Papers by Anand Vaidya
: Recent decades have seen renewed interest in panpsychism, as a solution to the hard problem of ... more : Recent decades have seen renewed interest in panpsychism, as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. This has, in part, also influenced and driven an increased interested in classical Indian philosophical traditions among analytic philosophers of mind. Many of these cross-cultural studies pertaining to panpsychism (and cosmopsychism) have focused on one particularly influential school of Indian philosophy, Advaita (non-dual) Vedānta, the most famous proponent of which is Śaṅkara. In this work, we would like to consider the view of another influential philosopher and the school that developed based on his view—Rāmānuja and Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism) Vedānta. We argue that a cosmopsychist-panentheistic metaphysics that is motivated by Rāmānuja’s views offers a solution to the hard problem that is preferable to other comparable views and could form the basis for a panentheistic conception of God that is compatible with the reality of the freedom of human selves.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2015
The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an... more The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an intriguing hypothesis about the nature of human minds that rests on functionalism about various components of mindedness. In this paper we present the Advaita Vedānta account of perception as continuous-part extension against the backdrop of panpsychism. We argue that this view is interesting because it allows us to see how an extended mind style hypothesis can be argued for against the backdrop of panpsychism, as opposed to functionalism.
Sophia, 2016
The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake: Jaysankar L. Shaw's name ... more The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake: Jaysankar L. Shaw's name was incorrectly presented as Jayshankar. The original article was corrected.
Synthese, 2018
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention o... more There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we callthe problem of modal epistemic friction(PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yieldmodal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.
Comparative Philosophy, 2014
India 1 is a delightful and dialogical examination of the classical philosophical debate between ... more India 1 is a delightful and dialogical examination of the classical philosophical debate between relativism and absolutism about truth. The book is by far one of the best introductions to the debate for philosophers and non-philosophers. As a philosopher I was left wondering: why did 20 th century philosophy ever leave the dialogue format as a way of conveying philosophy to the masses? Krausz's work reminded me of Arend Heyting's dialogue Disputation. In this dialogue Heyting introduces the intuitionist theory of mathematics. He does this through a character that is involved in a casual debate with other mathematicians at a bar. Each of the interlocutors represents a different position in the foundations of mathematics, such as Formalism and Logicism. A great contribution of Krausz's dialogue is that it is cross-cultural. It engages ideas from well-known philosophers in both Western and Eastern philosophy. However, and to the benefit of non-philosophers, the book makes no name-wise reference to key philosophers from either tradition. Instead, the knowledgeable reader can see insights from Parmenides, Plato, Nagarjuna, Wittgenstein, Davidson, Putnam, Hinduism, and Buddhism all at play. While the novice reader is introduced to complex ideas, such as reference frame, universalism, foundationalism, absolute relativism, bivalence, and self-realization without the excess jargon and namedropping that often makes presentation of these ideas inaccessible. The work is ostensibly a dialogue between four discussants: Adam, Ronnie, Nina, and Barbara who all knew each other in college, and are meeting for a reunion in India on the banks of the Ganges River. The dialogue takes place over four days, each day being a continuation and further examination of the debate between relativism and absolutism about truth. In what follows, I will give a short synopsis of the topics that are discussed on ________________________ VAIDYA, ANAND J.:
Philosophy
Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or exp... more Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or explained by essentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call, Reductive Finean Essentialism and Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale on Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge the presence of a deep standoff between the two views.
Synthese, 2018
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention o... more There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.
Tim Crane (The problem of perception. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (... more Tim Crane (The problem of perception. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2011 ed). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2011/entries/perception-problem/, 2011) distinguishes between the metaphysical problem of perception and the epistemological problem of perception. The metaphysical problem can be articulated as a function of the joint inconsistency between several theses concerning the nature of perception, such as the openness to the world thesis and the transparency of experience thesis. Disjunctivism holds that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences are distinct in some important way. Disjunctivism is often offered as a solution to the metaphysical problem of perception as well as a response to scepticism. In this comparative-philosophical-exploratory essay, I argue that on the basis of a specific reading of the Nya ¯ya misplacement theory of illusion one can generate a specific kind of disjunctivism about perception, which I call causal disjunctivism. Causal disjunctivism is distinct from Duncan Pritchard's epistemic disjunctivism, and John McDowell's metaphysical disjunctivism. The core idea of causal disjunctivism is that the processes that bring about veridical perception are distinct from the process that bring about non-veridical perception at the level of causal generation. Second, on the basis of causal disjunctivism, I go on to show that it offers a plausible solution to the metaphysical problem of perception.
The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an... more The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an intriguing hypothesis about the nature of human minds that rests on functionalism about various components of mindedness. In this paper we present the Advaita Vedānta account of perception as continuous-part extension against the backdrop of panpsychism. We argue that this view is interesting because it allows us to see how an extended mind style hypothesis can be argued for against the backdrop of panpsychism, as opposed to functionalism.
The modality of a statement or proposition S is the manner in which S's truth ho... more The modality of a statement or proposition S is the manner in which S's truth holds. Statements or propositions can be either necessary, possible, or contingent. For example, while the statement 'Aristotle is Plato's student' is actually true, it is only contingently true. It is possible that ...
Journal of philosophical logic, Jan 1, 2006
Page 1. ANAND JAYPRAKASH VAIDYA THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC Received 10 November 2004; r... more Page 1. ANAND JAYPRAKASH VAIDYA THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC Received 10 November 2004; received in revised version 25 July 2005 1. THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC In the philosophy ...
Erkenntnis, Jan 1, 2008
Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary ... more Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis, and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument explores the relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality.
Philosophia, Jan 1, 2010
Modal epistemology has been dominated by a focus on establishing an account either of how we have... more Modal epistemology has been dominated by a focus on establishing an account either of how we have modal knowledge or how we have justified beliefs about modality. One component of this focus has been that necessity and possibility are basic access points for modal reasoning. For example, knowing that P is necessary plays a role in deducing that P is essential, and knowing that both P and ¬P are possible plays a role in knowing that P is accidental. Chalmers and provide two good examples of contrasting views in modal epistemology that focus on providing an account of modal knowledge where necessity and possibility are basic access points for modal knowledge, and Yablo (1993) provides a good account of how we have justified beliefs about modality. In contrast to this tradition I argue for and outline a modal epistemology based on objectual understanding and essence, rather than knowledge or justification and necessity and possibility. The account employs a non-modal conception of essence and takes objectual understanding of essence, rather than knowledge of essence to be basic in modal reasoning. I begin by articulating account of objectual understanding, on which objectual understanding of F is not equivalent to propositional knowledge of F. I then argue that an epistemology of essence that uses property variation-in-imagination is better construed as a model that delivers objectual understanding of essence rather than knowledge of essence. I argue that this is so, since the latter and not the former runs into a version of the Meno paradox. I show how this account can be applied to two issues in modal epistemology: the Benacerraf problem for modality, and the architecture of modal knowledge.
Philosophical Psychology, Jan 1, 2010
... Correspondence to: Anand J. Vaidya, San Jose State University Philosophy, 1 Washington Squa... more ... Correspondence to: Anand J. Vaidya, San Jose State University Philosophy, 1 Washington Square, San Jose, CA 95192, United States. Email: [email protected] Anand J. Vaidya is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at San Jose State University. ...
Book Reviews by Anand Vaidya
Attention, Not Self (OUP 2017) by Jonardon Ganeri is a path breaking book in the field of cross-c... more Attention, Not Self (OUP 2017) by Jonardon Ganeri is a path breaking book in the field of cross-cultural and multi-disciplinary philosophy. In this review I attend to his discussion of attentional epistemology and the importance of the varieties of attention he discusses, in particular intimation.
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Papers by Anand Vaidya
Book Reviews by Anand Vaidya