. Mainly this interest was dictated by the political situation, including the threat to the autonomy of Italian cities. Nevertheless, a fundamental revision of the glossators’ method became possible only later, when, under the influence of humanist criticism, the idea of the historical-philological method spread among jurists, suggesting that Roman law should be interpreted in the context of the time in which it was created. The glossators and commentators’ belief in the universality and legal validity of the Roman law gone into the past. The new method (mos gallicus) was gradually transformed from a history- and philology-driven study of the Roman law texts into a general historicist point of view, which turned the main interest of jurists to domestic law and customs. Thus, the humanist approach became the basis from which the idea of the uniqueness of the domestic legal order was born. This idea was transferred to the field of public law and led to the belief that the principles of the domestic legal order should be derived not from universal categories of the alien Roman law, but from real political practices of the past, local customs and “ancient constitutions”. Nevertheless, the historical method itself, due to its focus on unique, specific features of legal orders, could not ensure the establishing of a new public law science. In this regard, Jean Bodin developed and later applied a peculiar comparative-legal approach, which, as the French jurist believed, should have served to create a system of universal concepts of public law theory.
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Начало правовой науки, как правило, относят к XI–XII векам, когда школе глоссаторов удалось создать общий, базирующийся на схоластике подход к исследованию и преподаванию римского права. Впоследствии данный текстоцентричный, «буквалистский» метод был преобразован школой «комментаторов», в особенности Бартоло да Сассоферрато. Комментаторы в отличие от глоссаторов проявляли куда больший интерес к вопросам публичного права, что было продиктовано во многом политической ситуацией эпохи, в том числе стремлением итальянских городов к автономии. Тем не менее принципиальный пересмотр метода глоссаторов стал возможен лишь позднее, когда под влиянием гуманистической критики среди юристов распространилась идея историко-филологического метода, предполагавшего, что римское право следует интерпретировать в контексте той эпохи, когда оно создавалось. Свойственное глоссаторам и комментатором убеждение в универсальности и юридической действительности римского права ушло в прошлое. Новый «галльский» метод (mos gallicus) постепенно трансформировался из обусловленного историей и филологией исследования римского права в общую историцистскую установку, которая обратила интерес юристов к местному праву и обычаям. Таким образом, гуманистический подход стал тем основанием, из которого родилась идея о своеобразии «национального» правового порядка. Данная идея, будучи перенесена в область публичного права, привела к убеждению, что принципы устройства «национального» правопорядка должны выводиться не из универсальных категорий чуждого римского права, но из политической практики прошлого, местных обычаев и «древних конституций». Тем не менее сам по себе исторический метод в силу его сосредоточения на уникальных, специфичных чертах правовых порядков не мог обеспечить становления новой публично-правовой науки. В связи с этим Ж. Боденом был разработан, а впоследствии применен своеобразный сравнительно-правовой подход, который, как полагал французский правовед, должен был служить созданию системы универсальных понятийных категорий публицистической науки.
RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2023
Discussions about the nature of constitutional rights set out in the Constitution emerged in post... more Discussions about the nature of constitutional rights set out in the Constitution emerged in postwar Germany in the late 1950s and early 1960s, triggered by the judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the so-called “Lüth case”. In this judgement, for the first time, the Court clearly articulated the position that fundamental rights are an objective value system that extends its legal force to all branches of law, including civil law.
One of the fiercest critics of the Court decision was Ernst Forsthoff, a disciple of Carl Schmitt. In a series of articles, he attacked the “value” legal interpretation, pointing out that it leads not only to the destruction of the legal method and the loss of jurisprudence autonomy, but also to changes in the institutional structure of the state. E. Forsthoff’s criticism was predominantly juridical, focusing on the actual law enforcement, as well as on the theoretical-legal origins of value interpretation which he found in R. Smend’s “integration theory”.
In contrast, C. Schmitt, in “Tyranny of Values”, practically omitted legal arguments and attacked the philosophical basis of the German Constitutional Court’s position. Relying on M. Weber, the German legal scholar attempted to demonstrate that the adoption of value interpretation by constitutional justice means the direct application of values, which destroys the rule of law. Despite the different trends of criticism, the conclusions reached by E. Forsthoff and C. Schmitt show a significant similarity in that both call for the autonomy of legal science and a return to the formal legal state.
Voprosy filosofii, 2022
The article is concerned with the problem of relativisation of the philosophical grounds of the l... more The article is concerned with the problem of relativisation of the philosophical grounds of the legal interpretation theory. The latter include ideas about the text and reality relationships, the interpreter’s ability to cognize the meaning of the text, and ethical principles of dealing with the text, its author, and its meaning. The article is discussing the author- (logo-) centric approach to the interpretation of authoritative texts, which used to be common for medieval scholasticism and jurisprudence and was conditioned by the genealogy of these two disciplines. The authors show how the consequent proclamation of the death of the signifier (God and the Author) and the signified (sign) affected the theory of legal interpretation. It is pointed out that the semantic voluntarism of the judge-interpreter and the absence of any ethical restraints in dealing with the author, text and meaning as the main consequence of the destruction of its logocentric foundations. The metaphor of the death of the legislator is introduced, with the help of which the distrust of the legislator as a source of meaning, which is widespread in modern theories of legal interpretation, can be recorded. When applied in jurisprudence, such theoretical conceptions can generate political effects in the legal order, changing the perception of the separation of powers and the subject of sovereignty. In the conclusion, the authors defend the position of interpretative realism, which obliges the interpreter to reveal the meaning invested in the text by its author.
The article investigates the possibility of applying political theology as a specific methodologi... more The article investigates the possibility of applying political theology as a specific methodological approach to international law. As the key theses of political theology were originally formulated by C. Schmitt in the context of national law acting in a homogeneous environment, political theology discourse in the modern philosophy of international law is mainly related to the universalist projects of global law based on an analogy with national law. The first of such strategies, the expansionist strategy, presupposes the construction of global order by the world hegemon. The second, the cosmopolitan strategy, assumes that international law can be built on the basis of an ongoing process of discussion of the global order foundations by the widest possible range of actors. Both of these strategies charm “eternal peace” and are nourished by a common messianic spirit and, therefore, are utopian. However, Schmitt’s international law legacy offers an atypical non-universalist and anti-m...
Vestnik of the St. Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, 2020
The subject of the study is the ideas of classical institutionalists (M. Hauriou and S. Romano) o... more The subject of the study is the ideas of classical institutionalists (M. Hauriou and S. Romano) on the role of court and the nature of justice. The methodological basis of the work is the method of interpretation, which is the main one for the study of the legal theories history, and also the method of problem-theoretical reconstruction, as well as general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, etc. The relevnce of the conducted research is to identify the key elements of Maurice Hauriou and Santi Romano’s ideas on the role and content of justice and their interpretation, taking into account the achievements of modern legal science regarding the different styles (strategies) of judicial interpretation. Maurice Hauriou believes that the basis of the court powers is not the political power, but the sovereignty of the constitutional statute. This makes it possible for courts to perform the function of deterrence (restriction) of other state bodies, the source of power of which is a...
Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS, 2020
Статья подготовлена в рамках поддержанного Российским фондом фундаментальных исследований научног... more Статья подготовлена в рамках поддержанного Российским фондом фундаментальных исследований научного проекта № 18-011-01195 «Действительность и действенность права: теоретические модели и стратегии судебной аргументации». Аннотация. Понятие «институционализм» в привычном словоупотреблении охватывает целый спектр влиятельных философско-правовых доктрин XX в. Вследствие коренных различий между ними теоретико-правовая реконструкция институционализма как единого учения и прояснение его содержания вызывают затруднения. Вместе с тем в дискуссиях современных правоведов популярность данного направления возрастает, а некоторые из представителей отечественной философско-правовой мысли полагают себя продолжателями названной традиции. В статье предлагается исходить из устоявшегося разделения институционализма на «старый» («классический») и «новый». Представители классического институционализма (М. Ориу, С. Романо) предсказуемо полагали, что основанием действительности норм является институт, однако источник действительности самих институтов как правовых явлений понимался ими различно. Для М. Ориу таким источником выступает «идея», структурирующая институт и организующая его деятельность. Она обусловливает и справедливый для конкретного института баланс власти и автономии индивидов, определяющий в конечном счете пра-Ключевые слова: действительность права, действенность права, правовые институты, институциональный факт, юридический институционализм, юридический позитивизм, институциональный юридический позитивизм, М.
Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS, 2019
The article was prepared within the framework of the scientific project № 18-011-01195 "Validity ... more The article was prepared within the framework of the scientific project № 18-011-01195 "Validity and efficacy of law: theoretical models and strategies of judicial argumentation", supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2021
The article investigates the possibility of applying political theology as a specifi methodologic... more The article investigates the possibility of applying political theology as a specifi methodological approach to international law. As the key theses of political theology were originally formulated by C. Schmitt in the context of national law acting in a homogeneous environment, political theology discourse in the modern philosophy of international law is mainly related to the universalist projects of global law based on an analogy with national law. The fist of such strategies, the expansionist strategy, presupposes the construction of global order by the world hegemon. The second, the cosmopolitan strategy, assumes that international law can be built on the basis of an ongoing process of discussion of the global order foundations by the widest possible range of actors. Both of these strategies charm “eternal peace” and are nourished by a common messianic spirit and, therefore, are utopian. However, Schmitt’s international law legacy offrs an atypical non-universalist and anti-messianic view on international law as a heterogeneous global legal order based on spatial concepts. Despite the fact that the application of political theology to this kind of order is diffilt, it shall not be excluded for several reasons. The pluralistic structure of the heterogeneous order can be seen as a katechon that holds back the end of history. Finally, the political theology of international law can be applied to analyze the historical transformations of the international legal order.
Vestnik of St. Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, 2020
The subject of the study is the ideas of classical institutionalists (M. Hauriou and S. Romano) o... more The subject of the study is the ideas of classical institutionalists (M. Hauriou and S. Romano) on the role of court and the nature of justice. The methodological basis of the work is the method of interpretation, which is the main one for the study of the legal theories history, and also the method of problem-theoretical reconstruction, as well as general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, etc. The relevnce of the conducted research is to identify the key elements of Maurice Hauriou and Santi Romano’s ideas on the role and content of justice and their interpretation, taking into account the achievements of modern legal science regarding the different styles (strategies) of judicial interpretation. Maurice Hauriou believes that the basis of the court powers is not the political power, but the sovereignty of the constitutional statute. This makes it possible for courts to perform the function of deterrence (restriction) of other state bodies, the source of power of which is a political sovereignty. For this reason, the French jurist pushes the boundaries of justice wide enough to allow judicial rule-making, which is competitive with the parliament. To a certain extent, this position of Maurice Hauriou may be at the heart of his world view. For example, he puts an «idea» in the foundation of the institution, which eventually becomes the guardian of justice. Santi Romano, on the other hand, seeks to avoid any idealism by remaining in positions close to sociological positivism. Unlike Maurice Hauriou, he creates not a public law theory, but a general legal theory. For this reason, he focuses much more on the content of interpretation as a specific judicial activity than his French teacher. He considers it as a formal logical and essentially cognitive procedure. However, the general context of the pluralistic teaching of Italian jurisprudence makes it possible to take a broader view of the judiciary than that of Maurice Hauriou. Santi Romano also allows the court to have normative competence, but does not consider it part of justice. Despite the fundamental assumption that it is possible for the courts to create norms, neither Santi Romano nor Maurice Hauriou can be considered forerunners or supporters of radical judicial realism, according to which the judge is the only true creator of law, who makes norms in a sovereign and spontaneous manner without looking back at the existing legal order.
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Предметом исследования являются воззрения классических институционалистов М. Ориу и С. Романо на роль суда и природу юстиции. Методологическую базу работы составляет метод интерпретации, являющийся основным для изучения истории правовых учений и охватывающий также метод проблемно-теоретической реконструкции, а также общенаучные методы анализа, синтеза и др. Новизна проведённого исследования заключается в выявлении ключевых элементов воззрений Мориса Ориу и Санти Романо на роль и содержание юстиции, их интерпретация с учётом достижений современной юридической науки в контексте различных стилей (стратегий) судебной интерпретации. Морис Ориу полагает, что основанием полномочий суда является не политическая власть, но суверенитет конституционного статуса. Это делает возможным выполнение судами функции сдерживания (ограничения) иных органов государства, источником власти которых является политический суверенитет. В связи с этим французский правовед достаточно широко раздвигает границы юстиции и вполне допускает судейское нормотворчество, конкурентное парламенту. В определенной мере такая позиция М. Ориу может быть обусловлена «идеалистическими» элементами в основе его мировоззрения. Так, в основание института им кладется «идея», на страже которой в конечном счёте и оказывается юстиция. Санти Романо в свою очередь, напротив, стремится избежать любого идеализма, оставаясь на позициях, близких социологическому позитивизму. В отличие от Мориса Ориу, он создаёт общую правовую теорию, а не теорию публичного права. По этой причине он куда больше своего французского учителя уделяет внимания вопросам содержания толкования как специфической судейской деятельности. Он понимает его как формальную логическую и сущностно когнитивную процедуру. Однако общий контекст плюралистического учения итальянского правоведа делает возможным не менее широкий взгляд на суд, чем у Мориса Ориу. Санти Романо также допускает существование у суда нормотворческой компетенции, однако не считает таковую частью юстиции. Несмотря на принципиальное допущение возможности создания судами норм, ни Санти Романо, ни Морис Ориу не могут рассматриваться как предтечи или сторонники радикального судебного реализма, согласно которому судья - единственный подлинный творец права, суверенно и спонтанно создающий нормы, без оглядки на уже существующий правовой порядок.
Trudy Instituta gosudarstva i prava RAN / Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS, 2019
The concept of "institutionalism" in the usual word use covers a whole range of inflential philos... more The concept of "institutionalism" in the usual word use covers a whole range of inflential philosophical and legal doctrines of the XX century. Due to fundamental diffrences between them, the general theoretical and legal reconstruction of institutionalism as a single doctrine and, consequently, the clarifiation of its content cause diffilties. At the same time, the popularity of this trend is growing in the discussions of contemporary legal scholars, and some of the representatives of the Russian philosophical and legal thought believe themselves to be the followers of this tradition. The paper proposes to proceed from the established division of institutionalism into "old" ("classical") and "new". Representatives of classical institutionalism (M. Hauriou, S. Romano) predictably believed that the basis for the validity of norms was institution, but the source of the validity of institutions themselves as legal phenomena was understood by them diffrently. For M. Hauriou, this was the "idea" which, from within, structured the institution and organized its activities. Among other things, it also determined the fair balance of power and individual autonomy for a particular institution, which, in the end, predetermined the legal character of this or that institution. S. Romano, adhering to more positivist positions, believed that the reality of so-called "original" institutions (whose reality is not justifid by other institutions) is a consequence of their effctive organisation, which distinguishes the institution from any other social group. An important step in the theoretical understanding of institutionalist ideas in law was Schmitt’s teaching about three types of legal thinking: decisionism, normativism, and thinking about law as a specifi order and form. The latter was formulated by a German lawyer under the inflence of the ideas of institutionalism and, according to his idea, should have included it as one of the subspecies. Despite the fact that Carl Schmitt’s affiation to institutionalism is a subject of discussion, the ultimate basis of the reality of the rule of law postulated by him is quite within the logic of the latter — these are the collective metaphysical notions that exist within a specifi order. The modern version of institutionalism is legally represented by the institutional legal positivism of O. Weinberger and N. MacCormick. The "new" institutionalism is based on the concept of institutional fact, which diffrs from the facts of the physical world. Institutions themselves are understood as systems of human action based on practical information (legal norms). In contrast to the "old" institutionalists, O. Weinberger and N. MacCormick do not consider norms secondary to institutions — one simply cannot be imagined without the other. The reality of norms is understood in the spirit of H. Kelsen’s theory, as based on their origin and having a complex connection with the notion of efficy. The historical development of legal institutionalism reflects the evolution of ideas about the relationship between reality and efficy of law — while classical institutionalism denied any connection between them, "new" institutionalism considers these categories as interrelated, which reflcts the normative tendencies of the latter.
Trudy Instituta gosudarstva i prava RAN — Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS, 2019
Political theology is a complex multi-valued concept, the use of which
is often associated with t... more Political theology is a complex multi-valued concept, the use of which
is often associated with the discrediting of certain ideologies, beliefs or value systems. Meanwhile, this concept has a serious theoretical and methodological potential, which due to numerous inversions is almost forgotten. Political theology in the legal sense, from the point of view of C. Schmitt, is a methodological approach, implying a historically changeable analogous similarity between the two systems of concepts — metaphysical (theological) and state-legal, which form corresponding visions of the world of a particular era. The content of this approach consists of three interrelated theses: 1) political theology is a kind of sociology of legal concepts ("sociological" thesis); 2) political theology assumes an analogy between the concepts of the doctrine of state and law and theological concepts (the thesis of the conceptual analogy); 3) political theology implies an analogy between the metaphysical and state-legal visions of the world of a particular epoch, in the structure of which these concepts exist (the thesis of structural analogy).
The heuristic significance of political theology as a methodological approach remains hidden. It is perceived as a kind of conservative ideology or even rhetorical practice. In fact, political theology, by contrast, can be a useful tool for discovering the hidden rhetorical potential of various political and legal arguments. In addition, with
its help, new aspects of such classical problems of the theory and philosophy of law as validity of legal order and its grounds, the concept of sovereign, the essence and limits of justice, strategies of judicial argumentation, etc., are revealed. Being the core of C. Schmitt’s theoretical and legal thinking, political theology appears to be connected not only with the German lawyer’s direct application of its basic theses (for example, to study the concept of sovereign or the neutralization and
depoliticization movement), but it also appears in the Schmitt’s basis of the validity of legal order, which German lawyer interprets as common ideas about the "normal" for a specific community, including the "normal" state-legal system, which are similar, according to the political theology, to the metaphysical vision of the world. Political theology as a methodological approach reveals itself in Schmitt’s criticism of the axiological foundations of constitutional justice. In the essay "Tyranny of Values" the practice of direct application of values by the courts, which is the content of a realistic strategy of judicial argumentation, is interpreted by a lawyer as a special case of the manifestation of a political and theological neutralization and depoliticization movement.
Статья подготовлена в рамках поддержанного Российским фондом фун-даментальных исследований научно... more Статья подготовлена в рамках поддержанного Российским фондом фун-даментальных исследований научного проекта № 18-011-01195 «Дей-ствительность и действенность права: теоретические модели и страте-гии судебной аргументации». Аннотация. Состоявшаяся в 1930-е гг. полемика К. Шмитта и Г. Кельзена о га-ранте конституции наглядно демонстрирует взаимосвязь между постулируемым основанием действительности правопорядка, определением существа и границ юстиции и моделью гарантии конституции. К. Шмитт выделяет три основания действительности права: норма (нормати-визм), решение (децизионизм), порядок (институционализм). Исходя из мышле-ния о праве как о конкретном порядке, ученый предлагает собственную модель конституционной гарантии-гаранта конституции «в институциональном смыс-ле», под которым он понимает главу государства, охраняющего порядок посред-ством чрезвычайных и потенциально беспредельных полномочий. В конкретной конституционной ситуации Веймарской республики таким гарантом, по его мне-нию, является президент. Суд интерпретируется немецким юристом как институт конкретного поряд-ка. Институциональное мышление К. Шмитта определяет границы юстиции-ими является «политическое», понимаемое им как экстраординарное по степени интенсивности разделение на публичных «друзей» и «врагов». Выходя за указан-ные границы, суд оказывается в сфере политической борьбы, где невозможны независимость, нейтральность и объективность, а следовательно, и юстиция. Эти представления о существе и границах юстиции составляют теоретический ба-зис, на котором К. Шмитт строит критику судебной модели гарантии конститу-ции, разработанной Г. Кельзеном. Г. Кельзен редуцирует правопорядок к иерархичной системе норм, действи-тельность которых проистекает из так называемой основной нормы. Из норма-тивистской позиции Г. Кельзена в определении основания действительности правопорядка логически следует тезис о тождестве правотворчества и право
Conference Presentations by Viacheslav Kondurov
XII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS: TRADITIONS AND PROSPECTS – 2020. PHILOSOPHY. ETHICS. PRACTICS, 2020
Кондуров В.Е., Тимошина Е.В. «Тирания ценностей» в конституционном и наднациональном правосудии /... more Кондуров В.Е., Тимошина Е.В. «Тирания ценностей» в конституционном и наднациональном правосудии // Санкт-
петербургский Государственный Университет, 19-21 ноября 2020 г. Материалы конференции / Отв.ред. В.Ю. Перов – СПб.: ООО «Сборка», 2020. С. 51-52. (P. 51-52)
XII международная конференция «Теоретическая и прикладная этика: Традиции и перспективы – 2020. Философия. Этика. Практика».
(http://philosophy.spbu.ru/2652/15963)
XII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS: TRADITIONS AND PROSPECTS – 2020. PHILOSOPHY. ETHICS. PRACTICS
Conference papers
St. Petersburg, Russia
November 19–21, 2020
Text in English:
“Tyranny of Values” in Constitutional and Supranational Justice
Kondurov V.E., Timoshina E.V.
Viacheslav E. Kondurov – Researcher, Teacher-Researcher, Lecturer of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.
Elena V. Timoshina – Doctor of Law, Professor of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.
The theses were prepared within the framework of the scientific project № 18-011-01195 “Validity and efficacy of law: theoretical models and strategies of judicial argumentation”, supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
In the last half-century, interpretation of the constitution as a system of values has become dominant both in legal doctrine and in the policy of interpreting “high justice” institutions (constitutional, supreme and supranational courts). In judicial practice, this idea was first formulated by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in the famous “The Lüth Case” (1958). The origins of this conversion of legal norms and principles into values, with the aim of facilitating their judicial weighing, are linked to the antipositivism of G. Radbruch, the neotomism of G. Düring and the integration of R. Smend.
However, the genesis of the “value” approach and its expansion from philosophy to jurisprudence and court practice has been little studied. How, when and why has there been a loss of understanding of the deontological nature of legal norms and legal principles, their transformation into voluntaristic - an act of judicial interpretation – values to be established and the transformation of institutions of constitutional and supranational justice into bodies for their establishment and promotion, often very aggressive? The “emancipation of values” in justice is linked to the discrediting concepts of the legislator and the law: first, the “will of the legislator” was demythologized as the purpose of judicial interpretation and the basis of the rule of law, followed by the law itself, which in a pluralistic society has become an empty form that reinforces the momentary compromise of opposing forces. Thus, under the slogan of “the rule of law”, the legislator and, subsequently, the law were discredited, and the notion of objectivity and fairness became associated with judges and their discretion not bound by the law that had lost credibility.
The law was seen as a reason for the judge to willfully construct its meaning – a meaning that was absent in the law before the act of judicial “interpretation”. In the rhetorical approach, the interpretation of the law is replaced by the construction of a system of arguments designed to convince the “audience” of the correctness of the decision taken. Paradoxically, the emancipation of the judiciary, its power to create general rules and the voluntarisation of interpretation were under the slogan of “rule of law”, which was justified by the voluntaristic origin of the law, while ignoring the fact that the court's decision also has a volitional character. On the contrary, “judicial law” was thought of as something objectively and “spontaneously” arising, while the wilful nature as well as the secret procedure for issuing a judicial act were ignored.
The idea of law as an instrument for the protection of values in conjunction with the idea of free judicial rule-making, the most radical version of which was legal realism – “justice without law”, was the reason for the radical pragmatisation of law, the end of which was the method of “weighing” values and the proportionality test. The latter would not have been possible without the expansion of the logic of values into legal reality.
Carl Schmitt and his students, Ernst Forsthoff and Ernst-Wolfgang Bökenförde, tried to project radical criticism of this approach. From the point of view of Schmitt, who follows Heidegger here, the value discourse is an ersatz of lost metaphysics, implying the reduction of different categories (goods, rights, ideals, etc.) into a single field of values, which makes it possible to compare them, convert them, hierarchy and thus ad hoc removal of “higher” values – “lower” ones. The German lawyer calls this mechanism “the tyranny of values” and the direct application of the value system by the courts is aggressive ideology and even terror. In addition to criticism, his students emphasized that value discourse has turned law enforcement into a policy of interpretation, stripped the constitution of the properties of a legal act, and in a pluralistic society, a court that appeals to values essentially makes an ideological decision in favor of a particular value system by removing the other. In this way, the courts make decisions on competing rights, which are based on fluctuating consents defined by those who dominate discussions about social values.
Thesis Chapters by Viacheslav Kondurov
Also, the way the footnotes are referenced is slightly different. In the English translation, whe... more Also, the way the footnotes are referenced is slightly different. In the English translation, when referring to sources, I indicate in square brackets the relevant place in the English translation of the source, as appropriate. When first citing such an English text, I give a full bibliographic description for the English translation of the source. Subsequently, however, I only indicate the page in square brackets, along with the main reference to the original source or to its Russian translation. This measure is only due to the requirement of easy reading for the English-speaking reader of the thesis.
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Papers by Viacheslav Kondurov
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Начало правовой науки, как правило, относят к XI–XII векам, когда школе глоссаторов удалось создать общий, базирующийся на схоластике подход к исследованию и преподаванию римского права. Впоследствии данный текстоцентричный, «буквалистский» метод был преобразован школой «комментаторов», в особенности Бартоло да Сассоферрато. Комментаторы в отличие от глоссаторов проявляли куда больший интерес к вопросам публичного права, что было продиктовано во многом политической ситуацией эпохи, в том числе стремлением итальянских городов к автономии. Тем не менее принципиальный пересмотр метода глоссаторов стал возможен лишь позднее, когда под влиянием гуманистической критики среди юристов распространилась идея историко-филологического метода, предполагавшего, что римское право следует интерпретировать в контексте той эпохи, когда оно создавалось. Свойственное глоссаторам и комментатором убеждение в универсальности и юридической действительности римского права ушло в прошлое. Новый «галльский» метод (mos gallicus) постепенно трансформировался из обусловленного историей и филологией исследования римского права в общую историцистскую установку, которая обратила интерес юристов к местному праву и обычаям. Таким образом, гуманистический подход стал тем основанием, из которого родилась идея о своеобразии «национального» правового порядка. Данная идея, будучи перенесена в область публичного права, привела к убеждению, что принципы устройства «национального» правопорядка должны выводиться не из универсальных категорий чуждого римского права, но из политической практики прошлого, местных обычаев и «древних конституций». Тем не менее сам по себе исторический метод в силу его сосредоточения на уникальных, специфичных чертах правовых порядков не мог обеспечить становления новой публично-правовой науки. В связи с этим Ж. Боденом был разработан, а впоследствии применен своеобразный сравнительно-правовой подход, который, как полагал французский правовед, должен был служить созданию системы универсальных понятийных категорий публицистической науки.
One of the fiercest critics of the Court decision was Ernst Forsthoff, a disciple of Carl Schmitt. In a series of articles, he attacked the “value” legal interpretation, pointing out that it leads not only to the destruction of the legal method and the loss of jurisprudence autonomy, but also to changes in the institutional structure of the state. E. Forsthoff’s criticism was predominantly juridical, focusing on the actual law enforcement, as well as on the theoretical-legal origins of value interpretation which he found in R. Smend’s “integration theory”.
In contrast, C. Schmitt, in “Tyranny of Values”, practically omitted legal arguments and attacked the philosophical basis of the German Constitutional Court’s position. Relying on M. Weber, the German legal scholar attempted to demonstrate that the adoption of value interpretation by constitutional justice means the direct application of values, which destroys the rule of law. Despite the different trends of criticism, the conclusions reached by E. Forsthoff and C. Schmitt show a significant similarity in that both call for the autonomy of legal science and a return to the formal legal state.
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Предметом исследования являются воззрения классических институционалистов М. Ориу и С. Романо на роль суда и природу юстиции. Методологическую базу работы составляет метод интерпретации, являющийся основным для изучения истории правовых учений и охватывающий также метод проблемно-теоретической реконструкции, а также общенаучные методы анализа, синтеза и др. Новизна проведённого исследования заключается в выявлении ключевых элементов воззрений Мориса Ориу и Санти Романо на роль и содержание юстиции, их интерпретация с учётом достижений современной юридической науки в контексте различных стилей (стратегий) судебной интерпретации. Морис Ориу полагает, что основанием полномочий суда является не политическая власть, но суверенитет конституционного статуса. Это делает возможным выполнение судами функции сдерживания (ограничения) иных органов государства, источником власти которых является политический суверенитет. В связи с этим французский правовед достаточно широко раздвигает границы юстиции и вполне допускает судейское нормотворчество, конкурентное парламенту. В определенной мере такая позиция М. Ориу может быть обусловлена «идеалистическими» элементами в основе его мировоззрения. Так, в основание института им кладется «идея», на страже которой в конечном счёте и оказывается юстиция. Санти Романо в свою очередь, напротив, стремится избежать любого идеализма, оставаясь на позициях, близких социологическому позитивизму. В отличие от Мориса Ориу, он создаёт общую правовую теорию, а не теорию публичного права. По этой причине он куда больше своего французского учителя уделяет внимания вопросам содержания толкования как специфической судейской деятельности. Он понимает его как формальную логическую и сущностно когнитивную процедуру. Однако общий контекст плюралистического учения итальянского правоведа делает возможным не менее широкий взгляд на суд, чем у Мориса Ориу. Санти Романо также допускает существование у суда нормотворческой компетенции, однако не считает таковую частью юстиции. Несмотря на принципиальное допущение возможности создания судами норм, ни Санти Романо, ни Морис Ориу не могут рассматриваться как предтечи или сторонники радикального судебного реализма, согласно которому судья - единственный подлинный творец права, суверенно и спонтанно создающий нормы, без оглядки на уже существующий правовой порядок.
is often associated with the discrediting of certain ideologies, beliefs or value systems. Meanwhile, this concept has a serious theoretical and methodological potential, which due to numerous inversions is almost forgotten. Political theology in the legal sense, from the point of view of C. Schmitt, is a methodological approach, implying a historically changeable analogous similarity between the two systems of concepts — metaphysical (theological) and state-legal, which form corresponding visions of the world of a particular era. The content of this approach consists of three interrelated theses: 1) political theology is a kind of sociology of legal concepts ("sociological" thesis); 2) political theology assumes an analogy between the concepts of the doctrine of state and law and theological concepts (the thesis of the conceptual analogy); 3) political theology implies an analogy between the metaphysical and state-legal visions of the world of a particular epoch, in the structure of which these concepts exist (the thesis of structural analogy).
The heuristic significance of political theology as a methodological approach remains hidden. It is perceived as a kind of conservative ideology or even rhetorical practice. In fact, political theology, by contrast, can be a useful tool for discovering the hidden rhetorical potential of various political and legal arguments. In addition, with
its help, new aspects of such classical problems of the theory and philosophy of law as validity of legal order and its grounds, the concept of sovereign, the essence and limits of justice, strategies of judicial argumentation, etc., are revealed. Being the core of C. Schmitt’s theoretical and legal thinking, political theology appears to be connected not only with the German lawyer’s direct application of its basic theses (for example, to study the concept of sovereign or the neutralization and
depoliticization movement), but it also appears in the Schmitt’s basis of the validity of legal order, which German lawyer interprets as common ideas about the "normal" for a specific community, including the "normal" state-legal system, which are similar, according to the political theology, to the metaphysical vision of the world. Political theology as a methodological approach reveals itself in Schmitt’s criticism of the axiological foundations of constitutional justice. In the essay "Tyranny of Values" the practice of direct application of values by the courts, which is the content of a realistic strategy of judicial argumentation, is interpreted by a lawyer as a special case of the manifestation of a political and theological neutralization and depoliticization movement.
Conference Presentations by Viacheslav Kondurov
петербургский Государственный Университет, 19-21 ноября 2020 г. Материалы конференции / Отв.ред. В.Ю. Перов – СПб.: ООО «Сборка», 2020. С. 51-52. (P. 51-52)
XII международная конференция «Теоретическая и прикладная этика: Традиции и перспективы – 2020. Философия. Этика. Практика».
(http://philosophy.spbu.ru/2652/15963)
XII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS: TRADITIONS AND PROSPECTS – 2020. PHILOSOPHY. ETHICS. PRACTICS
Conference papers
St. Petersburg, Russia
November 19–21, 2020
Text in English:
“Tyranny of Values” in Constitutional and Supranational Justice
Kondurov V.E., Timoshina E.V.
Viacheslav E. Kondurov – Researcher, Teacher-Researcher, Lecturer of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.
Elena V. Timoshina – Doctor of Law, Professor of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.
The theses were prepared within the framework of the scientific project № 18-011-01195 “Validity and efficacy of law: theoretical models and strategies of judicial argumentation”, supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
In the last half-century, interpretation of the constitution as a system of values has become dominant both in legal doctrine and in the policy of interpreting “high justice” institutions (constitutional, supreme and supranational courts). In judicial practice, this idea was first formulated by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in the famous “The Lüth Case” (1958). The origins of this conversion of legal norms and principles into values, with the aim of facilitating their judicial weighing, are linked to the antipositivism of G. Radbruch, the neotomism of G. Düring and the integration of R. Smend.
However, the genesis of the “value” approach and its expansion from philosophy to jurisprudence and court practice has been little studied. How, when and why has there been a loss of understanding of the deontological nature of legal norms and legal principles, their transformation into voluntaristic - an act of judicial interpretation – values to be established and the transformation of institutions of constitutional and supranational justice into bodies for their establishment and promotion, often very aggressive? The “emancipation of values” in justice is linked to the discrediting concepts of the legislator and the law: first, the “will of the legislator” was demythologized as the purpose of judicial interpretation and the basis of the rule of law, followed by the law itself, which in a pluralistic society has become an empty form that reinforces the momentary compromise of opposing forces. Thus, under the slogan of “the rule of law”, the legislator and, subsequently, the law were discredited, and the notion of objectivity and fairness became associated with judges and their discretion not bound by the law that had lost credibility.
The law was seen as a reason for the judge to willfully construct its meaning – a meaning that was absent in the law before the act of judicial “interpretation”. In the rhetorical approach, the interpretation of the law is replaced by the construction of a system of arguments designed to convince the “audience” of the correctness of the decision taken. Paradoxically, the emancipation of the judiciary, its power to create general rules and the voluntarisation of interpretation were under the slogan of “rule of law”, which was justified by the voluntaristic origin of the law, while ignoring the fact that the court's decision also has a volitional character. On the contrary, “judicial law” was thought of as something objectively and “spontaneously” arising, while the wilful nature as well as the secret procedure for issuing a judicial act were ignored.
The idea of law as an instrument for the protection of values in conjunction with the idea of free judicial rule-making, the most radical version of which was legal realism – “justice without law”, was the reason for the radical pragmatisation of law, the end of which was the method of “weighing” values and the proportionality test. The latter would not have been possible without the expansion of the logic of values into legal reality.
Carl Schmitt and his students, Ernst Forsthoff and Ernst-Wolfgang Bökenförde, tried to project radical criticism of this approach. From the point of view of Schmitt, who follows Heidegger here, the value discourse is an ersatz of lost metaphysics, implying the reduction of different categories (goods, rights, ideals, etc.) into a single field of values, which makes it possible to compare them, convert them, hierarchy and thus ad hoc removal of “higher” values – “lower” ones. The German lawyer calls this mechanism “the tyranny of values” and the direct application of the value system by the courts is aggressive ideology and even terror. In addition to criticism, his students emphasized that value discourse has turned law enforcement into a policy of interpretation, stripped the constitution of the properties of a legal act, and in a pluralistic society, a court that appeals to values essentially makes an ideological decision in favor of a particular value system by removing the other. In this way, the courts make decisions on competing rights, which are based on fluctuating consents defined by those who dominate discussions about social values.
Thesis Chapters by Viacheslav Kondurov
***
Начало правовой науки, как правило, относят к XI–XII векам, когда школе глоссаторов удалось создать общий, базирующийся на схоластике подход к исследованию и преподаванию римского права. Впоследствии данный текстоцентричный, «буквалистский» метод был преобразован школой «комментаторов», в особенности Бартоло да Сассоферрато. Комментаторы в отличие от глоссаторов проявляли куда больший интерес к вопросам публичного права, что было продиктовано во многом политической ситуацией эпохи, в том числе стремлением итальянских городов к автономии. Тем не менее принципиальный пересмотр метода глоссаторов стал возможен лишь позднее, когда под влиянием гуманистической критики среди юристов распространилась идея историко-филологического метода, предполагавшего, что римское право следует интерпретировать в контексте той эпохи, когда оно создавалось. Свойственное глоссаторам и комментатором убеждение в универсальности и юридической действительности римского права ушло в прошлое. Новый «галльский» метод (mos gallicus) постепенно трансформировался из обусловленного историей и филологией исследования римского права в общую историцистскую установку, которая обратила интерес юристов к местному праву и обычаям. Таким образом, гуманистический подход стал тем основанием, из которого родилась идея о своеобразии «национального» правового порядка. Данная идея, будучи перенесена в область публичного права, привела к убеждению, что принципы устройства «национального» правопорядка должны выводиться не из универсальных категорий чуждого римского права, но из политической практики прошлого, местных обычаев и «древних конституций». Тем не менее сам по себе исторический метод в силу его сосредоточения на уникальных, специфичных чертах правовых порядков не мог обеспечить становления новой публично-правовой науки. В связи с этим Ж. Боденом был разработан, а впоследствии применен своеобразный сравнительно-правовой подход, который, как полагал французский правовед, должен был служить созданию системы универсальных понятийных категорий публицистической науки.
One of the fiercest critics of the Court decision was Ernst Forsthoff, a disciple of Carl Schmitt. In a series of articles, he attacked the “value” legal interpretation, pointing out that it leads not only to the destruction of the legal method and the loss of jurisprudence autonomy, but also to changes in the institutional structure of the state. E. Forsthoff’s criticism was predominantly juridical, focusing on the actual law enforcement, as well as on the theoretical-legal origins of value interpretation which he found in R. Smend’s “integration theory”.
In contrast, C. Schmitt, in “Tyranny of Values”, practically omitted legal arguments and attacked the philosophical basis of the German Constitutional Court’s position. Relying on M. Weber, the German legal scholar attempted to demonstrate that the adoption of value interpretation by constitutional justice means the direct application of values, which destroys the rule of law. Despite the different trends of criticism, the conclusions reached by E. Forsthoff and C. Schmitt show a significant similarity in that both call for the autonomy of legal science and a return to the formal legal state.
***
Предметом исследования являются воззрения классических институционалистов М. Ориу и С. Романо на роль суда и природу юстиции. Методологическую базу работы составляет метод интерпретации, являющийся основным для изучения истории правовых учений и охватывающий также метод проблемно-теоретической реконструкции, а также общенаучные методы анализа, синтеза и др. Новизна проведённого исследования заключается в выявлении ключевых элементов воззрений Мориса Ориу и Санти Романо на роль и содержание юстиции, их интерпретация с учётом достижений современной юридической науки в контексте различных стилей (стратегий) судебной интерпретации. Морис Ориу полагает, что основанием полномочий суда является не политическая власть, но суверенитет конституционного статуса. Это делает возможным выполнение судами функции сдерживания (ограничения) иных органов государства, источником власти которых является политический суверенитет. В связи с этим французский правовед достаточно широко раздвигает границы юстиции и вполне допускает судейское нормотворчество, конкурентное парламенту. В определенной мере такая позиция М. Ориу может быть обусловлена «идеалистическими» элементами в основе его мировоззрения. Так, в основание института им кладется «идея», на страже которой в конечном счёте и оказывается юстиция. Санти Романо в свою очередь, напротив, стремится избежать любого идеализма, оставаясь на позициях, близких социологическому позитивизму. В отличие от Мориса Ориу, он создаёт общую правовую теорию, а не теорию публичного права. По этой причине он куда больше своего французского учителя уделяет внимания вопросам содержания толкования как специфической судейской деятельности. Он понимает его как формальную логическую и сущностно когнитивную процедуру. Однако общий контекст плюралистического учения итальянского правоведа делает возможным не менее широкий взгляд на суд, чем у Мориса Ориу. Санти Романо также допускает существование у суда нормотворческой компетенции, однако не считает таковую частью юстиции. Несмотря на принципиальное допущение возможности создания судами норм, ни Санти Романо, ни Морис Ориу не могут рассматриваться как предтечи или сторонники радикального судебного реализма, согласно которому судья - единственный подлинный творец права, суверенно и спонтанно создающий нормы, без оглядки на уже существующий правовой порядок.
is often associated with the discrediting of certain ideologies, beliefs or value systems. Meanwhile, this concept has a serious theoretical and methodological potential, which due to numerous inversions is almost forgotten. Political theology in the legal sense, from the point of view of C. Schmitt, is a methodological approach, implying a historically changeable analogous similarity between the two systems of concepts — metaphysical (theological) and state-legal, which form corresponding visions of the world of a particular era. The content of this approach consists of three interrelated theses: 1) political theology is a kind of sociology of legal concepts ("sociological" thesis); 2) political theology assumes an analogy between the concepts of the doctrine of state and law and theological concepts (the thesis of the conceptual analogy); 3) political theology implies an analogy between the metaphysical and state-legal visions of the world of a particular epoch, in the structure of which these concepts exist (the thesis of structural analogy).
The heuristic significance of political theology as a methodological approach remains hidden. It is perceived as a kind of conservative ideology or even rhetorical practice. In fact, political theology, by contrast, can be a useful tool for discovering the hidden rhetorical potential of various political and legal arguments. In addition, with
its help, new aspects of such classical problems of the theory and philosophy of law as validity of legal order and its grounds, the concept of sovereign, the essence and limits of justice, strategies of judicial argumentation, etc., are revealed. Being the core of C. Schmitt’s theoretical and legal thinking, political theology appears to be connected not only with the German lawyer’s direct application of its basic theses (for example, to study the concept of sovereign or the neutralization and
depoliticization movement), but it also appears in the Schmitt’s basis of the validity of legal order, which German lawyer interprets as common ideas about the "normal" for a specific community, including the "normal" state-legal system, which are similar, according to the political theology, to the metaphysical vision of the world. Political theology as a methodological approach reveals itself in Schmitt’s criticism of the axiological foundations of constitutional justice. In the essay "Tyranny of Values" the practice of direct application of values by the courts, which is the content of a realistic strategy of judicial argumentation, is interpreted by a lawyer as a special case of the manifestation of a political and theological neutralization and depoliticization movement.
петербургский Государственный Университет, 19-21 ноября 2020 г. Материалы конференции / Отв.ред. В.Ю. Перов – СПб.: ООО «Сборка», 2020. С. 51-52. (P. 51-52)
XII международная конференция «Теоретическая и прикладная этика: Традиции и перспективы – 2020. Философия. Этика. Практика».
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XII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS: TRADITIONS AND PROSPECTS – 2020. PHILOSOPHY. ETHICS. PRACTICS
Conference papers
St. Petersburg, Russia
November 19–21, 2020
Text in English:
“Tyranny of Values” in Constitutional and Supranational Justice
Kondurov V.E., Timoshina E.V.
Viacheslav E. Kondurov – Researcher, Teacher-Researcher, Lecturer of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.
Elena V. Timoshina – Doctor of Law, Professor of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.
The theses were prepared within the framework of the scientific project № 18-011-01195 “Validity and efficacy of law: theoretical models and strategies of judicial argumentation”, supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
In the last half-century, interpretation of the constitution as a system of values has become dominant both in legal doctrine and in the policy of interpreting “high justice” institutions (constitutional, supreme and supranational courts). In judicial practice, this idea was first formulated by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in the famous “The Lüth Case” (1958). The origins of this conversion of legal norms and principles into values, with the aim of facilitating their judicial weighing, are linked to the antipositivism of G. Radbruch, the neotomism of G. Düring and the integration of R. Smend.
However, the genesis of the “value” approach and its expansion from philosophy to jurisprudence and court practice has been little studied. How, when and why has there been a loss of understanding of the deontological nature of legal norms and legal principles, their transformation into voluntaristic - an act of judicial interpretation – values to be established and the transformation of institutions of constitutional and supranational justice into bodies for their establishment and promotion, often very aggressive? The “emancipation of values” in justice is linked to the discrediting concepts of the legislator and the law: first, the “will of the legislator” was demythologized as the purpose of judicial interpretation and the basis of the rule of law, followed by the law itself, which in a pluralistic society has become an empty form that reinforces the momentary compromise of opposing forces. Thus, under the slogan of “the rule of law”, the legislator and, subsequently, the law were discredited, and the notion of objectivity and fairness became associated with judges and their discretion not bound by the law that had lost credibility.
The law was seen as a reason for the judge to willfully construct its meaning – a meaning that was absent in the law before the act of judicial “interpretation”. In the rhetorical approach, the interpretation of the law is replaced by the construction of a system of arguments designed to convince the “audience” of the correctness of the decision taken. Paradoxically, the emancipation of the judiciary, its power to create general rules and the voluntarisation of interpretation were under the slogan of “rule of law”, which was justified by the voluntaristic origin of the law, while ignoring the fact that the court's decision also has a volitional character. On the contrary, “judicial law” was thought of as something objectively and “spontaneously” arising, while the wilful nature as well as the secret procedure for issuing a judicial act were ignored.
The idea of law as an instrument for the protection of values in conjunction with the idea of free judicial rule-making, the most radical version of which was legal realism – “justice without law”, was the reason for the radical pragmatisation of law, the end of which was the method of “weighing” values and the proportionality test. The latter would not have been possible without the expansion of the logic of values into legal reality.
Carl Schmitt and his students, Ernst Forsthoff and Ernst-Wolfgang Bökenförde, tried to project radical criticism of this approach. From the point of view of Schmitt, who follows Heidegger here, the value discourse is an ersatz of lost metaphysics, implying the reduction of different categories (goods, rights, ideals, etc.) into a single field of values, which makes it possible to compare them, convert them, hierarchy and thus ad hoc removal of “higher” values – “lower” ones. The German lawyer calls this mechanism “the tyranny of values” and the direct application of the value system by the courts is aggressive ideology and even terror. In addition to criticism, his students emphasized that value discourse has turned law enforcement into a policy of interpretation, stripped the constitution of the properties of a legal act, and in a pluralistic society, a court that appeals to values essentially makes an ideological decision in favor of a particular value system by removing the other. In this way, the courts make decisions on competing rights, which are based on fluctuating consents defined by those who dominate discussions about social values.