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Marc Bobro

Santa Barbara City College, Philosophy Department, Department Member

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Graduate of Univ. of Arizona (BA), King's College London (MA), and Univ. of Washington (PhD). I am Professor of Philosophy and Honors Program Director at Santa Barbara City College and regularly teach Modern Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Introduction to Ethics, Philosophy of Art, and Logic. And when not teaching, you can find me working on papers in early modern philosophy, biking, playing bass, synths, theremin, and euphonium with Sink to the Sea, Department of Electrophilosophy, or collaborating on art with Elizabeth Folk.
Supervisors: Ken Clatterbaugh, Robert Coburn, David Keyt, and Cass Weller

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Papers by Marc Bobro

Dialogue and Writing Philosophy

Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis, 2020

“Dialogue” combines the Greek dia (“across”) with logos (“word” or “speech”) to mean a mutual exc... more “Dialogue” combines the Greek dia (“across”) with logos (“word” or “speech”) to mean a mutual exchange of meaning across space and time. A dialogue involves two or more entities in communication with each other, taking turns in some physical or conceptual space that separates and distinguishes these entities. The discipline of philosophy is no stranger to the dialogue form. Philosophers certainly read many dialogues in their training and still assign them for students to read. However, philosophers today rarely write dialogues themselves or ask students to write them. Philosophy, along with most other academic disciplines, has moved away from the form. Straight, expository prose is now the standard for academic writing in and out of the classroom. Except in creative and play writing classes, the dialogue form is rarely used. Here I argue for its return, especially when it comes to student papers in philosophy.

Descartes' Meditations

1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 2018

A short synopsis of Descartes' _Meditations on First Philosophy_. I've tried to capture the main ... more

Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason

1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 2018

Imagine that your bicycle keeps dropping its chain. Annoyed, you take it to the local bike shop t... more Imagine that your bicycle keeps dropping its chain. Annoyed, you take it to the local bike shop to determine the cause in order to fix the problem. The bike mechanic then informs you that the problem cannot be fixed because there is no reason why your bike drops its chain. It just does. It’s not that the cause of the chain dropping has yet to be determined; it’s that there is no cause. Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) entails that the bike mechanic’s claim is patently false. “No fact can hold or be real, and no proposition can be true, unless there is a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.” There are no “brute” facts, no uncaused events, and no truths without reason. This essay will discuss Leibniz’s PSR, why he believes it to be true, its various applications, and its place in contemporary metaphysics.

Rating Rate My Professors

whatleibnizneverdid.wordpress.com, 2018

Occasionally I peruse the largest and most ubiquitous site for anonymous college and university s... more Occasionally I peruse the largest and most ubiquitous site for anonymous college and university students to submit ratings for their professors—the for-profit RateMyProfessors.com. I have a love-hate relationship with the site. My ratings are generally good, so I have no particular bone to pick, and the site is certainly good at tracking the outliers, namely, the most popular professors as well as the seriously unpopular ones. In other words, it is excellent at tracking " likeability. " It is less than accurate, however, when it comes to measuring which professors are actually good at their job, even while the site explicitly instructs student reviewers that they " discuss the professor's professional abilities including teaching style and ability to convey the material clearly. " What follows is my review of Rate My Professors (hereafter RMP). Based on studies, anecdotes, and my personal experience, I find three flaws. First, the percentage of student reviews on RMP versus classes taken is vanishingly small. I've probably had 8,000 students since RMP began and only 101 reviews on Rate My Professors. That's a student response rate of a little over 1%, certainly not a statistically significant or representative sample. Student evaluations administered internally by colleges are considered unhelpful if they go under even a 50% response rate. Second, positive reviews and ratings can easily be multiplied. Some professors give extra credit for rave academic reviews as well as " hot " ratings, as represented by RMP's famous chili pepper. I had a colleague who bragged about getting students to do this. Professors can even give themselves great ratings; they can rate themselves from their own computer as many times as they like. Just delete the RMP files from the cache and cookies from the browser. Some have set up contests with their colleagues to see who can write the best ratings for themselves and for each other. Well-placed misspellings and awkward grammar are included for an even more convincing fantastic bogus rating. (There's a Chronicle of Higher Education article on this very topic.)

Kings don't want to be pheasants: Some thoughts on writing philosophy

whatleibnizneverdid.wordpress.com

“Writing is cheaper than therapy or drugs” (Roxane Gay). Writing can be more pleasurable, too. Th... more “Writing is cheaper than therapy or drugs” (Roxane Gay). Writing can be more pleasurable, too. The operative phrase here is of course “can be.” Analogous to the playing of a musical instrument, following certain guidelines allows the author to write, paradoxically enough, more freely, and therefore more confidently and pleasurably. What follows are some of my guidelines on writing, specifically with regard to writing argumentative essays.

Leibniz on Causation

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jan 1, 2017

In this entry, I sketch Leibniz's positive theory of causation. I try not to argue "under a banne... more In this entry, I sketch Leibniz's positive theory of causation. I try not to argue "under a banner," since this is an encyclopedia entry. However, since there is no "standard" interpretation of intrasubstantial (immanent monadic) causation, I do in a way argue for an interpretation that I find the most textually defensible—an interpretation in which both final, formal, and efficient causes feature prominently in Leibniz's account.

Leibnizian Causes (Conceptual Map)

A conceptual or hierarchical map of the different kinds of causes featured in Leibniz's metaphysi... more

The Optimistic Science of Leibniz

The New Atlantis, 2014

The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is chiefly remembered today, when he is remembered at a... more The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is chiefly remembered today, when he is remembered at all, for two reasons. First, he invented the calculus — independently, most scholars now agree, of its other inventor Newton. And second, he authored the provocative statement that this world is “the best of all possible worlds.” This claim was famously lampooned in Voltaire’s 1759 satire Candide, in which the title character, “stunned, stupefied, despairing, bleeding, trembling, said to himself: — If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like?” Leibniz’s posthumous reputation, already marred by the accusation he had plagiarized Newton’s calculus, never recovered from Voltaire’s mockery. Yet Leibniz is one of the most impressive figures in the history of modern science, mathematics, and philosophy. It seems impossible that one individual could accomplish all that he did. The diversity of Leibniz’s interests and undertakings is dizzying. How are we to make sense of a man who contributed prominently to so many fields, including both religion and science? In our day, it is common to think especially of religion and science as either pulling in opposing directions in their respective understandings of the world, or as parallel but different domains. How did they hang together for Leibniz?

Some Students are Satanists: Religion in the Philosophy Classroom

American Philosophical Association Blog, 2017

Talking about religion in a philosophy classroom is not a simple proposition. Here, I consider wh... more

Hume's Image Problem

Philosophy Now, 2011

David Hume believed that the mind represents the world by having contents that resemble it, such ... more David Hume believed that the mind represents the world by having contents that resemble it, such as having images of it. This way of thinking about thinking has been called imagism. But, as Bertrand Russell and his friend Ludwig Wittgenstein noted much later, the same images can resemble different things, and may be variously interpreted. Such potential image ambiguity could be a serious problem for Hume. My aim here is not to defend imagism as a theory, but to determine how, if at all, Hume could defend his imagism in response to this potential ambiguity.

Link above to paper.

Leibniz on Concurrence and Efficient Causation

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 2008

To what and/or whom do we causally owe our action? Renaissance and early modern theists offered t... more To what and/or whom do we causally owe our action? Renaissance and early modern theists offered three very different answers to this question: occasionalism, mere conservationism, and concurrentism. Nicolas Malebranche, among others, defended occasionalism, the view that God is the only causal agent in nature. We do not causally contribute to our own action. Durandus de Saint–Pourçain defended mere conservationism, the view that God’s causal contribution, at least in the ordinary development of nature, consists “merely” in the creation and conservation of created substances along with their causal capacities and powers. And it is we who bring about or produce changes of states in ourselves. Leibniz himself defended concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work greatly downplays the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This paper argues against such a view; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his "mature" years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances as efficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances.

Is Leibniz’s Theory of Personal Identity Coherent?

Leibniz Society Review, 1999

In her influential 1976 article, "Leibniz: Self-Consciousness and Immortality In the Paris Notes... more In her influential 1976 article, "Leibniz: Self-Consciousness and Immortality In
the Paris Notes and After," Margaret Wilson argues that Leibniz's mature theory of personal identity is incoherent. In this paper, I shall consider the several ways in which interpreters, since 1976, have attempted to challenge the premises of Wilson's argument, and so have tried to rescue Leibniz's theory from Wilson's charge of incoherence. I shall argue that only one of these ways stands any chance of being successful.

Self and substance in Leibniz (Book)

Springer, Jan 1, 2004

"We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all poss... more "We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all possible worlds, yet do not causally interact. So what are we? Leibniz is known for many things, including the ideality of space and time, calculus, plans for a universal language, theodicy, and ecumenism. But he is not known for his ideas on the self and personal identity. This book shows that Leibniz offers an original, internally coherent theory of personal identity, a theory that stands on its own even next to Locke's contemporaneous and more famous version. This book will appeal not only to students of Leibniz's thought but also to philosophers and psychologists interested in methodological problems in understanding or formulating theories of self and personal identity.

Folktales and Philosophy for Children

Thinking machines and moral agency in Leibniz's Nouveaux essais

Studia Leibnitiana, 1998

Doting on the Beyond: Descartes and the Promise of Immortality

A critique of Descartes' account of immortality. (Draft only. Do not cite.)

Consolation and Cartesian Immortality

Faith and Philosophy, 2003

Like many other Christian philosophers, past and present, Descartes envisions an "afterlife" for ... more Like many other Christian philosophers, past and present, Descartes envisions an "afterlife" for the soul after bodily death. Some, including Geach, Strawson and Williams, have argued that the afterlife Descartes envisions is far from the attractive state heaven is supposed to be. Others, including Leibniz, Russier, and Cottingham, have argued that a Cartesian afterlife represents a state of existence that cannot even be rationally desired. But I shall argue in this paper that both criticisms fail to appreciate fully the details of Descartes' doctrine of immortality.

Prudence and the Concern to Survive in Leibniz's Doctrine of Immortality

History of Philosophy Quarterly, Jan 1, 1998

This article examines Leibniz's claim in the "Discourse on Metaphysics" and elsewhere that we, as... more This article examines Leibniz's claim in the "Discourse on Metaphysics" and elsewhere that we, as persons, would have no reason to desire a future state of survival if that state did not guarantee the memory or knowledge of what we have been. It begins by placing Leibniz's claim in the context of the contemporary debate among personal identity theorists on what makes survival meaningful to us. This article ends by evaluating the main argument for Leibniz's claim, never losing sight of the fact that Leibniz's ultimate concern is with the kind of immortality God would bestow upon us.

Leibniz on Embodiment and the Moral Order

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 1999

Leibniz consistently maintains that the human soul is not reducible to a body but does not surviv... more Leibniz consistently maintains that the human soul is not reducible to a body but does not survive without it. But if not reducible to body, why must a soul be embodied at all? Two answers have been routinely identified in the corpus of Leibniz's writings: embodiment follows in virtue of the imperfection of all created substances; and, embodiment is a condition of the individuality of created substances. This paper seeks to articulate a third answer: embodiment is a condition of the moral order of created substances.

Unpacking the monad: Leibniz's theory of causality

The Monist, Jan 1, 1996

Apart from God, what "causes" the change in the perceptions of monads? The literature contains th... more Apart from God, what "causes" the change in the perceptions of monads? The literature contains three interpretations that have been advanced to explain this change: the "conceptual unfolding view" locates the source of change in the monad's individual concept; the "efficacious perception view" says that the cause of each perception is to be found in previous perceptions; and the "monadic agency view" claims that perceptual changes are caused by the monad's primitive active force. This paper defends the third account, for only it adequately grounds Leibniz's distinctions between reasons and causes, natural and miraculous perceptions, and real and apparent causality. (Co-authored with Kenneth Clatterbaugh.)

Dialogue and Writing Philosophy

Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis, 2020

“Dialogue” combines the Greek dia (“across”) with logos (“word” or “speech”) to mean a mutual exc... more “Dialogue” combines the Greek dia (“across”) with logos (“word” or “speech”) to mean a mutual exchange of meaning across space and time. A dialogue involves two or more entities in communication with each other, taking turns in some physical or conceptual space that separates and distinguishes these entities. The discipline of philosophy is no stranger to the dialogue form. Philosophers certainly read many dialogues in their training and still assign them for students to read. However, philosophers today rarely write dialogues themselves or ask students to write them. Philosophy, along with most other academic disciplines, has moved away from the form. Straight, expository prose is now the standard for academic writing in and out of the classroom. Except in creative and play writing classes, the dialogue form is rarely used. Here I argue for its return, especially when it comes to student papers in philosophy.

Descartes' Meditations

1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 2018

A short synopsis of Descartes' _Meditations on First Philosophy_. I've tried to capture the main ... more

Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason

1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 2018

Imagine that your bicycle keeps dropping its chain. Annoyed, you take it to the local bike shop t... more Imagine that your bicycle keeps dropping its chain. Annoyed, you take it to the local bike shop to determine the cause in order to fix the problem. The bike mechanic then informs you that the problem cannot be fixed because there is no reason why your bike drops its chain. It just does. It’s not that the cause of the chain dropping has yet to be determined; it’s that there is no cause. Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) entails that the bike mechanic’s claim is patently false. “No fact can hold or be real, and no proposition can be true, unless there is a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.” There are no “brute” facts, no uncaused events, and no truths without reason. This essay will discuss Leibniz’s PSR, why he believes it to be true, its various applications, and its place in contemporary metaphysics.

Rating Rate My Professors

whatleibnizneverdid.wordpress.com, 2018

Occasionally I peruse the largest and most ubiquitous site for anonymous college and university s... more Occasionally I peruse the largest and most ubiquitous site for anonymous college and university students to submit ratings for their professors—the for-profit RateMyProfessors.com. I have a love-hate relationship with the site. My ratings are generally good, so I have no particular bone to pick, and the site is certainly good at tracking the outliers, namely, the most popular professors as well as the seriously unpopular ones. In other words, it is excellent at tracking " likeability. " It is less than accurate, however, when it comes to measuring which professors are actually good at their job, even while the site explicitly instructs student reviewers that they " discuss the professor's professional abilities including teaching style and ability to convey the material clearly. " What follows is my review of Rate My Professors (hereafter RMP). Based on studies, anecdotes, and my personal experience, I find three flaws. First, the percentage of student reviews on RMP versus classes taken is vanishingly small. I've probably had 8,000 students since RMP began and only 101 reviews on Rate My Professors. That's a student response rate of a little over 1%, certainly not a statistically significant or representative sample. Student evaluations administered internally by colleges are considered unhelpful if they go under even a 50% response rate. Second, positive reviews and ratings can easily be multiplied. Some professors give extra credit for rave academic reviews as well as " hot " ratings, as represented by RMP's famous chili pepper. I had a colleague who bragged about getting students to do this. Professors can even give themselves great ratings; they can rate themselves from their own computer as many times as they like. Just delete the RMP files from the cache and cookies from the browser. Some have set up contests with their colleagues to see who can write the best ratings for themselves and for each other. Well-placed misspellings and awkward grammar are included for an even more convincing fantastic bogus rating. (There's a Chronicle of Higher Education article on this very topic.)

Kings don't want to be pheasants: Some thoughts on writing philosophy

whatleibnizneverdid.wordpress.com

“Writing is cheaper than therapy or drugs” (Roxane Gay). Writing can be more pleasurable, too. Th... more “Writing is cheaper than therapy or drugs” (Roxane Gay). Writing can be more pleasurable, too. The operative phrase here is of course “can be.” Analogous to the playing of a musical instrument, following certain guidelines allows the author to write, paradoxically enough, more freely, and therefore more confidently and pleasurably. What follows are some of my guidelines on writing, specifically with regard to writing argumentative essays.

Leibniz on Causation

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jan 1, 2017

In this entry, I sketch Leibniz's positive theory of causation. I try not to argue "under a banne... more In this entry, I sketch Leibniz's positive theory of causation. I try not to argue "under a banner," since this is an encyclopedia entry. However, since there is no "standard" interpretation of intrasubstantial (immanent monadic) causation, I do in a way argue for an interpretation that I find the most textually defensible—an interpretation in which both final, formal, and efficient causes feature prominently in Leibniz's account.

Leibnizian Causes (Conceptual Map)

A conceptual or hierarchical map of the different kinds of causes featured in Leibniz's metaphysi... more

The Optimistic Science of Leibniz

The New Atlantis, 2014

The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is chiefly remembered today, when he is remembered at a... more The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is chiefly remembered today, when he is remembered at all, for two reasons. First, he invented the calculus — independently, most scholars now agree, of its other inventor Newton. And second, he authored the provocative statement that this world is “the best of all possible worlds.” This claim was famously lampooned in Voltaire’s 1759 satire Candide, in which the title character, “stunned, stupefied, despairing, bleeding, trembling, said to himself: — If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like?” Leibniz’s posthumous reputation, already marred by the accusation he had plagiarized Newton’s calculus, never recovered from Voltaire’s mockery. Yet Leibniz is one of the most impressive figures in the history of modern science, mathematics, and philosophy. It seems impossible that one individual could accomplish all that he did. The diversity of Leibniz’s interests and undertakings is dizzying. How are we to make sense of a man who contributed prominently to so many fields, including both religion and science? In our day, it is common to think especially of religion and science as either pulling in opposing directions in their respective understandings of the world, or as parallel but different domains. How did they hang together for Leibniz?

Some Students are Satanists: Religion in the Philosophy Classroom

American Philosophical Association Blog, 2017

Talking about religion in a philosophy classroom is not a simple proposition. Here, I consider wh... more

Hume's Image Problem

Philosophy Now, 2011

David Hume believed that the mind represents the world by having contents that resemble it, such ... more David Hume believed that the mind represents the world by having contents that resemble it, such as having images of it. This way of thinking about thinking has been called imagism. But, as Bertrand Russell and his friend Ludwig Wittgenstein noted much later, the same images can resemble different things, and may be variously interpreted. Such potential image ambiguity could be a serious problem for Hume. My aim here is not to defend imagism as a theory, but to determine how, if at all, Hume could defend his imagism in response to this potential ambiguity.

Link above to paper.

Leibniz on Concurrence and Efficient Causation

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 2008

To what and/or whom do we causally owe our action? Renaissance and early modern theists offered t... more To what and/or whom do we causally owe our action? Renaissance and early modern theists offered three very different answers to this question: occasionalism, mere conservationism, and concurrentism. Nicolas Malebranche, among others, defended occasionalism, the view that God is the only causal agent in nature. We do not causally contribute to our own action. Durandus de Saint–Pourçain defended mere conservationism, the view that God’s causal contribution, at least in the ordinary development of nature, consists “merely” in the creation and conservation of created substances along with their causal capacities and powers. And it is we who bring about or produce changes of states in ourselves. Leibniz himself defended concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work greatly downplays the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This paper argues against such a view; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his "mature" years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances as efficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances.

Is Leibniz’s Theory of Personal Identity Coherent?

Leibniz Society Review, 1999

In her influential 1976 article, "Leibniz: Self-Consciousness and Immortality In the Paris Notes... more In her influential 1976 article, "Leibniz: Self-Consciousness and Immortality In
the Paris Notes and After," Margaret Wilson argues that Leibniz's mature theory of personal identity is incoherent. In this paper, I shall consider the several ways in which interpreters, since 1976, have attempted to challenge the premises of Wilson's argument, and so have tried to rescue Leibniz's theory from Wilson's charge of incoherence. I shall argue that only one of these ways stands any chance of being successful.

Self and substance in Leibniz (Book)

Springer, Jan 1, 2004

"We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all poss... more "We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all possible worlds, yet do not causally interact. So what are we? Leibniz is known for many things, including the ideality of space and time, calculus, plans for a universal language, theodicy, and ecumenism. But he is not known for his ideas on the self and personal identity. This book shows that Leibniz offers an original, internally coherent theory of personal identity, a theory that stands on its own even next to Locke's contemporaneous and more famous version. This book will appeal not only to students of Leibniz's thought but also to philosophers and psychologists interested in methodological problems in understanding or formulating theories of self and personal identity.

Folktales and Philosophy for Children

Thinking machines and moral agency in Leibniz's Nouveaux essais

Studia Leibnitiana, 1998

Doting on the Beyond: Descartes and the Promise of Immortality

A critique of Descartes' account of immortality. (Draft only. Do not cite.)

Consolation and Cartesian Immortality

Faith and Philosophy, 2003

Like many other Christian philosophers, past and present, Descartes envisions an "afterlife" for ... more Like many other Christian philosophers, past and present, Descartes envisions an "afterlife" for the soul after bodily death. Some, including Geach, Strawson and Williams, have argued that the afterlife Descartes envisions is far from the attractive state heaven is supposed to be. Others, including Leibniz, Russier, and Cottingham, have argued that a Cartesian afterlife represents a state of existence that cannot even be rationally desired. But I shall argue in this paper that both criticisms fail to appreciate fully the details of Descartes' doctrine of immortality.

Prudence and the Concern to Survive in Leibniz's Doctrine of Immortality

History of Philosophy Quarterly, Jan 1, 1998

This article examines Leibniz's claim in the "Discourse on Metaphysics" and elsewhere that we, as... more This article examines Leibniz's claim in the "Discourse on Metaphysics" and elsewhere that we, as persons, would have no reason to desire a future state of survival if that state did not guarantee the memory or knowledge of what we have been. It begins by placing Leibniz's claim in the context of the contemporary debate among personal identity theorists on what makes survival meaningful to us. This article ends by evaluating the main argument for Leibniz's claim, never losing sight of the fact that Leibniz's ultimate concern is with the kind of immortality God would bestow upon us.

Leibniz on Embodiment and the Moral Order

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 1999

Leibniz consistently maintains that the human soul is not reducible to a body but does not surviv... more Leibniz consistently maintains that the human soul is not reducible to a body but does not survive without it. But if not reducible to body, why must a soul be embodied at all? Two answers have been routinely identified in the corpus of Leibniz's writings: embodiment follows in virtue of the imperfection of all created substances; and, embodiment is a condition of the individuality of created substances. This paper seeks to articulate a third answer: embodiment is a condition of the moral order of created substances.

Unpacking the monad: Leibniz's theory of causality

The Monist, Jan 1, 1996

Apart from God, what "causes" the change in the perceptions of monads? The literature contains th... more Apart from God, what "causes" the change in the perceptions of monads? The literature contains three interpretations that have been advanced to explain this change: the "conceptual unfolding view" locates the source of change in the monad's individual concept; the "efficacious perception view" says that the cause of each perception is to be found in previous perceptions; and the "monadic agency view" claims that perceptual changes are caused by the monad's primitive active force. This paper defends the third account, for only it adequately grounds Leibniz's distinctions between reasons and causes, natural and miraculous perceptions, and real and apparent causality. (Co-authored with Kenneth Clatterbaugh.)

Ethics Podcast

Soundcloud, 2018

Podcast episodes on contemporary moral issues, including world aid, animal rights, vegetarianism,... more

Where are the Women Philosophers? An Unsolicited Book Review of Justin E.H. Smith's The Philosopher: A History in 6 Types

whatleibnizneverdid.wordpress.com, 2018

Julia Jorati's Leibniz on Causation and Agency

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews , 2017

Works in the history of philosophy, including book-length interpretations of Leibniz's thought, t... more Works in the history of philosophy, including book-length interpretations of Leibniz's thought, typically adopt one of two approaches. At one extreme is the " fossil bed " approach whose sole aim is to determine what a dead philosopher thought. There is no real attempt to judge its philosophical merits and especially not to relate its ideas to current developments. This is historical history of philosophy. Daniel Garber's books come to mind. At the other extreme, there is philosophical history of philosophy. Such works are not especially concerned with getting a philosopher right, but to determine whether that philosopher was right. Jonathan Bennett's books represent this tendency. Julia Jorati's book on Leibniz seems a perfect blend of these two approaches: history with philosophy. To my mind, the most compelling feature of Jorati's book is her case that not only does Leibniz have a complex and persuasive philosophy of action, but also offers an account that is actually relevant for the current debate on human agency. Yet she does not mortise Leibniz into some preferred theory of action. The book combines a very careful attempt to get Leibniz right with a recognition that the historical Leibniz gets the philosophy right as well. However, this third approach carries with it its own obstacles and if I have any reservations about Jorati's otherwise excellent book, they are along these lines.

Review of The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz

Auslegung, 1996

A review in Auslegung of The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, edited by Nicholas Jolley, a year af... more

"What, if anything, does God owe to humans? Stanislaw Lem on intelligent beings and their creators in Cyberiad, Memoirs of a Space Traveler, and A Perfect Vacuum"

Sci-Fi Conference, Univ. of Southern Maine

Stanislaw Lem's science fiction addresses many philosophical issues. This paper focuses on one th... more Stanislaw Lem's science fiction addresses many philosophical issues. This paper focuses on one that finds special emphasis in Lem's writings: the relationship between intelligent beings and their creators. Attempts to address this issue obviously have implications for the traditional philosophical question of what, if anything, do human beings owe to their supposed creator, namely, God. In Lem's hands, we must also ask the converse: What, if anything, does God owe to humans? Stories in three of Lem's books—Cyberiad, Memoirs of a Space Traveler, and A Perfect Vacuum—have much to say in answer to these questions. His answer seems to be that neither party owes the other much, if at all. Stanislaw Lem's science fiction addresses many philosophical issues, including: the difference between the proper, benevolent use of science and the mad, obsessive use of science; the connection between technological progress and happiness; whether there are or could be non-human intelligent beings; the possibility of thinking machines and their nature; the ethical approach to space exploration; and whether certain objects of desire, such as eternity and immortality, should be desired. This paper focuses on an issue that finds special emphasis in Lem's writings: the relationship between intelligent beings and their creators. Attempts to address this issue obviously have implications for the standard philosophical problem of what, if anything, do human beings owe to their supposed creator, namely, God. In Lem's hands, we must also ask the converse: What, if anything, does God owe to humans? Stories in three of Lem's books—Cyberiad, Memoirs of a Space Traveler, and A Perfect Vacuum—have much to say in answer to these questions. His answer seems to be that neither party owes the other much, if at all. We don't owe God, and God should stay out of our lives.