Complete Issues by Camilla Colombo
American Journal of Bioethics
Rivista di Filosofia, 2023
Sistemi Intelligenti, 2022
Our study aims to investigate the role of motor and rational cues in driving interpersonal coordi... more Our study aims to investigate the role of motor and rational cues in driving interpersonal coordination. On one side, there is plenty of evidence that people may take advantage of motor representations to understand others’ action; on the other side, agents involved in strategic interactions are expected to act rationally. What if motor cues and rationality are conflicting when we have to predict (and accordingly adjust with) our partner’s action?To answer this question, we used an online cooperative game with a (fictional) partner, who could either behave rationally (choosing a high reward) or irrationally (choosing a low reward). Participants were instructed to achieve coordination with their partner in order to obtain a monetary reward, based on their success in coordinating upon high or low reward. Importantly, participants could observe part of the kinematic or the partner’s action, indicating if the partner would choose high or low reward. Our results show that rational thinking drives decision making when motor cues are not informative about the partner’s action. Conversely, when motor cues are informative, participants are ready to coordinate even upon low reward.
Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory th... more Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of 'belief-less reasoning', a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated meta-representation.
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, 2021
This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to fr... more This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to framing effects in the famous BAsian flu^ case. It argues that, alongside with their Bloss/ no gain effect^ account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empirical data, amounts to a more reasonable psychological explanation for the preference reversal. Specifically , my hypothesis is that shifts in the baseline induce shifts in the agents' classification of the same action as Bdoing harm^ rather than Ballowing harm to occur^, and that people are risk-seeking when it comes to avoid causing extra deaths–doing harm–and risk-averse when it comes to preventing more deaths–by the means of allowing other deaths to occur as a side effect. I then survey the two most influential concurrent accounts in the moral literature, with respect to the relation between the loss/no gain and the doing/allowing distinction: Horowitz's reductionist conclusion, which argues that the latter collapses into the former, and Kamm's rebuttal, which claims instead that the two distinctions can be pulled apart. I eventually explain why my interpretation differs from both these positions.
The precautionary principle (PP) roughly recommends that we make careful decisions about how to a... more The precautionary principle (PP) roughly recommends that we make careful decisions about how to act, especially where long-term human well-being is at stake, and where we face uncertainty that is more or less severe about the decision problem at hand. Not surprisingly, there has been much controversy about how this maxim for decision-making should be cashed out, and whether it provides any new, concrete guidance at all. Some argue that the PP is merely a ragbag of wisdom about appropriate values, beliefs, and decision rules governing the choice of how to act in any given circumstance. Moreover, when it comes to decision rules for negotiating uncertainty, there seems to be internal division as to whether the PP merely promotes the orthodox ('expected value') rule, or rather sides with a more controversial rule that gives extra emphasis, in evaluating acts, to the worst-case scenarios. Detractors argue that, either way, there are problems: the former 'weak' interpretation is vacuous, while the latter 'strong' interpretation is inconsistent. Against this criticism, Steel seeks an account of the PP that is unified and coherent, yet still recognizably broad in content. Steel's strategy is to recast the 'weak' versus 'strong' divide rather as different, complementary levels of advice for negotiating uncertainty (Chapters 1–2). Moreover, he fleshes out Brit.
The urgent and dramatic need to introduce and promote a vaccine against smallpox, a scourge for s... more The urgent and dramatic need to introduce and promote a vaccine against smallpox, a scourge for society at the end of the 1700s, provided the occasion for a lively debate between Daniel Bernoulli and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. This article discusses the motivations and arguments of the dispute, illustrating the probabilistic model proposed by Bernoulli to justify the greater ''reasonableness'' of the campaign in favour of the vaccine, and the objections raised by d'Alembert. The aim of this analysis is, beginning with a reconstruction of the contributions of the two authors, to show how the newly founded ''art of conjecture'' was the object of divergent interpretations, from the characterisation of its theoretical principles, such as the concept of expectation, to the question of its legitimacy in applications as a ''guide to practical living''.
There are public projects which many people welcome because they are expected to be beneficial fo... more There are public projects which many people welcome because they are expected to be beneficial for society at large. On the other hand, however, these projects may generate larger negative externalities for certain parts of society. One example is the erection of a nuclear power-plant, a measure that is widely considered to render a country's energy provision less dependent on supply from outside. On the other hand, it possibly causes a feeling of insecurity among people who live in the vicinity of such a power station, and can furthermore have negative economic consequences in so far as the price of land and of houses may decline in this area. How should decisions on public projects with larger negative externalities be taken? Assuming that the benefits for all those who are directly or indirectly affected by such a project are roughly the same, a cost-sharing or burden-sharing method is proposed that focuses on a weighted difference between the economic performance of a particular region and the average performance of all regions concerned. The weight is to be determined by an impartial observer.
Nel giugno dello scorso anno, il SeLP organizzò due giornate di studio sulla Filosofia della Mate... more Nel giugno dello scorso anno, il SeLP organizzò due giornate di studio sulla Filosofia della Matematica presso l'Università degli studi di Milano. Da quella stimolante esperienza nacque una collaborazione con la nostra Redazione che portò al primo numero tematico di RIFAJ (RIFAJ 2:2 (2011)). In quell'occasione la rivista ospitò diversi articoli dedicati ad attuali tematiche di ricerca in Filosofia della Matematica, alcuni dei quali frutto proprio delle presentazioni tenutesi in quell'evento.
Papers by Camilla Colombo
Argumenta, 2024
Is doing harm morally worse than allowing it to occur? Our everyday intuitions, supported by a lo... more Is doing harm morally worse than allowing it to occur? Our everyday intuitions, supported by a long-standing tradition in moral philosophy, suggest that this is the case. Nonetheless, the study of framing effects and cognitive biases has pointed out that our intuitions over the doing/allowing distinction are far from robust and reliable. This line of research casts doubts over the adequacy of our intuitions in grounding the moral principle "doing is worse than allowing" and seems to downplay the doing/allowing distinction as a cognitive bias or as a byproduct of our flawed reasoning skills. In this paper, I take evidence about framing and biases as a serious threat to the doing/allowing distinction. However, if we aim to explain common-sense morality, we need to account for its widespread use. To keep these two insights together, I build a causal model of the distinction, based on Christopher Hitchcock's self-contained network account, which explains instances of attributions of these two labels. I conclude that the doing/allowing distinction can be better understood as a heuristic: in most cases, it helps us delivering quick moral judgements, but it can also misfire when cases are unfamiliar, underdescribed, or controversial.
Intuitively, an agent who does harm behaves differently from an agent who allows harm to happen. ... more Intuitively, an agent who does harm behaves differently from an agent who allows harm to happen. This thesis examines the distinction between doing harm and merely allowing it to occur. I argue that this distinction is morally relevant, and doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm, but that there is not always a fact of the matter how the distinction ought to be drawn. In Chapters 1 and 2, I survey the main alternative accounts for explaining the difference between “doing” and “allowing”. I compare causal approaches, which distinguish doing and allowing on the basis of how an agent caused an outcome, with “norm-based” accounts, which explain the distinction appealing to independent moral features. I conclude that a “mixed” causal account, such as Hitchcock's self-contained network model, is the most promising for tracking doing/allowing classifications. I then examine whether this distinction is morally relevant. I outline two theoretical hypotheses, the “positive” and...
Revue d'économie politique, 2018
Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Dalloz. © Dalloz. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. ... more Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Dalloz. © Dalloz. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, 2021
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2018
This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to fr... more This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to framing effects in the famous BAsian flu^case. It argues that, alongside with their Bloss/ no gain effect^account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empirical data, amounts to a more reasonable psychological explanation for the preference reversal. Specifically, my hypothesis is that shifts in the baseline induce shifts in the agents' classification of the same action as Bdoing harm^rather than Ballowing harm to occur^, and that people are risk-seeking when it comes to avoid causing extra deaths-doing harm-and risk-averse when it comes to preventing more deaths-by the means of allowing other deaths to occur as a side effect. I then survey the two most influential concurrent accounts in the moral literature, with respect to the relation between the loss/no gain and the doing/allowing distinction: Horowitz's reductionist conclusion, which argues that the latter collapses into the former, and Kamm's rebuttal, which claims instead that the two distinctions can be pulled apart. I eventually explain why my interpretation differs from both these positions.
Lettera Matematica, 2015
The urgent and dramatic need to introduce and promote a vaccine against smallpox, a scourge for s... more The urgent and dramatic need to introduce and promote a vaccine against smallpox, a scourge for society at the end of the 1700s, provided the occasion for a lively debate between Daniel Bernoulli and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. This article discusses the motivations and arguments of the dispute, illustrating the probabilistic model proposed by Bernoulli to justify the greater ''reasonableness'' of the campaign in favour of the vaccine, and the objections raised by d'Alembert. The aim of this analysis is, beginning with a reconstruction of the contributions of the two authors, to show how the newly founded ''art of conjecture'' was the object of divergent interpretations, from the characterisation of its theoretical principles, such as the concept of expectation, to the question of its legitimacy in applications as a ''guide to practical living''.
Philosophical Psychology, 2021
Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focus... more Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focusing on the case of coordination, and conjecture that people coordinate using a mode of reasoning that does not require the representation of others' beliefs. We compare this sort of belief-less reasoning with theories that appeal to limited meta-representation, and present evidence indicating that people employ both-with meta-representation being used less frequently in coordinative than in competitive tasks.
Erkenntnis, 2021
Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory th... more Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of 'belief-less reasoning', a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated meta-representation.
Philosophical Psychology
Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focus... more Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focusing on the case of coordination, and conjecture that people coordinate using a mode of reasoning that does not require the representation of others' beliefs. We compare this sort of belief-less reasoning with theories that appeal to limited meta-representation, and present evidence indicating that people employ both -- with meta-representation being used less frequently in coordinative than in competitive tasks.
Erkenntnis, 2021
Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory th... more Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of 'belief-less reasoning', a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated metarepresentation.
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Complete Issues by Camilla Colombo
Papers by Camilla Colombo