The deflationist about truth is committed to a triviality or transparency thesis: the content of ... more The deflationist about truth is committed to a triviality or transparency thesis: the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of the truth-schema [P] is true iff P (where `[P]' stands for any declarative propositional object and `P' stands for `[P]'s ...
On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propo... more On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (1986, 1988, 1996) and have recently affirmed the a priori infallibility of some category (ii) propositions. In this paper, I take aim at rationalist infallibilism by calling into question the a priori infallibility of both analytic and synthetic propositions. The upshot will be twofold: first, rationalist infallibilism unsurprisingly emerges as a defective epistemological doctrine, and second, more importantly, the case for the a priori infallibility of one or both categories of propositions turns out to lack cogency.
Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a triv... more Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a trivial concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I first situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative-the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is trivial concept but not a property). I then outline and appraise two of the primary challenges facing minimalism. Finally, based on this discussion, I draw some conclusions concerning the soundness and stability of minimalism.
The nativist view of language holds that the principal foundation of linguistic competence is an ... more The nativist view of language holds that the principal foundation of linguistic competence is an innate faculty of linguistic cognition. In this paper, close scrutiny is given to nativism's fundamental commitments in the area of metaphysics. In the course of this exploration it is argued that any minimally defensible variety of nativism is, for better or worse, committed to two theses: linguistic competence is grounded in a faculty of linguistic cognition that is (i) embodied and (ii) whose operating rules are represented in the neurophysiology of human language users.
The deflationist about truth is committed to a triviality or transparency thesis: the content of ... more The deflationist about truth is committed to a triviality or transparency thesis: the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of the truth-schema [P] is true iff P (where `[P]' stands for any declarative propositional object and `P' stands for `[P]'s ...
On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propo... more On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (1986, 1988, 1996) and have recently affirmed the a priori infallibility of some category (ii) propositions. In this paper, I take aim at rationalist infallibilism by calling into question the a priori infallibility of both analytic and synthetic propositions. The upshot will be twofold: first, rationalist infallibilism unsurprisingly emerges as a defective epistemological doctrine, and second, more importantly, the case for the a priori infallibility of one or both categories of propositions turns out to lack cogency.
Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a triv... more Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a trivial concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I first situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative-the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is trivial concept but not a property). I then outline and appraise two of the primary challenges facing minimalism. Finally, based on this discussion, I draw some conclusions concerning the soundness and stability of minimalism.
The nativist view of language holds that the principal foundation of linguistic competence is an ... more The nativist view of language holds that the principal foundation of linguistic competence is an innate faculty of linguistic cognition. In this paper, close scrutiny is given to nativism's fundamental commitments in the area of metaphysics. In the course of this exploration it is argued that any minimally defensible variety of nativism is, for better or worse, committed to two theses: linguistic competence is grounded in a faculty of linguistic cognition that is (i) embodied and (ii) whose operating rules are represented in the neurophysiology of human language users.
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Papers by Glen Hoffmann