ABSTRACT We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium co... more ABSTRACT We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts used by the "theory of voting." It is demonstrated that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modeled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.
This paper gives a definition of adaptive learning for extensive form games and provides sufficie... more This paper gives a definition of adaptive learning for extensive form games and provides sufficient conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning sequences to be sequential equilibria.
ABSTRACT We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (atomless) economies... more ABSTRACT We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (atomless) economies; the local bargaining by MasColell (1989) and the global bargaining set by Vind (1992) We alter these definitions to limit the size of the permitted size of the involved coalitions. It turns out that the local bargaining set becomes very large, whereas the global bargaining set is unaltered.
ABSTRACT The paper considers the problem of modelling voting situations, seeking models and equil... more ABSTRACT The paper considers the problem of modelling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts suggested by the "theory of voting". The paper demonstrates that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modelled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him. In single stage games, i.e. voting games with just two alternatives, we find that the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in a game with open voting is equal to the set of sophisticated outcomes in the corresponding game with secret voting. In multistage games with more alternatives and a fixed agenda, the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes is equal to the set of multistage sophisticated outcomes.
ABSTRACT Capacities (monotone, non-additive set functions) have been suggested to describe situat... more ABSTRACT Capacities (monotone, non-additive set functions) have been suggested to describe situations of uncertainty. We examine the question of how to define the product of two independent capacities. In particular, for the product of two belief functions (totally monotone capacities), there is a unique minimal product belief function. This is characterized in several ways.
Page 1. Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integralw Ebbe Groes, Hans Jùrgen Jacobsen, Bi... more Page 1. Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integralw Ebbe Groes, Hans Jùrgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth, and Torben Tranñs Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestrñde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, DENMARK ...
... bV2)(E) = max[O, 12(E) -- D~_~cE Iz-'(V, ~bv2)(D)].3 (13) Proof. Throughout, we denote b... more ... bV2)(E) = max[O, 12(E) -- D~_~cE Iz-'(V, ~bv2)(D)].3 (13) Proof. Throughout, we denote by vb and ~b the functions given by the right-hand sides of (11) and (12), respectively, and use mi for/~-l(vi). (ii)(iii). We must show that /~-l(Vb)=_mb. For any J~e, define for any Dt x D2 E ff'l x ...
Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for... more Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a ...
The economics profession appears to have been unaware of the long build-up to the current worldwi... more The economics profession appears to have been unaware of the long build-up to the current worldwide financial crisis and to have significantly underestimated its dimensions once it started to unfold. In our view, this lack of understanding is due to a misallocation of research efforts in economics. We trace the deeper roots of this failure to the profession's focus on models that, by design, disregard key elements driving outcomes in real-world markets. The economics profession has failed in communicating the limitations, weaknesses, and even dangers of its preferred models to the public. This state of affairs makes clear the need for a major reorientation of focus in the research economists undertake, as well as for the establishment of an ethical code that would ask economists to understand and communicate the limitations and potential misuses of their models.
This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the... more This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the intransitivity explanation of Allais-paradoxtype violations of expected utility theory. We compare the common consequence effect of two choice problems differing only with respect to whether alternatives are statistically correlated or independent. We framed the experiment so that intransitive preferences could explain violating behavior when alternatives are independent, but not when they are correlated. We found the same pattern of violation in the two cases. This is evidence against intransitivity as an explanation of the Allais Paradox. The question whether violations of expected utility are mainly due to intransitivity or to violation of independence is important since it is exactly on this issue the main new decision theories differ.
We report new results on a slightly generalized version of the classical learning process for gam... more We report new results on a slightly generalized version of the classical learning process for games proposed by Brown (1951), and further analyzed by Robinson (1951), Miyasawa (1961) and Shapley (1964). the learning process rests on an exogenous prior distribution ...
... Louis. Did you know? There are over 30000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service. ... Mor... more ... Louis. Did you know? There are over 30000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service. ... More detailed search. ... Voting over the Partition of a Pie. ... Author Info. Birgitte Sloth (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen). Registered author(s): Birgitte Sloth. Abstract. ...
ABSTRACT A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two r... more ABSTRACT A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two responses gives rise to equilibrium selection which is in remarkable accordance with the selection obtained by the intuitive criterion.
ABSTRACT We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium co... more ABSTRACT We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts used by the "theory of voting." It is demonstrated that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modeled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.
This paper gives a definition of adaptive learning for extensive form games and provides sufficie... more This paper gives a definition of adaptive learning for extensive form games and provides sufficient conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning sequences to be sequential equilibria.
ABSTRACT We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (atomless) economies... more ABSTRACT We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (atomless) economies; the local bargaining by MasColell (1989) and the global bargaining set by Vind (1992) We alter these definitions to limit the size of the permitted size of the involved coalitions. It turns out that the local bargaining set becomes very large, whereas the global bargaining set is unaltered.
ABSTRACT The paper considers the problem of modelling voting situations, seeking models and equil... more ABSTRACT The paper considers the problem of modelling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts suggested by the "theory of voting". The paper demonstrates that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modelled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him. In single stage games, i.e. voting games with just two alternatives, we find that the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in a game with open voting is equal to the set of sophisticated outcomes in the corresponding game with secret voting. In multistage games with more alternatives and a fixed agenda, the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes is equal to the set of multistage sophisticated outcomes.
ABSTRACT Capacities (monotone, non-additive set functions) have been suggested to describe situat... more ABSTRACT Capacities (monotone, non-additive set functions) have been suggested to describe situations of uncertainty. We examine the question of how to define the product of two independent capacities. In particular, for the product of two belief functions (totally monotone capacities), there is a unique minimal product belief function. This is characterized in several ways.
Page 1. Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integralw Ebbe Groes, Hans Jùrgen Jacobsen, Bi... more Page 1. Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integralw Ebbe Groes, Hans Jùrgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth, and Torben Tranñs Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestrñde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, DENMARK ...
... bV2)(E) = max[O, 12(E) -- D~_~cE Iz-'(V, ~bv2)(D)].3 (13) Proof. Throughout, we denote b... more ... bV2)(E) = max[O, 12(E) -- D~_~cE Iz-'(V, ~bv2)(D)].3 (13) Proof. Throughout, we denote by vb and ~b the functions given by the right-hand sides of (11) and (12), respectively, and use mi for/~-l(vi). (ii)(iii). We must show that /~-l(Vb)=_mb. For any J~e, define for any Dt x D2 E ff'l x ...
Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for... more Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a ...
The economics profession appears to have been unaware of the long build-up to the current worldwi... more The economics profession appears to have been unaware of the long build-up to the current worldwide financial crisis and to have significantly underestimated its dimensions once it started to unfold. In our view, this lack of understanding is due to a misallocation of research efforts in economics. We trace the deeper roots of this failure to the profession's focus on models that, by design, disregard key elements driving outcomes in real-world markets. The economics profession has failed in communicating the limitations, weaknesses, and even dangers of its preferred models to the public. This state of affairs makes clear the need for a major reorientation of focus in the research economists undertake, as well as for the establishment of an ethical code that would ask economists to understand and communicate the limitations and potential misuses of their models.
This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the... more This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the intransitivity explanation of Allais-paradoxtype violations of expected utility theory. We compare the common consequence effect of two choice problems differing only with respect to whether alternatives are statistically correlated or independent. We framed the experiment so that intransitive preferences could explain violating behavior when alternatives are independent, but not when they are correlated. We found the same pattern of violation in the two cases. This is evidence against intransitivity as an explanation of the Allais Paradox. The question whether violations of expected utility are mainly due to intransitivity or to violation of independence is important since it is exactly on this issue the main new decision theories differ.
We report new results on a slightly generalized version of the classical learning process for gam... more We report new results on a slightly generalized version of the classical learning process for games proposed by Brown (1951), and further analyzed by Robinson (1951), Miyasawa (1961) and Shapley (1964). the learning process rests on an exogenous prior distribution ...
... Louis. Did you know? There are over 30000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service. ... Mor... more ... Louis. Did you know? There are over 30000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service. ... More detailed search. ... Voting over the Partition of a Pie. ... Author Info. Birgitte Sloth (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen). Registered author(s): Birgitte Sloth. Abstract. ...
ABSTRACT A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two r... more ABSTRACT A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two responses gives rise to equilibrium selection which is in remarkable accordance with the selection obtained by the intuitive criterion.
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