In this essay, I argue that Tolkien's Sam Gamgee embodies a Thomistic understanding of humility. ... more In this essay, I argue that Tolkien's Sam Gamgee embodies a Thomistic understanding of humility. For Aquinas humility was a proper valuing of the self that helped resist the temptations to overstep the bounds of right reasoning. But the humble person was also, through humility's twin virtue magnanimity, able to do great things by relying on the aid of others. Sam Gamgee's journey from what Tolkien calls "vulgar conceit" to ennobled humility serves as an exemplar of Thomistic virtue.
Abstract: Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Ch... more Abstract: Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Christians who wish to defend the faith against the onslaughts of these critics might appeal to virtue epistemology by showing that the New Atheists do not possess the necessary habits of thought that a person would need to make a careful and thoughtful consideration of the evidence. In fact, the New Atheists fail to practice intellectual humility and this prevents them from genuine engagement with the strengths religion offers.
Key words: new atheism, Dawkins, humility, pride, virtue epistemology
A central theme that shapes Aquinas' thought in the Summa Theologiae is that "Grace does not dest... more A central theme that shapes Aquinas' thought in the Summa Theologiae is that "Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it." Whatever God creates is naturally good but needs the perfecting work of grace in order to achieve its proper telos. In the case of the human affect (or passiones) this means that we need to "participate" in the life of grace if our desires would be what they were created to be. And since our chief activity is to love God, our affect must be "perfected" in charity (caritas). But here Aquinas makes a startling claim, we are to "participate in the Holy Spirit." This idea of a "participation" in the divine life runs counter to many misinterpretations of Aquinas that seem to sacrifice the immanence (or intimacy) of God for the sake of the transcendent. What I show in this chapter is that there are three key ideas that inform Aquinas' views on the proper functioning of the affect: (1) grace perfects our affect,
Philosopher Joshua Greene and psychologist Jonathan Haidt have argued that experiments based on v... more Philosopher Joshua Greene and psychologist Jonathan Haidt have argued that experiments based on variations of a class of thought experiments known as "trolley problems" demonstrate not only that some regions of the brain are correlated with moral reasoning but also that emotion and reason are at odds when it comes to a moral agent's ability to navigate ethical dilemmas. 1 Although Greene and Haidt differ on the "normative direction" the research should take, they both believe that neuroscience should play a central role in the development of contemporary normative ethics. The claim that specific regions of the brain are activated in the process of moral deliberation is a fairly uncontroversial empirical finding-and the idea that our reason and affect may be at odds when we encounter various moral dilemmas also seems to correspond well to our prima facie moral intuitions. However, the assertion that neuroscience should be determinative with regard to the direction of normative ethics seems to move beyond the proper scope of neuroscience-and it is this at this point we can ask to what extent can, or should, empirical data alter normative theory? In what follows, I will focus primarily on Greene's elaboration of the data and how he employs it in defense of his own normative claims. Both psychologists and philosophers have employed the "trolley problem" for their own purposes. But the thought experiment was initially developed decades ago by Philippa Foot in a discussion on the "principle of double-effect." 3 Although Greene and Haidt know that the trolley problem distinguishes Kantians from utilitarians, this is not their primary concern. They ask us to consider following scenario: Suppose a runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people. Suppose further that you can hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto a different set of tracks where it will kill only one person instead of five. Is it okay to hit the switch? Now what if the only way to save the five people were to push a large person (larger than yourself) in front of the trolley, killing him but saving the others? Would that be okay? 4 As a philosophical thought experiment, the scenario helps to distinguish between utilitarians and deontologists, yet, this is not how Greene and Haidt employ the thought experiment. Their interest in the trolley problem is to demonstrate that different portions of the brain are at work in how people react to the different scenarios presented to the subject while being monitored by an fMRI. The results of their experiments seem to demonstrate that our emotions lead us to make decisions based on sympathy with others, but our reason points to a utilitarian calculus wherein we should maximize the greatest benefit for the greatest number. They argue that we must resist our evolutionary emotional heritage in favor of a utilitarian rational choice model. Because our emotional areas of the brain are activated when we consider pushing the large person onto the track rather than in the lever scenario, our emotions overwhelm our "utilitarian calculus." That is, our affect is in conflict with our intellect and that we should choose to side with the intellect. I argue that there are three basic problems with the neuroscientific approach to normative ethics as advocated by Greene. One is the famous "Is-Ought" problem. The second is related to the first and it is that the normative cannot be reduced to the descriptive. The third is that neuroscience cannot account for the complexity of normative moral relationships. Although Greene recognizes that the "Is-Ought" problem may be an objection to this approach, he insists on it nonetheless. I contend that although we may acknowledge that the Trolley Problem helps us to "map" the brain, it tells us nothing more than what area is active when we are engaged in the determination of how to process specific moral dilemmas. Moreover, the solution Greene offers falls victim to the same criticism he levels against others. In response to the second claim I argue not only that his neuroscientific utilitarian arguments fail to grasp critical features of morality but that it is actually self-refuting. And finally, I contend that in adjudicating normative claims of morality that one must necessarily take into account various unique relational aspects
This article evaluates and considers two important philosophical contributions to the discussion ... more This article evaluates and considers two important philosophical contributions to the discussion considering divine action in the work of Thomas Aquinas and John Polkinghorne. Aquinas argues that God employs both primary and secondary causality, in that God causes some events directly by divine power and others by means of secondary causes. Polkinghorne argues that this approach makes God the author of evil and opts instead for a ''kenotic approach'' to divine action, wherein God chooses to ''empty'' God's self of complete divine control. We think that these views can complement each other and need not represent mutually exclusive alternatives.
Traditional Darwinian theory presents two difficulties for Thomistic natural-law morality: relati... more Traditional Darwinian theory presents two difficulties for Thomistic natural-law morality: relativism and essentialism. The sociobiology of E. O. Wilson seems to refute the idea of evolutionary relativism. Larry Arnhart has argued that Wilson's views on sociobiology can provide a scientific framework for Thomistic natural-law theory. However, in his attempt to reconcile Aquinas's views with Wilson's sociobiology, Arnhart fails to address a critical feature of Aquinas's ethics: the role of rational goods in natural law. Arnhart limits Aquinas's understanding of rationality to the Humean notion of economic rationality-that "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions." On Aquinas's view, rationality discovers goods that transcend the merely biological, viz., the pursuit of truth, virtue, and God. I believe that Aquinas's natural-law morality is consistent with some accounts of sociobiology but not the more ontologically reductionist versions like the one presented by Wilson and defended by Arnhart. Moreover, Aquinas's normative account of rationality is successful in refuting the challenges of evolutionary relativism as well as the reductionism found in most sociobiological approaches to ethics.
In this essay, I argue that Tolkien's Sam Gamgee embodies a Thomistic understanding of humility. ... more In this essay, I argue that Tolkien's Sam Gamgee embodies a Thomistic understanding of humility. For Aquinas humility was a proper valuing of the self that helped resist the temptations to overstep the bounds of right reasoning. But the humble person was also, through humility's twin virtue magnanimity, able to do great things by relying on the aid of others. Sam Gamgee's journey from what Tolkien calls "vulgar conceit" to ennobled humility serves as an exemplar of Thomistic virtue.
Abstract: Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Ch... more Abstract: Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Christians who wish to defend the faith against the onslaughts of these critics might appeal to virtue epistemology by showing that the New Atheists do not possess the necessary habits of thought that a person would need to make a careful and thoughtful consideration of the evidence. In fact, the New Atheists fail to practice intellectual humility and this prevents them from genuine engagement with the strengths religion offers.
Key words: new atheism, Dawkins, humility, pride, virtue epistemology
A central theme that shapes Aquinas' thought in the Summa Theologiae is that "Grace does not dest... more A central theme that shapes Aquinas' thought in the Summa Theologiae is that "Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it." Whatever God creates is naturally good but needs the perfecting work of grace in order to achieve its proper telos. In the case of the human affect (or passiones) this means that we need to "participate" in the life of grace if our desires would be what they were created to be. And since our chief activity is to love God, our affect must be "perfected" in charity (caritas). But here Aquinas makes a startling claim, we are to "participate in the Holy Spirit." This idea of a "participation" in the divine life runs counter to many misinterpretations of Aquinas that seem to sacrifice the immanence (or intimacy) of God for the sake of the transcendent. What I show in this chapter is that there are three key ideas that inform Aquinas' views on the proper functioning of the affect: (1) grace perfects our affect,
Philosopher Joshua Greene and psychologist Jonathan Haidt have argued that experiments based on v... more Philosopher Joshua Greene and psychologist Jonathan Haidt have argued that experiments based on variations of a class of thought experiments known as "trolley problems" demonstrate not only that some regions of the brain are correlated with moral reasoning but also that emotion and reason are at odds when it comes to a moral agent's ability to navigate ethical dilemmas. 1 Although Greene and Haidt differ on the "normative direction" the research should take, they both believe that neuroscience should play a central role in the development of contemporary normative ethics. The claim that specific regions of the brain are activated in the process of moral deliberation is a fairly uncontroversial empirical finding-and the idea that our reason and affect may be at odds when we encounter various moral dilemmas also seems to correspond well to our prima facie moral intuitions. However, the assertion that neuroscience should be determinative with regard to the direction of normative ethics seems to move beyond the proper scope of neuroscience-and it is this at this point we can ask to what extent can, or should, empirical data alter normative theory? In what follows, I will focus primarily on Greene's elaboration of the data and how he employs it in defense of his own normative claims. Both psychologists and philosophers have employed the "trolley problem" for their own purposes. But the thought experiment was initially developed decades ago by Philippa Foot in a discussion on the "principle of double-effect." 3 Although Greene and Haidt know that the trolley problem distinguishes Kantians from utilitarians, this is not their primary concern. They ask us to consider following scenario: Suppose a runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people. Suppose further that you can hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto a different set of tracks where it will kill only one person instead of five. Is it okay to hit the switch? Now what if the only way to save the five people were to push a large person (larger than yourself) in front of the trolley, killing him but saving the others? Would that be okay? 4 As a philosophical thought experiment, the scenario helps to distinguish between utilitarians and deontologists, yet, this is not how Greene and Haidt employ the thought experiment. Their interest in the trolley problem is to demonstrate that different portions of the brain are at work in how people react to the different scenarios presented to the subject while being monitored by an fMRI. The results of their experiments seem to demonstrate that our emotions lead us to make decisions based on sympathy with others, but our reason points to a utilitarian calculus wherein we should maximize the greatest benefit for the greatest number. They argue that we must resist our evolutionary emotional heritage in favor of a utilitarian rational choice model. Because our emotional areas of the brain are activated when we consider pushing the large person onto the track rather than in the lever scenario, our emotions overwhelm our "utilitarian calculus." That is, our affect is in conflict with our intellect and that we should choose to side with the intellect. I argue that there are three basic problems with the neuroscientific approach to normative ethics as advocated by Greene. One is the famous "Is-Ought" problem. The second is related to the first and it is that the normative cannot be reduced to the descriptive. The third is that neuroscience cannot account for the complexity of normative moral relationships. Although Greene recognizes that the "Is-Ought" problem may be an objection to this approach, he insists on it nonetheless. I contend that although we may acknowledge that the Trolley Problem helps us to "map" the brain, it tells us nothing more than what area is active when we are engaged in the determination of how to process specific moral dilemmas. Moreover, the solution Greene offers falls victim to the same criticism he levels against others. In response to the second claim I argue not only that his neuroscientific utilitarian arguments fail to grasp critical features of morality but that it is actually self-refuting. And finally, I contend that in adjudicating normative claims of morality that one must necessarily take into account various unique relational aspects
This article evaluates and considers two important philosophical contributions to the discussion ... more This article evaluates and considers two important philosophical contributions to the discussion considering divine action in the work of Thomas Aquinas and John Polkinghorne. Aquinas argues that God employs both primary and secondary causality, in that God causes some events directly by divine power and others by means of secondary causes. Polkinghorne argues that this approach makes God the author of evil and opts instead for a ''kenotic approach'' to divine action, wherein God chooses to ''empty'' God's self of complete divine control. We think that these views can complement each other and need not represent mutually exclusive alternatives.
Traditional Darwinian theory presents two difficulties for Thomistic natural-law morality: relati... more Traditional Darwinian theory presents two difficulties for Thomistic natural-law morality: relativism and essentialism. The sociobiology of E. O. Wilson seems to refute the idea of evolutionary relativism. Larry Arnhart has argued that Wilson's views on sociobiology can provide a scientific framework for Thomistic natural-law theory. However, in his attempt to reconcile Aquinas's views with Wilson's sociobiology, Arnhart fails to address a critical feature of Aquinas's ethics: the role of rational goods in natural law. Arnhart limits Aquinas's understanding of rationality to the Humean notion of economic rationality-that "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions." On Aquinas's view, rationality discovers goods that transcend the merely biological, viz., the pursuit of truth, virtue, and God. I believe that Aquinas's natural-law morality is consistent with some accounts of sociobiology but not the more ontologically reductionist versions like the one presented by Wilson and defended by Arnhart. Moreover, Aquinas's normative account of rationality is successful in refuting the challenges of evolutionary relativism as well as the reductionism found in most sociobiological approaches to ethics.
Tolkien's depiction of the vice of curiositas stands within the catholic tradition of Augustine (... more Tolkien's depiction of the vice of curiositas stands within the catholic tradition of Augustine (who saw it as the 'lust of the eyes') and Aquinas (who saw it as the vice opposed to the virtue of studiositas). In their encounters with the palantÃr, Saruman, Denethor, and Pippin all are tempted by curiositas. But only Pippin can withstand the experience because of his inability to isolate himself from "The Fellowship.' While Saruman and Denethor give themselves over to knowledge too great for their capacities, Pippin is saved only because he cannot escape the confines of his community.
In this essay, I argue that Tolkien's Sam Gamgee embodies a Thomistic understanding of humility. ... more In this essay, I argue that Tolkien's Sam Gamgee embodies a Thomistic understanding of humility. For Aquinas humility was a proper valuing of the self that helped resist the temptations to overstep the bounds of right reasoning. But the humble person was also, through humility's twin virtue magnanimity, able to do great things by relying on the aid of others. Sam Gamgee's journey from what Tolkien calls " vulgar conceit " to ennobled humility serves as an exemplar of Thomistic virtue.
Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Christians w... more Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Christians who wish to defend the faith against the onslaughts of these critics might appeal to virtue epistemology by showing that the New Atheists do not possess the necessary habits of thought that a person would need to make a careful and thoughtful consideration of the evidence. In fact, the New Atheists fail to practice intellectual humility and this prevents them from genuine engagement with the strengths religion offers.
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Key words: new atheism, Dawkins, humility, pride, virtue epistemology
Key words: new atheism, Dawkins, humility, pride, virtue epistemology