Papers by Alexander Geddes
Mind
Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgments about hypothet... more Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgments about hypothetical cases. When the judgments and the theses conflict, it is often the latter that are rejected. But what is the nature of the judgments such that they are able to play this role? I answer this question by arguing that typical judgments about thought experiments are in fact judgments of normal counterfactual sufficiency.
I begin by focussing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgments about thought experiments are mere possibility judgments. This view is shown to fail for two closely related reasons: it cannot account for the incorrectness of certain misjudgments, and it cannot account for the inconsistency of certain pairs of conflicting judgments. This prompts a reconsideration of Timothy Williamson’s alternative proposal, according to which typical judgments about thought experiments are counterfactual in nature, and I show that taking such judgments to concern what would normally hold in instances of the relevant hypothetical scenarios avoids the objections that have been pressed against this kind of view. I then consider some other potential objections, but argue that they provide no grounds for doubt.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2013
According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases—cas... more According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases—cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity—are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne’s arguments are flawed, and that animalism is capable of handling the case.
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Papers by Alexander Geddes
I begin by focussing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgments about thought experiments are mere possibility judgments. This view is shown to fail for two closely related reasons: it cannot account for the incorrectness of certain misjudgments, and it cannot account for the inconsistency of certain pairs of conflicting judgments. This prompts a reconsideration of Timothy Williamson’s alternative proposal, according to which typical judgments about thought experiments are counterfactual in nature, and I show that taking such judgments to concern what would normally hold in instances of the relevant hypothetical scenarios avoids the objections that have been pressed against this kind of view. I then consider some other potential objections, but argue that they provide no grounds for doubt.
I begin by focussing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgments about thought experiments are mere possibility judgments. This view is shown to fail for two closely related reasons: it cannot account for the incorrectness of certain misjudgments, and it cannot account for the inconsistency of certain pairs of conflicting judgments. This prompts a reconsideration of Timothy Williamson’s alternative proposal, according to which typical judgments about thought experiments are counterfactual in nature, and I show that taking such judgments to concern what would normally hold in instances of the relevant hypothetical scenarios avoids the objections that have been pressed against this kind of view. I then consider some other potential objections, but argue that they provide no grounds for doubt.