Julien Murzi

University of Salzburg, Philosophy (KGW), Faculty Member

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Department für Philosophie, Religionswissenschaft und Wissenschaftstheorie, Visiting fellow

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I am an Assistant Professor at the University of Salzburg, Austria. Before moving to Salzburg, I was a lecturer at the University of Kent (2012-2015) and post-doctoral researcher at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy (2010-2012). I have two PhDs in Philosophy: one from the University of Sheffield (2010) and one from the University of Rome, La Sapienza (2008). As a PhD student, I was a visiting student at St Louis University (2005) and at the University of St Andrews (2006, 2008, 2009-10). Before all of this, I used to be a cellist. I am passionate about logic, philosophy of logic, epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and mountains.
Supervisors: Bob Hale and Dominic Gregory

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Johannes Zachhuber

University of Oxford

Daniel D. Hutto

University of Wollongong

Ole T Hjortland

University of Bergen

Galen Strawson

The University of Texas at Austin

John Corcoran

SUNY: University at Buffalo

David Seamon

Kansas State University

Shaun Gallagher

University of Memphis

Louis de Saussure

University of Neuchâtel

Armando Marques-Guedes

UNL - New University of Lisbon

Stephen Yablo

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

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Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language

The Paradox of Idealization

A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, purports to show ... more A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, purports to show that all truths are knowable only if all truths are known.1 This is the Paradox of Knowability. If we take it, quite plausibly, that we are not omniscient, the proof appears to undermine metaphysical doctrines committed to the knowability of truth, such as semantic anti-realism. Since its rediscovery by Hart and McGinn (1976), many solutions to the paradox have been offered. In this article, we present a new proof to the effect that not all truths are knowable, which rests on different assump-tions from those of the original argument published by Fitch. We highlight the general form of the knowability paradoxes, and argue that anti-realists who favour either an hierarchical or an intuitionistic approach to the Paradox of Knowability are confronted with a dilemma: they must either give up anti-realism or opt for a highly controversial interpretation of the principle that every truth is kn...

Intuitionism and logical revision

The topic of this thesis is logical revision: should we revise the canons of classical reasoning ... more The topic of this thesis is logical revision: should we revise the canons of classical reasoning in favour of a weaker logic, such as intuitionistic logic? In the first part of the thesis, I consider two metaphysical arguments against the classical Law of Excluded Middle-arguments whose main premise is the metaphysical claim that truth is knowable. I argue that the first argument, the Basic Revisionary Argument, validates a parallel argument for a conclusion that is unwelcome to classicists and intuitionists alike: that the dual of the Law of Excluded Middle, the Law of Non-Contradiction, is either unknown, or both known and not known to be true. As for the second argument, the Paradox of Knowability, I offer new reasons for thinking that adopting intuitionistic logic does not go to the heart of the matter. In the second part of the thesis, I motivate an inferentialist framework for assessing competing logics-one on which the meaning of the logical vocabulary is determined by the ru...

Julien Murzi

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