Book Reviews by Jason Cruze
Papers by Jason Cruze
Philosophia Christi, 2014
ABSTRACT:
In a recent article J. Daryl Charles argues that a neurobiological account of morality... more ABSTRACT:
In a recent article J. Daryl Charles argues that a neurobiological account of morality is significantly limited. Although there is something right about this claim, it’s unclear what Charles thinks that neuroscience tells us about our ability to make moral judgments and to be held blameworthy as moral agents. Regarding the true case of the stepfather (“Smith”) who became a pedophile, I argue, against Charles, that it reveals the crucial role that the prefontral cortex plays in the regulation of moral behavior. I offer additional evidence that brain damage does indeed encroach on our moral capacities and that in the case of Smith, it is unreasonable to hold him morally blameworthy. Indeed, given Smith’s inability to comply with the norms of moral obligation, the reactive attitudes in this case are not appropriately fitting nor necessary to hold Smith accountable.
In his paper, "Restoration and Retribution," 1 Antony Duff contends that to defend retributive ju... more In his paper, "Restoration and Retribution," 1 Antony Duff contends that to defend retributive justice it is not incompatible with defending restorative justice. He maintains that a restorative view is right to insist that responses to crime should be restorative and that retributivists are also right to demand that offenders suffer the punishments they deserve. Yet, Duff makes the further claim that restoration is not merely compatible with retribution: it requires retribution. I offer an objection to Duff's account of restorative justice and argue that, contrary to his novel position, restoration does not necessarily require retribution. I show that in order for Duff's defense of the compatibility of restoration and retribution to succeed he would need to satisfactorily explain (i) the relevant role the offender's moral autonomy plays in fairly attributing desert, (ii) an understanding of retributive blame that is not irrational and that also does not hinder the offender's secular penance, and (iii) the necessity of expressing the negative reactive attitudes towards the offender for the sake of his moral repair.
According to the control-based account of blame an agent A is blameworthy for X-ing iff doing X w... more According to the control-based account of blame an agent A is blameworthy for X-ing iff doing X was morally wrong and A was capable of i) understanding and ii) responding to the basic demands of morality when X-ing. But consider the notion of 'taking blame.' On this view, agent B takes the punishment that A deserves so that A does not have to suffer it. In this paper I will analyze the common thought that penal substitution of blame is subject to the decisive objection that it is morally wrong to express blame towards the innocent in place of the guilty. Although there is something generally right about this objection I will argue that when certain conditions are met the concept of vicarious agency is morally plausible, indeed, in some cases it can be morally praiseworthy. Minimally, when i) the wrongdoer cannot bear the blame that he deserves, ii) it is the case that someone will have to bear the blame, iii) someone else can carry the blame that is willing, and iv) the substitute's taking the blame enables the wrongdoer to be restored and creates trust and hope in a shared sense of value and moral responsibility. I hope to show that the idea of 'restoring' the wrongdoer can motivate the plausibility of the controversial substitutionary account of blame. What will follow is a provision of an initial sketch of an area in the ethics of blame that is underexplored in the literature, yet possibly reveals an appropriate modification to the strictness of the control-based account of blame. My main purpose is to use the following discussion to encourage further debate on normative questions surrounding vicarious agency.
Beneath this face that appears so impassive hell's tides continually run. And henceforth I will n... more Beneath this face that appears so impassive hell's tides continually run. And henceforth I will not deny them-for how can I deny myself? -Walt Whitman, "Autumn Rivulets" Abstract Imagine that you are the victim of a crime that seriously harms you. It is natural and normal that you be initially disposed to experience a range of emotions in response to how you were mistreated. It is understandable to react with the blaming attitudes of anger and resentment towards the wrongdoer. But now imagine, so far as you can, becoming fully aware of the facts that the wrongdoer's action was the result of a very brutal upbringing.
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Book Reviews by Jason Cruze
Papers by Jason Cruze
In a recent article J. Daryl Charles argues that a neurobiological account of morality is significantly limited. Although there is something right about this claim, it’s unclear what Charles thinks that neuroscience tells us about our ability to make moral judgments and to be held blameworthy as moral agents. Regarding the true case of the stepfather (“Smith”) who became a pedophile, I argue, against Charles, that it reveals the crucial role that the prefontral cortex plays in the regulation of moral behavior. I offer additional evidence that brain damage does indeed encroach on our moral capacities and that in the case of Smith, it is unreasonable to hold him morally blameworthy. Indeed, given Smith’s inability to comply with the norms of moral obligation, the reactive attitudes in this case are not appropriately fitting nor necessary to hold Smith accountable.
In a recent article J. Daryl Charles argues that a neurobiological account of morality is significantly limited. Although there is something right about this claim, it’s unclear what Charles thinks that neuroscience tells us about our ability to make moral judgments and to be held blameworthy as moral agents. Regarding the true case of the stepfather (“Smith”) who became a pedophile, I argue, against Charles, that it reveals the crucial role that the prefontral cortex plays in the regulation of moral behavior. I offer additional evidence that brain damage does indeed encroach on our moral capacities and that in the case of Smith, it is unreasonable to hold him morally blameworthy. Indeed, given Smith’s inability to comply with the norms of moral obligation, the reactive attitudes in this case are not appropriately fitting nor necessary to hold Smith accountable.