Theology and Religion by Teed Rockwell
Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism | Volume 28 | Article 1, 2020
Science-inspired arguments for atheism confuse 1) claims that are unfalsifiable within a paradigm... more Science-inspired arguments for atheism confuse 1) claims that are unfalsifiable within a paradigm with 2) claims that have been scientifically proven by that paradigm. This confusion enables atheists to confidently claim they would change their position, once they encounter “scientific evidence” that cannot possibly exist. It also inspires theists to search in vain for scientific evidence to support their position, which necessarily dissolves into a handful of mechanisms once it is in their grasp. Neither side notices that the deck was stacked against the theists from the beginning. A close look at possible candidates for scientific evidence of atheistic (or theistic) claims reveals that, given our current assumptions, no such data could possibly exist.
The Scientific God Journal, January 2017. Volume 8 Issue 1, 2017
The Tilde fallacy is the mistaken inference that, because an argument contains a Tilde it can be ... more The Tilde fallacy is the mistaken inference that, because an argument contains a Tilde it can be called the Null hypothesis, and therefore does not need to be positively defended. I show how this argument is used to defend Logical Positivism, Libertarianism and Atheism. It is also used to defend a position I call Mortalism, which uses it to set the burden of proof on those who believe in some form of personal immortality. In some cases the argument is actually self-contradictory, in others it is only an illegitimate use of Occam's Razor. In Mortalism's case, there is a contradiction, but it is phenomenological, not logical
Many modern theological debates are built around a false dichotomy between 1) an atheism which as... more Many modern theological debates are built around a false dichotomy between 1) an atheism which asserts that the universe was created by purposeless mechanical processes and 2) acceptance of a religious system which requires both faith in the infallibility of sacred texts and belief in a supernatural God. I propose a form of naturalistic theism, which rejects sacred texts as unjustified, and supernaturalism as incoherent. I argue that rejecting these two elements of traditional organized religion would have a strongly positive impact on the beliefs and practices of religion, even though many religious people feel strongly attached to them. It is belief in sacred texts that is responsible for most of the evil done in the name of religion, not belief in God. Many of the strongest arguments for atheism work only against a supernatural God, and have no impact on the question of the existence of a natural God.
Buddhism Now, Aug 1996
One of the most famous Dharma stories in Tibetan Buddhism is the life of the twelve century Yogi ... more One of the most famous Dharma stories in Tibetan Buddhism is the life of the twelve century Yogi Milarepa, and perhaps the most quoted part is the story of the ordeal that his guru, Marpa, put him through before he accepted him as a student. The most recently published (and reputedly most accurate) version of this story is The Life of Milarepa translated by Lobsang P. Lhalungpa (Shambala 1977), which is the source for the following summary and most of the following quotes.
This chapter questions the reductionist assumption that bits of lifeless matter must have grouped... more This chapter questions the reductionist assumption that bits of lifeless matter must have grouped themselves into complex patterns that eventually became living conscious beings. There is no decisive reason to question Peirce’s suggestion that mind came first and that mechanical causality emerges when regions of a fundamentally conscious universe settle into deterministic habits. If we define consciousness in a way that ignores clearly accidental properties such as looking and behaving like us, some form of panpsychism is not only possible but plausible. Ignoring this possibility could cause us to subconsciously exclude legitimate avenues of research.
Darwinian atheists ridicule the “God of the Gaps” argument, claiming that it is theology and/or m... more Darwinian atheists ridicule the “God of the Gaps” argument, claiming that it is theology and/or metaphysics masquerading as science. This is true as far as it goes, but Darwinian atheism relies on an argument which is equally metaphysical, which I call the “No Gaps, No God” argument. This atheist argument is metaphysical because it relies on a kind of conceptual necessity, rather than scientific observations or experiments. “No Gaps No God” is a much better metaphysical argument than “God of the Gaps,” because the latter is based on a clearly false conditional inference. However, there are also good, but not decisive, arguments against the “No Gaps No God” argument. Because metaphysical arguments never resolve as decisively as scientific research questions, there will probably always be a legitimate controversy at the metaphysical level on this topic, even though there is no serious controversy about Darwinian science itself. If this fact were more widely acknowledged, it could help to defuse the controversy over teaching Darwin in thepublic schools
Zygon®, Jan 1, 2009
Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with... more Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the allegedly scientific view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna’s argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to “The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything.” Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world
Robert Thurman argues that the Buddhist tradition shares essential principles and methods with We... more Robert Thurman argues that the Buddhist tradition shares essential principles and methods with Western Science. He says “The Buddhist tradition is more science than religion. . . more a process of education than an adoption of a credo or a joining of an institution.” I think there is some truth to this statement, but it can also be misleading. Buddhism is to some degree suspended half-way between the two Western prototypes of Science and Religion, without fitting comfortably in either category.
To read my blog on Islam, click on the link above next to my name. My posts were usually built ar... more To read my blog on Islam, click on the link above next to my name. My posts were usually built around my responses to various Islamophobic memes. This page of the blog is devoted to responses to the question. "Why don't Muslims speak out against extremism?" The answer is they do, and these responses get buried on page 12 while the extremists get the headlines.
Philosophy of Mind by Teed Rockwell
Much of this paper found its way into other papers, and into my book Neither Brain nor Ghost. Nev... more Much of this paper found its way into other papers, and into my book Neither Brain nor Ghost. Nevertheless, there is much in it which does not appear elsewhere, and which I think is still worth reading.
I argue that the mind not only extends beyond the brain, but that its borders fluctuate depending... more I argue that the mind not only extends beyond the brain, but that its borders fluctuate depending on the goals and projects of the person who has the mind. The Mind is thus best described as a behavioral field that fluctuates within the Brain/Body/World Nexus
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1996
Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinc... more Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness.(MDM) This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that the question "how do you get experience out of meat?" actually fragments into at least three different questions.
(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?
(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?
(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?
Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.
Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragma... more Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe.
Philosophical Psychology, Jan 1, 2010
The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the ... more The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the coupling/constitution fallacy, but it is the critic’s use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny that the line between the self and the world should be drawn at the skull and/or the skin. But the data used to support HEC reveal that there was never a good enough reason to draw the line there in the first place. The burden of proof has fallen on the Mind/Brain identity theory, now that our intuitions/prejudices no longer support it. One of those “intuitions” is the Aristotelian assumption that the world can be neatly divided into objects that possess intrinsic causal powers, and the causal relations that connect those objects. In modern science, however, the concept of intrinsic causal powers is only a temporary stopgap that makes it possible to begin research in a particular area. It therefore seems best to assume that the line between mind and world is both pragmatic and dynamic. Consequently, the mind might best described as a fluctuating field, rather than an object or structur
Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes,... more Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees sentences constructed out of individual words. I argue that our experience of music, and experience in general is equally well accounted for by seeing it as starting with an experience of an undifferentiated whole, without even awareness of a distinction between self and environment. New experiences are not acquired by stuffing sense data into the brain, but rather by dividing a primordially unified experience into smaller interacting parts. This view dissolves many traditional problems in philosophy of mind, and also more accurately reflects what we have learned about connectionist neuroscience.
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, defended most prominently by
Anthony Chemero, proposes that ... more Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, defended most prominently by
Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on continuous analog representation, of the sort described by James' theory of radical empiricism, rather than the discrete digital representations described by the language
of thought theory. I concede, however, that analog representations are borderline cases of representation. The most prototypical cases of representation are those hypotheses developed during the process that Dewey called inquiry. Inquiry is necessary only when our harmonious relationship with our environment is disrupted
in some way, which in turn requires us to represent that environment as an “other” as we figure out how to restore harmony again. Perception is legitimately describable as “direct” because we do not need to make representations when the organism is in harmony with the environment.
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Theology and Religion by Teed Rockwell
Philosophy of Mind by Teed Rockwell
(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?
(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?
(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?
Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.
Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on continuous analog representation, of the sort described by James' theory of radical empiricism, rather than the discrete digital representations described by the language
of thought theory. I concede, however, that analog representations are borderline cases of representation. The most prototypical cases of representation are those hypotheses developed during the process that Dewey called inquiry. Inquiry is necessary only when our harmonious relationship with our environment is disrupted
in some way, which in turn requires us to represent that environment as an “other” as we figure out how to restore harmony again. Perception is legitimately describable as “direct” because we do not need to make representations when the organism is in harmony with the environment.
(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?
(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?
(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?
Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.
Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on continuous analog representation, of the sort described by James' theory of radical empiricism, rather than the discrete digital representations described by the language
of thought theory. I concede, however, that analog representations are borderline cases of representation. The most prototypical cases of representation are those hypotheses developed during the process that Dewey called inquiry. Inquiry is necessary only when our harmonious relationship with our environment is disrupted
in some way, which in turn requires us to represent that environment as an “other” as we figure out how to restore harmony again. Perception is legitimately describable as “direct” because we do not need to make representations when the organism is in harmony with the environment.
This paper explores and questions the assumptions of Game Theory--the branch of computer science that assumes that society can only be understood as the interaction of isolated rational autonomous agents. If the Game Theory of the future were to follow the lead of cutting edge cognitive science, it would replace computational models with dynamical ones. Just as Extended Cognition theories recognize that the line between mind and world is a flexible one, Dynamic social theories would recognize that the line between mind and mind is equally flexible—that we must be understood not as autonomous individuals with selfish interests, but rather as fluctuating tribes or families dynamically bonded, and motivated not only by selfishness, but by trust, loyalty and love.
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In this paper, I examine some of the modern debates between pragmatism and so-called “realism”, especially those between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey’s original ideas, rather than Rorty’s reinterpretations of Dewey, these problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases dissolved.
realized in a connectionist network embodied in a brain/body and embedded in a world. It would not require logical reasoning as such, but rather a form of skilled coping very different from anything else considered by ethical theory. Once we realize that ethical judgments are based on prototypes and stories, rather than rules and justice, we can rethink how best to empower the revolutionary changes that are now taking place in our concepts of ethics and courtesy.
concept of a unilaterally declared original acquisition, which supposedly supplies the foundation for all other property rights, is incoherent and unjust. A more moderate form of libertarianism would require institutions that strive to create approximate equality of opportunity. Those who took advantage of those opportunities would have a right to keep most of the wealth they created, and an obligation to create similar opportunities for others
Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (MIT 2005) is a welcome addition to the mind-body literature. Along with the philosophical contributions discussed below, Rockwell provides a valuable survey of recent developments in the relevant sciences, including a beautifully simple explanation of competing AI (artificial intelligence)strategies and techniques. If nothing else, the first three chapters summarizing recent developments in the sciences are worth reviewing for anybody working in the field, and the explanation of neural nets in the final chapter would be useful for any class addressing mentality. But the primary burden of the work is philosophical, and it is here that Rockwell makes his most interesting contributions. First, Rockwell makes a plausible case for the claim that assumptions of Cartesian materialism have contaminated much of the scientific and philosophical work in the area over the last fifty years (or longer). Second, in making this case, he also lays the groundwork for renewed attention to the “zombie problem” so derisively dismissed by Daniel Dennett (2005 and elsewhere) and others, for ignoring some of those irritating “brain in a vat” counter-examples, for abandoning or inverting the traditional understanding of the relationship between sentience and cognition, and for revitalizing the neglected pragmatist account of mind and the world.
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
(RECS) and even comes to some similar conclusions, but it is precisely where he misunderstands Chemero that we find an opportunity to clarify what it is that RECS is all about. Rockwell presents his view as a slightly tempered endorsement of RECS that agrees that “minds and worlds are blended in a constantly shifting dynamic relationship, and that perception does not function by creating representations inside the brain,” but he expresses misgivings about some of Chemero's more radical claims and offers some correctives (Rockwell, p. 220). The problem is that both his misgivings and his suggested correctives betray a misunderstanding of some of the key features that make RECS a departure from traditional cognitive science – most importantly, the claim that nonmechanistic, dynamical explanations of perception, action, and cognition are genuine explanations. Among the many things we share with Rockwell is a fondness for Gilbert Ryle. When Rockwell named his book
Neither Brain Nor Ghost
, he was referring to Ryle’s famous “ghost in the machine”. Of course, we agree with Rockwell that cognitive science should not in the business of studying ghosts. What Rockwell fails to realize, though, is that according to RECS, cognitive science should not therefore be condemned to studying machines. Before explaining what this means, we will look at a few of the more important issues where it seems that Rockwell and Chemero disagree,