Papers by Joseph Stramondo
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability, 2020
It may seem obvious that causing disability in another person is morally problematic in a way tha... more It may seem obvious that causing disability in another person is morally problematic in a way that removing or preventing a disability is not. This suggests that there is a moral asymmetry between causing disability and causing non-disability. This chapter investigates whether there are any differences between these two types of actions that might explain the existence of a general moral asymmetry. After setting aside the possibility that having a disability is almost always bad or harmful for a person (a view that we have critiqued at length elsewhere), seven putative differences are considered. Ultimately, it is concluded that none of these seven factors can ground a general moral asymmetry between causing disability and causing non-disability, though each factor can provide some moral reason to avoid causing disability in certain particular cases. On the face of it, there seems to be a significant moral difference between causing disability and causing non-disability. 1 For many of us, the idea of making a person disabled often raises moral alarms that the idea of preventing or removing disability does not. This may suggest that there is virtually always a strong moral reason to avoid causing disability that does not apply to causing non-disability. In this chapter, we want to examine this apparent "moral asymmetry" between causing disability and causing non-disability, most fundamentally asking: are there any differences between these two types of actions that could ground a general moral asymmetry of this kind?
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine, 2016
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2017
Most people take it for granted that disability is a bad thing. They assume that, barring rare ex... more Most people take it for granted that disability is a bad thing. They assume that, barring rare exceptions, having a disability is bad for or harmful to the person who is disabled. In other words, the common belief is that disability tends to have a negative impact on one's wellbeing. We follow Ron Amundson in calling this the Standard View. 1 This view undergirds a range of significant practices in contemporary life, such as the allocation of funding for genetics research initiatives that serve the long-term goal of preventing or reducing disabilities, the practice of giving lower healthcare priority to individuals with disabilities based on their estimated quality of life, the choice of couples to selectively abort fetuses that are found to have certain genetic conditions, and the pitying stance taken by many nondisabled people toward people with disabilities. The Standard View is also openly endorsed by many philosophers, bioethicists, and public intellectuals who favor the reduction or elimination of disability from human experience. 2
While it may be surprising to some, there is a history of persistent, sometimes heated conflict b... more While it may be surprising to some, there is a history of persistent, sometimes heated conflict between the profession of bioethics and the disability movement. Namely, the disability movement has engaged mainstream bioethics in an adversarial way because of radically divergent positions on topics such as: prenatal diagnosis, health care rationing, growth attenuation interventions, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia. In my dissertation, I argue that this tension between the analyses of the disability movement and mainstream bioethics is not merely a conflict between two insular communities of “disability activists” and “bioethicists” but between those who have experienced disability and those who have not. That is, I maintain that it is a mistake to think of this conflict as arising just from a difference in ideology or political commitments, because it represents a much deeper difference—one rooted in moral psychology and epistemology. Analyzing the causes and effects of nuanced differences between the disability movement and field of bioethics’ respective moral psychologies and epistemologies--and then suggesting both theoretical and practical changes that might dissolve the conflict produced by these unacknowledged differences--is the key task of my dissertation.
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, Volume 8, Number 1, Apr 2015
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 2013
International Journal of Feminist Approaches To Bioethics, 2011
Social Philosophy Today, 2010
Book Reviews by Joseph Stramondo
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016
Interviews by Joseph Stramondo
Hello, I'm Shelley Tremain and I'd like to welcome you to the twenty-first installment of Dialogu... more Hello, I'm Shelley Tremain and I'd like to welcome you to the twenty-first installment of Dialogues on Disability, the series of interviews that I am conducting with disabled philosophers and post here on the third Wednesday of each month. The series is designed to provide a public venue for discussion with disabled philosophers about a range of topics, including their philosophical work on disability; the place of philosophy of disability vis-à-vis the discipline and profession; their experiences of institutional discrimination and personal prejudice in philosophy, in particular, and in academia, more generally; resistance to ableism; accessibility; and anti-oppressive pedagogy. His research focuses on the intersection of bioethics and philosophy of disability. He is currently working on projects related to moral psychology and well-being and has interests in feminist philosophy and social-political philosophy. In his down time, Joe can usually be found exploring the many wonders of his new home state with his partner, newborn daughter, and two dogs.
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Papers by Joseph Stramondo
Book Reviews by Joseph Stramondo
Interviews by Joseph Stramondo