Papers by Karen Robertson
PhaenEx, 2016
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to argue that Martin Heidegger’s account of Dasei... more The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to argue that Martin Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) has implications for a Heideggarian understanding of social atmosphere or “mood,” itself understood as the domain in which we realize our meaningful attachment to the world; second, to link Heidegger’s account of Dasein to sociologist Arlie Hochschild’s analysis of affective labour in order to underscore Hochschild’s critique of affective labour by showing it to occur at the very site of our free and meaningful involvement in the world; third, to demonstrate the relevance of Heidegger’s analysis to concrete sociological analysis. I begin by arguing that Heidegger’s existential account of affective life reveals affective life as: (a) an accomplished attachment to worldly specificities, (b) grounded on socially constituted significance, and (c) our responsibility. Second, showing Hochschild’s account of emotions to be compatible with Heidegger’s work, I ...
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to argue that Martin Heidegger’s account of Dasei... more The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to argue that Martin Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) has implications for a Heideggarian understanding of social atmosphere or “mood,” itself understood as the domain in which we realize our meaningful attachment to the world; second, to link Heidegger’s account of Dasein to sociologist Arlie Hochschild’s analysis of affective labour in order to underscore Hochschild’s critique of affective labour by showing it to occur at the very site of our free and meaningful involvement in the world; third, to demonstrate the relevance of Heidegger’s analysis to concrete sociological analysis. I begin by arguing that Heidegger’s existential account of affective life reveals affective life as: (a) an accomplished attachment to worldly specificities, (b) grounded on socially constituted significance, and (c) our responsibility. Second, showing Hochschild’s account of emotions to be compatible with Heidegger’s work, I consider Hochschild’s analysis of airline stewardesses, clarifying how the affective lives of individuals and the shared, public dimension of affective life are both undermined by affective labour, specifically in terms of the way that communicative interactions are manipulated in commercial settings. Resulting from the manipulation of affective life by companies are various challenges to our freedom: an inability to find meaningful projects; a lack of substantial measures in terms of which to choose our projects; and the inability to recognize such choices as constitutive of affective life and as our responsibility. Connecting these consequences to the three aspects of affective life noted above, it is concluded that affective labour threatens the inherently social character of freedom and also suppresses and inhibits the existential involvement in the world through which we realize meaningfully our freedom.
Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018
Drawing on Heidegger's essay " The Origin on the Work of Art, " I argue that works of art reveal ... more Drawing on Heidegger's essay " The Origin on the Work of Art, " I argue that works of art reveal human experience to be simultaneously finite and ecstatic, and that art is part of the way our experience unfolds. Secondly, I argue that the dynamic of experience that art enables and in which it is implicated is precisely what historical experience is; this historical character of our experience is also always intersubjective and relational. Next, I turn to " Why Poets? " to analyse Heidegger's critique of Rilke's work in terms of the idea that art is involved in our self-constitution as historical and relational beings. Reading these two essays together, finally, allows me to conclude by characterising the demands of a distinctly modern experience of interpretation, one defined in terms of the possibilities of difference and cooperation and by the need to question what it means to be a " we. "
The question of the availability of normative guidelines for human action in Martin Heidegger's w... more The question of the availability of normative guidelines for human action in Martin Heidegger's work has been a long-standing site of controversy. Indeed, his work is often labeled antinomian in light of the fact that it precludes and undermines the priority of positive law in accordance with the insight that anything like a first principle of thought fails to keep the thinking of Being alive. 1 Nevertheless, strong efforts have been made to draw out the normative aspects of Heidegger's work, and this should come as no surprise given that Heidegger's philosophy is, at least in Being and Time, concerned with the question of how to live, and because much of his other work radically criticizes the modern, liberal account of how to live. 2 Whatever their motivation may be, those who claim that there are resources in Heidegger's work for ethical and political thought must justify such use of his scholarship in light of Heidegger's own political involvement with the National Socialist party. Heidegger's work is often criticized as a resource for political or ethical thinking. It is also taken to task for a lacking in praxis, and of consequently having nothing to offer to a practical approach to human life. 3 In this paper I demonstrate that there are normative guidelines for behavior in Heidegger's work, but that rather than taking the form of explicit law these guidelines require that we respond self-critically to the way in which the enactment of our individual identities has been enabled by our participation in the public, communicative structures that define community. 4 I will argue that the involvement of others in Dasein's self-enactment has implications for Dasein's authenticity.
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Papers by Karen Robertson