In her 1926 essay "On being ill" Virginia Woolf laments the poverty of our language for pain: "le... more In her 1926 essay "On being ill" Virginia Woolf laments the poverty of our language for pain: "let a sufferer try to describe a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry," she notes. Looking at studies of patient-doctor exchanges about pain, particularly those dealing with chronic pain, it seems that Woolf's worry is born out. a Both patients and clinicians frequently report problems around communicating and assessing pain, with patients expressing dissatisfaction with their doctors and doctors often finding exchanges with chronic pain patients difficult and frustrating. Yet we know that positive patient-clinician interaction matters to both parties and that a patient's sense that they are being listened to can increase their overall sense of well-being , as well as promoting adherence to lifestyle changes and medical interventions that lead to reduced levels of experienced pain. So, how could we go about improving pain communication, and thereby enhance quality of life, particularly for chronic pain patients? This chapter explores that question by reflecting on what might be learned from philosophical accounts of the meaning of pain terms, seeing how these views impact on practical issues around pain communication and shed light on a newer model of how to think about pain communication (one that we hope might deliver concrete clinical improvements).
There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wron... more There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties—they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. So far, no experimental work has investigated the scalar nature of stakes effects on knowledge: do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects only appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Does the effect plateau at a certain point? To address these questions, we conducted experiments that probe for the scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches. We found evidence of scalar stakes effects using an “evidence- seeking” experimental design, but no evidence of scalar effects using a traditional “evidence-fixed” experimental design. In addition, using the evidence-seeking design, we uncovered a large, but previously unnoticed framing effect on whether participants are skeptical about whether someone can know something, no matter how much evidence they have. The rate of skeptical responses and the rate at which participants were willing to attribute “lazy knowledge” — that someone can know something without having to check — were themselves subject to a stakes effect: participants were more skeptical when the stakes were higher, and more prone to attribute lazy knowledge when the stakes were lower. We argue that the novel skeptical stakes effect provides resources to respond to criticisms of the evidence-seeking approach that argue that it does not target knowledge.
This paper sets out the felicity conditions for metalinguistic proposals, a type of directive ill... more This paper sets out the felicity conditions for metalinguistic proposals, a type of directive illocutionary act. It discusses the relevance of metalinguistic proposals and other metalinguistic directives for understanding both small-and large-scale linguistic engineering projects, essentially contested concepts, metalinguistic provocations , and the methodology of ordinary language philosophy. Metalinguistic proposals are compared with other types of linguistic interventions, including met-alinguistic negotiation, conceptual engineering, lexical warfare, and ameliorative projects.
We investigate claims about the frequency of "know" made by philosophers. Our investigation has s... more We investigate claims about the frequency of "know" made by philosophers. Our investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to confirm or disconfirm philosophers' claims about the comparative frequency of different uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodology , in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers would have overlooked if they remained in their "armchairs of an afternoon", to use J.L. Austin's phrase. Third, we discuss facts about the meaning of "know" that so far have been ignored in philosophy, with the aim of reorienting discussions of the relevance of ordinary language for philosophical theorizing.
This paper defends a challenge, inspired by arguments drawn from contemporary ordinary language p... more This paper defends a challenge, inspired by arguments drawn from contemporary ordinary language philosophy and grounded in experimental data, to certain forms of standard philosophical practice. The challenge is inspired by contemporary philosophers who describe themselves as practicing "ordinary language philosophy". Contemporary ordinary language philosophy can be divided into constructive and critical approaches. The critical approach to contemporary ordinary language philosophy has been forcefully developed by Baz (2012a,b, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018), who attempts to show that a substantial chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. I describe Baz's project and argue that while there is reason to be skeptical of its radical conclusion, it conveys an important truth about discontinuities between ordinary uses of philosophically significant expressions ("know", e.g.) and their use in philosophical thought experiments. I discuss some evidence from experimental psychology and behavioral economics indicating that there is a risk of overlooking important aspects of meaning or misinterpreting experimental results by focusing only on abstract experimental scenarios, rather than employing more diverse and more ecologically valid experimental designs. I conclude by presenting a revised version of the critical argument from ordinary language.
In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of episte... more In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of epistemic contextualism using formal (rather than armchair) experimental methods. By-and-large, the results of these experiments have not supported the original motivation for epistemic contextualism. That is partly because experiments have only uncovered effects of changing context on knowledge ascriptions in limited experimental circumstances (when contrast is present, for example), and partly because existing experiments have not been designed to distinguish between contextualism and one of its main competing theories, subject-sensitive invariantism. In this paper, we discuss how a particular, “third-person”, experimental design is needed to provide evidence that would support contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism. In spite of the theoretical significance of third-person knowledge ascriptions for debates surrounding contextualism, no formal experiments evaluating such ascriptions that assess contextualist claims have previously been conducted. In this paper, we conduct an experiment specifically designed to examine that central gap in contextualism’s empirical foundation. The results of our experiment provide crucial support for epistemic contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism.
This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took p... more This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about "what we say". On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about "what we say" should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to make statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. My aim in this paper is to defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn't require empirical observation. I will argue that ordinary language philosophers (Austin, Cavell) are (at least some of the time) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.
Are color adjectives ("red" , "green", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing... more Are color adjectives ("red" , "green", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives attempt to answer that question using informal ("armchair") judgments. The informal judgments of theorists conflict: it has been proposed that color adjectives are absolute with standards anchored at the minimum degree on the scale, that they are absolute but have near-midpoint standards, and that they are relative. In this paper we report two experiments, one based on entailment patterns and one based on presupposition accommodation, that investigate the meaning of scalar adjectives. We find evidence confirming the existence of subgroups of the population who operate with different standards for color adjectives. The evidence of interpersonal variation in where standards are located on the relevant scale and how those standards can be adjusted indicates that the existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives are at best only partially correct. We also find evidence that paradigmatic relative adjectives ("tall", "wide") behave in ways that are not predicted by the standard theory of scalar adjectives. We discuss several different possible explanations for this unexpected behavior. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our findings for philosophical debates about the nature and extent of semantically encoded context sensitivity in which color adjectives have played a key role.
An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made ... more An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently , an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues (Gómez-Torrente, 2016). In Hansen (2015), I argued that the recent objectivist response doesn't apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation.
Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences... more Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert judgments vs. the judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that ambiguity plays in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of meta-linguistic judgments are also assessed.
I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivi... more I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez-Torrente 2014).
J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overl... more J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employed an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his "donkey stories", that "mistake" and "accident" apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as "intentionally" and "deliberately"). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.
There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the... more There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular (some versions of) “contextualism” and (some versions of) “experimental philosophy”. And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title of ordinary language philosophy and arguing that it has been unfairly maligned and was never decisively refuted. In this overview, I will outline the main projects and arguments employed by contemporary ordinary language philosophers, and make the case that updated versions of the arguments made by ordinary language philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century are attracting renewed attention.
Odd and memorable examples are a distinctive feature of Charles Travis's work: cases involving sq... more Odd and memorable examples are a distinctive feature of Charles Travis's work: cases involving squash balls, soot-covered kettles, walls that emit poison gas, faces turning puce, ties made of freshly cooked linguine, and people grunting when punched in the solar plexus all figure in his arguments. One of Travis's examples, involving a pair of situations in which the leaves of a Japanese maple tree are painted green, has even spawned its own literature consisting of attempts to explain the context sensitivity of color adjectives (green", e.g.). For Travis, these examples play a central role in his arguments for occasion-sensitivity, which he takes to be a pervasive feature of how we understand natural language. But how, exactly, do these examples work? My aims in this paper are to put Travis's examples under the microscope, using recent experimental studies of Travis-style cases to raise worries about aspects of the way Travis's cases are informally presented, but then show how his examples can be redesigned to respond to these doubts.
In this paper we refine the design of context shifting experiments, which play a central role in ... more In this paper we refine the design of context shifting experiments, which play a central role in contextualist debates, and we subject a large number of scenarios involving different types of expressions of interest to contextualists, including ‘know’ and color adjectives like ‘green’, to experimental investigation. Our experiment (i) reveals an effect of changing contexts on the evaluation of uses of the sentences that we examine, thereby overturning the absence of results reported in previous experimental studies (so-called null results), (ii) uncovers evidence for a ‘truth bias’ in favor of positive over negative sentences, and (iii) reveals previously unnoticed distinctions between the strength of the contextual effects displayed by scenarios involving knowledge ascriptions and for scenarios concerning color and other miscellaneous scenarios.
Radical contextualists have observed that the content of what is said by the utterance of a sente... more Radical contextualists have observed that the content of what is said by the utterance of a sentence is shaped in far-reaching ways by the context of utterance. And they have argued that the ways in which the content of what is said is shaped by context cannot be explained by semantic theory. A striking number of the examples that radical contextualists use to support their view involve sentences containing color adjectives (‘‘red’’, ‘‘green’’, etc.). In this paper, I show how the most sophisticated analysis of color adjectives within the explanatory framework of compositional truth conditional semantics—recently developed by Kennedy and McNally (Synthese 174(1):79–98 2010)—needs to be modified to handle the full range of contextual variation displayed by color adjectives.
Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in... more Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose’s reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose’s bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose’s arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good reason to pay close attention to several subtle aspects of the design of context shifting experiments.
This paper concerns the philosophical significance of a choice about how to design the context-sh... more This paper concerns the philosophical significance of a choice about how to design the context-shifting experiments used by contextualists and anti-intellectualists: Should contexts be judged jointly, with contrast, or separately, without contrast? Findings in experimental psychology suggest (1) that certain contextual features are difficult to evaluate when considered separately, and there are reasons to think that one feature that interests contextualists and anti-intellectualists—stakes or importance—is such a difficult to evaluate attribute, and (2) that joint evaluation of contexts can yield judgments that are more reflective and rational in certain respects. With those two points in mind, a question is raised about what source of evidence provides better support for philosophical theories of how contextual features affect knowledge ascriptions and evidence: Should we prefer evidence consisting of "ordinary" judgments, or more reflective, perhaps more rational judgments? That question is answered in relation to different accounts of what such theories aim to explain, and it is concluded that evidence from contexts evaluated jointly should be an important source of evidence for contextualist and anti-intellectualist theories, a conclusion that is at odds with the methodology of some recent studies in experimental epistemology.
Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin’s philosophy of language. Th... more Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin’s philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary’s reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin’s work, and I think Crary’s reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin’s targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary’s reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning.
In her 1926 essay "On being ill" Virginia Woolf laments the poverty of our language for pain: "le... more In her 1926 essay "On being ill" Virginia Woolf laments the poverty of our language for pain: "let a sufferer try to describe a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry," she notes. Looking at studies of patient-doctor exchanges about pain, particularly those dealing with chronic pain, it seems that Woolf's worry is born out. a Both patients and clinicians frequently report problems around communicating and assessing pain, with patients expressing dissatisfaction with their doctors and doctors often finding exchanges with chronic pain patients difficult and frustrating. Yet we know that positive patient-clinician interaction matters to both parties and that a patient's sense that they are being listened to can increase their overall sense of well-being , as well as promoting adherence to lifestyle changes and medical interventions that lead to reduced levels of experienced pain. So, how could we go about improving pain communication, and thereby enhance quality of life, particularly for chronic pain patients? This chapter explores that question by reflecting on what might be learned from philosophical accounts of the meaning of pain terms, seeing how these views impact on practical issues around pain communication and shed light on a newer model of how to think about pain communication (one that we hope might deliver concrete clinical improvements).
There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wron... more There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties—they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. So far, no experimental work has investigated the scalar nature of stakes effects on knowledge: do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects only appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Does the effect plateau at a certain point? To address these questions, we conducted experiments that probe for the scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches. We found evidence of scalar stakes effects using an “evidence- seeking” experimental design, but no evidence of scalar effects using a traditional “evidence-fixed” experimental design. In addition, using the evidence-seeking design, we uncovered a large, but previously unnoticed framing effect on whether participants are skeptical about whether someone can know something, no matter how much evidence they have. The rate of skeptical responses and the rate at which participants were willing to attribute “lazy knowledge” — that someone can know something without having to check — were themselves subject to a stakes effect: participants were more skeptical when the stakes were higher, and more prone to attribute lazy knowledge when the stakes were lower. We argue that the novel skeptical stakes effect provides resources to respond to criticisms of the evidence-seeking approach that argue that it does not target knowledge.
This paper sets out the felicity conditions for metalinguistic proposals, a type of directive ill... more This paper sets out the felicity conditions for metalinguistic proposals, a type of directive illocutionary act. It discusses the relevance of metalinguistic proposals and other metalinguistic directives for understanding both small-and large-scale linguistic engineering projects, essentially contested concepts, metalinguistic provocations , and the methodology of ordinary language philosophy. Metalinguistic proposals are compared with other types of linguistic interventions, including met-alinguistic negotiation, conceptual engineering, lexical warfare, and ameliorative projects.
We investigate claims about the frequency of "know" made by philosophers. Our investigation has s... more We investigate claims about the frequency of "know" made by philosophers. Our investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to confirm or disconfirm philosophers' claims about the comparative frequency of different uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodology , in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers would have overlooked if they remained in their "armchairs of an afternoon", to use J.L. Austin's phrase. Third, we discuss facts about the meaning of "know" that so far have been ignored in philosophy, with the aim of reorienting discussions of the relevance of ordinary language for philosophical theorizing.
This paper defends a challenge, inspired by arguments drawn from contemporary ordinary language p... more This paper defends a challenge, inspired by arguments drawn from contemporary ordinary language philosophy and grounded in experimental data, to certain forms of standard philosophical practice. The challenge is inspired by contemporary philosophers who describe themselves as practicing "ordinary language philosophy". Contemporary ordinary language philosophy can be divided into constructive and critical approaches. The critical approach to contemporary ordinary language philosophy has been forcefully developed by Baz (2012a,b, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018), who attempts to show that a substantial chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. I describe Baz's project and argue that while there is reason to be skeptical of its radical conclusion, it conveys an important truth about discontinuities between ordinary uses of philosophically significant expressions ("know", e.g.) and their use in philosophical thought experiments. I discuss some evidence from experimental psychology and behavioral economics indicating that there is a risk of overlooking important aspects of meaning or misinterpreting experimental results by focusing only on abstract experimental scenarios, rather than employing more diverse and more ecologically valid experimental designs. I conclude by presenting a revised version of the critical argument from ordinary language.
In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of episte... more In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of epistemic contextualism using formal (rather than armchair) experimental methods. By-and-large, the results of these experiments have not supported the original motivation for epistemic contextualism. That is partly because experiments have only uncovered effects of changing context on knowledge ascriptions in limited experimental circumstances (when contrast is present, for example), and partly because existing experiments have not been designed to distinguish between contextualism and one of its main competing theories, subject-sensitive invariantism. In this paper, we discuss how a particular, “third-person”, experimental design is needed to provide evidence that would support contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism. In spite of the theoretical significance of third-person knowledge ascriptions for debates surrounding contextualism, no formal experiments evaluating such ascriptions that assess contextualist claims have previously been conducted. In this paper, we conduct an experiment specifically designed to examine that central gap in contextualism’s empirical foundation. The results of our experiment provide crucial support for epistemic contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism.
This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took p... more This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about "what we say". On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about "what we say" should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to make statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. My aim in this paper is to defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn't require empirical observation. I will argue that ordinary language philosophers (Austin, Cavell) are (at least some of the time) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.
Are color adjectives ("red" , "green", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing... more Are color adjectives ("red" , "green", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives attempt to answer that question using informal ("armchair") judgments. The informal judgments of theorists conflict: it has been proposed that color adjectives are absolute with standards anchored at the minimum degree on the scale, that they are absolute but have near-midpoint standards, and that they are relative. In this paper we report two experiments, one based on entailment patterns and one based on presupposition accommodation, that investigate the meaning of scalar adjectives. We find evidence confirming the existence of subgroups of the population who operate with different standards for color adjectives. The evidence of interpersonal variation in where standards are located on the relevant scale and how those standards can be adjusted indicates that the existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives are at best only partially correct. We also find evidence that paradigmatic relative adjectives ("tall", "wide") behave in ways that are not predicted by the standard theory of scalar adjectives. We discuss several different possible explanations for this unexpected behavior. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our findings for philosophical debates about the nature and extent of semantically encoded context sensitivity in which color adjectives have played a key role.
An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made ... more An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently , an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues (Gómez-Torrente, 2016). In Hansen (2015), I argued that the recent objectivist response doesn't apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation.
Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences... more Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert judgments vs. the judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that ambiguity plays in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of meta-linguistic judgments are also assessed.
I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivi... more I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez-Torrente 2014).
J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overl... more J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employed an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his "donkey stories", that "mistake" and "accident" apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as "intentionally" and "deliberately"). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.
There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the... more There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular (some versions of) “contextualism” and (some versions of) “experimental philosophy”. And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title of ordinary language philosophy and arguing that it has been unfairly maligned and was never decisively refuted. In this overview, I will outline the main projects and arguments employed by contemporary ordinary language philosophers, and make the case that updated versions of the arguments made by ordinary language philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century are attracting renewed attention.
Odd and memorable examples are a distinctive feature of Charles Travis's work: cases involving sq... more Odd and memorable examples are a distinctive feature of Charles Travis's work: cases involving squash balls, soot-covered kettles, walls that emit poison gas, faces turning puce, ties made of freshly cooked linguine, and people grunting when punched in the solar plexus all figure in his arguments. One of Travis's examples, involving a pair of situations in which the leaves of a Japanese maple tree are painted green, has even spawned its own literature consisting of attempts to explain the context sensitivity of color adjectives (green", e.g.). For Travis, these examples play a central role in his arguments for occasion-sensitivity, which he takes to be a pervasive feature of how we understand natural language. But how, exactly, do these examples work? My aims in this paper are to put Travis's examples under the microscope, using recent experimental studies of Travis-style cases to raise worries about aspects of the way Travis's cases are informally presented, but then show how his examples can be redesigned to respond to these doubts.
In this paper we refine the design of context shifting experiments, which play a central role in ... more In this paper we refine the design of context shifting experiments, which play a central role in contextualist debates, and we subject a large number of scenarios involving different types of expressions of interest to contextualists, including ‘know’ and color adjectives like ‘green’, to experimental investigation. Our experiment (i) reveals an effect of changing contexts on the evaluation of uses of the sentences that we examine, thereby overturning the absence of results reported in previous experimental studies (so-called null results), (ii) uncovers evidence for a ‘truth bias’ in favor of positive over negative sentences, and (iii) reveals previously unnoticed distinctions between the strength of the contextual effects displayed by scenarios involving knowledge ascriptions and for scenarios concerning color and other miscellaneous scenarios.
Radical contextualists have observed that the content of what is said by the utterance of a sente... more Radical contextualists have observed that the content of what is said by the utterance of a sentence is shaped in far-reaching ways by the context of utterance. And they have argued that the ways in which the content of what is said is shaped by context cannot be explained by semantic theory. A striking number of the examples that radical contextualists use to support their view involve sentences containing color adjectives (‘‘red’’, ‘‘green’’, etc.). In this paper, I show how the most sophisticated analysis of color adjectives within the explanatory framework of compositional truth conditional semantics—recently developed by Kennedy and McNally (Synthese 174(1):79–98 2010)—needs to be modified to handle the full range of contextual variation displayed by color adjectives.
Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in... more Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose’s reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose’s bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose’s arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good reason to pay close attention to several subtle aspects of the design of context shifting experiments.
This paper concerns the philosophical significance of a choice about how to design the context-sh... more This paper concerns the philosophical significance of a choice about how to design the context-shifting experiments used by contextualists and anti-intellectualists: Should contexts be judged jointly, with contrast, or separately, without contrast? Findings in experimental psychology suggest (1) that certain contextual features are difficult to evaluate when considered separately, and there are reasons to think that one feature that interests contextualists and anti-intellectualists—stakes or importance—is such a difficult to evaluate attribute, and (2) that joint evaluation of contexts can yield judgments that are more reflective and rational in certain respects. With those two points in mind, a question is raised about what source of evidence provides better support for philosophical theories of how contextual features affect knowledge ascriptions and evidence: Should we prefer evidence consisting of "ordinary" judgments, or more reflective, perhaps more rational judgments? That question is answered in relation to different accounts of what such theories aim to explain, and it is concluded that evidence from contexts evaluated jointly should be an important source of evidence for contextualist and anti-intellectualist theories, a conclusion that is at odds with the methodology of some recent studies in experimental epistemology.
Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin’s philosophy of language. Th... more Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin’s philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary’s reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin’s work, and I think Crary’s reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin’s targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary’s reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning.
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Papers by Nat Hansen
John Collins: Genericity as a Unitary Psychological Phenomenon: An Argument from Linguistic Diversity
Kristen Syrett: QR Out of a Tensed Clause: Evidence from Antecedent-Contained Deletion
Nat Hansen and Emmanuel Chemla: Linguistic Experiments and Ordinary
Language Philosophy
Bart Geurts and Paula Rubio- Fernández: Pragmatics and Processing
Dimitra Lazaridou- Chatzigoga, Napoleon Katsos and Linnaea Stockall: Genericity is Easy? Formal and Experimental Perspectives