Maria Grafova
National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE), Moscow, Russia, School of Philological Studies of the Faculty of Humanities, Faculty Member
National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE), Moscow, Russia, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs / School of International Affairs, Assistant Professor / Associate Senior Lecturer
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Papers by Maria Grafova
during the New Economic Policy (NEP). From the start, the Soviet
authorities made great efforts to gradually eliminate religious beliefs
within Soviet society. One of the first steps in that direction
was the removal of marriage from Church jurisdiction. Moreover,
Soviet power was constantly trying to compromise the tradition
of religious marriage. However, many people still preferred to be
married in church in addition to civil registration. A wide range of
historical sources studied in this research (political and sanitary
propaganda, communist and entertainment media, printed court
reports) reveals that the new “civil” marriage was considered to be
extremely unreliable by “ordinary” people, especially young girls of
marriageable age and their parents. It was too easy to enter into
such a marriage and to end it. It was associated with divorces, alimony
suits, almost legalized cheating. The intention to marry in
church at least meant a serious commitment, a willingness to take
responsibility. Also, even many years later, during the Census of
1937, the majority of the population of the USSR considered themselves
believers. This situation continued until a crucial change in
ideology and social politics took place in the late 1920s, when most
churches were closed. This study is focused on psychology of the
“little man” in an epoch of global political and social changes.
almost religious nature, and they are opposed by carriers of opposite, but
equally fervent convictions. But for the majority, radical ideas and global
transformations are usually of little interest. As soon as the Civil War ended,
this majority of the population of Soviet Russia faced the task of adapting
to the new peaceful reality of the NEP. One of the actively used terms in the
rhetoric of Soviet Russia in the 1920s for such adaptation is “philistinism”. In
pre-revolutionary Russia, this was the name of one of the categories of the
urban population, and after the change of system, the only actual meaning
of this word was the designation of a seeker of well-being and personal hap-
piness of any gender and age, avoiding following the new communist quasi-
religion and morality. Oftentimes, sincere “believers” in communism and
“philistine” opportunists were forced to either clash or find a compromise
within the same family. On the basis of a wide range of media, narrative and
sanitary-educational sources, using visual material, we trace the formation of
the caricatured image of the “philistine” with its characteristic life adaptation
strategies. Among them is mimicry of the carrier of the current ideology (join-
ing the Party, following hybrid quasi-religious cultural practices) in order to
build a career or organize one's personal life. The phenomenon of “philistine”
adaptation to the state communist ideology will be characterized up to the1
“Great Break”, when the NEP was abolished, and the political, economic and
cultural situation in the country changed dramatically.
wives’ revolts” in 1920s Soviet Russia are examined.
They played a significant role in the formation of the
new Soviet ideology and ideological politics within
the framework of the actualization of the “cultural
revolution.” In historical studies, “country wives’ revolt”
usually refers to women’s protests in villages
during collectivization, but an analysis of 1920s
agitatio nal literature shows that “country wives’ revolts”
were an entire conceptual segment of Soviet
agitation. As a result of an analysis of sources, the
general patterns of the plotlines, moves, and stereotypical
characters have been defined. It has been
determined that the goal of this kind of agitation
was to inform peasant women about their new political
rights and imbue them with new self-consciousness
and trust in the Soviet government. This gen -
der emancipation, however, was given within the
limi ted framework of the Marxist understanding
of the women question: the goal of the revolt was
only to educate the women and discipline the men.
“Сountry wives’ revolts” in the 1920s are merely an
ideological concept that had the aim of imposing
gender modernization on the peasantry from above,
but strictly within the framework of party strategy in
relationship to the peasantry.
This paper deals with the fate of recipes of Orthodox ritual dishes, such as Easter cakes and paskhas, in Soviet time. The Cook books during the New Economic Policy in 1920s still have these recipes, which proves that they were a natural part of everyday life. In 1930s and 1940s they disappeared from cook books, but in the early 1950s they returned to the new ones, e.g. the recipes of Easter cakes were published in the “Book of Tasty and Healthy Food”, an official representation of the late Stalin era cuisine. Howewer, Easter cakes became now not a ritual dish but an element of the “national traditional culture”.
during the New Economic Policy (NEP). From the start, the Soviet
authorities made great efforts to gradually eliminate religious beliefs
within Soviet society. One of the first steps in that direction
was the removal of marriage from Church jurisdiction. Moreover,
Soviet power was constantly trying to compromise the tradition
of religious marriage. However, many people still preferred to be
married in church in addition to civil registration. A wide range of
historical sources studied in this research (political and sanitary
propaganda, communist and entertainment media, printed court
reports) reveals that the new “civil” marriage was considered to be
extremely unreliable by “ordinary” people, especially young girls of
marriageable age and their parents. It was too easy to enter into
such a marriage and to end it. It was associated with divorces, alimony
suits, almost legalized cheating. The intention to marry in
church at least meant a serious commitment, a willingness to take
responsibility. Also, even many years later, during the Census of
1937, the majority of the population of the USSR considered themselves
believers. This situation continued until a crucial change in
ideology and social politics took place in the late 1920s, when most
churches were closed. This study is focused on psychology of the
“little man” in an epoch of global political and social changes.
almost religious nature, and they are opposed by carriers of opposite, but
equally fervent convictions. But for the majority, radical ideas and global
transformations are usually of little interest. As soon as the Civil War ended,
this majority of the population of Soviet Russia faced the task of adapting
to the new peaceful reality of the NEP. One of the actively used terms in the
rhetoric of Soviet Russia in the 1920s for such adaptation is “philistinism”. In
pre-revolutionary Russia, this was the name of one of the categories of the
urban population, and after the change of system, the only actual meaning
of this word was the designation of a seeker of well-being and personal hap-
piness of any gender and age, avoiding following the new communist quasi-
religion and morality. Oftentimes, sincere “believers” in communism and
“philistine” opportunists were forced to either clash or find a compromise
within the same family. On the basis of a wide range of media, narrative and
sanitary-educational sources, using visual material, we trace the formation of
the caricatured image of the “philistine” with its characteristic life adaptation
strategies. Among them is mimicry of the carrier of the current ideology (join-
ing the Party, following hybrid quasi-religious cultural practices) in order to
build a career or organize one's personal life. The phenomenon of “philistine”
adaptation to the state communist ideology will be characterized up to the1
“Great Break”, when the NEP was abolished, and the political, economic and
cultural situation in the country changed dramatically.
wives’ revolts” in 1920s Soviet Russia are examined.
They played a significant role in the formation of the
new Soviet ideology and ideological politics within
the framework of the actualization of the “cultural
revolution.” In historical studies, “country wives’ revolt”
usually refers to women’s protests in villages
during collectivization, but an analysis of 1920s
agitatio nal literature shows that “country wives’ revolts”
were an entire conceptual segment of Soviet
agitation. As a result of an analysis of sources, the
general patterns of the plotlines, moves, and stereotypical
characters have been defined. It has been
determined that the goal of this kind of agitation
was to inform peasant women about their new political
rights and imbue them with new self-consciousness
and trust in the Soviet government. This gen -
der emancipation, however, was given within the
limi ted framework of the Marxist understanding
of the women question: the goal of the revolt was
only to educate the women and discipline the men.
“Сountry wives’ revolts” in the 1920s are merely an
ideological concept that had the aim of imposing
gender modernization on the peasantry from above,
but strictly within the framework of party strategy in
relationship to the peasantry.
This paper deals with the fate of recipes of Orthodox ritual dishes, such as Easter cakes and paskhas, in Soviet time. The Cook books during the New Economic Policy in 1920s still have these recipes, which proves that they were a natural part of everyday life. In 1930s and 1940s they disappeared from cook books, but in the early 1950s they returned to the new ones, e.g. the recipes of Easter cakes were published in the “Book of Tasty and Healthy Food”, an official representation of the late Stalin era cuisine. Howewer, Easter cakes became now not a ritual dish but an element of the “national traditional culture”.