Sharp Text by Andrew Sharp Articles

  • Takaichi, Tanking and Legalization Lessons

    Kim Kyung-Hoon – Pool/Getty Images

    We’ve started the year with a series of longer, standalone articles on this website, but I want to go a different direction today and hit a few different topics that have been on my mind this week. Also, while we’re here, one programming note: I will publish normally next week but then be off for vacation on the following Friday, February 27th. For now, let’s go to Japan.

    Takaichi and the Democracy Variable

    About two weeks after she’d taken office in October, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi was already driving China insane. The inciting incident came November 7th during testimony in the Diet, as Takaichi departed from longstanding Japanese ambiguity and suggested that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Such a situation is one of several limited exceptions to a pacifist Japanese constitution that restricts the use of military force, and Takaichi’s candid response to a question from an opposition lawmaker was a strong implication that Japan would join multi-lateral military efforts to defend Taiwan.

    A conniption ensued. From Bloomberg in November:

    Takaichi said that if military force were to be used in a Taiwan conflict, including the use of warships, it could be considered a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. That classification is significant because it would provide a legal justification for Japan to deploy its military to help defend friendly nations.

    Her comments on Friday sparked anger from Xue Jian, the consul-general of China in the western city of Osaka, who took to X to say that Japan’s stance in considering a Taiwan contingency as threatening its own survival as a fatal path chosen by “foolish politicians.” “If you go sticking that filthy neck where it doesn’t belong, it’s gonna get sliced right off. You ready for that?” Xue wrote in a separate post. 

    Xue, the consul-general in Osaka, eventually deleted the comments about beheading a sitting foreign leader. His media peers continued the offensive—a CCTV Twitter account asked whether Takaichi was kicked in the head by a donkey, a China Daily commenter called the Prime Minister an “American running dog,” while Hu Xijin, the former editor of the Global Times, called Takaichi “an evil witch.” 

    Chinese diplomats and journalists may have been trying to make an example of Japan and Takaichi in an effort to warn other countries in the region against allying with Taiwan or the U.S.. Whatever their motivations, the volume and tone of the response was pretty unhinged. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned, “Whoever dares to challenge China’s bottom line will face a resolute, head-on blow and be shattered against the great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people,” while a spokesman added, “Those who play with fire will perish by it!” The rhetoric was followed by a raft of escalatory actions, including China advising its citizens not to travel to Japan for vacations, suspending select Japanese imports, pulling Japanese performers off stage in China, and restricting the flow of rare earths to Japanese companies.

    All of the above is useful context for Xi Jinping’s semi-regular attempts to cast China as a “responsible global actor,” and, of course, for Takaichi’s soaring popularity in Japan over the past few months and her party’s landslide victories in last Sunday’s elections. The Takaichi-led Liberal Democratic Party now has a super-majority within Japan’s government, and from a geopolitical perspective, that means Takaichi will have wide latitude to increase military spending and move in lockstep with the United States. China’s attempts to isolate Japan in the wake of Takaichi’s comments—meetings with governments throughout Asia and letters to the U.K., France, and United Nations—were unavailing on every front, and ultimately left China looking like the isolated party. Worse, the entire affair seemed to make clear to the Japanese public that concerns over Chinese aggression are not hypothetical, and increased military spending (a Takaichi tentpole) is probably a reasonable response.

    A popular reaction to this sequence has been to revel in the blindspots exposed in Chinese strategy. I certainly understand the sentiment, and agree that China’s insecure, aggressive and ultimately clarifying behavior tends to be counterproductive. I also can’t help but admire any world leader who, to channel Holly McLane in Die Hard, can drive the CCP that crazy. Bigger picture, though, what I found most interesting about Sunday’s landslide elections was the reminder from Japan that the democratic world’s response to China will be decided in no small part by the will of democratic voters.

    Consider this a coda to what I wrote two weeks ago about the globalist world leaders who seem incapable of reckoning with the world as it exists today. To the extent the modern world requires clear-eyed leaders, the same will be true of citizens. Takaichi is not part of the globalist cohort; she is closer to an unapologetic nationalist and avowed fan of Trump. Her party dominated last weekend thanks to her personal popularity, with a platform that emphasizes immigration reform and cost of living concerns, in addition to her stance on Chinese aggression. Though she’s been branded “far right” by some in the media, this interview in the New Yorker describes her political instincts as more pragmatic than her critics seem to think.

    Whether Takaichi succeeds or fails as Prime Minister, the opportunity she’s been given is a reflection of the Japanese people and what they want. And for all the world’s commentary on grand strategies and leaders at Davos, including my own, all these leaders have domestic considerations and constituents that will decide their fate and that of their agenda. Moreover, domestic elections are rarely decided by foreign policy, which means that local scandals can dramatically swing international affairs. Some of this obvious, of course, but because it goes without saying, we may not mention it enough. The primacy and capriciousness of domestic politics is so fundamental and such a foregone conclusion that it’s easy to overlook what a massive variable it is to any projections of our geopolitical future.

    Take Keir Starmer, one star of last month’s article, who has spent the past two weeks embroiled in a scandal related to the Epstein files and a former U.K. Ambassador to the U.S. He currently sits as “the most unpopular British prime minister since records began”. Or take Kamala Harris, whose foreign policy would have been a lot more popular than Trump in both Beijing and Davos, and who lost in 2024 because of cultural issues, inflation and Elon Musk buying Twitter. Gavin Newsom, a U.S. contender in 2028, is notably friendly with China. Meanwhile, due in part to immigration resentment and economic anxiety, Japan now has a Prime Minister who is set to increase military spending to unprecedented post-war levels and sits squarely in alignment with the U.S.

    As leaders all over the world stand for election in the years to come, there will be ample opportunity for voters to prioritize pragmatic strategies, national interests, and economic security—or not. The Dutch government recently appointed a series of hawkish ministers after last fall’s Nexperia mess, but the ruling parties lack a majority to set policy unilaterally. Elsewhere, rejecting U.S. calls to action is both popular and understandable, because the Trump Administration makes it hard to be loudly pro-America. Even tacitly aligning with Trump proved politically radioactive for center-right candidates in Australia and Canada. Likewise, spending billions of dollars on re-industrialization or re-armament efforts becomes less popular if it comes at the expense of social safety nets.

    What should be clear to everyone is that if we’re in the middle of Schrödinger’s Cold War, many of the world’s most decisive strategic choices will be made not only by leaders, but by the people who live in these countries and choose who represents them. Outcomes will vary by country, including the United States, where this fall’s midterms provide an opportunity for voters to check Trump’s power (which may explain why the Administration is currently very invested in the stability of its China trade truce, and, by extension, the American economy).

    In the meantime, Takaichi’s ascendance is good evidence that democracy is not, in fact, dying. Not in Japan, the United States, or elsewhere. That’s both affirming and reassuring and, when you consider what’s at stake and what typically drives domestic voting decisions, a bit unsettling.

    How to Fix Tanking in the NBA

    Last weekend the Utah Jazz introduced their newest star, Jaren Jackson Jr., and proceeded to bench him for the entire fourth quarter as the team forfeited a double-digit lead and lost the game on purpose to maximize their odds at landing a top draft pick in May’s NBA Draft Lottery.

    From Jazz blog SLC Dunk:

    For days, fans across the NBA anxiously awaited to see how the Jazz’s big man lineup of Lauri Markkanen at the three, Jackson at the four and Jusuf Nurkic (next year this spot will be filled by Walker Kessler) would play together. … At one point late in the third quarter on Saturday, the Jazz led the Orlando Magic by 17 points. Jackson and Markkanen were incredibly efficient, scoring 49 points on 55.3% field goal shooting. …

    The trade was a success! This team is good!

    A little too good.

    In the fourth quarter, “Tank Note” took over. Head coach Will Hardy — and likely Danny Ainge and Ryan Smith — had seen enough of this new look team. Hardy yanked Jackson, Markkanen and Nurkic in the fourth quarter. With Keyonte George going out earlier in the game with an ankle injury, the Jazz managed to only play one starter in the fourth quarter, rookie Ace Bailey.

    The Jazz lost the game 120-117. Just how they drew it up.

    That was one of at least a dozen examples of increasingly egregious tanking seen across the NBA this year. I attended a Nets-Wizards game Brooklyn last weekend in which the Wizards sat more than half their team, and were trailing Brooklyn by 30 points with eight minutes left in the second quarter.

    Displays like that are going to become even more common over the next two months. The current draft lottery system has more flattened odds than it used to and was adjusted in 2017 to dissuade the worst teams from tanking. That initiative has been an utter failure; today’s worst teams stay bad for longer, tanking year after year to land a top pick that’s now harder to secure, while the smoothed odds actually increase the expected returns to mediocre teams who decide to punt their season. This year it’s all become widespread, and after last week’s trade deadline, the NBA has at least seven teams (the Wizards, Kings, Jazz, Pacers, Nets, Mavericks, Grizzlies) with no incentive to win and lots of incentive to lose as many games as possible over the final two months.

    Of the Jazz gimmicks—benching stars mid-game to ensure they lose (which they did again on Monday)—ESPN’s Bobby Marks said, “What Utah is doing right now is messing around with the integrity of the NBA.” He’s clearly right, of course. Instead of players throwing games, we saw a coach try to do it (the Jazz actually won Monday’s game; they’ve since shut Jackson Jr. down for the season). And to be clear, this isn’t an indictment of Hardy or his team; given the incentives of the current system, they’re making the right choice!

    I may write more about the general malaise around the NBA in the next few weeks, but in the meantime, I’ll just note that while tanking has always been a problem, it will be an even bigger PR problem for the league in an environment where half the league’s superstars are injured, the season is so long that even teams themselves look “borderline disinterested”, and no one feels good about the state of the product. Throw in a quarter of the league sitting healthy players and openly punting 3-4 games a week, and it makes the whole league look like a tremendous waste of time.

    So, here’s what the NBA could do to avoid this problem in the future.

    • Teams in seventh place or lower, in both conferences, are all entered into the NBA lottery in May.
    • Each of the 18 lottery teams has the same odds.
    • The lottery determines the top five picks.
    • Picks 6-18 are then determined by record, with the worst teams getting the highest picks.

    That’s it!

    That system pulls in playoff teams, broadening the pool of lottery entrants and further randomizing the outcome, while also limiting the incentive for, say, an eighth place team to tank out of the playoffs for a chance at a top five pick. Every lottery team gets a 6.25% chance at number one, and losing games in the meantime does not move the needle one way or the other. This would allow the Jazz to play their veterans in the fourth quarter, and the Wizards to play their young guys in Brooklyn. The worst teams in the NBA can still count on picking 6-10, potentially rebuilding with top ten picks across successive seasons. And yes, flattening the lottery odds would remove a surefire path to franchise-altering superstars—tanking entire seasons in exchange for draft position—but the NBA’s reformed odds have already sort of done that (while failing to curb tanking).

    Mind you, unlike my admittedly wild prescriptions for the NBA Cup, what’s offered here is not a groundbreaking solution. We’re not abolishing the draft, introducing a wheel, etc. This is an obvious, common sense fix that would be better for the NBA’s business and has been sitting there for about 15 years.

    If Adam Silver watches this season unfold and fails to galvanize owners to take any meaningful action in this direction, it will be yet another indictment of a commissioner who’s lost control of the league in a dozen other areas, as well. Alas, I’ll be surprised if that’s not exactly what happens.

    In Defense of Regulation

    From the New York Times Editorial Board:

    This editorial board has long supported marijuana legalization. In 2014, we published a six-part series that compared the federal marijuana ban to alcohol prohibition and argued for repeal. Much of what we wrote then holds up — but not all of it does.

    At the time, supporters of legalization predicted that it would bring few downsides. In our editorials, we described marijuana addiction and dependence as “relatively minor problems.” Many advocates went further and claimed that marijuana was a harmless drug that might even bring net health benefits. They also said that legalization might not lead to greater use.

    It is now clear that many of these predictions were wrong. Legalization has led to much more use. Surveys suggest that about 18 million people in the United States have used marijuana almost daily (or about five times a week) in recent years. That was up from around six million in 2012 and less than one million in 1992. More Americans now use marijuana daily than alcohol.

    As a millennial who spent most my teens and twenties convinced that America needed legalized marijuana, the sentiments in that editorial resonate. The Times soft pedals the implications of its second-guessing, but the takeaway seems clear. The execution of legalization was mishandled, and while there are millions of people who can use marijuana recreationally without any consequences, the net impact of all this has been (and will continue to be) negative. Legalized gambling, particularly on apps, strikes me as a similar story.

    The Times, for its part, argues that in the future marijuana should be regulated like alcohol and tobacco, mimicking “relatively high taxes, open-container laws and regulations on alcohol and nicotine levels,” and “balanc[ing] personal freedom and public health.” Reasonable, unobjectionable goals, but it’s not clear to me that those sorts of measures would be enough to curb some of the negative impacts the rest of the editorial describes.

    Leaving aside the policy specifics of the debate itself, the discussion reminded me of a distinction that’s occurred to me a number of times over the course of hosting Sharp Tech and debating policy prescriptions for the tech world and beyond. “Government regulation” is a catch-all term that describes everything from building codes to antitrust enforcement to nuclear power plants to cigarette advertising. It’s also become a pejorative term, in the course of incoherent AI executive orders or Abundance-adjacent discussions about American rejuvenation, as politicians on both sides lament regulation that slows down businesses, grid expansions or rebuilding a home in Pacific Palisades. The risk, though, is that we consciously or subconsciously conflate all government interventions into private affairs as a sort of saftey-ist intrusion into the freedoms that have typically spurred American dynamism.

    The early returns from legalized marijuana and gambling are good evidence that moral regulation, for one, was probably more useful in American life than critics like me acknowledged. Fewer people want to make that argument, because an entire generation of politically conscious people came to associate the concept of moral regulation with people like Jerry Falwell, Newt Gingrich or Tipper Gore. Unfortunately, running the other direction may not be much better. Compare the talking points from Adam Silver’s 2014 op-ed arguing for legalized gambling to this account from Bloomberg last month:

    The average DraftKings customer, Funt says, loses about $100 a month on the site. (That’s roughly what the company reports for average monthly revenue per user.) … Then there are the more diffuse and far-reaching costs. A trio of researchers from UCLA and the University of Southern California documented declines in across-the-board financial well-being in states following the legalization of sports gambling. Calls to helplines, online searches for help with gambling, and other markers of problem gambling are rising, too. …

    Calls to gamble are now woven seamlessly into sports broadcasts via ads, team and arena sponsorships and commentators’ steady discussion of odds, spreads and probabilities. It’s unavoidable and, for many casual fans, including parents, that’s a problem. More than 50% of sports fans now believe that ads for sports betting should be banned during games and say that gambling has hurt the integrity of the games, according to a recent Ipsos poll.

    Athletes also report new levels of online harassment and temptation. In an anonymous poll of professional basketball players, nearly half said the NBA’s gambling partnerships were bad for the league, describing an onslaught of threats and entreaties from gamblers.

    Here again, I’ll leave the specific debate over gambling to another article, and note only that the story is more complicated than Silver made it seem in 2014. Legalized gambling (and a complete absence of friction thanks to apps) is not a problem for many people, but is it good or bad for the majority?

    Looking ahead, the concept of the moral regulation, or social health regulation, should not be taboo. Whether it’s smart phones in schools, the incentive structure of social media platforms, OnlyFans and porn, or regulating and/or repealing legalized weed and gambling, there is no shortage of billion dollar businesses built on brain-altering, addictive products that may be a net negative for American society. The government actively grappling with these problems would be healthy and good; while everyone seems to agree that over-regulation has creeping, compounding negative consequences in a variety of areas, the next decade or two may remind us that a failure to regulate can be equally insidious.

    To me, it’s becoming pretty clear that a defining challenge of the next generation in the U.S. will be to reject certain types of regulation while embracing others, and finding politicians who can reliably distinguish between the categories at issue. Good luck, you might say. And sure, it looks like one party has a tendency to regulate everything, everywhere, while the other has Donald Trump Jr. on the board of both Polymarket and Kalshi. Nevertheless, if a skeptic says it’s impossible for America to embrace regulation for personal behavior but exercise restraint with respect to industry, a historian might add that we did that for the first 75 years of the 20th Century.

    The goal, in the broadest possible strokes, should be cutting away the web of bureaucratic and environmental red tape that has slowed everyone down (and driven a lot of industry offshore), while rediscovering the mettle to pass and enforce regulations that prioritize public welfare and productivity.

    Anyone who cares about optimizing for national health had better invest in both sides of that spectrum.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • What ‘Any Given Sunday’ Gets Right

    Photo By Getty Images

    We’re three days out from Super Bowl Sunday, and that gives me an excuse to zag a bit today and celebrate a football movie that was described in 1999 as “a film loaded with cynicism and choking on overbearing imagery that nevertheless winds up buying into many of the myths surrounding the sport.”

    Yes, I’d like to add 27 years later, and that’s good.

    Oliver Stone’s Any Given Sunday was considered over the top and sensational when it arrived in 1999, but it’s sentimental, too. That combination makes for a fun cultural document nearly 30 years later. Rewatching it recently, I was hooked within the first 10 minutes.

    The Look and Feel of Pro Football

    For anyone who hasn’t seen this movie in 20 years, the story opens with the Miami Sharks in the second quarter, at home against the Minnesota Americans (the NFL refused to license anything for this movie). In the very first scene, Miami’s star quarterback Jack “Cap” Rooney (Dennis Quaid) gets crunched between an unblocked linebacker and a blitzing safety, grimacing in pain on the ground until a sideline full of cameras and cheers from the crowd convince him to gamely hobble off the field. The next play, the backup quarterback, Tyler Cherubini, gets hit from behind, he gets injured, too, and his fumble is returned for a touchdown. On the ensuing possession, then, in goes 26 year-old, third-string quarterback Willie Beamen (Jamie Foxx), a “mystery man” according to the play-by-play announcer. Beamen, memorably, vomits on the field before taking a snap.

    All of this is great, standard sports movie stuff, and after Beamen calls audibles that don’t exist and struggles to get his bearings throughout his first series, the Sharks stagger into halftime down by three. Cut to the locker room, where an offensive lineman is demanding vicodin and cyclobenzaprine amid cramping, team doctors are arguing over the injury to Rooney, and assistant coach Montezuma Monroe (Jim Brown) is standing in front of a chalkboard and screaming at his defense: “We got the third string quarterback that ain’t gonna produce s***! And when I’m talking about the defense, goddamnit, you’re dumb enough, we made it simple enough! We made this s*** real f***ing simple.”

    The chaos eventually gives way to a speech from legendary, Pantheon Cup-winning head coach Tony D’Amato (Al Pacino), which culminates with this:

    TONY D’AMATO: We’re only down by three. We can win this one.

    [locker room murmurs]

    D’AMATO (screaming): We got three losses in a row!

    D’AMATO (lowers his voice): I’m sick and tired of this. Are you? Because if you’re not, raise you’re hand. [D’AMATO raises his hand]. If you’re gonna act like a loser, raise your hand! If you’re gonna act like p***y, raise your hand!”

    [Camera pans to the back of the locker room, star running back JULIAN WASHINGTON slowly standing on a chair to raise his hand]

    D’AMATO: What the hell are you doing, J?

    WASHINGTON: I didn’t want you to be the only p***y with his hand raised, Coach. So I figured I’d help you out.

    [whole locker room erupts in laughter]

    Successive generations have come to revere Pacino’s “Inches” speech at the end of this movie, and I’m certainly not here to argue; it’s one of the best sports movie scenes of all time. Still, as someone who’s spent a decent amount of time in and around pro sports, the moment above rings truer to what any of these worlds actually look and sound like. Because sure pro sports are full of egos and testosterone and occassionally dramatic speeches, but there’s also quite a bit of comedy that punctures all that tension on a regular basis. Guys being dudes, giving each other grief, etc.

    There are a dozen more moments that capture that particular aspect of how the now-mind-blowingly successful NFL sausage gets made, like when linebacker Luther “Shark” Lavay (Lawrence Taylor) convinces Beamen to bring flowers to a meeting with his coach (who’s baffled by the gesture), or when Lavay confronts an offensive lineman about turning off postgame celebratory rap music to play hard rock. “Hell no!” Lavay says, “Not this Nazi rock shit again.” And the lineman responds: “Metallica ruuuuuuuules! Hetfield is God. We live to serve him.”

    Nailing the emotional beats of pro athlete interactions is just one, minor charm of the the movie. In broader strokes, I was surprised by how well the football scenes hold up. This enjoyable reporting from Mike Freeman at the New York Times describes the painstaking steps Stone took to make the games realistic, including signing a cast full of extras from the Arena Football League, as well as then-active NFL players like Irving Fryar, Ricky Watters, and Terrell Owens. Stone held an 8-week training camp for the cast, and there was live hitting throughout the production. After filming a half-dozen takes of Watters colliding with a nearly-40 year-old Taylor on a fourth-and-one, LT was left dazed and lying on the field, with filming paused for nearly half-an-hour.

    The camera work during games is jittery, full of abrasive jump cuts set to fast-paced music. All this was done in service of approximating on-field speed and power that was “shocking” to Stone, and which rarely comes through on a traditional TV broadcast. I’m no cinematography expert, but to the extent Stone is trying to make football look like barely controlled chaos moving so quickly and violently that just standing on the field would give any normal person a panic attack, the effects work.

    Off the field, Stone talked to owners, coaches, team physicians, and even the wives and girlfriends of players, all to understand what they care about, what the experience of pro football really looks like for various stakeholders, and what drives tension. As Freeman wrote in 1999, “The movie shows how, if two players in a locker room do not like each other, the players’ wives or girlfriends will dislike each other as well. Such a scenario has happened several times with recent Giants teams.”

    So, on the back of all that research and realism, there’s also the matter of the reviewer’s complaint at the top, that this film is “loaded with cynicism.” On that one… I don’t know! Many of the storylines that were read as overly cynical or sensational in 1999 have come to look prescient and borderline mundane.

    The movie features an insecure new owner, Christina Pagniacci (Cameron Diaz), who’s meddling with the coaching staff and using the threat of relocation to Los Angeles to extort Miami for a new, publicly funded stadium. Elsewhere, Lavay is a linebacker who continues playing despite risks of brain damage. One team doctor (James Woods) is colluding with the ownership to shield the extent of Lavay’s risk, promising a sleight of hand with test results the team “won’t forget come contract time.” There’s a quarterback, Rooney, who’s too injured to keep playing but too famous to quit. There’s a running back, Washington (LL Cool J), who wants more carries to ensure he hits his contract incentives. There’s a hotshot offensive coordinator, Nick Crozier (Aaron Eckhart), who thinks the team should be playing faster, taking more risks, and has tensions with the more traditional D’Amato.

    Versions of all those stories have happened in real life, and continue to! That’s the NFL. None of these characters were invented or even particularly embellished.

    Then there’s Jamie Foxx’s Willie Beamen, the engine of the movie as the third-string QB whose athleticism sparks a turnaround in Miami and who quickly becomes a household name. He reacts to his newfound fame by disregarding playcalls from the coaching staff, publicly taking shots at D’Amato (“Coach Stone Age”), and losing the locker room by taking shots at the defense. Now, is this part embellished? Is it realistic that all of this would happen in the span of three weeks? Of course not. But Beamen’s trajectory from precocious upstart to jaded and truculent superstar is pretty familiar to anyone who’s followed pro sports for the last 30 years.

    In his one-on-one meeting with D’Amato, after exchanging flowers and pretending to enjoy his coach’s gumbo, the young quarterback lashes out when told Rooney will start the team’s playoff game in Texas:

    BEAMEN: I seen a long line of coaches just like you, all the way from college with that same old bull***t halftime speech.

    D’AMATO: Bull***t?

    BEAMEN: Yes, it’s bull***t. You know, you always bull***t, because it’s about the money. Raking in the TV contracts, fat cat boosters sitting the sky box, the coaches trying to up their salaries. And the whole time what you looking for? You looking for the next black stud to take you to the top ten. Get you in a bowl game. It’s the same way in the pros, except in the pros, the field hands get paid.

    D’AMATO: Come on, don’t play that race card on me, kid. Twenty-five years I work with men of your color.

    BEAMEN: Maybe it’s not racism. Maybe it’s place-ism. Brother has to know his place. Right, boss?

    The reason the movie works, and is smarter than it gets credit for, is that Beamen’s perspective is not endorsed. Yes, he’s got legitimate grievances with D’Amato’s playcalling, and certainly with the coaches who played him out of position in college, or teams that didn’t draft him because of trumped up NCAA violations—two pitfalls for young, black athletes that were very real 25 years ago. But when he draws on those experiences and sneers to an interviewer that “football is a corporation,” the only character who agrees with him is peevish TV host who says, “Your smack is so fresh. It’s so on time. It’s so truthful.”

    The actual truth is more complicated in Stone’s rendering: football is a business, but it can’t be purely transactional if you want to succeed. So Beamen’s interview ends, and the movie immediately jumps to Shark Lavay in a hot tub, hearing about his young quarterback taking shots at the defense, and then interrupting a team party by chain-sawing Beamen’s yellow Tahoe into two pieces (“In football there’s an offense and a defense, you can’t have one without the other.”). From there, Beamen starts the final game of the regular season, it’s a disaster, and he gets punched in the face in the shower.

    Meanwhile, Beamen’s fake-deep musings are bookended a few scenes later by Coach Jim Brown at a bar, lamenting that in his day players used to sell liquor and wrestle in the offseason, while today’s players have year-round training regimens and bodies that crack like china. A drunk Al Pacino answers that point by blaming TV for corrupting the purity of the game he used to coach. “The first time they cut away to commercial,” he says, “that was the end of it.”

    They don’t sound wise, either—just old.

    The Moral of This Story

    Any Given Sunday was largely panned critically when it was released (Rotten Tomatoes score: 51%) and it’s full of shagginess and heavy-handed imagery (there are Roman chariots from Ben Hur interspersed at one point) that may not be for everyone. Without poring too much over contemporary reviews, I recall that people who loved the NFL thought the movie’s depiction of the league’s corruption was way over the top, while others, maybe more open to NFL skepticism, seemed disappointed it wasn’t more negative. As the New York Times wrote in 1999, “Although the story presents many opportunities for tragedy (some situations practically beg for it), ‘Any Given Sunday’ turns ludicrously upbeat…”

    Regardless, what I found rewatching it was a surprisingly resonant great time. For one thing, I didn’t realize until writing this article how much I adore the names of everyone involved here. Willie Beamen as the young black quarterback, Montezuma Monroe (!!!) as the defensive coordinator, Nick Crozier as the whiz kid OC, Julian Washington as the running back, Luther “Shark” Lavay, Jack “Cap” Rooney, Dr. Harvey Mandrake, Tyler Cherubini… On and on and on. For character names alone, this is hands down the best sports movie of my lifetime.

    Elsewhere, the football scenes are solid, the emotional beats land (“Don’t you drop me… I’m worth a million dollars”), and some of the best performances in the movie come from Jim Brown and Lawrence Taylor, two of the most legendary players in the history of the sport. And sure, the story is full of stock characters who don’t develop that much—another critic nitpick—but what I enjoy about the writing 27 years later is that there was no Twitter-brained self-consciousness about dealing in cliches or taboos; as a result, the broad characters in this movie are actually a more honest look at the virtues and blindspots of modern athletes than you’ll find in most of today’s media coverage.

    The Hollywood Reporter complained in 1999 that “[t]here is no area of professional football in which Stone and fellow writers John Logan and Daniel Pyne do not see money-hungry, ego-gratifying misbehavior.” In other words, then, they had eyes. The NFL, for its part, complained that Stone’s script does not “accurately or positively portray our players, club owners or club personnel.” Stone, on the other hand, said, “This movie is a tribute to the players of the NFL, because they sacrifice everything to play this sport.”

    To that end, the movie stops short of indicting an entire industry the way, say, Stone’s Wall Street did. The restraint shown in that regard lends a sneaky bit of depth to a movie in which Lawrenece Taylor saws a Tahoe in half and a lineman releases a baby alligator into the team showers (among other things). Indeed, a lesser version of this project could have been a polemic painting the NFL as a morally bankrupt universe, or maybe been framed as a simpler story around Beamen or D’Amato as a singular hero—the old coach trying to prevent the game from losing its soul to capitalism, or the young quarterback fighting conservative shackles and trying to usher in a more progressive style and get paid.

    The moral of this story, though, is merely that both those perspectives exist in parallel, and each side has some valid points. That rings truer to how any of this works. Draymond Green doesn’t win titles without Steve Kerr, the inverse is equally true, and similar, barely functional dynamics exists in dozens of other locker rooms throughout pro sports. Everyone has worked a lifetime to get to these levels, is sacrificing a great deal to stay there, and has to trust people they can’t fully control as the most dramatic moments of their lives play out in real time.

    The movie resolves its own version of that drama with an uplifting and fun note, apparently to the chagrin of that Times critic. And yes, it’s fair to see the health risks, ethical compromises and corporate incentives endemic to pro football and conclude this movie lets the league off easy. The media’s NFL conversations certainly went the other direction for much of the 2010s, back when everyone was writing their “Why I stopped watching football” essays.

    What I love about Any Given Sunday, though, is that for all the prescient and unsparing portrayals of greed, sex, drugs, corrupt team doctors, craven owners, and concussion risks—many of the same issues that led to that NFL backlash—the movie itself never makes the mistake of judging the characters who choose to dedicate their lives to this enterprise. Instead, you can tell that Stone’s interviews with players and coaches made an impression. Football, it turns out, does in fact transform lives and provide meaning to a wide variety of people who are not merely rubes tricked into a lifetime in the meatgrinder. We see humanity and dignity in the linebacker who wants to hit his million dollar bonus regardless of the health risks, the coach who gave his life to the game even if it cost him his family, or the quarterback who became famous, became insufferable, and then re-centered himself.

    It would have been easy to make an NFL movie that grabs at the low-hanging fruit, debunks much of the sport’s mythology, and adopts the scathing cynicism of some of Stone’s characters. Maybe that movie gets better reviews, but it probably struggles to resonate nearly 30 years later, because at a fundamental level its conclusions would be simplistic, incomplete and hollow.

    Cynicism that’s presented as wisdom is often its own form of naïveté. Real intelligence, on the other hand, will recognize a chaotic world for exactly what it is and find reasons to love it anyway.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • The Scorpion and the Frogs

    Etienne Oliveau/Getty Images

    Last week in Switzerland, at the World Economic Forum, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng discussed his country’s role in the global economy. “China is committed to fostering common prosperity with its trading partners through its own development,” he said, “and making the pie bigger for the global economy and trade. We never seek trade surplus; on top of being the world’s factory, we hope to be the world’s market too.”

    Delivered with a straight face and in the shadow of a $1.2 trillion global trade surplus, I’d like to imagine the Vice Premier continued his remarks by telling the roomful of world leaders about new oceanfront property in Sichuan province that will be a great opportunity for everyone.

    Of course, He’s address was a footnote to what became the main event in Davos last week. That was the speech from Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who invoked Czech dissident Václav Havel and his description of a greengrocer hanging a “Workers of the World, Unite!” sign in his shop window, signaling participation in the communist system, perpetuating the subjugation of the very workers that system was supposed to benefit. This was prelude to Carney taking down Canada’s sign, as it were, inveighing against American hegemony in the modern era:

    For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

    We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

    This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.

    So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality. This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.

    Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration. But more recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

    You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

    Here I’ll pause to note that people occasionally ask me how in the world I came to host a podcast about China, or what qualifies me, a former lawyer and sportswriter, to now opine about geopolitics on a weekly basis.

    The answer to the first question is that three years ago Ben Thompson and I were thinking about Stratechery Plus and searching for tentpole topics that any savvy news consumer should want to know more about, but that were not well covered by mainstream media. China and its interactions with the rest of the world were my first nomination (in retrospect, a good bet!). Plus, as an avid reader of Sinocism, the chance to host with Bill Bishop was a dream. So, three years later, here we are.

    As for what qualifies me to offer any insight of my own? I read the news every week and don’t ignore the implications of what I’m reading. That, I’ve come to realize, is a real superpower when it comes to understanding China’s rise and its relationship the rest of the world. Merely maintaining a half-decent memory and a firm grasp on the facts puts you head and shoulders above the China insights and policy prescriptions from many pundits and world leaders, including someone like Mark Carney. That’s not because these leaders are stupid, mind you, but because doing business with China requires leaders to engage in so much cognitive dissonance, in so many areas, that eventually, any kind of coherent, clear-eyed recognition of reality becomes impossible.

    The Main Character Carney Missed

    Carney’s Davos speech was praised at the New York Times by Ezra Klein, who called the remarks “a brave act,” and wrote that “Carney is right that America’s power is, in part, dependent on the willingness of other countries to be entwined with our might.” Klein later doubled down on the praise with a podcast episode dedicated to “The Most Important Foreign Policy Speech in Years.” David French, also at the Times, wrote that Carney “delivered what might be the most important address of Trump’s second term” and “articulated a vision of how the ‘middle powers’—nations like Canada—should respond to the great powers.” There’s no better bellwether for elite consensus than the Times, and indeed, those rapturous sentiments were echoed all over the world last week, including in Davos, where Carney’s remarks received a standing ovation.

    Leaving aside whether the decision to criticize Trump trade policy in a room full of frustrated European leaders was in fact “a brave act,” my problem with Carney’s speech and the fawning coverage it received is that none of these people seem interested in grappling with the the world-historic trade surplus in the room. Blaming the United States for asserting its leverage and upsetting the status quo is a predictable and perhaps understandable response, but it’s such an incomplete rendering of what’s happened that it’s effectively dishonest.

    Go back to He Lifeng’s comments at the outset. “China is committed to fostering common prosperity with its trading partners through its own development,” the Vice Premier said, “and making the pie bigger for the global economy and trade.”

    In reality, China is doing precisely the opposite. As the Wall Street Journal wrote in December, “China’s Growth Is Coming at the Rest of the World’s Expense.” According to Goldman Sachs economists cited in that piece, while in the past “1% more output in China would raise the rest of the world’s output by 0.2% as it pulled in imports,” today that dynamic has flipped negative as Chinese exports lead to factory closures and job loss. “The upshot,” the Journal writes, “is that Goldman sees China growing about 0.6 percentage point a year faster over the next few years, but that will reduce the rest of the world’s growth by 0.1 point a year.” This trend will, inevitably, “generate growing headwinds for other industrial economies in Europe and East Asia, and for Mexico.”

    China may not be explicitly seeking to erode the industrial capacity and employment centers of its trading partners, but that’s what’s happening, and it’s not changing. Exports have risen every year for five years straight, state subsidies will continue for strategic sectors while economies of scale advantages persist in non-strategic sectors, and all of it makes it that much harder for international businesses to survive. Likewise, China may want to position itself as “the world’s market” in addition to “the world’s factory,” but its consumer market is in a depression/deflationary spiral, is increasingly crowded with domestic competition, and is far less attractive to foreign businesses than it was 10 years ago. This is all downstream of 2015’s “Made in China 2025” set of industrial policies and what Xi Jinping characterized in 2020 as a “dual circulation” strategy, in which the General Secretary exhorted the Communist Party to “tighten the international industrial chain’s dependence” on China, while forging a domestic market that can be self-sustaining independent of Western firms.

    These are critical details. It’s politically convenient for Chinese leaders to discuss the country’s trade surplus as a happy accident and something the Party is working to address, just as it’s politically convenient for embattled world leaders to believe them, rather than jeopardize business with the second largest economy in the world. It is, however, an objective fact that the macroeconomic realities straining the global economy are the result of policies emphasized by the CCP. Understood through that lens—through the explicit and public guidance set forth by Xi Jinping and the Chinese government—it’s clearly China, not the United States, that has upended the global system the world knew, made trade impossible and rendered globalization a losing proposition for much of the developed Western world (not to mention the mounting frustration among Chinese allies). Yet talking around these realities, naming the U.S. as a hegemon but not China, is a textbook example of the cognitive dissonance that’s required to do business with the P.R.C.

    Canada and the New World Order

    The context for Carney’s speech was a Canada-China trade deal agreed upon several days earlier, during the Prime Minister’s visit to China. “Mine is the first visit of a Canadian Prime Minister in nearly a decade,” Carney told his counterparts in Beijing. “The world has changed much since that last visit. And I believe the progress that we have made, and the partnership, sets us up well for the new…. world…. order.”

    The deal, which Carney called a “strategic partnership,” generated lots of predictable bluster within the Beltway, with many voices declaring that U.S. policies are driving allies into the arms of Chinese adversaries. In reality, what Canada agreed to was relatively modest, reducing the tariff rate on an import of 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles (3% of the total market in Canada) in exchange for China’s agreement to reduce tariffs on agricultural products and Canadian canola oil, a $2.6 billion business that had been sanctioned by the PRC since Canada announced 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs in 2024. In any event, while I think the risks of further damage to the U.S. relationship were not worth the marginal rewards from China, I’m not here to litigate the logic of what Canada agreed to on that trip.

    Carney’s halting delivery of the “new world order” line is what struck a chord with me. The words were carefully considered, delivered slowly for effect (and effective translation), and there should be no mistake about what was happening in that video. That was a leader attempting to ingratiate himself to an authoritarian government, incorporating language that’s favored by Xi, himself, to describe a vision for the world in which China uses its leverage to erode U.S. leadership and Western norms, and usher in an era of multi-polarity whereby China wields as much or more leverage as the United States. It’s a moment worth considering alongside last week’s celebrations of Carney’s refusal to subjugate Canadian values in the name of economic self-preservation.

    Meanwhile, it doesn’t take any mental gymnastics to imagine what Xi Jinping’s “new world order” would look like in practice, as in many ways it’s already here. Look at the decade-long transformation of Hong Kong, once a beloved international hub and today a that’s city rife with fear, repression, dubious prosecutions, and far fewer foreigners than there used to be.

    At the United Nations, China sits on the Human Rights Council despite ongoing accusations of genocide against its Uyghur population, and has used its influence to shut down debate on Xinjiang, weaken resolutions condemning Russia, and lobby members to mischaracterize the meaning of a 1972 UN resolution in a years-long campaign to enshrine China’s claims to Taiwan as international law. At the World Health Organization, China’s influence is so pervasive that in this video an American doctor can be seen pretending not to hear a question about Taiwan and then closing the Skype call to avoid answering a follow-up, in a clip that goes a long way toward explaining the WHO initially abetting the CCP’s efforts to downplay COVID’s severity and eventually obscure the extent to which China obstructed investigations of COVID’s origins. At the World Anti-Doping Agency, Chinese donations and influence allegedly led to burying 23 positive test results for Chinese swimmers before the 2021 and 2024 Olympics. At the World Trade Organization, China spent decades clinging to its status as a “developing country,” which for the past 15 years meant a first-world superpower enjoyed third-world obligations, affording China more leeway with respect to state subsidies and longer timelines to comply with rules and adverse rulings. When the U.S. pushed to strip this status from China in 2019, the Chinese delegation teamed with nine actually-developing nations to successfully scuttle the measure.

    Those are just major world institutions. That’s before you get to the way Chinese money has compromised think tanks, green energy orgs, media, Hollywood, and yes, Harvard. The PRC playbook in any of those contexts is not complicated: China is aggressive about buying influence in international institutions, shrewd about weaponizing the rules of the rules-based order when it’s advantageous, and unapologetic about disregarding those rules when it’s not. Carney, again, wasn’t wrong to single out the unraveling of the open and fully integrated world at the hands of an “international law for thee, but not for me” hegemon; he just cited the wrong country.

    Chinese leaders, to be clear, should not be begrudged for their ingenuity in a lot of these areas, using their system’s advantages and seizing on Western complacency. But the full scope and implications of that activity is why the world wound up where it is today, and it’s a reality that should prompt more introspection from those who denounce the U.S. using leverage of its own to affect changes and remake the order that U.S. partners had come to know. Because really, what sort of outcomes has that order and its institutions been yielding lately? Ezra Klein’s column makes an elegant argument that America’s restraint with allies and trade partners was always the source of its strength, and while that is indisputably true, his insight fails to account for the costs of that restraint, and the corrosive behaviors the whole world now tolerates as a cost of doing business.

    In Canada, specifically, China has been accused of operating secret police stations to harass the Chinese diaspora extraterritorially, interfering in domestic politics to the benefit of Trudeau’s Liberal party, jailing two Canadian citizens under false pretenses for over 1,000 days to protest the arrest of a Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou, and looking the other way as thousands of kilograms of precursor chemicals enter Canada every year to support transnational drug gangs dealing fentanyl throughout North America. Carney, himself, said in April of last year that China is Canada’s greatest security threat. Yet two weeks ago, asked whether his assessment has evolved, Carney said, “The security landscape continues to change. And in a world that’s more dangerous and divided, we face many threats.”

    The West’s Direction of Travel

    None of this is to single out Canada or Carney. His viral Davos speech was delivered at a time when leaders all over the West are faced with similar choices navigating tariffs, heightened demands from the U.S., and tensions between two rival superpowers. So far, those leaders are mostly refusing to choose, redirecting attention to Trump, and trying to gin up business however they can. Last week, it was French President Emmanuel Macron decrying U.S. bullying and soliciting direct Chinese investment across Europe’s key sectors (because apparently funding Russia’s war in Ukraine doesn’t count). This week, it was U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer visiting Beijing with nearly 60 British business executives, in a bid to revive the “golden era” of U.K.-China relations, while promising that he won’t be forced to “choose between” doing business with China and maintaining close ties with the United States.

    “President Xi tells the story of blind men being presented with an elephant,” Starmer said Thursday in Beijing. “One touches the leg and thinks it is a pillar; another feels the belly and thinks it is a wall. Too often this reflects how China is seen. But I profoundly believe that broader and deeper engagement… is our way of seeing the whole elephant, and therefore building a more sophisticated relationship, fit for these times.”

    We’ll see. Starmer’s trip came on the heels of reports that China spent several years intercepting communications from 10 Downing Street, and the trip itself was conditioned upon the Labour Government last week approving plans for a Chinese “mega embassy” in downtown London, overruling internal security concerns and objections from the White House. This all comes amid an ongoing mess surrounding Starmer’s plans to transfer British ownership of the Chagos Islands, home to Diego Garcia, one of the most important U.S. military bases in the world, to China-aligned Mauritius. We’re also only a few months removed from the U.K. government abandoning a high-profile espionage prosecution against a Parliament staffer because no one from Labour would testify that China is a national security threat, a predicate for proving the charged offense. Again, none of this is top secret or in any way conspiratorial. This is just what the news looks like every week.

    It’s tempting to feint toward middle ground at the end here, acknowledging the difficult choices facing leaders like Starmer or Carney, nodding at the complexity of our world, etc. The truth is, that’s not where I land. Just because choices are difficult, or inconvenient, does not mean there are not clear correct answers. Reviving structural dependencies on a demonstrably hostile authoritarian state is a bad idea, particularly if it risks corrupting an alliance with an American partner whose consumer market, military, and currency reserves are strategically more important. Failing to reckon with these realities is only defensible if you start from the premise that all these leaders have been asleep for the past 15 years, and especially the past 12 months.

    But again, we’ll see. Leaders seeking business abroad and political wins at home often take their eyes off the ball, and modern media makes that easier. We live in an era in which China is regularly celebrated for its climate leadership, Trump is pilloried for preferring the stability and abundance of fossil fuels, and the entire conversation ignores that China gets 88% of its own energy from coal, oil and natural gas, with twice the carbon emissions of the U.S., while burning more coal every year than all 27 EU member states combined. This sort of thing happens in lots of areas; it’s a reflection of Western political incentives, and maybe a return on years of Chinese investments in elite Western institutions. Still, at some point the farce becomes dangerous.

    Ross Douthat wrote last week that the celebration of Mark Carney reminded him of the viral fanfare that once surrounded Angela Merkel, a leader whose legacy is now complicated by the destabilizing impact of mass migration, voluntarily abandonment of nuclear energy, voluntarily de-industrialization, and a pivot to Russian gas that was strenuously opposed by President Trump and left Germany profoundly reliant on an authoritarian government that invaded Ukraine three months after Merkel left office. Carney is not Merkel, but that’s the risk. And as an aside, in 2025, Chinese exports to the German market were up 108% year-over-year, while Germans lost 10,000 manufacturing jobs per month.

    I of course understand why many Americans, and particularly international audiences, may find the aesthetics and demands of Trump foreign policy to be unsettling. But if any of Trump’s foreign counterparts allow emotions and short term interests to become a substitute for moral or strategic clarity, they are an even bigger threat to the future of the liberal Western order. Because ultimately, which world leader is more pernicious? The one who talks boorishly about a broken system and brags about structural advantages that will be leveraged to fix it, or the leaders who tend to obscure the problem altogether? The latter group is polite, impeccably credentialed, and speaks eloquently about a system of global engagement, clean energy and progress. Implicit in those appeals, though—from Carney, Starmer, and Macron, as well as those from Clinton, Blair, Bush, Merkel, Scholz, and Obama—is a request to avert our eyes from all the evidence that the system they describe has led to economic calamity for millions of working people, created structural weaknesses throughout the West, and is likely to demand illiberal concessions in service of economic self-preservation in the future.

    It’s ultimately the gift and the curse of reading the world’s news every week. Any clear-eyed recognition of malign Chinese behavior, I’ve found, also yields clear-eyed recognition of the sorts of Western pundits and leaders who have enabled it for decades. And they’re not quite done yet.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • Was Nico Harrison Wrong?

    Harry How/Getty Images

    Let’s stipulate up front: Former Mavericks GM Nico Harrison wasn’t right when he traded Luka Doncic. He could have gotten a better return than he did. He should have had conversations with more than one or two teams as he investigated trade possibilities. He was bizarrely tone deaf in his messaging to Mavericks fans. And even last February, before it all went awry in a heap of injuries and fan protests, the plan to build a championship team around Anthony Davis and Kyrie Irving didn’t make much sense to anyone who had watched either of those players attempt to lead teams for the previous 10 years. So, no arguments there. Nico’s execution was a problem. However

    The Luka trade was derided first and foremost because the whole world agreed it was certifiably insane to trade a future Hall of Famer who was 25 years old, nine months removed from an NBA Finals appearance, and all set to sign a 5-year, $345 million contract extension that would have kept him in Dallas through 2031. Sure, the return was deemed insufficient, but the shock of trading a beloved prodigy in the middle of his prime, suddenly deciding that Luka was a bad bet, is why the world lost its mind. It’s why a quick Google search finds The Ringer calling Harrison an all-time embarrassment and the Wall Street Journal calling the Luka deal the worst trade in NBA history.

    We’re approaching the one year anniversary of all that madness—Luka and the Lakers are also set to visit Dallas on Saturday night—and Greatest of All Talk listeners will remember that elements of the volcanic backlash to the trade annoyed me even last February. For one thing, there were lots of extremely personal attacks on Harrison and his intelligence that didn’t sit right with me. More generally, everyone was speaking and writing with so much authority and certainty on how all this will be remembered, and it set off some of my bullshit alarms.

    Luka was being discussed like he was 25 year-old Michael Jordan, and there was no humility with respect to NBA history, and how much of this particular story remained unwritten. There was not much curiosity as to why people like Harrison and Jason Kidd, who were around Luka every day, might have moved on, or the many different outcomes that were—and are!—still on the board.

    Consider the beginning of that Ringer column, which ran after Harrison was fired by the Mavericks in November:

    And just like that, the man behind the dumbest in the history of the NBA is out of a job. Who could’ve seen this coming? Nine months after Nico Harrison decided it was time to get out of the Luka Doncic business—still such a comically unfathomable, shortsighted move—Dallas Mavericks owner Patrick Dumont finally came to the conclusion that enough was enough on Tuesday. 

    That lede echoes the way the NBA media has characterized the trade for the past 12 months. My guess is the story will be understood differently as time passes. Based on what we’ve seen in Los Angeles, there’s a good chance that getting out of the Luka Doncic business will not be seen as shortsighted, and that over time that decision will, in fact, become much easier for everyone to fathom.

    One year later, let’s get into it.

    What’s Going Wrong for Luka and the Lakers?

    Statistically, Doncic is having a phenomenal season. He was a named All-Star starter in the Western Conference earlier this week, and he’s leading the league in scoring averaging 33 points-per-game, 7.5 rebounds, and nearly nine assists. After the Lakers lost in five games in the first round of last year’s playoffs, J.J. Redick challenged him to come back in “championship shape,” and Doncic did just that. A few days before he signed a three-year contract extension worth $165 million, he appeared in Men’s Health looking noticeably slimmer and more toned than last season. A month later, the PR push continued, and he was appearing in Wall Street Journal‘s magazine for a cover story headlined, “Welcome to the Luka Doncic Revenge Tour.”

    The tour got off to a fantastic start. Luka looked and played great, and even without LeBron for the first month, the Lakers started 15-4. Luka looked like an MVP candidate and one of the three best players alive. All of this coincided with a Mavs season that was cratering with Kyrie Irving sidelined and Anthony Davis out of shape and playing sporadically at best; for a few weeks in late October and early November, right before Nico Harrison was fired, the deal to move Doncic absolutely did look like one of the most regrettable decisions in NBA history.

    But the season didn’t end there. Since the 15-4 start for the Lakers, Austin Reaves went down with a calf strain and the Lakers have been flatlining. They’re 10-10 in games Doncic has played since December 1st, and 11-12 overall. Of the losses, 10 of 12 have come by double digits. In other words, when it breaks bad for the Lakers, it gets ugly, and lately, that happens about twice a week. They’re still sixth in the West standings, but just barely. Their point differential is worse than the Charlotte Hornets or Orlando Magic, and only slightly better than the 20-24 Los Angeles Clippers, who were, until recently, in the middle of one of the most depressing seasons in NBA history.

    To be clear, what’s happening here is not primarily Luka’s fault. This is a transitional season in L.A.; the team’s paying $52 million to LeBron James, whose athleticism is gone and who can’t play defense anymore, and who was not offered a contract extension last summer. Last summer the front office wanted to keep its books clean for the 2026 offseason and beyond, so this year’s roster is full of imperfect, stop-gap gambles (Jake LaRavia, Marcus Smart, Deandre Ayton), past experiments that failed to launch (Gabe Vincent, Jaxson Hayes), one-way holdovers from a previous era (Rui Hachimura, Jarred Vanderbilt), cast-off success stories (Nick Smith Jr., Drew Timme?), and Bronny James (Bronny James).

    Despite the balky roster construction, the formula can work for them in the regular season if Doncic plays like an MVP candidate and either LeBron or Reaves is putting up All-NBA numbers. On the other hand, that kind of Reaves or James production is a pretty tough standard to sustain for seven months straight, let alone for multiple playoff rounds. More pertinent for this column, Luka hasn’t looked like an MVP candidate for two months.

    His numbers are a bit misleading. Watch the Lakers, and Doncic is not only not a one-man solution, but he’s often part of the problem for a team that can’t defend, lacks athleticism, and seems to check out when things get hard. His body language isn’t great, and despite the Men’s Health photoshoot from August and all the revenge tour talk, he seems to be out of shape again. This isn’t a surprise to longtime Luka watchers—contrary to some peers who play themselves into shape, Luka’s conditioning often gets worse during the NBA season, while playing a full slate of games. There are various theories as to how that happens and why Luka’s conditioning is such a struggle, and the Mavs reportedly had concerns about his drinking. Whatever the cause, this has always been a question of basic professionalism for a star basketball player, and we’re sort of back to square one.

    The lack of conditioning manifests as some of the softest defense in the NBA, but more concerning for the future, it’s also affecting his offense. He’s never moved off the ball when other players are initiating, and as Ben Golliver pointed out at the Washington Post this week, Doncic is now taking only seven percent of his shots at the rim this season, down from 26 percent during his first All-Star season. Compare that number to Anthony Edwards shots at the rim (20%), Cade Cunningham (17%), Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (19%), Tyrese Maxey (24%), Donovan Mitchell (19%), or even guys like Jamal Murray and Jalen Brunson (13%).

    Doncic isn’t getting downhill and creating advantages the way he used to, or the way all other superstar guards continue to. Instead, watch the Lakers and you’ll see for stepback after stepback after stepback, with some early shot-clock pull-ups and contested midrange shots sprinkled in along the way. It’s a testament to his talent that he can still lead the league in scoring that way, but the numbers mask the reality that 26 year-old Luka is playing like 36 year-old James Harden (13% of shots at the rim this year, down from 25% when he was Luka’s age). His shooting has fallen off, too, which may be another byproduct of poor conditioning—he’s taking ten threes-per-game, many of them lazy shots early in the shot clock, without probing the defense, and he’s hitting 33% on those shots.

    “It’s not just physical shape,” Doncic said when he was asked about Redick’s challenge at the beginning of the season. “It’s mental shape, too.” Well, mentally, in some these losses Luka looks preoccupied with the officials, making this at least the fifth straight season that he’s more dedicated more energy to complaining about calls than he does playing defense.

    Luka is still unbelievably good. He’s a perennial All-Star, and when he’s rolling, there’s nothing a defense can do. He’s terrifying to criticize in print or on podcasts, because on any given night he can look like one of the greatest players of all time and make you look like an idiot. That’s all still true. But none of the concerns above are particularly subjective. It’s just a fact that Doncic is a heliocentric scorer who doesn’t move off the ball, doesn’t play defense, and doesn’t attack the rim anymore, making him heavily reliant on a jumper that comes and goes. His shot selection can be lazy and frustrating, and where a 26 year-old LeBron James would be dominant enough in every phase of the game to make the Lakers quasi-contenders despite the roster’s flaws, Luka is dominant enough to get his numbers despite those flaws. Quasi-contention is looking less likely.

    What Do the Next Five Years Look Like?

    To understand where this may go over the next several years, let’s go back to the 2024 Finals. After leading the Mavs through the West and making it to his first NBA Finals, Doncic was humiliated by the Celtics. Playing through nagging injuries, Luka was exploited over and over again on defense. Rather than a coronation for the player of a generation, that series became a lesson in what championship basketball actually requires. And here again, the loss wasn’t strictly on Luka—Kyrie was terrible—but he was more of a problem than a solution in that series.

    All of this was memorialized by ESPN’s Brian Windhorst, in a bracing and frank answer to Scott Van Pelt after the Mavs lost a decisive Game 3 at home:

    I’m standing here in the Mavericks tunnel, over there is the Celtics tunnel. That’s where the winners are. If Luka’s ever going to be a winner, coming out of this tunnel here, he’s going to have to use what’s happened in this Finals as a learning experience. His defensive performance is unacceptable. He is a hole on the court. The Celtics are attacking him. They are ahead in this series because they have attacked him defensively.

    And you’ve got a situation here where Luka’s complaining about the officiating… [the Mavericks] have begged him. They have talked with him. They have pleaded with him. He is costing his team because of how he treats the officials. He’s a brilliant player, he does so many things well. They are here because of how he did. His performance in this game is unacceptable, and the reason why the Mavericks are not going to win.

    He’s got to get over this. And the fact that he came out after the game and blamed the officials, showed me he’s nowhere close yet. So maybe over the summer, somebody will get to him. Because nobody with the Mavericks, or anybody else in his life, has.

    Rewatching that clip this week, one aspect that I’d forgotten about is that as soon Luka fouled out, he yelled at the ref and begins to make a money gesture with his hands (implying the NBA Finals refs are on the take) before catching himself, at which point he redirected his energy and screamed at the Mavericks coaching staff to “challenge the fucking call!” (which was a pretty clear blocking foul). That split-second is one data point to consider when future generations wonder how in the world the Mavs could have moved on from their franchise player.

    In any event, not much has changed in the 18 months since that clip. Moreover, everything the Celtics did to Luka, the Golden State Warriors also did to Luka during the 2022 Western Conference Finals—targeting him on defense, exploiting his lapses, and annihilating his team across five games.

    That Warriors series wasn’t a turning point, and despite Windhorst’s best efforts, neither was the Celtics series. Luka followed his Finals reality check by showing up out of shape the following year in Dallas, and beginning the season with more awful defense, a Mavs team that sputtered out of the gate, and what was reported to be an 11-day leave of absence from the team to get in shape (followed by Luka’s fourth calf strain in three years).

    The trade last February was supposed to be a turning point, too, and so was a five-game playoff loss to the Timberwolves and a public conditioning challenge from J.J. Redick. In the interest of fairness, we can say the jury is still out as to whether any corners have or will be turned this year. But while we wait, I’d suggest more basketball fans make room for the possibility that this is just who Doncic is going to be. And going forward for the Lakers, building a championship team around him is going to be harder than people realize.

    There are ultimately three big red flags for the future:

    • The roster. Conventional wisdom says the answer to this year’s defensive struggles is to move on from LeBron and then surround Doncic with athletic defenders who can cover for his weaknesses, but those players are hard to find! LaRavia has been fine as a fifth starter, but someone like Ayton’s not good enough to contend with. So, for example, where is the path to a center who can anchor a championship team? And how are you filling the other five rotation spots in a league where Desmond Bane and Mikal Bridges went for a combined nine first round picks? Mark Williams nearly cost two first round picks, and would that investment have made any difference to this year’s Lakers? Clean cap sheet or not, the role players who are going to be available to replace Rui Hachimura and Deandre Ayton aren’t likely to be that much better than Hachimura or Ayton.

    • The window. Winning a title with a roster built around Luka will require luck and skill on the margins, but it will also require Luka to be one of the three best players in the NBA at the center of that mix. And how much longer can the Lakers be certain he’ll be at that level? Because of Luka’s body and how he’s likely to age—and how he’s already aging—the window to capitalize on his talent is now, and within the next few years. For example, it’s already debatable as to whether Cade Cunningham and Anthony Edwards are better than Luka today, but how might those debates look in three years? While Cunningham looks like an All-NBA mainstay, and Edwards has incrementally improved every year he’s been in the NBA, nothing Doncic has shown over the past few years should make the Lakers especially confident in his ability to adapt, improve, take care of his body, and arrive at his 30th birthday playing better than he did at 25. This means that on top of a roster building challenge that looks pretty tricky on any timeline, there may less runway than you’d think to put the pieces in place that make this work at a championship level.

    • The contract. Doncic is under contract for two more seasons after this one, at which point he can opt-out and sign a 5-year, $418 million contract extension that begins in 2028. And as soon as he signs that deal, it becomes even harder for the Lakers to build around him. This particular red flag isn’t really even a reflection on Luka (although I do wonder what $418 million would mean for his conditioning adventures). Building around any player who makes $80 million per year is going to be very difficult, and there are only a handful of players dominant enough to anchor a title contender in that context. The league’s new CBA handicaps teams trying to build around its most bankable stars; this is flat out stupid for the NBA’s interests as a whole, but that’s a separate conversation. What matters here is that it’s a dynamic that’s real and not going away, and it will likely complicate the second half of Luka’s career, particularly if he’s not quite at the peak of his powers.

    The final two concerns there—Luka’s lack of professionalism and what that portends for durability and longevity, coupled with a massive price tag that constrains long term flexibility and leaves no room for error—were why Harrison made the move last February. For everyone else: consider the lack of progress on the court (on defense, dealing with the refs, shot selection that’s getting lazier), and couple that with conditioning that continues to be a problem even at 26 years old. Can anyone really say the decision to not pay him $345 million is “unfathomable”? Shocking, risky, arguably heartless. Sure. But the logic wasn’t particularly revolutionary. Betting on the second half of Luka’s career to be more successful than the first is beginning to look like a losing proposition. Dallas pivoted before the story got there.

    The Legacy of the Worst Trade in NBA History

    Let me reiterate that there’s no version of this story that ends with Nico Harrison vindicated. Landing Cooper Flagg last June was NOT part of the plan, or the vision, and aside from my stipulations at the top, “getting out of the Luka business” is only a reasonable idea if you confine that business strictly to basketball. The problem for Nico and Mavs owner Patrick Dumont is that professional sports teams are on some level a public trust, and decision making has to account for more than just cap sheets and championship odds. The emotional connections Luka had to Dallas and its fans were real, and the investments they’d made in Luka’s story were literal. The pre-trade Mavs had a genuine title contender assembled in Dallas and they owed it to their paying customers to give it a few more shots with Doncic before evaluating what made the most sense for the organization. Trading Luka when they did was actually sort of sociopathic when considered alongside the human connections that make basketball profitable in any local context. Harrison never quite acknowledged those connections, or how wrenching the trade must have been for people who love the Mavs. Repairing that relationship with fans is why he ultimately had to be fired, and destroying it in the first place is why his legacy as crazed GM villain is understandable, if a bit overstated.

    As for the Lakers, regardless of the concerns outlined above, they still make the Luka trade 100 times out of 100. The deal provided an off-ramp from the current era and a bridge to something new. Whether any of this works or not, the possibilities of an era built around Doncic are better than a guaranteed two or three more years of fake contention built around LeBron and AD, particularly since the Mavericks allowed the Lakers to sidestep a 5-7 year journey into the rebuilding wilderness. Also, in the middle of all this, the team was sold at a $1o billion valuation. Thanks Nico!

    As for the trade itself? We’ll see. History is often weirder and more absurd than we can predict, which is why I was annoyed by the hivemind insistence that this deal was an inexplicable disaster destined to be mocked for generations to come. For now, we can say for certain that Nico Harrison was wrong to discount what Luka meant to Dallas. He was wrong to bet that Kyrie Irving could be a proto-Kobe in a post-Luka era. He was wrong to bet on Anthony Davis, who was technically injured when Harrison traded for him and has proceeded to get re-injured in several new ways since last February. Harrison was even wrong, if we’re being comprehensive, to follow the AD acquisition with a bizarre deal to add Caleb Martin, another player who was injured at the time he arrived in Dallas and never moved the needle for the Mavs. Harrison also failed to replace Doncic with another guard, putting a huge burden on Kyrie, who tore his ACL a month after the trade.

    Indeed, Nico was wrong about basically everything. But he might have been right about Luka.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • News in the Era of Irreconcilable Differences

    Spencer Platt/Getty Images

    Today’s focus will be on media and tech, inspired by a podcast on the modern news business from Puck’s Dylan Byers and Jim VandeHei, the co-founder and CEO of Axios. Their conversation hit on AI disruption, Axios differentiation, the Washington Post looking adrift, and it also included a fun CBS take from VandeHei that began with this: “This might not be the most popular opinion with legacy media: I don’t fully get the criticism of Bari [Weiss].”

    We’ll come back to his reasoning, but I do get the criticism of Bari Weiss. More importantly, as someone who works on the internet, I can’t possibly escape it. Weiss was hired to be editor-in-chief of CBS News in October, after Paramount CEO David Ellison paid $150 million in cash and stock to acquire her Substack-hosted independent journalism outlet, The Free Press. Since then, she has become a terrifically polarizing figure who is mocked and reviled by most of the left and nearly all of the legacy media, including some of her subordinates at CBS (who are predictably resistant to change).

    Some of the criticism has been embarrassingly catty, and some of it is blissfully oblivious to irony, like when host Nikki Glaser joked at Sunday’s Golden Globes (on CBS!) that “the award for Most Editing goes to CBS News. Yes, CBS News, America’s newest place to See-BS-news.” It’s unclear whether Glaser is aware that CBS News was at the center of a pretty big controversy after it edited a Kamala Harris answer on Gaza to be less incoherent. Regardless, the joke landed with a theater full of people who loathe Weiss and Ellison (a Trump donor who was also in the audience Sunday night).

    Zooming out, I think a lot of the ire that Weiss attracts is an instinctive response to her Free Press-era goals of providing balanced coverage that takes arguments from both sides seriously and engages with differences of opinion absent emotion and moralizing. That approach threatens a modern liberal orthodoxy that uses moral urgency to enforce ideological conformity and vilify opponents as stupid or evil, tactics that often are employed at the expense of curiosity and humanity, and occasionally put liberals at odds with observable reality. For Weiss, the same heterodox, anti-woke impulses that once made her unpopular with peers at the New York Times make her even more unpopular with the Times and its readers now that she has founded and sold a successful company and finds herself running one of the most powerful legacy news organizations in the world. She is not MAGA, but she’s a liberal who became MAGA-tolerant, which makes her even more threatening to the orthodoxy. Thus the knives are out, literally every day, in print and on X. This week the early ratings for the Weiss-revamped CBS Evening News were widely framed as a 23% drop from the same period last year, which is technically true (Trump was taking over last January, and half of California was on fire), and pretty misleading (after one week, the number is slightly up from CBS’ Q4 rating).

    To be clear, though, I’m not here to defend or earnestly litigate every editorial decision that’s been made under Weiss. I think her justification for holding that 60 Minutes segment was ultimately pretty reasonable, the segment about Marco Rubio memes was tonally incoherent and embarrassing, an internal directive to *be the news* would make me want to quit, and, though it appears “Whiskey Fridays” aren’t a real thing, I did enjoy this 30 Rock meme responding to the idea. But those are just my half-baked takes. I also have questions about whether CBS in its current state has the mettle to hold the current administration to account for clear abuses, though in all honesty, among my concerns with the Trump era, “a lack of institutional media scrutiny” is not one of them.

    Rather than play judge and jury on CBS media ethics and what they mean for Our Democracy, I’m more interested in the broad strokes of what Weiss is trying to do, and why it will almost certainly fail.

    Go back to what David Ellison said when he hired her in October. “Bari is a proven champion of independent, principled journalism, and I am confident her entrepreneurial drive and editorial vision will invigorate CBS News,” his statement read. “We believe the majority of the country longs for news that is balanced and fact-based, and we want CBS to be their home.”

    That tracks with where VandeHei was going in the podcast with Byers. Mind you, VandeHei founded Politico and Axios, two of the most successful news organizations launched this century, and two organizations that built their businesses by spotting gaps in the media marketplace and filling them. Of Weiss, VandeHei noted that the three network news operations have been functionally identical for years, and all of them are likely to be irrelevant within 10 years. He continued:

    It then, as a business proposition, makes a hell of a lot of sense to me that somebody would look at that and say listen, I want to make my own mark. I want to carve out my own space. I want to go where the other two networks aren’t. I want to be appeal to a different part of the country. I want to appeal potentially to a different subset of ideologies. I think if I can do that, and aggregate that, I might be able to build a business that then transitions from a TV-focused institution into something digital…

    She’s come in, she’s trying to take the sensibilities of The Free Press, take the sensibilities that animate her. I don’t think — full disclosure I’ve had a long meal with her, I’ve texted with her, I’ve been on panels with her, I’ve listened to her podcast, I’ve read her stuff — I don’t think she’s a big Trumper! I think she’s a pro-Israel, anti-woke, centrist, or however the hell she would define it. So I don’t think she’s what her critics think she is…

    Could she be leading better? Obviously because there’s a lot of people [at CBS] who seem unhappy with her leadership. But it was inevitably going to be a dramatic, controversial shift. But it’s not a stupid shift, if you’re just looking at it as a business, and you’re looking at market opportunity. There is actually an elegance to what she’s doing.

    All of the above sounds reasonable, but there are two reasons I don’t see this project succeeding at CBS, and both are related to technological shifts that have completely upended media in the past 10 years.

    First, while I appreciate VandeHei for not letting reality derail a perfectly good take, you really could begin and end the conversation about CBS News with his initial premise that the networks as they exist today are in big, likely irreversible trouble. The economics of these businesses simply don’t work the way they once did, and they won’t be around much longer. Consider what we learned when Stephen Colbert’s show was cancelled last summer. Late Night with Stephen Colbert had the best ratings in late night, but the show was losing $40 million-per-year in a space where the total ad spend has been cut in half since 2018. As the Late Night model approaches extinction, then, it stands to reason that an expensive nightly news operation could one day be subject to a similar fate.

    Thus far the biggest losers from the streaming era have been cable channels, but the bleeding won’t stop there. CBS receives retransmission fees from traditional cable and satellite TV subscriptions, which have been in steep decline for more than a decade now. This is the economic gravity that all networks will be fighting against for the next decade: cable subscriptions will continue to decline (costing networks guaranteed money), and as more people gravitate to steaming options, the audience will continue to decline, as well. Then, as audience declines, ad revenue goes with it. Again, none of this is hypothetical, as all of it has already happened throughout the legacy media market. It will get worse, though, and more pronounced. There will be even less of the money that once went to funding inefficient products like sprawling and ambitious network news operations. At a certain point, the survival of NBC News, ABC News and CBS News will depend on the generosity and vanity of their owners, and perhaps the political advantages of retaining those operations despite their losses.

    In that context, the media’s ongoing fascination with Weiss and her agenda reads like an obsession with a team’s new general manger in a league that’s about to go about business. I don’t write that happily; most of these shifts are depressing and create some uncomfortable questions about where Americans will get their news 10 years from now. Nevertheless, the trends are real and worth keeping in mind.

    Even beyond those trends, I’m skeptical about the market opportunity. On this point, it’s actually useful to distinguish between the opportunity VandeHei highlights and what Ellison promised last October. VandeHei talked about appealing to “a different part of the country,” and “a different subset of ideologies.” That makes sense. Ellison, on the other hand, said, “We believe the majority of the country longs for news that is balanced and fact-based, and we want CBS to be their home.”

    The goal at CBS, then, is to appeal to everyone and win with balance. I’m not sure that makes as much sense as what VandeHei was envisioning. And yes, there’s a little bit of irony implicit in my take here. While I would argue a close reading of Weiss’ work over the years and CBS’ work now suggests she’s not the blind MAGA loyalist that her critics allege her to be, it might be better for the CBS business if she were. In that case, there’s at least a clear market (half the United States) and a clear playbook on how to cover the news.

    Instead, what CBS is actually attempting is both laudable and unlikely to be successful. I’m thinking of Dokoupil’s sign-off from Minneapolis last week, broadcasting in the wake of the Renee Good killing, where he mentioned hearing from “protesters who haven’t slept since it happened, who want ICE out now, who don’t like masked men on their streets,” as well as “people who want to see our immigration laws enforced—legally, and peacefully, and with safety for all. Including the officers who in many cases are also parents, themselves.” He continued, saying:

    These are both deeply American sentiments. But our job now is maybe the most American thing of all: it’s to find a way to live with people who are genuinely different from us. To try to be fair to them, and in doing so, to make things better and keep things decent.

    I strongly agree with that sentiment, but the night this segment aired, pretty much everyone who was familiar with the killing of Renee Good had already seen the videos on social media and had their understanding of the moment shaped by people with much stronger opinions than Doukopil. To those people, particularly those on the left who understood that scene to be a case of obscenely bad policing and/or state sponsored murder, a call for civility and decency sounds insufficient and borderline alienating. That sort of disconnect is a problem that will recur as CBS continues its experiment in talking to both sides in America about the news of the day.

    Observing the overwhelming impact of social media on our society feels trite because it’s so obvious, but it can’t be overstated how much algorithmic feeds of commentary on photos, videos, and facts have warped everyone’s perception of the world. Today’s current events are mediated by platforms that incentivize users to frame the news as sensationally as possible, flattening life’s complexity into good and evil, massaging facts without institutional oversight, and forging an era of American life in which our political differences often look irreconcilable. If the wildly divergent understandings of the same tragic videos of Renee Good are not evidence enough of this phenomenon, then consider the lower stakes example of CBS’ aforementioned ratings. Reading a tweet from Variety would have you believe that Bari Weiss and her editorial changes have tanked a quarter of CBS’ audience; read another and the ratings are effectively flat.

    That narrative schizophrenia is everywhere, and particularly acute with anything approaching political news. It’s why I’m skeptical that any attempt to calibrate for balance in this environment will succeed at finding a market full of satisfied customers. There’s no shared understanding of the facts among news consumers. Inconvenient evidence is met with suspicion. Most of America disagrees on what “balanced” should look like on any given night. 

    All of this does, for the record, validate the fundamental concern among Weiss and Ellison critics that whoever has the power to frame the news can skew our understanding of the facts. The problem for Weiss and Ellison, and their media critics, and maybe all of us, is a more fundamental reality of the modern media ecosystem: the content that is actually informing opinions is consumed on social media platforms long before any of it makes it to an evening news broadcast.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • Notes from Schrödinger’s Cold War

    (Photo by XNY/Star Max/GC Images)

    Let’s begin 2026 with a bit of geopolitics, and a note from Dan Wang’s annual year-end letter, musing about the preponderance of Sputnik moments that lead nowhere:

    One of the startling geopolitical moves of the year was how quickly Donald Trump withdrew his ~150 percent tariffs on China. Trump folded not out of beneficence, but because Xi Jinping denied rare earth magnets to most of the world, threatening many types of manufacturing operations. And yet I’m struck by Beijing’s relative restraint. Chinese producers are close to being monopolists not only in rare earths, but also electronics products, batteries, and many types of active pharmaceutical ingredients. In case China denies, say, cardiovascular drugs to the elderly, how long could a state hold out?

    One might have expected the US to have roused itself after this bout of the trade war. But there have been too many declarations of Sputnik Moments without commensurate action. Barack Obama declared a Sputnik with China’s high-speed rail; Mark Warner repeated with Huawei’s 5G; Marc Andreessen called it with DeepSeek. The more that people use the term, the less likely that society spurs itself into taking it seriously.

    That passage resonated for a few reasons. First, it’s just a good observation: there have been lots of purported Sputnik moments in recent years! Second, the collective meltdown in the wake of DeepSeek’s R1 release last year is still amazing to look back on (approaching the one year anniversary!), and as someone who follows China news every week, I can attest that that sort of fevered, existential dread is not rare (Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro and its 7 nm chip inspired a similar wave of alarm across Washington). And finally, paranoid AI and chip hyperbole nowithstanding, Wang asks a serious question that I come back to frequently: if these two countries are trending toward a full decoupling and a prolonged conflict, then why isn’t the US acting like it?

    Aside from rhetorical commitments to restoring domestic industrial capacity and a variety of China Select Committee investigations that tend to go ignored, there’s near-weekly evidence that Congress and the current administration are not entirely serious about leading a whole of nation effort to eliminate regulatory bottlenecks to power abundance, bring pharmaceutical production onshore, mine and refine rare earths, and reduce the leverage that China has over the U.S. economy in about a dozen different areas. Absent solutions on any of those fronts, some of which will take years, Trump couldn’t even ban TikTok. Then, just before Christmas, the U.S. greenlit the sale of high-end Nvidia chips that could help Chinese companies narrow the gap with U.S. competitors in AI. If successfully navigating a prolonged competition with China requires not only acknowledging said competition but actually making the sacrifices necessary to win it, one could be forgiven for reading the news over the past 10 years and concluding that America simply doesn’t have the mettle to prioritize long term national interests over short term private interests (or political incentives).

    Wang, who earlier in 2025 penned the New York Times bestseller Breakneck, about China’s quest to engineer the technological future, published his year-end letter on New Year’s Day. Then, 36 hours after reading his warnings about American complacency, I opened WhatsApp to find a flurry of messages and tweets about a Delta Force operation to capture and exfiltrate Nicolas Maduro from Caracas, fly him to Manhattan to face prosecution on drug charges, and replace him with a government that’s beholden to the United States.

    Now when I re-read Wang asking whether America can rouse itself to respond to competitive threats from its greatest adversaries, I can’t help but wonder whether the world just watched the U.S. provide an answer.

    What the U.S. Wants in Venezuela

    Attempting to parse the logic and implications of this operation is not easy, and possibly ill-advised. The facts on the ground will continue to evolve, as will our understanding of last week’s operation. With that caveat noted, and having just recorded a Sharp China episode that was largely focused on China’s reaction to these developments, I’ll work from what’s known today and share why I’m encouraged by what the U.S. is attempting here.

    First, there’s the threshold matter of who’s driving these policies and what that means for how they’re perceived. Let’s stipulate the Trump administration says and does a number of things that are unbecoming of the Presidency. I won’t list my personal grievances and specific examples of the lack of humanity, judgment and/or tact of the current administration, but suffice to say I understand why anyone would be exhausted and deeply uncomfortable with this presidency. On the other hand, where Trump critics tend to err is in the assumption that because he is often careless and objectionable, everything he does is careless and objectionable. If you start from the premise that Trump is simply a boorish moron who’s unfit to hold power in any context, there’s a risk that confirmation bias will distort the analysis of whether any of his policies are reasonable or effective. This leads to buying into resistance fan fiction like “Trump didn’t support an incredibly risky, full scale regime change because of bitterness over the Nobel Peace Prize,” and, a more relevant risk for his political opponents, it leads to opposing a good number of broadly popular policies and initiatives.

    Going the the other direction here, and treating Trump like a historical figure worth thinking about with a bit more intellectual rigor, one of the most perceptive (and concise!) reads on Trump-era policy came early last year from a Bank of Japan Deputy Governor named Himino Ryozo. Remarking on tariffs and how Japan should view the U.S. under Trump, Himino began his comments by saying:

    If I could offer some personal and tentative reflections, I would argue that there are three characteristics that define the current administration’s way of thinking.

    First, the administration adopts a holistic approach and treats political, economic, and cultural matters, as well as domestic and international affairs, as integral parts of a single, inseparable policy agenda.

    Second, while it is highly flexible in its tactical decisions, switching its approaches as situations evolve and choosing when to press ahead, pause, or make temporary retreats, the administration remains persistent in its strategic choices about what it ultimately aims to attain.

    Third, it is unfettered from conventional wisdom and orthodoxy, focuses on facts that define the locus and sources of power, and explores opportunities that have thus far not been exploited.

    The analysis above applies pretty cleanly to the news of this week. I don’t have a security clearance, but it seems likely that U.S. national interests driving engagement in Venezuela are related to countering transnational narcotics gangs, controlling the flow of oil, securing access to critical minerals, power projection, and national security. The U.S. was negotiating a peaceful Maduro exit to Turkey in late December; when that offer was rejected, there was a pivot.

    Maduro was a repressive, corrupt dictator who oversaw human rights violations and suffering on a mass scale. My own lesson in that respect came when I saw the Venezuela’s basketball team at the Rio Olympics in 2016 and met a Venezuelan fan who told me through a translator that he was filling his suitcase with medicine to bring back to his his mother and grandmother, all while the team played in Rio amid a widespread hunger crisis back home (and spoke very carefully about it). There have been two rigged elections since then, and removing Maduro now is hopefully a step in the right direction for the Venezuelan people.

    Still, there are corrupt, inhumane leaders all over the world. As to the American interests that justified capturing this one, with one of the most audacious U.S. military operations of my lifetime, Marco Rubio appeared on “Meet The Press” this week and said the following:

    “What we’re not going to allow is for the oil industry in Venezuela to be controlled by adversaries of the United States. You have to understand, why does China need their oil? Why does Russia need their oil? Why does Iran need their oil? They’re not even in this continent. This is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live, and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors and rivals of the United States.”

    It would be easy to focus on the first half of the answer—oil! Iraq part two!—and miss the far more important note on Venezuela as a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States. By many accounts, that’s precisely what Venezuela had become.

    For example, this article from Renegade Resources was compelling, outlining the extensive ties between Venezuela and Russia, which sells arms to Venezuelans and trains them (“Over 120 Russian troops operate in Venezuela under Lieutenant General Oleg Makarevich, leading what Ukrainian intelligence identifies as the “Equator Task Force.’”); Iran, which sold even more arms to Venezuela and has an operational presence in the country (“Documented Iranian weapons transfers to Venezuela since 2020 include Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicles with 2,000 kilometer operational range, sufficient to reach any target in Florida. Venezuela has publicly displayed these systems in military parades from 2021 through 2023.”); and then China, which has flooded the country with investment and cornered the market on critical minerals extraction (“Western nations seeking to diversify away from Chinese processing looked to Venezuela, only to discover Chinese buyers already controlled extraction operations. This is strategic encirclement where China dominates both global processing infrastructure and alternative source extraction”). There was also a note this week from former Biden NSC official Rush Doshi, who wrote that “The PRC has long pursued military sites in Latin America,” and that “prominent PRC figures confirmed to me directly [one desired site] was Venezuela.”

    This overview of Unmanned and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles highlights another potentially urgent security risk, noting that Venezuela’s coastline “sits close enough to the Panama Canal, Gulf shipping lanes, and cable approaches that UUVs can operate without long transits draining their batteries.” Undersea drones were recently deployed to great effect in the Ukraine war and are incredibly difficult to defend against. The hypothetical risk of deploying them from Venezuela to disrupt U.S. internet cables and shipping lanes illustrates the more concrete problem with allowing hostile foreign adversaries to deeply embed military assets in a country within the Western Hemisphere. If the U.S. intends to defend Taiwan, or Ukraine, or fight battles anywhere else in the world, it’s a potentially history-altering liability if China, Russia and/or Iran have the capability to paralyze the U.S. economy from South America (and exhaust U.S. resources addressing the problem).

    Finally, while the ultimate value of Venezuelan oil to the United States is debatable, the value of that oil to China is more interesting. To wit, restricting oil exports to Cuba could spell disaster for the communist regime within months, which would be bad news for Russia and China, both of whom maintain extensive signals intelligence operations in the country. Additionally, this highly technical post about oil composition and global refining capacity argues that if U.S.-aligned producers in Venezulea stop shipping oil to China, over the long term, it could force China into a single point of dependence on Iran for certain critical oil imports (Canada is potentially a player here too, while reliance on the Iranian regime is increasingly looking like a pretty big wild card). On the other hand, if US-aligned producers in Venezuela do ship to China, but retain the power to pause those shipments, that creates leverage over the Chinese industrial complex that mimics rare earth export controls and creates “a very real wartime advantage against China.”

    That post concludes by observing of the strategic advantage, “It’s likely the US does not recognize this fully. They just wanted China OUT.” Which brings us to a headline from Tuesday night—Trump demands Venezuela kick out China and Russia, partner only with US on oil: EXCLUSIVE.

    What the US does and doesn’t recognize about the scale of its opportunity is an open question, and there’s room to debate how much strategic leverage America will actually gain. Regardless, it certainly looks like the U.S. is in a better strategic position today than it was a week ago. The same cannot be said for Russia, Iran, or the CCP, which had an “all-weather strategic partnership” with the Maduro regime, had Chinese delegates meeting with the former president hours before he was captured, and is now left hoping that the U.S. continues to sell them oil.

    The Cold War That Was Never Announced

    Many of my millennial peers processed the news last weekend and immediately thought about the Iraq War. I get that. Those were formative political years for an entire generation that was then conditioned to be skeptical of military engagement specifically and Republicans generally. None of us have lived in a world where there’s active tension with rival superpower. Moreover, to anyone who’s not been paying close attention to the threats facing the U.S. in any wartime scenario, and the extent to which those threats have expanded and evolved over the past 10 years, a Delta Force helicopter invasion to capture a world leader on foreign soil, in violation of International Law, sounds like something that would be too stupid even for Dick Cheney, but might be pushed by Donald Rumsfeld.

    Also, let’s go back to Sputnik. The reason there’s never been a Sputnik moment that resonates with the mainstream is because most people don’t even know the U.S. is in the middle of another cold war. David Wallace-Wells had a good column about this dynamic for the New York Times last year, noting that “part of how Americans made sense of their rivalry with the Soviet Union was through popular culture,” while “this time, there has been essentially none of that — no real effort in Hollywood to make use of high-stakes global conflict even as a narrative crutch.” But of course Hollywood’s not doing that; Zootopia 2 just made a billion dollars thanks to the Chinese market. And in all seriousness, given the economic interdependence of the US and China, there are lots of incentives to not declare a cold war, mobilizing the entire United States public behind efforts that will take years, while tanking the retirement accounts of 100 million Americans in the meantime.

    All this makes for a bewildering landscape in which the U.S. is on one hand taking certain steps that seem reckless, overtly aggressively, and unprecedented in the modern world, and on the other hand conducting business mostly as usual. The Administration itself does not make it any easier; unlike the Bush administration pushing Yellow Cake stories in 2002, none of the asymmetric threats described above have been cited publicly, while Trump talks often about his “great relationship with Xi Jinping.” After meeting Xi in November he referred to the US and China as the “G2” and wrote, “This meeting will lead to everlasting peace and success. God bless both China and the USA!” He’s set to visit Beijing in March, and U.S. countermeasures on China are paused indefinitely in service of a trade war truce to keep rare earths flowing for at least the next 10 months.

    It’s certainly possible that Trump’s critics are right and he is a credulous fool, easily flattered, destined to start pointless wars, destroy relationships with allies, and forge a grand bargain that hands China control of Taiwan. Chinese scholars certainly hope so. My guess, though, is that those assessments will ultimately look facile. Trump’s words have successfully mollified the Chinese and kept rare earths flowing to U.S. industry, but last weekend’s actions reflect an American security apparatus that understands the scale of its modern threats and the urgency of addressing them.

    Here’s to betting that there will be more moves that bend the norms of the postwar liberal order but nevertheless advance American interests in ways that will benefit successive administrations from either party. As for Venezuela, it’s still early. It will be several years before we know whether any of this was truly successful. In the meantime what we can say for certain is that last weekend’s operation an attempt at fortifying regional security that may weaken some of America’s greatest adversaries. If not quite a race to the moon, it was the latest reminder that we’re all living in a different world these days.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • Five Questions About Victor Wembanyama

    (Photo by Ronald Cortes/Getty Images)

    The holidays are here, and today I’d like to keep it light and talk hoops. Specifically, the most interesting story in basketball this year: Victor Wembanyama and the San Antonio Spurs. Here are some notes, and five questions on my mind, as I watch this story unfold in 2025 and 2026.

    1. How Great Is He Right Now?

    Last weekend, ESPN asked Wembanyama who is the best player in the NBA, and he said: “Jokic is the best offensive player… I don’t think he’s the best player. I think it’s between Giannis and Shai. When I come back on the court, I think it’ll be me.” I rolled my eyes. He delivered that line having played only 12 of the 24 Spurs games at that point, and after missing half of last season, as well. He’s never made the playoffs. Players with that kind of track record can’t call themselves the best player in the NBA.

    And yet… Mere hours after I saw that clip, Wemby returned from injury, sat the entire first quarter of San Antonio’s Cup semifinal against the 24-1 Thunder, then finally entered the game with San Antonio down 11 at the beginning of the second quarter. Everyone knows what happened next, but I’ll repeat it here because I’m still a little bit amazed.

    The first quarter showcased everything the league has been this year—OKC on its way to another 20-point win—and then the script was flipped, showing us what the NBA story might be in the near future. Wemby met one of the most dominant regular season teams of all time and made them look mortal. Offensively, he was good, settling down against OKC pressure, getting to the line 12 times, and generating all kinds of open looks for teammates (the rest of the Spurs were great as well). Defensively, he was laughably dominant, almost single-handedly short circuiting anything the Thunder tried to do inside the arc. Altogether it was a reminder that Wembanyama side-eyeing Jokic’s dominance (“best offensive player”) may be a corny look for a player who’s never won anything meaningful, but strictly as a technical matter, even if “best” is subjective, “making a bigger individual impact than any player in the league” is not far off.

    Then came Tuesday and the NBA Cup Final against the Knicks, where it was Mitchell Robinson making Wembanyama look mortal. Wemby, who played that night having lost his grandmother earlier in the day, never found his rhythm offensively and had no answers as New York took control in the fourth quarter. The Knicks, and particularly the 7’1 journeyman Robinson, punished San Antonio on the glass down the stretch. Offensively, Wemby missed all four of his shots in the fourth quarter (including three missed threes). He finished his 25 minutes with the worst plus-minus on either team (-18), spawning fair questions from the viewing public:

    And look, this is part of the fun! There’s no definitive answer to “how great is he right now?”; instead, there are fits and starts as he navigates the journey from preposterously talented prodigy to literal MVP candidate. Some nights all the pieces click and your mind goes to crazy places, others he’s getting justifiably clowned on Twitter. He’s somewhere between the 4th and 11th-best player in the league. The Spurs have been as successful without him this season as they have been with him. On defense, I’m pretty sure he’s the most dominant player I’ve ever seen. He covers so much ground with his length and his feet that he shrinks the court for opposing teams, taking away shots in the midrange and at the rim. He rarely fouls, and during the NBA Cup final on Tuesday, Nate Duncan noted “the Knicks are 6-17 in the paint with Victor on the floor. 12-15 when he’s off.” It’s like that every game!

    Offense is more of an adventure. He’s made real progress this season and kicked his addiction to threeslast year he took 8.8 threes-per-game and 4.1 free throws, and this year those numbers are inverted (4.5 threes, 7.7 free throws). But he still struggles with physicality. His shot selection is inconsistent. He should be a play-finisher who terrorizes teams in the pick-and-roll and lives at the rim, and while he’s done more of that this year, just as often he’ll try to initiate offense on his own, stop the ball, and end up settling for contested jumpers. He’s playing much smarter offense than last year, but it’s still not clear he knows where he wants to go on that end, and how he wants to score.

    So yes, “best player in the league” is still a ways off, mainly because earning that label means doing it every night — and, more importantly, in the playoffs. That’s where Jokic and Shai have been. But while we wait for Wemby to get there, watching him try to put the pieces together is the best show the league has. He’s as dominant on defense as Jokic or Steph are on offense. On the other end, the sample size of Wemby playing meaningful offense for a winning team is small enough to make every new game interesting. How much better can he get? How will he fit with capable teammates? How will he respond in the clutch? I look forward peeling that onion for the next five months.

    2. Can He Stay Healthy?

    One more thing on the “best player” quote. Consider the guys who have actually been in the mix to wear that crown over the last 30 years. Jordan, Duncan, Shaq, Kobe, LeBron, Stephall of them were borderline bionic and enjoyed near-perfect health when they had a credible claim to being the best player in the NBA. The same is true for SGA and Jokic now, even as the rest of the league goes down in a heap of adductor injuries and calf strains.

    Wemby is listed at 7’4, may be closer to 7’6, and the track record of players that tall staying healthy is not great. Wemby, himself, suffered a stress fracture in his hip before he came to the NBA, was mostly healthy his rookie year, missed half of last season with a scary blood clot injury, and has missed half of this season (so far) with a calf strain. I didn’t want to foreground this question and be a buzzkill, but it’s the single most important question for the future of Wembanyama, and to a lesser extent the NBA. My fear here is that humans weren’t meant to be this tall and move the way Wemby wants to, and therefore weird, seemingly inexplicable injuries will recur, and all the talk of who the Spurs should trade for, how he should play, a potential rivalry with OKCtopics I’ve loved discussing all yearwill come to look like a lot of wasted energy.

    The worst case scenario for basketball fans is one in which Wemby does grow into the most dominant player alive, he’s ranked atop every list, and we only get to see him play games about 60 percent of the time. The best theoretical player alive. And that scenario, if not necessarily likely, is a possibility that can’t be totally discounted until he plays a full season and full playoff run without any major hiccups. So here’s to knocking on wood.

    3. Is Peak Wemby a Hero or a Villain?

    It may seem crass to consider vilifying a 21 year-old kid who’s impossibly gifted, hard-working by all accounts, and unusually thoughtful and articulate (in a second language). But hear me out. He opened last year by saying of certain NBA stars, “I’m just not sure they deserve it. Like they don’t seem like they put as much work in as I thought.” Earlier this week, he explained that he plays more “correct” basketball than everyone else, in his opinion:

    In modern basketball, we see a lot of brands of basketball that don’t offer much variety in dangers they propose to the opponents. Lots of isolation ball and, sometimes, kind of forced basketball. We try to propose a brand of basketball that can be described as more old school sometimes; the Spurs way as well. So it’s tactically more correct basketball, in my opinion.

    Of the Knicks, he said, “They don’t play a brand of basketball as sophisticated as the Miami Heat or the Thunder.” Rather than give the people what they want (more shots at OKC’s foul-baiting), he appears to have appointed himself basketball and work ethic ombudsman. Great.

    No one is saying Wemby is a bad person, but is he annoying? He’s definitely not cool. He’s lecturing people, philosophizing, performatively reading books in the locker room (and getting mocked by Jokic), and generally coming off like someone who’s very invested in seeming smart. Where Anthony Edwards exudes charm, Wemby exudes smarm. Or, put differently, Wemby is quite clearly French (derogatory).

    There have been lots of questions about whether America will eventually embrace a 7’4 international star as the best player in the NBA, and how that might impact of the popularity of the league. What I have been wondering about for the past two yearsWemby interviews have been a tough hang for a while nowis whether Peak Wemby would better for the NBA’s ratings if most of America agreed that he’s annoying and began rooting for him to fail. This may sound like a counterintuitive marketing strategy, but the league was very popular when LeBron went to Miami in 2010! It’s worth considering: as the Spurs become more of a mainstay in the years to come, would the league be better off if Wemby were delivering press conferences exclusively in French (because it’s a superior language),1 and more explicitly hating on the work ethic and basketball IQ of American players? And, of course, telling his critics that win or lose, he’s going to the Côte d’Azur, and they all have to go back to their sad, fast food-filled lives.

    The counter here is two-fold. First, Wemby at his absolute best is so electric that he’s closer to Steph Curry in 2016 than LeBron James in 2010. He’s hitting shots from everywhere, smothering offenses by himself on the other end, and gliding around looking like a prototype that’s never been seen before. The coolest experience in sports is when a player or a big game is preceded by crazy amounts of hype and anticipation, and then the player or game actually exceeds the hype in the moment. When Wemby’s offense clicks, that’s what happens. It’s very difficult to root against, and more aesthetically thrilling than, say, Shaq in 2001, or even LeBron at his peak.

    Second, I’m not sure the NBA media ecosystem has the capacity to lean into a villain framing in the modern era. It’s been 15 years since the Decision and the resulting backlash, and lots of NBA media is still over-correcting for that environment, afraid to criticize players, and lecturing fans who do. That’s before you get to the inevitable neuroses about criticizing a foreign player, even though, to be clear, this is all in good fun and not that serious (as if the French don’t roll their eyes at Americans).

    We’ll see where we end up. For now, Wemby is magnetic as a relative unknown. Once his game becomes more defined, and assuming his team becomes more dominant and inescapable, I’m very curious to see how the public responds, how Wemby himself changes, and what it all means for the league.

    4. Should the Spurs Have Drafted Kon Knueppel?

    Over the summer I argued on Greatest of All Talk that the Spurs should have drafted Kon Knuppel over Dylan Harper with the number two pick in June’s Draft. I thought Knueppel had a higher ceiling than people realized, Harper’s ceiling wasn’t meaningfully different, and Knueppel was a much better fit with the roster in San Antonio, and Wemby, in particular. Three months into the NBA season, that take is… still very much alive!

    Knueppel went fourth in the draft, and he’s been outstanding in Charlotte, effective on and off the ball. He’s the front runner for rookie of the year. Harper, to be clear, has been nearly as impressive in San Antonio. He snakes his way to the rim with ease. He’s finishing in the paint like a player who’s been in the league for 10 years. He’s good on defense. He clearly has All-Star upside. My question with him on the Spurshow effective can he be if he’s sharing on-ball responsibilities alongside De’Aaron Fox and Stephon Castle?has been answered, and the early returns are encouraging. He looks comfortable on and off the ball, and he’s putting pressure on the defense in all kinds of ways. No matter what happens from here, this wasn’t an Oden-Durant situation; Harper is already good, and could be great.

    I do still wonder about the roster construction. The Spurs were winning without Wemby (during his calf strain hiatus) playing a frenetic offense built around Fox, and adding Harper and Castle to that mix is a perfect fit for that kind of relentless, attacking style. Having multiple ball-handlers who can go downhill and get to the rim is a good thing, as evidenced by both teams in last year’s Finals. If the goal is optimizing Wemby’s offense, though, it would be nice to run pick-and-rolls where defenses actually have to fear the guard taking pull-up threes, as opposed to hedging onto Wemby and making his life more difficult. Or, when Wemby kicks out of double teams for the next five years, it would be nice to have Knueppel there — shooting 40.5% from 3 on 8.5 attempts per game — instead of Harper, who’s currently shooting 26% from three on 2.5 attempts per game.

    It’s entirely possible that Knueppel plateaus in Charlotte over the next year or two, while Harper improves as a shooter and becomes an All-NBA sidekick throughout Wemby’s prime. Obligatory qualifiers aside, though, Knueppel has been good enough to make this a killer “what if?” that will be fun to track for the next several years, particularly if San Antonio’s halfcourt offense looks as clunky in close games as it did in the fourth quarter against the Knicks Tuesday night.

    5. What’s the Ceiling in San Antonio This Year?

    I love watching Harper and Castle slither around (Harper) and barrel through (Castle) NBA defenses. Those two alone have made me a Spurs fan this year, while Fox looks like an All-Star again and has raised the floor for everyone. Watching the Spurs on the right night will give you shades of the young OKC teams with Durant, Harden, Ibaka, and Westbrook (Luke Kornet is bizarro Perk here). And like that OKC team in 2010, my bet is that for all the fun over the past few weeks, this is a team that ends the year with a valiant first round loss. San Antonio is too small and too thin on the wings, and while Harrison Barnes is punching above his weight in Year 13, the returns there will likely diminish as the months pass. When it matters, Fox can only do so much, and Wemby is not ready for crunch time possessions on offense.

    On the other hand, Wemby in year three is already so dominant on defense that he will level the playing field in any playoff series the Spurs enter. Also, he’s played a total of 14 games this season and only played 25 minutes in San Antonio’s loss Tuesday night. What does his offense look like with a full four months of regular season games next to Fox, Castle, and Harper? And if he gets 20-30% more comfortable by the end of the year, how might that change the equation? The most purely enjoyable phase of sports fandom is not actually the prime of a great player or a special nucleus, but that period just before their dominance is established, when expectations are minimal, and the possibilities are endless.

    Spurs fans should enjoy that ride for the next few months. The rest of the basketball world will be right there with them.


    What I’m Reading This Week

    This is my first NBA article in more than a month, and I’d be remiss if I didn’t note that the proposal from my last piece, a fix for the NBA Cup and the parity era, would have ended with the Knicks getting the number one pick, the Spurs getting number five, OKC getting 10, and Orlando getting 15. This would have been a phenomenal outcome for the league, adding one more young star to Wemby’s team, putting the number one pick in New York City, and making this week’s Cup Final the biggest story in sports. Maybe next year!

    As for the writing everywhere else… Vacation is approaching for most of us, so I’ve included a few more recommendations than usual this week.

    On that note, we’re done for the next few weeks. Thanks for reading, and see you in 2026.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.

    1. Credit to GOAT listener Bryan M. for this wonderfully obnoxious suggestion. ↩︎


  • Netflix and the Flattening of Everything

    Mario Tama/Getty Images

    A few months ago, about 30 minutes after Ben Thompson and I finished recording a Sharp Tech segment about Spotify making video episodes of The Rewatchables podcast exclusive to YouTube, I realized I’d missed a fundamental irony looming over the news: Netflix, new home of The Rewatchables, is the same company that effectively killed the rewatchable movie.

    That’s not a condemnation, but simply a fact. The emergence of Netflix and its business model accelerated the demise of Blockbuster and the DVD/VHS market, which fundamentally altered the risk tolerance of the movie business. Here, I’ll lean on an email from a Sharp Tech listener named Steven that came in earlier this year. Please forgive the long excerpt, but he nails it:

    In the 80s and 90s, movies had significantly less dependency on their box office take because they would usually make a larger component of their overall revenue in the home video market as well as being shown on broadcast/cable TV. Blockbuster’s default revenue share of a movie rental was in the 40-50% range depending on the studio, which meant the post-box office revenue for a “single watch” was considerably higher than what studios see today from the streaming services. The revenue from a “true fan” was multiples higher.

    The death of that market has produced two parallel problems that are killing creativity within the industry. First, the ARPU has dropped considerably, and while the internet has enabled a much broader global market, that isn’t an asset unless you’re telling stories that appeal to a global market – as an example, I’m not sure what the appeal of Hoosiers is outside the US. That cuts off a considerable number of stories from being made right there.

    Second, you either make or break a movie in the box office exclusively today, and misses are catastrophic. As a result, you have to spend enormous money on marketing and then you throw in your famous recognizable actor/actress which command high salaries, and if you’re going to spend that much on marketing and Ryan Gosling, you might as well spend more on the rest of the movie. As a result, the cost of making movies has skyrocketed and risk tolerance is at an all time low.

    In the past, a movie could flop in the box office, find an audience in rental, get a boost from TV showings on niche cable networks aligned to its core audience, get a boost from the Oscars, etc and make its money back over years with multiple swings of the bat at lower cost marketing campaigns. This was essential because – how do you market a movie like Shawshank Redemption perfectly when you have exactly one shot at it? We’re now in a world where targeted marketing should be able to find exactly the right million viewers for a movie, but the revenue mechanisms we have in place don’t function for midsized audiences. As a result, we get YouTube content and big budget films.

    Matt Damon has made the same argument point in a 76-second interview clip that goes viral on X every few months. The specific type of movies that suffered in this boom-or-bust ecosystem are the bread and butter of The Rewatchables: mid-budget movies that are kinda idiosyncratic, with great actors and unique stories that will pull you back in if you happen across them on cable. For example, I loved recent Rewatchables episodes on 1992’s Sneakers (budget $35 million), 1996’s Tin Cup ($45 million), 1995’s Quiz Show ($31 million) and 2005’s Two for the Money ($35 million, and an inspired choice from the Rewatchables editorial team). I also had a great time re-watching 1995’s Crimson Tide on Sunday ($53 million), and that’s another movie that’s never made today (and no one ever settles the question of whether Lipizzaner stallions are from Spain or Portugal).

    Not all of those movies are classics, but they’re fun and weird and interesting in a way that today’s movies usually aren’t. And as for true classics, you can go right down the list with some of the most iconic movies in history. Would Hoosiers be made today? A Few Good Men? The Firm? Jerry Macguire? Smart, ambitious, character-driven content for adults doesn’t really have a place at modern movie theaters anymore (but we do get eight Mission: Impossible movies).

    This isn’t to say that sort of content stopped being made. Many of the mid-budget projects made for adults are now made as TV shows. Some of them are great, and many of them are just fine. I watch most of them. Re-watching those shows, though, and reliving the character arcs, twists and emotional payoffs of stories I remember fondly, requires committing 10 to 20 hours of my time. I’ll make that commitment for certain exceptional shows (The Wire, The Americans, Veep, Eastbound and Down, Industry, Le Bureau), but I can’t imagine finding the time to revisit a much bigger universe of pretty good or even very good shows that I genuinely enjoyed and will probably never see again (Game of Thrones, Mr. Robot, The Honourable Woman, Narcos, Billions, The Night Manager, Yellowstone, Orphan Black, Killing Eve, House of Cards, and dozens of others I’m forgetting).

    The problem with this landscape for audiences is that the current environment renders even the best content disposable and less meaningful than it used to be. The industry that people love, or at least that I have always loved, was centered on shared experiences in theaters, and films that could be revisited for years to come, reviving all the memories, unintentional comedy, and unanswerable questions that have made The Rewatchables one of the most successful podcasts on the planet. That doesn’t really exist anymore. Even the fun genre movies that do get made (2023’s Air would be a decent Rewatchables candidate) are now competing in tiles, instead of re-running on channels, and are quickly overwhelmed by a river of new content that will itself be forgotten as soon as it’s watched.

    For streaming services, meanwhile: If educated adults and families who pay $17.99/month for services like Netflix are enjoying new scripted content, but don’t have time to revisit any of it, those platforms need to make, license or acquire a lot more content to keep people watching. Which brings us to this week’s merger news.

    Why Netflix Wants Warner Brothers

    Netflix’s proposed acquisition of Warner Brothers Discovery is already fraught with peril, with inevitable regulatory challenges looming, and continued bids from Paramount that may force Netflix to continue a bidding war for months, an adventure that may not appeal to Netflix shareholders. Let’s assume, though, that the deal were to go through as announced last Friday: Netflix buys Warner Brothers for $72 billion and assumes $11.1 billion in debt while taking on $50 billion in new debt, all to to finance the purchase of a studio that has been sold four times in the past 25 years, in a succession of deals that ended in varying degrees of disaster. Given the history of media mergers at this scale, why would Netflix risk regulatory scrutiny and a whole new round of debt skepticism to go this direction anyway?

    In short, acquiring Warner Brothers is both an offensive move that would dramatically enhance Netflix’s offering to customers, and a defensive move that would eliminate any new competition in the paid streaming space, possibly forever. To the former point, Warner Bros. provides exactly the sort of library that Netflix needs in order to keep audiences engaged, and no, it’s not a coincidence that almost all of this content dates to an era before Netflix upended the entertainment ecosystem. One baseline irony of the deal is that Netflix has been so successful at disrupting audience consumption habits that its own original programming efforts have almost universally failed to develop durable, franchise appeal in the modern era; so much so that the company is now paying a $72 billion premium to acquire content that was mostly made 25 years ago.

    Regardless, Warner Bros. movies and television shows provide some of the most attractive IP available anywhere, eliminating Netflix’s need to license shows like Friends, ER, or The Big Bang Theory, while also opening a world of original franchises to push to global audiences and potentially leverage for new content (e.g., Batman, Superman, Game of Thrones, Harry Potter, The Matrix). HBO could be offered as a premium tier of Netflix, and its staggering collection of scripted TV hits could be marketed to a bigger audience than HBO Max ever had. Netflix already has 100 million more subscribers than its next-closest competitor, with a much lower churn rate than anyone in the space. This deal would transform the company from last year’s Thunder (68-14, champions) to this year’s Thunder (24-1, won by 49 points Wednesday night).

    Part of that story, of course, would be killing off one of its chief competitors in HBO Max (currently the fourth-largest streaming service), while preventing Paramount or Comcast from leveraging HBO and Warner Brothers content to mount a real challenge in the future. This is the defensive appeal.

    A deep reservoir of Warner Brothers scripted content affords Netflix not only the ability to tap a much richer vein of IP on its own platform, but also to potentially withhold that content from competing platforms, making it that much harder for any other service to make inroads into the future streaming market. As Ben Thompson observed of this possibility on Stratechery this week:

    [I]t seems likely that Netflix will, over time, make Warner Bros. content, particularly its vast libraries, exclusive to Netflix, instead of selling it to other distributors. This will be economically destructive in the short term, but it very well may be outweighed by the aforementioned increase in value that Netflix can drive to established IP, giving Netflix more pricing power over time (which will increase regulatory scrutiny)

    Pricing power is the endgame for both the offensive and defensive logic of this merger. A Netflix subscription was $7.99/month a decade ago, and it’s $17.99/month today. Better content and fewer credible alternatives for customers will make it much easier for Netflix to ratchet that number up every eighteen months for the foreseeable future.

    Now, to the extent Hollywood is currently in the throes of an industry-wide panic over the possibility of a Netflix-Warner Bros. merger (complete with a great Variety cover this week), that, too, is a pricing power story, but the concern is not limited to customers.

    Will Netflix Get Warner Brothers?

    Senator Mike Lee chairs the Senate subcomittee on antitrust, and he said this week that the proposed deal raises “about seven different red flags.” For one, as the Entertainment Strategy Guy observed earlier this week, the merger would flunk any consumer welfare analysis undertaken by a court, because it’s likely to reduce the supply of scripted Hollywood content (bad for consumers), and lead to higher prices (ditto). The latter point was addressed in the previous section, while the former is simply a matter of common business sense. Netflix is buying a studio that makes TV and movies to pair with its original programming operations. If the deal closes, one platform can only serve so much content (Netflix has been investing in fewer original programs every year since 2022), and audiences will almost certainly get fewer total TV shows and movies than they did when two studios were making content for two different platforms. That will also mean fewer jobs in Hollywood, and reduced bargaining power for the writers, directors, actors and crew members still working.

    The law at issue in a Netflix case is probably going to be Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which is a more liberal standard than the Sherman Antitrust Act and bars “acquisitions where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” Assuming the deal is challenged, the legal question will turn on how any court defines the market where competition is allegedly at risk. And to be sure, Netflix has a colorable argument that any market analysis should not be limited to premium streaming services (where Netflix dominates), but should include YouTube and liner television networks. As co-CEO Ted Sarandos argued to President Trump this fall, Netflix is “the fifth-or sixth-biggest distributor on TV,” compared to YouTube and a variety of cable conglomerates. Buying Warner Brothers “would make the company roughly the size of YouTube,” in Sarandos’ rendering, while analysts point out that Disney “represents more TV time spent (10%) than Netflix does today (8%), and is still larger even with HBO added (8% + 1.3%).”

    As Netflix’s other CEO, Greg Peters, explained to investors this week:

    We just want to really bring the facts to this conversation because if you look at Nielsen, this is Nielsen number of view hours on TV in the U.S. … We’re sixth in the current ranking right now. We’re behind YouTube. We’re behind Disney. We’re behind NBCUniversal. We’re behind Fox. We’re behind Paramount. And then if you say, ‘Okay, well, you’re going to go buy HBO and HBO Max, put that viewing on the list,’ this is what that would look like. We go from 8% of view hours today in the United States to 9%. We’re still behind YouTube at 13%. And potentially worth noting that we would be behind what would be if Paramount combined with WBD, them at 14%. We think there’s a really strong, fundamentals-based case for why regulators should approve this deal.

    The narrative sleight of hand on display there is Netflix comparing itself to completely different businesses, with different cost structures and different distribution networks; namely, cable companies that broadcast on linear television (like Disney or NBC) or on free apps like YouTube. Netflix clearly doesn’t have interest in competing for viewing hours in the cable or broadcast space, otherwise it would be buying Warner Brothers Discovery cable channels, rather than telling David Zaslav to continue spinning them out. And YouTube, while definitely a competitive threat for attention on TV, is not a Netflix competitor for either content or consumer spending.

    The risk of courts anchoring legal analysis to one expansive and theoretically defensible market definition is that it ignores the practical realities of market power and its impact on industries, which is ultimately what antitrust law was conceived to regulate. The continued emergence of YouTube may well be a Netflix concern, but a) Netflix isn’t expecting to pay for the $72 billion price tag here by moving from eight to nine percent market share, and b) Hollywood isn’t panicking because of where a post-merger Netflix would rank on a “TV time spent” graphic. Instead, Hollywood is internalizing the reality that if this merger is approved, it would reduce the number of viable buyers for premium content in TV, and reduce the number of films put in theaters, jeopardizing the financial health of a theater industry that’s already struggling to survive, in part because there aren’t enough movies to show.

    It’s the other side of the pricing power concern. As Netflix dominance becomes further entrenched, it will have the power to pay talent less (because how many others are bidding for original programming?) and dictate terms to theaters, eventually reducing the amount of time any of its movies are shown in theaters (before airing free to its subscribers, exclusively on Netflix). “I think over time the windows will evolve to be much more consumer friendly,” Sarandos said this month, “to meet the audience where they are … all those things we’d like to do.”

    If that policy eventually applies to Warner Brothers releases (this year’s hits: A Minecraft Movie, Superman, The Conjuring: Last Rites, One Battle After Another, Weapons, Sinners, and Final Destination: Bloodlines), it will absolutely accelerate the death of theaters. Then, as movie theaters die, the best path to monetization for feature-length content will come back to Netflix, the platform that will be able to promise an audience of 300 million people around the world, can create hits that generate valuable secondary revenue streams for studios, and will have the bargaining power to negotiate favorable terms to deliver that audience. This economy is already taking shape; it’s how Sony forfeited most of the upside in one of the biggest movies of the year, KPop Demon Hunters, in what was still arguably a good deal for the studio.

    A Warner-Netflix merger would compound Netflix’s negotiating leverage with any Sony movies in the future (because it can always promote Warner and Netflix studio content instead). Meanwhile, the streaming landscape would look like an oligolopoly with Netflix clearly at the top, and Amazon and Disney far beneath them, with a hundred million fewer subscribers and distinct content priorities. The net effect of the reduction in competition will be fewer options for entertainment, and a transfer of profit upside from the talent that makes Hollywood programming to the company that distributes it and monetizes it at a scale that will be impossible for any of its competitors to match. It’s easy to see why that plan appeals to Netflix. It’s also important context for Senator Mike Lee warning, “There are potential monopoly-type issues, but also monopsony-type issues.”

    The shift in market structure and profit incentives would result in higher prices for Netflix subscribers as well as less, and worse, movie and television content. But of course, as noted at the beginning, that shift has been underway for about 15 years.

    The Flattening of Everything

    There’s been a groundswell of opposition to big tech over the past 10 years, yet as that sort of backlash has become ubiquitous and borderline cliche, Netflix has more or less avoided scrutiny. Even as its debt-fueled rise permanently upended one of the most successful industries in American history and trained a generation to “binge watch” a bunch of sleek-looking and forgettable TV, it’s been rare to see mainstream discussions wondering about the net impact of technological shifts and consumption habits that one company spearheaded.

    Whether the Warner Bros. deal is approved or not, I suspect the era of Netflix as Big Tech Switzerland is now over. It’s not that what the company is attempting is morally wrong, but the power grab is too transparent, and the potential impact too clear for the world to see. That, more than any market definition haggling, is why I expect Netflix to lose if this merger is challenged in court. Antitrust is inherently political, and the politics of this move are unpopular on a bipartisan basis.

    Of course, even if Netflix loses today, the structural dynamics of the modern environment still favor its business tomorrow, and those same dynamics remain bearish for the rest of Hollywood. And on that point, the Netflix story is a perfect distillation of the big tech’s impact on practically every corner of modern life. The company began by offering enormous consumer surpluses while legacy incumbents were flat-footed in their response (first with Blockbuster, and later when it took Hollywood six years after the 2013 premiere of “House of Cards” to launch competing products). It thrives today because of unmatched engineering, superior leverage over its costs, and consumer inertia in a market where everyone else got started 10 years too late.

    Consider the social concerns animating tech resentment and Netflix checks those boxes, as well. Depressed that social media companies like Meta are serving mindless content that’s both monopolizing attention and isolating everyone? Streaming TV is not necessarily better, and certainly more literal in its isolation. Worried about the incentive structure of an economy in which aggregators like Amazon, Google, and Meta are leveraging their distribution networks to extract the profit margins from the businesses that actually make the things people buy? Well, that’s not far off from where the entertainment business may land. Curious about the impact on innovation, quality and consumer welfare if big tech companies can impair the ability of new companies to achieve scale and profitably compete with them? That, too, sounds familiar after the past 3,000 words.

    There was a long and entertaining New Yorker profile this week that ended with Konrad Kay riffing on the dangers of conflating financial health with social health. Kay is an ex-banker, one of the co-writers on HBO’s cult classic Industry, potentially a future Netflix employee, and he said:

    “My screen time is eight hours a day, and anytime I feel anything—anxiety, feelings of self-worthlessness, does my girlfriend love me, why am I not a dad, I’m going to die, all the things I think when I have five minutes on my own—this thing denies you all that, in a way that is so pleasurable,” he said. “I’m, like, ‘Wow, this fucking jacket! It’s going to make me feel fucking amazing.’ The jacket comes, and I look good for a day, and then I start to feel that feeling again. The danger of this thing is it flattens the experience of the world. So I can go on Instagram and see some woman I’m not dating, and then I can go on Twitter and see some kid being beheaded in Gaza, and then I can look at the jacket—spending the exact same amount of time on each of them. … And you wonder why people are fucking miserable!”

    The frustrations he describes there are hard to capture with data and hard for most to even articulate, but that doesn’t make them any less valid and widely held. Again, this is not a condemnation, but closer to a fact: Technological change and unregulated big tech growth has created a world that is more convenient for everyone, great for shareholders, but less financially rewarding for producers, and less spiritually fulfilling for consumers.

    A collective reckoning with those realities may not be ideal for Netflix as it seeks to close its Warner Brothers deal, but it’s becoming unavoidable for everyone else. 

    What I’m Reading This Week

    This will be quicker because today’s column ran long, but here are some recommended reads this week.

    Finally, this is not reading, but this chart on the EU’s regulatory revenue is incredible. And, in brighter EU news, I had a great 15 minutes watching this 60 Minutes segment on Swiss watches.

    Thanks for reading, and have a great weekend.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • The Forest the New York Times Missed Among the David Sacks Trees

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    (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

    As politics becomes its own genre of pop culture for an entire generation of Americans, laying into the editorial choices of The New York Times has become a national pastime for both the left and right. It was the right’s turn this week, along with many of the most powerful executives in tech, as the Times ran a story on Trump’s AI and Crypto Czar, David Sacks, that was headlined, “Silicon Valley’s Man in the White House Is Benefiting Himself and His Friends.”

    Sacks, for his part, responded on X by posting a six-page letter from defamation attorneys who have previously repped the Sackler family, Project Veritas, and former Harvard president Claudine Gay, while Sam Altman wrote, “David Sacks really understands AI and cares about the US leading in innovation. I am grateful we have him.” Indeed, the Valley’s collective response to the article turned into multiple days of “OpenAI is nothing without its people”-style tributes, but for David Sacks and the federal government. On the other end of the spectrum, reporters wondered about the back-channel text messages that spawned the anti-Times outpouring from venture funds the world over, while The Verge observed the groundswell of Sacks support and ran a story headlined, “Silicon Valley is rallying behind a guy who sucks.”

    Again, for better or worse — almost certainly worse! — these sorts of episodes are part-entertainment now, generating all kinds of shoulder programming for everyone involved. Sacks’ All-In Podcast will undoubtedly have one of its best weeks ever when the post-Times episode is released this weekend.

    With regard to the story itself, past the “Benefiting Himself and His Friends” headline, the body outlines a variety of Sacks-led policy initiatives, but nothing in the reporting ever supports the headline’s implication of nakedly corrupt self-dealing. I think writer Timothy Lee put it best, noting soberly that the story “unhelpfully conflates David Sacks promoting (1) policies that benefit AI companies generally, and (2) policies that benefit specific AI companies Sacks invested in. The examples are almost all (1), but written like they are mostly (2).” I’d add that the story is assiduously not defamatory in a legal sense, but is more pernicious in its perfectly legal smears by conspiratorial implication. What results is a 3,000 word feature that would be misleading to anyone who doesn’t follow the AI and chip policy space (my mom, and most of the Times core audience) and insulting to those who do (people who understand, say, that David Sacks’ chip policies may be controversial, but he does not personally benefit from more Nvidia sales to the Middle East or China).

    Here, I’ll stop short of outright sympathy for Sacks. While I’m a lapsed All-In listener, I’ve heard enough episodes to know that he has deployed similar attacks on all kinds of liberal targets, often relying on the same sort of half-baked circumstantial evidence the Times had on offer. And in any event, most of the conversation around this story, like the story itself, ignores the aspect of Sacks’ tenure that I find most interesting. The Times is just asking questions, wondering why David Sacks wants to work in the government, and how he might be benefiting. Sure. But the better question is, why might the government need to employ someone like David Sacks?

    Sacks is a “special government employee” who’s limited to working for the government for 130 days per year. He had no prior experience in government. He takes no salary. He is subject to many of the same ethics requirements that apply to full-time cabinet members, but the restrictions are relaxed in certain areas. According to White House ethics waivers, he divested $200 million of his AI and crypto assets before assuming the post that was created for him by Trump. The Times cautions that he hasn’t divested all of those holdings, the timing of the divestments is unclear, and Sacks still retains stakes, through Craft Holdings, his VC firm, in hundreds of hardware and software-focused companies that may benefit from a more business-friendly AI policy set by the White House.

    The context the Times omits is that given the investment environment surrounding AI over the past two years, it’s likely Sacks would be wealthier on paper today had he simply never divested any of his holdings and continued to serve in the private sector.

    Zooming out, a similar calculus applies to almost any high-achieving private citizen who’s considering government service. It’s a secondary effect of the K-shaped economy that often goes underappreciated. As corporate profits have compounded over the last forty years, the difference between private and public salaries has become progressively more dramatic. A Supreme Court justice makes around $300,000, for example, while a federal judge at the district level is paid $247,000. There are two dozen corporate law firms that pay ten times those numbers to top partners, and many of them pay first-year associates close to what a federal judge makes. The average staffer at the Bureau of Industry and Security, the Commerce Department subgroup overseeing chip controls, makes $107,366. How much more money might those employees get from Nvidia, where the parking lot is full of lime green Lamborghinis? And, of course, juxtaposing the salaries of financial regulators or Treasury employees with those of the executives they regulate has been a laughable exercise for 40 years.

    Those dynamics are not new, but they are especially extreme in tech, where working in government not only means making far less money, but also that you operate 3,000 miles away from all the most interesting people in the field, and likely forego future opportunities as a result. Meanwhile, what is new today, and what may not be fully internalized by New York Times readers, is that many of the most urgent questions facing the future of the western world relate to technological shifts that have overwhelming political (and geopolitical) implications. Among them:

    • How should the U.S. government incorporate cryptocurrency and stablecoins while preserving both economic stability, regulatory transparency, and the dollar’s global primacy?
    • Who should we sell advanced AI chips to, and what precisely are we trying to accomplish with chip controls?
    • How might the government effectively regulate tech monopolies to prevent a monopolist in one market using its advantages to distort the outcomes in an entirely new one?
    • How should self-driving cars be regulated?
    • What guardrails should be put in place to prevent AI disasters and/or mass job loss?
    • Are there ways to regulate AI without handicapping innovation and imposing regulatory burdens that favor big companies?
    • What sort of policies might delay a war in Taiwan (which would arrest all AI progress for five to 10 years and erase half the stock market’s value overnight)? What’s the most effective way to revive domestic chipmaking capacity?

    There are two reasons charting an effective path forward on any of those fronts will require leaning on people outside of Washington. First, to the extent the U.S. wants to capitalize on the opportunities in an industry that has been the envy of the rest of the world for the past 30 years, it helps to have leaders who don’t reflexively resent tech (rare on the East coast). And second, answering any of the questions above demands balancing domestic and geopolitical priorities alongside industry impact and the secondary consequences of any policy, all of which requires granular knowledge of the technologies, leaders and companies at the center of all this change. With AI, specifically, and tech generally, that kind of nuanced expertise eludes most everyone who has spent their career in academia or government. And perversely, that lack of expertise often manifests in tech policies that are hopelessly over-engineered and counter-productive to long term American interests, like last year’s baffling AI Diffusion Rule (which Sacks helped repeal).

    None of this is to suggest the government should cede all its decision-making to the Valley, or be absolved of the responsibility to perform comprehensive conflict checks and follow the law with respect to executive branch appointments. Nor am I joining the chorus of tech luminaries saying thank you, David Sacks. I’d like to leave room here for the possibility that the Times story was a mess, VC twitter is awful, and Sacks policies are a mixed bag.

    Still, if a venture capitalist’s influence on government policy is depressing to you, I get it, but I would caution that the practical alternative to that AI leadership was Kamala Harris as AI czar, and a 36-page AI executive order under Biden that was grounded in paranoia and equity concern (and partially inspired by Mission: ImpossibleDead Reckoning). There was also the aforementioned AI Diffusion Rule, which introduced three tiers of global chip access, along with nine acronyms (“AIA, ACM, LPP, DC VEU, UVEU, NVEU, TPP, ACA”), while proposing to throttle the flow of U.S. chips and software to more than half the world (creating an enormous gap for Huawei to fill, particularly among U.S. allies in the Middle East).

    American tech policy that effectively navigates the years ahead will require reckoning with the reality of modern government’s limits, as well as the multi-dimensional complexity of its priorities. Rather than casting Kleptocratic aspersions on a part-time government employee with so much industry experience that the appearance of conflicted interests is effectively unavoidable, a more useful Times story might have identified those dynamics and asked whether arrangements like Sacks-as-AI-czar may nevertheless become more common in administrations of the future. Provided there are strong national security and regulatory voices that remain in the room, it seems clear the U.S. government incorporating genuine tech expertise is better than the alternative.

    What I’m Reading This Week

    • Part 1: My Life is a Lie. A great piece on the limits of available economic statistics, the need for a new definition of poverty, and the “valley of death” among working class Americans that breeds resentment and social instability. Some of the numbers in this piece have been questioned as it’s gone viral, but the structural dynamics read as deadly accurate. (Part 2 was also excellent).
    • My Boy. A fantastic and moving piece on raising an autistic son, from my friend Ethan Strauss.
    • How NBA Legend Michael Jordan Is Blowing Up NASCAR’s Monopoly. “Several jurors were dismissed because of their love for Jordan, whereas another was kicked off the case because of her dislike for one of the driving teams involved. And then there was the guy who joked on his juror form that his hobby is ‘heavy drinking;’ he was ultimately chosen to serve.” Wonderful stuff.
    • MAGA’s Aquatic Valkyrie. A comprehensive response to an episode of Pablo Torre’s podcast that seemed pretty naive about how political activism works.
    • Stanford Earth Sciences Chair Collaborates with China’s Nuclear Program. An investigation of a Stanford scientist’s apparent collaboration with the CCP nuclear program; this is one of dozens of examples with respect to the academy’s endemic China problems. Part 1 in this remarkable series from student journalists was similarly disturbing.
    • China is making trade impossible. For anyone new to the world’s trade tensions, this 900-word op-ed is the most cogent statement of the problem (and why, particularly for Europe, there are no good solutions).

    And with that, we’re done! Thanks for reading, and have a great weekend.


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.


  • The Definitive Ranking of Tech Company Takeability

    Welcome back to Sharp Text. If you’re reading this via email, thank you for subscribing. For anyone reading on the web who would like to receive weekly posts, you can sign up here


    Good morning!

    Today’s focus will be tech companies and takes. Having hosted podcasts of all kinds for more than ten years, takes are near and dear to my heart. So the question today is simple: which tech companies are doing the most for the take economy in 2025?

    To be clear, these aren’t judgements on the quality of these companies. Someone or something that’s particularly valuable to the take economy is not necessarily good or bad, but usually provocative, and preferably has a story that’s still being written, leaving plenty of ro0m for half-baked theorizing. For example, we can frame today’s exercise with recent news from Hollywood: the takeability spectrum runs from Robert Redford’s career (uncontroversially excellent, universally respected, what can you say?) to Sydney Sweeney’s career (your mileage may vary!).

    In any event, you get the gist. I won’t be posting next week because of Thanksgiving, so what we’re celebrating today are the companies that all tech content producers, or content consumers, should be most grateful for this year. With that in mind, here are my notes…

    15. Microsoft. The cloud business is fine, Office lock-in isn’t going away, and sure, the Activision deal looks like a disaster and the Copilot efforts are lagging a bit, but this is still a mature and extremely profitable business with an enterprise software moat that has survived for more than three decades. Even the years-long tension with OpenAI ended with Microsoft making a perfectly sensible decision to hedge against OpenAI’s upside rather than bet on its own ability to make great AI products. This is Microsoft under Nadella: smart, unsexy, and by not overtly trying to dominate the world, they wind up (ever so quietly) continuing to dominate the world. Unfortunately, none of is very takeable. Crush Microsoft and you will sound like kind of a moron; evangelize about Microsoft and you will sound like someone who needs to get out more. 

    14. Amazon. Microsoft in e-commerce clothing (complete with a massive cloud business). There may be conversations to have about why the stock has underperformed the rest of big tech over the past few years, or what the company is doing wrong in A.I., but the core business is fine, and the logistics moat is impossible to beat. More importantly, we’re living through one of the wildest eras technology has seen in 25 years. Does anyone really want to spend their time on a deep dive into the Andy Jassy era?

    13. Nvidia. Seems like it should be higher, and definitely would be higher if this list were focused on the companies that produce the most content for Sharp China. In America, though: CUDA lock-in is real, efficiency advantages are only going to become more important, there are 500 ASIC start-ups and not one that matters, and demand for Nvidia chips still outpaces supply every single quarter. It’s very, very tempting to play devil’s advocate on a $4 trillion company that conquered the world in the blink of an eye — people do it on Twitter every single day! — but none of those arguments seem to hold water. Nvidia is great at what they do, what they do is boring but incredibly valuable, and now they are well-positioned to dominate for the foreseeable future. Actually a very frustrating company from a takes perspective, because all the most fun, skeptical takes tend to be wrong.

    12. Netflix. Would have been much higher on this list five years ago! Unfortunately, most of the best Netflix debates have been settled for at least two years. Spending from rival Hollywood studios didn’t erode Netflix’s dominance, and in fact some of those studios are now selling their content to Netflix. Netflix did offer an ad tier, and no, it didn’t kill the subscription business. There’s maybe a medium term question about whether YouTube poses a threat to Netflix, but that argument feels strained in 2025. Netflix is so powerful today that its audience can generate a new franchise for studios, its churn rate is five times better than some of its competitors, and there’s not really any question anymore as to whether its formula is sustainable. And speaking of the formula, this is a good Netflix take:

    11. TikTok. A company that has generated more takes (billions) than profits (???) over the course of its short history, and one that would have been much higher on this list a few years ago. The problem is that TikTok debates are very familiar now: yes, the the CCP could almost certainly use TikTok to manipulate algorithms and access user data; no, the U.S. wouldn’t be violating the First Amendment if it banned the app; and yes, Trump ignoring Congress and refusing to enforce the law is probably his most egregious abuse of law during his second term (a whole different realm of takes). There are also more basic questions — is this app making an entire generation dumber? — that have their own, obvious answers. That said, I’ll happily have any of those conversations. Some of them are important! And while we’re at it, I’ll throw out one more for consideration: TikTok pioneered addictive short-form video and forced Meta to push short form videos of its own, thereby training an entire generation to consume content this way, and further eroding the attention spans of millions of young people. To the extent this trend plays a role in diminishing the influence of of Hollywood and the traditional entertainment industry, which has been a source of U.S. soft power for roughly 100 years, isn’t that also a pretty massive victory for China? It would be a bigger coup than, say, convincing people in Taiwan that the Houston Rockets don’t exist. 

    10. The Other Model Makers. Why is Anthropic doing ads on Ringer podcasts? Do coders love The Big Picture? And what are these aesthetics? The company is pushing millennial-core minimalism that looks like a Hims ad, on one hand, and feels like it’s from 2015, on the other. It seems like the target audience for that “thinking” campaign is “people who want use AI but also lament its existence,” which would at least be consistent with every interview Dario Amodei has given for the past three years. Elsewhere: xAI sometimes looks like a very, very expensive hammer in search of a nail. No one knows what Ilya Sutskever saw or what his new company is trying to do. And how is Mira Murati’s new company, without revenue and without a product, raising funds at a $50 billion valuation? People bag on OpenAI’s spending and revenue projections, but at least there are users, products and cogent goals. This is the economy that makes no sense. All these players have to be on the list, however, because a) everyone enjoys teeing off on overvalued companies and/or effective altruists; and b) these companies are good for takes, because a world where OpenAI, Meta and Google are the only major AI players is far less interesting.

    9. DeepSeek. 10 months ago, might have landed at number one on this list! For about 36 hours in January, the sheer volume of takes surrounding this company seemed like it might pop the AI bubble, and in D.C., DeepSeek’s success was treated as dispositive evidence that chip controls were hopeless, on one hand, or not being enforced properly, on the other. Today, DeepSeek’s R2 release has reportedly been delayed because the company was encouraged by the government to run on Chinese chips, the American AI market is frothier than ever, and the narratives surrounding DeepSeek’s costs ($5 million!) have been debunked. However… Deepseek is high on this list because it’s still used as the rhetorical stand-in for a Chinese open source AI ecosystem (Qwen, Kimi, et al) that might very well be a long-term problem for a variety of U.S. interests (chips, models, U.S. tech leadership around the world). Additionally, with now-close oversight and support from the CCP (with apologies to Meta, rumor has it that Vice Premier Li Qiang has banned rival companies from poaching DeepSeek talent), the next few years will be a fun experiment to see whether the party’s control freak tendencies will impact China’s national champion in AI.

    8. Uber. Very similar to Netflix in that this company had entire armies of skeptics for almost a decade, and it’s harder to sustain any of those arguments in 2025. Unlike Netflix, though, a real disruption threat looms. If we assume that autonomous vehicles will be eventually ubiquitous in a variety of markets, Uber is like a team that doesn’t control its own destiny to make the playoffs. Essentially, Uber will need Waymo, Tesla and perhaps others in the autonomous space to strike out at monetizing their significant hardware investments — via their own apps, or maybe delivery — thereby forcing them to turn to Uber for access to customers, and preserving Uber’s negotiating leverage as an aggregator that can lean on fleets of other companies’ cars to deliver rides, extracting the same margins they would on any other trip. And look, it’s entirely possible that’s how it plays out; everyone already uses Uber and breaking those user habits is tough. But a) it’s easier to create new user habits when you’re offering an entirely new or better service, which Waymo sort of does; and b) while Netflix won by betting against the ability of companies like Warner Brothers, Comcast, and Paramount to thrive in a new technological paradigm, Uber is betting against Google, Tesla, and perhaps Amazon. A tougher row to hoe!

    7. Meta. The core value proposition in the modern era — serving up addictive, mindless content from people you don’t know, surveilling user habits more effectively than any private company not run out of Beijing, and using that data to serve ads not too far off from that scene in Minority Report — may be looking increasingly bleak, but it’s also looking increasingly stable. We’re past the era of semi-regular panics over Meta’s lack of a moat, and the dominance looks as entrenched as ever. (And in fairness, Instagram ads are more useful than every other ad you’re assaulted with on the internet.)

    All that noted, it’s everything else that Meta is doing that provides tremendous fodder for takes. Reality Labs has been happily lighting money on fire for a full decade with no end in sight. Every new pair of Smart Glasses is cool, yet no one in tech seems to understand that normal people don’t want to walk around with a computer on their face. Meanwhile, the AI division gets reshuffled every two months and is now full of poached researchers, on max contracts, who are improving Meta AI products that no one uses, as well as internal AI tools that should improve Meta’s ad products. We’ll see where that goes. Vibes would have been great for takes if the horrified reactions to that product hadn’t been instantly eclipsed by a rapturous reception for Sora. Speaking of which, it’s seems like Meta senses that OpenAI and ChatGPT are a real threat, and is responding by driving up the price for talent and hardware, while also releasing open source models that could theoretically undercut OpenAI’s long term pricing power. It’s defensive, but proactive, and at times very entertaining.

    On the other hand: Will any of this work? Has Zuck in Founder Mode actually been additive to Meta’s business for the past 10 years? And outside of buying Instagram and WhatsApp and copying features from Snap and TikTok, when was the last time Meta built something new that people liked? These questions are becoming evergreen, and are at least more interesting than discussing Instagram’s ad load.

    6. SpaceX

    5. xAI and X

    4. Tesla. I’m grouping all of Elon’s companies together because in practice, discussing one Musk company usually invites discussion of a few others. Related: The number of well-capitalized misses from Zuckerberg at Facebook should underscore just how hard it is to marry vision, timing and execution at scale, which Elon has done over and over again.

    There’s an alternate timeline in which Tesla lands in the Netflix zone of this list, having successfully disrupted to the American car industry for the first time in 100 years, proving all its doubters wrong, and now sitting entrenched as by far the most dominant EV maker in the US (although China is making the rest of the world a lot more interesting). What’s great about Tesla, though, is that the company is pushing several orders of magnitude beyond that goal. From The Information:

    Optimus is Tesla’s biggest long-term bet. Musk has said there will eventually be more humanoid robots than cars in the world, and that Optimus will one day be responsible for about 80% of Tesla’s market capitalization. Inside Tesla, he’s pushed the Optimus team to find ways to use the robot in tandem with another big, nearer-term bet: the Cybercab, according to a person with direct knowledge.

    That includes Musk’s desire to have the Optimus robot sit in the Cybercab so it can deliver packages. That should be possible: newer versions of the Optimus robot are capable of consistently lifting and moving around with roughly 25-pound objects for three to four hours on a 30 minute charge, another person with direct knowledge said. But the connection between the robot’s torso and legs isn’t flexible enough to allow it to seamlessly get in and out of a Cybercab, according to the first person.

    Ben wrote more about this on Tuesday, but let’s marvel at the insanity of that report. What’s envisioned above involves autonomous technology that doesn’t fully exist yet, Cybercabs that don’t exist yet, a market for automated delivery that doesn’t exist yet, and robots that do exist, but are not functional enough to drive around delivering packages. So, a lot of moving pieces! On the other hand, if anyone could will that science fiction vision into reality… And see? This is how you end invoking SpaceX catching a rocket as it re-enters orbit, as well as explaining that xAI will be critical to realizing any of those visions.

    Elon is a maniac, with a Twitter account that’s completely intolerable to all and politics that are intolerable to many, but that shouldn’t distract anyone from the sheer volume of genuine breakthroughs that he’s pushing toward at all times, making technology more interesting for everyone. He’s the antidote to Meta building a trillion dollar business on the strength of Reels. And the more grand his ambitions and accomplishments become in the physical world, the funnier it becomes that he also owns X, and that him buying X had a bigger impact on American life than all of his other businesses combined.

    Additionally, in the middle of all this, Musk still finds the time to sue Sam Altman every three weeks.

    3. Google. What a two year ride. In 2023, the company that invented the transformer was behind in AI and rushing out hamfisted demos in Paris, their safety team celebrated Black History Month by accidentally making all history black, and ChatGPT was being hailed as the first credible threat to the search business since the Bush administration. Two years later… maybe this is going to be most powerful company the world has ever known? The search business continues to generate obscene profits and a Federal Judge was recently too scared to disrupt their distribution deal with Apple despite explicitly finding it illegal. Gemini 3 is state of the art (though it’s unclear how much that means at any given time), Veo is far and away the best in AI video, and Waymo is expanding to 5 more cities as of this week. YouTube is the most dominant entertainment platform on the planet, which will not only help Google own the future of consumption, but should also help the company’s AI efforts. YouTubeTV could be the cable bundle of the future if the company ever decides to make an aggressive play to own that market.

    The advantages and opportunities in front of Google so are obvious and abundant that I’d be open to arguments that Google is too high on this list, as it’s now become clear to everyone that this company can and should win the future on a variety of fronts. On the other hand, I leave room for the possibility that Google and its massive bureaucracy will fail to capitalize on some or all of the foregoing opportunities, and I don’t know anyone in my personal life who prefers Gemini to ChatGPT. We’ll see. In the interim, I’m just enjoying the shift from the whole world asking whether Google needs to fire Sundar Pichai to now talking about him like he’s Keyser Soze:

    2. Apple. This list is ultimately a celebration of takes, and in the current environment, is there any hotter take than just skipping out on AI spending altogether? I’ve come to admire it, and as a very satisfied iPhone 17 Pro Max user, I think it’s probably the right call. I don’t plan on switching phones anytime soon, neither do you, and besides, I don’t trust modern Apple to execute if the company were to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in AI infrastructure. Would they really better off flailing around in the wildnerness like Meta?

    Elsewhere, Apple continues to collect a 30% fee on every app store transaction, an egregious practice that has generated a full decade of Stratechery hand-wringing and seems to face renewed scrutiny every six months. While I’d prefer if that behavior eventually led to meaningful consequences for a company that is now dangerously dependent on extortive Services revenue to drive growth (the app store fees, collecting a $25 billion toll from Google every year, and my favorite: launching an ads business just before deploying ATT changes that killed everyone else’s ad business), Apple is betting that regulators are too lazy to act, and companies are too desperate for Apple’s audience to do anything about it. Honestly, a reasonable calculus!

    Finally, Tim Cook’s religious dedication to operations optimization was so extreme that it inspired one of the best technology books of the decade (mainly for its history of Apple) and one of my favorite Stratechery interviews of the year. This would be my guess for the controversial strategy that actually hurts Apple’s bottom line at some point in the next ten years, but we’ll see. Either way, Apple at once looks more vulnerable than it has for about 15 years, and more dominant than ever. Everyone has an opinion on what Apple should be doing and why, and it powers the take ecosystem all year long. However…

    1. OpenAI. Listen.

    OpenAI may or may not be the most important company of the future. There can be no doubt, however, that we are witnessing one of the most takeable enterprises in the history of the world.

    From the day it was founded — with a non-profit corporate structure that sought to build AGI and then control it themselves “to ensure artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity” — this company has divided the audience and invited either passionate support or aggressive eye-rolls.

    10 years later, not a week goes by without a story that makes the leadership look kind of ridiculous (a Larry Summers snafu here, an Altman conniption there, and a friendly suggestion to the U.S. government over here), yet ChatGPT stands alone as the one AI product that practically the entire world continues to use and enjoy on a regular basis. And as fevered as the current landscape in tech can look, we should all be clear that the defining characteristics of that atmosphere — crazy lending, circular partnerships, overheated market reactions, uncomfortable social implications, and rapid uptake that makes anything seem possible — are all almost entirely attributable to the success and ambition of one company.

    What I love about OpenAI is that it should be impossible for anyone to bet against a start-up with 800 million weekly users, but the company makes it so tempting. Not content to merely compete with Google, OpenAI is also trying to be a hardware company that competes with Apple (Jony and Sam saw you across the bar and like your vibe), the company’s also competing with Meta for attention and “time spent” on their app, and, according to Sam Altman in his Stratechery Interview, will compete for share in the enterprise space. Sam and co. are trying to do everything, and be everything, and will soon be serving users “mature content” (an arguably bearish signal if leadership is that desperate to juice engagement). The company also appears to be losing tons of money as it throws these ideas at the wall, though precisely how much is anyone’s guess.

    That last bit is the crucial aspect of why this company continues to generate so many frenzied conversations, not only because OpenAI’s future prospects depend in part on how much it costs them to serve their product and that distinguishes ChatGPT from the stickiest consumer hits of the past (AI is, uh, not zero marginal cost). What’s most important is we don’t know. Incomplete information is a feature here, not a bug. OpenAI is a private company that doesn’t have to report out its costs and doesn’t have to answer to shareholders as it attempts five moonshots at once. The lack of transparency and accountability, coupled with a market that’s being redefined every month, leaves room for the whole world to theorize on what will happen next and why. Almost no OpenAI prediction in 2025 is definitively falsifiable.

    Think OpenAI is the new AOL? I can buy that argument. But if it’s not, where might this story go? Will OpenAI hardware pose a threat to Apple, while its software becomes elemental to how the whole world works, shops, and learns? Do you trust Sam Altman? Will he still be running this company in four years? Is ChatGPT destroying higher education?

    Whoever you are, wherever you are, I bet you’ve got a take.


    A Taylor Sheridan Starter Kit

    Brett asks: 

    As somebody who’s only dipped their toes into the Sheridanverse (Sicario + Hell and High Water) where do you recommend starting with the rest of his work?

    Great question. Sheridan is an acquired taste and someone people never get there; my wife finds his shows to be too violent. The movies you mentioned are great in a more conventional, critically acclaimed way, whereas his TV shows take traditional TV formulas and heighten the drama with either violence, bizarre plots, or history that you won’t find elsewhere on TV. In any event, my recommendations would be the following:

    • 1883. Probably his best television work to date. The one and only season chronicles the Dutton family ancestors (stars of Yellowstone) as they make their way across the American frontier. This show is brutally violent at times, poignant at others, and it’s all gorgeously shot. And no, you don’t need to watch Yellowstone beforehand.
    • 1923. Another Yellowstone prequel. The pacing can be pretty languid at times, and there’s a sadist plotline that was probably a bit much, but I came to enjoy it over the course of the first season, and love it by the end of the second and final season. It’s his most sentimental work, and it features Helen Mirren and Harrison Ford having a great time. Maybe my favorite Sheridan project.
    • Landman. Great collection of stars — Billy Bob Thornton, Demi Moore (sort of), Jon Hamm, Ali Larter, a number of character actors from other Sheridan vehicles — and a killer concept for a show, unpacking the oil industry in West Texas. It has about six more storylines than it needs, there is a Jerry Jones cameo at one point, and when I wrote that Sheridan shows are often weird and fun in a way that’s refreshing, I was thinking of Landman.
    • Lioness. For people who loved Sicario, but also secretly enjoyed Sicario 2: Day of the Soldado. Drug cartels are again the enemy here, special ops are involved, and no, these kill missions have not been sanctioned. The show is gripping from the opening scenes of Season 1 and more or less maintains that pace throughout the run, though I still have lots of questions about Nicole Kidman’s marriage.

    Yellowstone is also an enjoyable watch for the first two or three seasons, though I’ve been partial the work Sheridan has done since. And while we’re here… I was happy with how that Sheridan article came together, but as much as I celebrate Sheridan for taking more interesting creative risks than, say, The Bear, I don’t want to denigrate too much of modern TV, mainly because I still avidly consume lots of it. So, a handful of non-Sheridan recs for anyone who’s looking for something to watch over the holidays:

    • Task on HBO is the best show I’ve seen this year.
    • Industry on HBO is my favorite show of the decade (three seasons; the first one is a little bit weird and may be off-putting, but it’s the rare show in the streaming era that gets better with each episode, in every season).
    • Platonic on AppleTV is a great comedy to watch with your spouse. Much better than, say, The Studio.
    • The Gilded Age is another outstanding spouse show; nails the formula for compulsively watchable procedural.
    • America’s Team on Netflix. The best sports documentary I’ve seen this year.
    • Beckham on Netflix. The best sports documentary I saw last year, in case anyone hasn’t seen it.
    • Pluribus … Still making up my mind on this one, but I’m enjoying myself so far.

    Letters of Recommendation

    • Empire of AI is wildly misleading about AI water use. Andy Masley with a piece that went viral on tech Twitter this week and was very gratifying to read. The notion that data centers use dangerous amounts of water is one of the more pernicious talking points distorting the modern AI conversation, and its persistence among the mainstream, particularly on the left, is good evidence that our information systems are still pretty broken.
    • The Bitter Lessons. Dean Ball with a really well-observed piece on the AI “race” between the US and China, and the ways in which that metaphor fails to capture the current dynamics.
    • What the Movies Need from Sydney Sweeney. Good, short column on the dignity of Sydney Sweeney’s (mostly terrible) movie career, and why Ross Douthat hopes she sticks with it.
    • How NOT to Negotiate with China. A brief note from Robin J. Brooks on how Trump should have handled the rare earths standoff, and why a modest tariff probably would’ve worked better than the maximalist strategy the U.S. side chose instead. He might be right, and he’s definitely right about the underlying dynamics in China.
    • Is Gambling Really Ruining the Integrity of Sports?. Jay Kang with a fair counterpoint to the reflexive argument that gambling is corrosive to the long term interests and integrity of sports leagues. I’m not sure I agree, but it made me think.
    • america against china against america. I recommended this on Sharp China Wednesday, but if you’d like a corrective to the sycophantic videos from Hasan Piker in China this week, this (very long) travelogue from Jasmine Sun was terrific, as she traveled to Shenzen, Shanghai, Yuyao and Hangzhou and visited a variety of tech companies along the way.

    Also: this is not writing, but I thoroughly enjoyed this three minute video from my friend Spike Eskin on the “consensus of fear” in modern MLB awards voting (and lots of other places).

    And with that, we’re done! Thank you to everyone who’s subscribed and written emails; the early response to this newsletter has been very encouraging. If you have questions for future newsletters, you can email me here. And since I won’t be publishing next week, have a great Thanksgiving!


    Sharp Text is extension of the Stratechery Plus podcasts Sharp Tech, Greatest of All Talk, and Sharp China. We’ll publish once a week, on Fridays. To subscribe and receive weekly posts via email, click here.