Papers by Alexander Arifianto
Indonesia's Islamic organizations sustain the country's thriving civil society, democracy... more Indonesia's Islamic organizations sustain the country's thriving civil society, democracy, and reputation for tolerance amid diversity. Yet scholars poorly understand how these organizations envision the accommodation of religious difference. What does tolerance mean to the world's largest Islamic organizations? What are the implications for democracy in Indonesia and the broader Muslim world? Jeremy Menchik argues that answering these questions requires decoupling tolerance from liberalism and investigating the historical and political conditions that engender democratic values. Drawing on archival documents, ethnographic observation, comparative political theory, and an original survey, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia demonstrates that Indonesia's Muslim leaders favor a democracy in which individual rights and group-differentiated rights converge within a system of legal pluralism, a vision at odds with American-style secular government but common in Africa, Asia ...
Journal of Global Strategic Studies, 2022
In this article, I will apply the varieties of secularism theory developed by Elizabeth Shakman H... more In this article, I will apply the varieties of secularism theory developed by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and Ahmet Kuru in the case of Indonesia. Following Kuru’s typology, I argue that Indonesian secularism resembles that of passive secularism. This form of secularism came about from an alliance between secular nationalists and a religious minority (Christianity). The alliance between the two groups had successfully prevented Islam from becoming a dominant religion when an independent Indonesian state was formed in 1945. It was also successful from preventing reformist Muslims from instituting a state based on the sharia law during the crucial period of state-building in Indonesia between 1945 and 1960. However, this alliance also results in the formation of two authoritarian regimes that ruled Indonesia for four decades (1959-1998), and in the often tenuous relationship between two religious groups that sat on the opposite end of this conflict, namely Indonesian Muslims and Christians.
RSIS Commentary, 2022
Two years ahead of the 2024 simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections, Indonesian Pre... more Two years ahead of the 2024 simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections, Indonesian President Joko Widodo once again reshuffled his cabinet. These latest changes are designed to retain the cohesiveness of his ruling rainbow coalition and minimise potential political disruptions prior to the elections. COMMENTARY ON 16 JUNE 2022, President Joko Widodo reshuffled his cabinet for the seventh time, replacing his trade minister, Muhammad Lutfi, amid a growing corruption scandal in his ministry over the awarding of palm oil export licences.
IDSS Paper, 2022
Nahdlatul Ulama — Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation — recently elected Yahya Cholil Staquf... more Nahdlatul Ulama — Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation — recently elected Yahya Cholil Staquf as its new chairman. A close analysis of his background and past accomplishments reveals that Yahya has a potential agenda to transform the organisation into a global voice on religious moderation through his promotion of “humanitarian Islam”.
Indonesia at Melbourne, 2022
On 24 December 2021, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama, concluded its 34t... more On 24 December 2021, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama, concluded its 34th national congress (muktamar) in Lampung. Congress delegates elected Yahya Cholil Staquf, the former general secretary (katib aam) of the organisation, as its next leader. He handily defeated his immediate predecessor, Said Aqil Siradj, 337 votes to 210.
APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter, 2021
Why does a religious group that has long promoted moderate political norms engage in intra-Islami... more Why does a religious group that has long promoted moderate political norms engage in intra-Islamic sectarian rhetoric and other practices that contribute to democratic regression in a country previously thought to have consolidated its democracy? How does this contribute to scholarship on the moderation of religious parties and movements and more broadly, to scholarship on democratization and authoritarianism? An analysis of different strategies adopted by Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), in response to changing political and social circumstances over time can help to answer these questions. This is important, as new forms of identity politics, populism, and polarization are impacting and dividing countries and regions across the globe.
Indonesia at Melbourne, 2021
Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, plans to hold its long-postponed Natio... more Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, plans to hold its long-postponed National Congress (muktamar) later this month. The muktamar is held once every five years, and is the organisation's most important leadership meeting. Its primary agenda is to elect the organisation's next chairman, who will then select members of NU's leadership board (PBNU).
RSIS Commentary, 2021
Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, will hold its national congress tentat... more Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, will hold its national congress tentatively in December 2021. Several leaders representing different theological viewpoints within the organisation have announced their candidacies to be NU's next chairman.
RSIS Commentary, 2021
In response to the ongoing COVID-19 surge in Indonesia, President Joko Widodo has enacted the str... more In response to the ongoing COVID-19 surge in Indonesia, President Joko Widodo has enacted the strictest lockdown policy since the pandemic began 18 months ago. Jokowi seems increasingly concerned that the surge could threaten his political legacy.
Journal of Global Strategic Studies, 2021
This article addresses recent development related to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)-Indonesia's largest Isl... more This article addresses recent development related to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)-Indonesia's largest Islamic organization-and its recent actions as it faces ideological and political challenges from other conservative Islamist organizations. In the process, NU seems to have engaged in backtracking its commitment to consistently promote moderate norms like democracy and tolerance toward different religious and political viewpoints. It examines the factors which explains this reversal and answers the following research puzzle: Under which socio-political conditions do a religious organization that has adhered to follow moderate political norms and discourses decide to backtrack from them and decide to pursue policies to embrace an 'exclusivist moderation'? The article concludes the declining commitment to moderate norms within the NU is due to growing ideological competition from conservative Islamists both within and outside of the organization, leading NU to embrace immoderate responses to crack down against its competitors.
Religion, State, and Society, 2021
This contribution applies the sectarianisation thesis of Hashemi and Postel to analyse renewed po... more This contribution applies the sectarianisation thesis of Hashemi and Postel to analyse renewed political sectarianism between Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the two largest Indonesian Islamic organisations. It finds that while distinct ideologies and rituals do distinguish these organisations one from another, recent conflicts between the two organisations can be attributed to political-based sectarianism rather than an ideological-based one. The contribution also shows how sectarianism can be effectively politicised in Indonesia-a formally democratic nation-due to weak state capacity and other societal problems. Such problems led to a legitimacy challenge against the Joko Widodo ('Jokowi') regime from senior Muhammadiyah leaders and other Islamist-leaning groups through the 2016/17 Defending Islam movement. In response, the regime aligns itself with the NU, which utilises sectarian rhetoric to discredit these groups. However, in the process NU renews the long-standing sectarianism between itself and Muhammadiyah.
RSIS Commentary, 2021
On 28 April 2021, Indonesian president Joko Widodo announced his latest cabinet reshuffle with th... more On 28 April 2021, Indonesian president Joko Widodo announced his latest cabinet reshuffle with the appointment of three new ministers. Is he driven by a desire to secure his legacy?
RSIS Commentary, 2021
An increasing number of retired army and police senior officers had chosen to become political ca... more An increasing number of retired army and police senior officers had chosen to become political candidates during the 2020 Indonesian regional elections. Nonetheless, it is the local political context and networks that determine whether they win or lose.
RSIS Commentary, 2020
In the past few months, several new political organisations and parties were founded as vehicles ... more In the past few months, several new political organisations and parties were founded as vehicles to attract support from a growing conservative Islamist constituency. Why are these entities, such as KAMI, New Masyumi and Ummah Party, emerging?
Asia Policy, 2020
The recent prominence of conservative and hard-line Islamism in Indonesia—as seen during the 2016... more The recent prominence of conservative and hard-line Islamism in Indonesia—as seen during the 2016 Defending Islam rallies and the 2019 Indonesian presidential election campaign—is not an isolated, one-time phenomenon. Islamism has a long historical precedence dating back to Indonesia’s independence in 1945 when the country’s founders debated whether Islamist principles should be part of the constitution and national ideology. Public expressions of Islamism returned to the fore when Suharto fell from power in 1998. Conservative Islamists have been able to gain followers and political influence due to their shrewdness in utilizing new and innovative propagation methods on university campuses and the internet. In the meantime, the authority of NU and Muhammadiyah—Indonesia’s two largest moderate Islamic organizations—has declined due to the increasing role of quasi-state Islamic institutions like the Indonesian Ulama Council, competition from conservative and hard-line Islamist organizations, and factionalism from within these organizations driven by activists who sympathize with the ideological and political goals of conservative groups. Government efforts to suppress these groups risk further undermining Indonesia’s young democracy. Instead, NU and Muhammadiyah should take the lead in countering the growing Islamist influence.
RSIS Commentary, 2020
A draft law on Pancasila Ideological Guidance (RUU Haluan Ideologi Pancasila, HIP) was recently p... more A draft law on Pancasila Ideological Guidance (RUU Haluan Ideologi Pancasila, HIP) was recently proposed by the Indonesian parliament. While the stated intent is to strengthen national unity, questions are being asked whether, on the contrary, old divisions are being resurrected.
RSIS Commentary , 2020
Although the Indonesian government has increased its budget deficit to accommodate a larger stimu... more Although the Indonesian government has increased its budget deficit to accommodate a larger stimulus package, it is seen as insufficient to address the economic damage from the COVID-19 pandemic. Philanthropic organisations, in particular, Islamic charities, have stepped in to fill the gaps.
RSIS Commentary, 2020
As the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases rose rapidly in Indonesia, the president imposed a stat... more As the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases rose rapidly in Indonesia, the president imposed a state of emergency. The initial lethargy was due to unpreparedness, low public health spending, and a political structure that incentivises appointments based on political considerations.
Asia Policy, 2019
This essay reviews several factors that contributed to the political
division and polarization su... more This essay reviews several factors that contributed to the political
division and polarization surrounding the 2019 Indonesian election. The
first is the rising influence of conservative Islamist groups in Indonesia
over the past several years, eventuating in their support of Prabowo
Subianto—a retired Suharto-era general who is a long-term opponent
of incumbent president Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi). The
second is Jokowi’s response to Prabowo challenging his selection of the
conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin. Through this nomination, Jokowi
intended to counter the perception that he was not a good Muslim
presidential candidate. The third factor is Prabowo’s hostile response to
the election results and Jokowi’s reaction to the challenges brought about by Prabowo and his supporters, which was considered heavy-handed.The fourth and final factor is the post-election maneuver by
Jakarta’s political elite supporting Jokowi’s re-election to propose a new
series of constitutional amendments, which would have ended Indonesian democracy as we know it.
RSIS Commentary, 2019
Home to roughly 31 million eligible voters, both President Joko Widodo and his opponent Prabowo S... more Home to roughly 31 million eligible voters, both President Joko Widodo and his opponent Prabowo Subianto are currently locked in a statistical deadheat in East Java – a key province in which the winner is likely to become Indonesia’s next president. East Java has a total population of 42 million − including an estimated 31 million citizens who are eligible to vote in the 2019 Indonesian general election. It is Indonesia’s second largest province measured in terms of its population.
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Papers by Alexander Arifianto
division and polarization surrounding the 2019 Indonesian election. The
first is the rising influence of conservative Islamist groups in Indonesia
over the past several years, eventuating in their support of Prabowo
Subianto—a retired Suharto-era general who is a long-term opponent
of incumbent president Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi). The
second is Jokowi’s response to Prabowo challenging his selection of the
conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin. Through this nomination, Jokowi
intended to counter the perception that he was not a good Muslim
presidential candidate. The third factor is Prabowo’s hostile response to
the election results and Jokowi’s reaction to the challenges brought about by Prabowo and his supporters, which was considered heavy-handed.The fourth and final factor is the post-election maneuver by
Jakarta’s political elite supporting Jokowi’s re-election to propose a new
series of constitutional amendments, which would have ended Indonesian democracy as we know it.
division and polarization surrounding the 2019 Indonesian election. The
first is the rising influence of conservative Islamist groups in Indonesia
over the past several years, eventuating in their support of Prabowo
Subianto—a retired Suharto-era general who is a long-term opponent
of incumbent president Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi). The
second is Jokowi’s response to Prabowo challenging his selection of the
conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin. Through this nomination, Jokowi
intended to counter the perception that he was not a good Muslim
presidential candidate. The third factor is Prabowo’s hostile response to
the election results and Jokowi’s reaction to the challenges brought about by Prabowo and his supporters, which was considered heavy-handed.The fourth and final factor is the post-election maneuver by
Jakarta’s political elite supporting Jokowi’s re-election to propose a new
series of constitutional amendments, which would have ended Indonesian democracy as we know it.