Papers by Timothy Perrine
Theoria, 2021
Many philosophers believe that true belief is of epistemic value, but that knowledge is of even m... more Many philosophers believe that true belief is of epistemic value, but that knowledge is of even more epistemic value. Some claim that this surplus value is instrumentally valuable to the value of true belief. I call the conjunction of these claims the Instrumentalist’s Conjunction. The so-called “Swamping Problem” is meant to show that Instrumentalist’s Conjunction is inconsistent. Crudely put, the problem is that if knowledge only has surplus value to the value of true belief, and a belief is true because known, then knowledge cannot be of any more value than true belief. Given the inconsistency, most philosopher reject the claim the surplus value of knowledge is instrumental to the value of true belief. This paper argues that the Swamping Problem is illusory. Once we clean up the problem and pay attention to the distinction between token/type properties, we can see that Instrumentalist’s Conjunction is perfectly coherent.
The Journal of Value Inquiry
According to Realism about Epistemic Value, there is such a thing as epistemic value and it is ap... more According to Realism about Epistemic Value, there is such a thing as epistemic value and it is appropriate to evaluate things—e.g., beliefs—for epistemic value because there is such a thing as epistemic value. Allan Hazlett's A Luxury of the Understanding is a sustained critique of Realism. Hazlett challenges proponent of Realism to answer explanatory questions while not justifiably violating certain constraints, including two proposed naturalistic constraints. Hazlett argues they cannot. Here I defend Realism. I argue that it is easy for proponents of Realism to answer Hazlett's explanatory questions. The interesting issue is whether those answers violate Hazlett's naturalistic constraints. My own view is that epistemic value is irreducible to natural properties; it thus violates Hazlett's proposed constraints. I argue that this is justifiable because Hazlett fails to convincingly motivate his naturalistic constraints and there is reason for thinking epistemic value is irreducible to natural properties anyway.
Sophia
Skeptical theism is a family of responses to arguments from evil. One important member of that fa... more Skeptical theism is a family of responses to arguments from evil. One important member of that family is Stephen Wykstra’s CORNEA-based criticism of William Rowe’s arguments from evil. A cornerstone of Wykstra’s approach is his CORNEA principle. However, a number of authors have criticized CORNEA on various grounds, including that it has odd results, it cannot do the work it was meant to, and it problematically conflicts with the so-called common sense epistemology. In this paper, I explicate and defend a CORNEA principle. After sketching a brief argument for it, I show how it can be acquitted of these recent charges.
Synthese
This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is... more This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue of false beliefs are, individually, plausible but, collectively, contradictory. My solution claims that sometimes false beliefs are epistemically valuable. I nonetheless show how my solution is not in deep tension with the Jamesian idea that true beliefs are epistemically valuable and false beliefs are epistemically disvaluable. I conclude by indicating how the results here are relevant to formulating and defending Veritism.
Episteme
This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the "Simpliciter Conception." On i... more This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the "Simpliciter Conception." On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasing popular views in meta-normativity.
International Philosophical Quarterly, 2021
This paper describes both an exegetical puzzle that lies at the heart of Frege's writings-how to ... more This paper describes both an exegetical puzzle that lies at the heart of Frege's writings-how to reconcile his logicism with his definitions and claims about his definitions-and two interpretations that try to resolve that puzzle, what I call the "explicative interpretation" and the "analysis interpretation." This paper defends the explicative interpretation primarily by criticizing the most careful and sophisticated defenses of the analysis interpretation, those given my Michael Dummett and Patricia Blanchette. Specifically, I argue that Frege's text either are inconsistent with the analysis interpretation or do not support it. I also defend the explicative interpretation from the recent charge that it cannot make sense of Frege's logicism. While I do not provide the explicative interpretation's full solution to the puzzle, I show that its main competitor is seriously problematic.
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2021
This paper describes a pair of dietary practices I call default vegetarianism and default veganis... more This paper describes a pair of dietary practices I call default vegetarianism and default veganism. The basic idea is that one adopts a default of adhering to vegetarian and vegan diets, with periodic exceptions. While I do not exhaustively defend either of these dietary practices as morally required, I do suggest that they are more promising than other dietary practices that are normally discussed like strict veganism and vegetarianism. For they may do a better job of striking a balance between normative concerns about contemporary farming practices and the competing considerations of life. Additionally, I argue that framing discussions in terms of defaults is useful for various reasons: it helps organize agreements and disagreements, it more accurately reflects the way people conceptualize their dietary practices, and it presents a more dialectically effective view. A dietary practice includes both a diet-a set of purchasing and consuming behaviors-a cluster of normative attitudes about that diet-the desirability, permissibility, attractiveness, etc. of that diet-and beliefs about how to conform to the diet. In the past several decades, more information has come to light about the costs of standard diets on animal welfare, the environment, and farming communities. In light of this information, many philosophers have focused on the normative status of various dietary practices-to which degree certain dietary practices actually are good or bad, permissible or impermissible, virtuous or vicious, etc. However, some might be dissatisfied with the range of dietary practices that are discussed. The dietary practices discussed in ordinary life frequently lie on the ends of an extreme-either entirely unrestrictive in what people purchase and consume or quite restrictive and prohibitive. Philosophers do discuss intermediate dietary practices. But normally those dietary practices are unrealistic for most consumers in developed countries. The overall aim of this paper is to describe a pair of dietary practices that are more moderate and realistic.
Synthese
Priority Theory is an increasingly popular view in metaphysics. By seeing metaphysical questions ... more Priority Theory is an increasingly popular view in metaphysics. By seeing metaphysical questions as primarily concerned with what explains what, instead of merely what exists, it promises not only an interesting approach to traditional metaphysical issues but the resolution of some outstanding disputes. In a recent paper, Louis deRosset argues that Priority Theory isn't up to the task: Priority Theory is committed to there being explanations that violate a formal constraint on any adequate explanation. This paper critically examines deRosset's challenge to Priority Theory. We argue that deRosset's challenge ultimately fails: his proposed constraint on explanation is neither well-motivated nor a general constraint. Nonetheless, lurking behind his criticism is a deep problem for prominent ways of developing Priority Theory, a problem which we develop.
Logos and Episteme, 2020
Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic... more Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism is false. This paper critically examines those arguments, finding them wanting. However, I develop an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds which turns on general reflection on the nature of value.
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Abstract
Peter Singer argues, on consequentialist grounds, that individuals ought to be vegetaria... more Abstract
Peter Singer argues, on consequentialist grounds, that individuals ought to be vegetarian. Many have pressed, in response, a causal impotence objection to Singer’s argument: any individual person’s refraining from purchasing and consuming animal products will not have an important effect on contemporary farming practices. In this paper, I sketch a Singer-inspired consequentialist argument for vegetarianism that avoids this objection. The basic idea is that, for agents who are aware of the origins of their food, continuing to consume animal products is morally bad because it leads to not appropriately disvaluing the origins of their food. That is a morally bad outcome that can be avoided by becoming vegetarian.
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , 2019
According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view i... more According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view is the Argument from Consciousness: animals have moral status because they are conscious and can experience pain and it would be bad were they to experience pain. In a series of papers (2015a, b, 2017), Timothy Hsiao claims that animals do not have moral status and criticizes the Argument from Consciousness. This short paper defends the Argument from Consciousness by providing two simple responses to Hsiao's criticism. According to a common view, animals have at least some moral status. It is part of common sense; it is reflected in our laws; it plays a role in how we raise our children; and it is a component of our expectations of others. Of course, philosophical theorizing has not always maintained this. But many, myself included, have seen recognition of this fact as genuine and significant moral progress-akin to progress on issues on sex, gender, and race. However, in a series of papers (2015a, b, 2017), Timothy Hsiao has challenged this common and prevailing view. He maintains that animals do not have moral status. He argues that a common argument that animals have moral status-what I call the Argument from Consciousness-is flawed. He then proposes a positive view which implies that animals do not have moral status. If Hsiao is correct, then it would have important consequences. Importantly, it would make arguments for vegetarianism or veganism seem moot-like arguing that we have obligations to blades of grass or tin cans. This paper responds to Hsiao. A number of other authors have criticized his work, focusing mostly on his positive view of moral status (see Bruers (
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2018
This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman's account of basic final value in The Nature of ... more This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman's account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman's account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman's account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman's account while avoiding its pitfalls.
Acta Analytica, 2019
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Fe... more Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
Logos and Episteme, 2018
Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, ... more Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, with evidentialists giving theories of virtually every important topic in epistemology. Nevertheless, at the heart of evidentialism is a handful of concepts, namely evidence, evidence possession, and evidential fit. If evidentialists cannot give us a plausible account of these concepts, then their research program, with all its various theories, will be in serious trouble. In this paper, I argue that evidentialists has yet to give a plausible account of evidence possession and the prospects for doing so are dim.
Epistemic deontology maintains that our beliefs and degrees of belief are open to deontic evaluat... more Epistemic deontology maintains that our beliefs and degrees of belief are open to deontic evaluations—evaluations of what we ought to believe or may not believe. Some philosophers endorse strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology on which agents can always access what determines the deontic status of their beliefs and degrees of belief. This paper articulates a new challenge for strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology. Any version of epistemic deontology must face William Alston's argument. Alston combined a broadly voluntarist conception of responsibility, on which ought implies can, with doxastic involuntarism, the position that our beliefs are not under our control. Together, those views imply that epistemic deontology is false. A promising response to Alston's argument is to embrace a compatibilist account of control— specifically a reason-responsive version of compatibilism—and use it to criticism his doxastic involuntarism. I argue that while reason-responsive compatibilism about control does undermine Alston's argument, it comes at a cost. Specifically, it is inconsistent with strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology. The surprising upshot is that so long as we retain a voluntarist conception of responsibility, we have reason for rejecting strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology.
In a series of papers, Adam Leite has developed a novel view of justification tied to being able ... more In a series of papers, Adam Leite has developed a novel view of justification tied to being able to responsibly justify a belief. Leite touts his view as (i) faithful to our ordinary practice of justifying beliefs, (ii) providing a novel response to an epistemological problem of the infinite regress, and (iii) resolving the " persistent interlocutor " problem. Though I find elements of Leite's view of being able to justify a belief promising, I hold that there are several problems afflicting the overall picture of justification. In this paper, I argue that despite its ambitions, Leite's view fails to solve the persistent interlocutor problem and does not avoid a vicious regress.
There's a growing sense among philosophers of religion that (i) Humean arguments from evil are so... more There's a growing sense among philosophers of religion that (i) Humean arguments from evil are some of the most formidable arguments against theism, and (ii) skeptical theism fails to undermine those arguments because they fail to make the inferences skeptical theists criticize. In line with this trend, Wes Morriston has recently formulated a Humean argument from evil, and his chief defense of it is that skeptical theism is irrelevant to it. Here I argue that skeptical theism is relevant to Humean arguments. To do this, I reveal the common structure of skeptical theism's critiques. Seeing the common structure reveals why some versions of skeptical theism are irrelevant to Humean arguments from evil. It also points the way forward to forming a relevant version. By combining skeptical theism with a plausible principle concerning reasonable belief, I formulate a version of skeptical theism that undermines Morriston's argument that is also immune from his objections.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2017
The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically ... more The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable (ethical conservativism) seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview (ethical naturalism). Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism.
The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil, 2017
Skeptical theism is a family of responses to the evidential problem of evil. What unifies this fa... more Skeptical theism is a family of responses to the evidential problem of evil. What unifies this family is two general claims. First, that even if God were to exist, we shouldn't expect to see God's reasons for permitting the suffering we observe. Second, the previous claim entails the failure of a variety of arguments from evil against the existence of God. In this essay, we identify three particular articulations of skeptical theism—three different ways of " filling in " those two claims—and describes their role in responding to evidential arguments of evil due to William Rowe and Paul Draper. But skeptical theism has been subject to a variety of criticisms, several of which raise interesting issues and puzzles not just in philosophy of religion but other areas of philosophy as well. Consequently, we discuss some of these criticisms, partly with an eye to bringing out the connections between skeptical theism and current topics in mainstream philosophy. Finally, we conclude by situating skeptical theism within our own distinctive methodology for evaluating world views, what we call " worldview theory versioning. "
Sophia, 2015
In a recent article, David Kyle Johnson has claimed to have provided a " refutation " of skeptica... more In a recent article, David Kyle Johnson has claimed to have provided a " refutation " of skeptical theism. Johnson's refutation raises several interesting issues. But in this short note I focus on only one—an implicit principle Johnson uses in his refutation to update probabilities after receiving new evidence.
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Papers by Timothy Perrine
Peter Singer argues, on consequentialist grounds, that individuals ought to be vegetarian. Many have pressed, in response, a causal impotence objection to Singer’s argument: any individual person’s refraining from purchasing and consuming animal products will not have an important effect on contemporary farming practices. In this paper, I sketch a Singer-inspired consequentialist argument for vegetarianism that avoids this objection. The basic idea is that, for agents who are aware of the origins of their food, continuing to consume animal products is morally bad because it leads to not appropriately disvaluing the origins of their food. That is a morally bad outcome that can be avoided by becoming vegetarian.
Peter Singer argues, on consequentialist grounds, that individuals ought to be vegetarian. Many have pressed, in response, a causal impotence objection to Singer’s argument: any individual person’s refraining from purchasing and consuming animal products will not have an important effect on contemporary farming practices. In this paper, I sketch a Singer-inspired consequentialist argument for vegetarianism that avoids this objection. The basic idea is that, for agents who are aware of the origins of their food, continuing to consume animal products is morally bad because it leads to not appropriately disvaluing the origins of their food. That is a morally bad outcome that can be avoided by becoming vegetarian.