We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and arg... more We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and argue that such is neither automatic nor inexorable. We review and extend a body of recent research that underscores the extensive 'work' required by 'big D' Development actors to render target contexts legible, attractive, and amenable to private finance and investment. We introduce the framework of 'rendering (Development) investible' to help us unpack the attendant governmental rationality of Development institutions and professionals in the current financialised conjuncture. We reveal the drivers and primary characteristics of this rationality and we discuss its significant, yet unintended, consequences for Development thought and practice.
The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, ... more The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, has led to a qualitative shift in Global Development Governance (GDG) towards what we term ‘GDG 2.0’. Realising accountability in this context presents challenges due to growing actor diversity, institutional plurality and a lack of formalised accountability structures. Building on the introduction to this special section, we explore the potential of ‘forward-looking’ approaches to ac- countability, notably collective deliberation, learning and competition. Despite the importance of these mechanisms for GDG processes, conceptualising them as accountability tools may have limited gains and indeed reinforce the pref- erences of established actors, dilute useful monitoring approaches and divert attention from longstanding agendas. We argue that prioritising enabling en- vironments for more circumscribed ‘backward-looking’ accountability—with a focus on standard-setting and monitoring—may be more feasible and effective towards holding decision-makers to account within the GDG 2.0 context.
European journal of international relations, Jan 31, 2024
To what extent is neoliberal global economic governance transforming in a world where states play... more To what extent is neoliberal global economic governance transforming in a world where states play greater roles as promoters, supervisors and owners of capital? Do these transformations signal a potential paradigm shift? To answer these questions, we focus on global financial governance and the trade and investment regime. We analyse recent policy documents from the IMF, World Bank and WTO-the 'Unholy Trinity' of neoliberal global governance. Our analysis reveals a growing acceptance of state interventionism within and across these organizations. Although this accommodation is significant, we argue that it constitutes a limited transformation. We observe attempts to incorporate emerging state interventionist practices and state-owned entities into established governance arrangements in order to discipline, curtail and control them. We argue that this does not signify a shift towards post-neoliberal plurality within Western-dominated global economic governance, but rather a defensive, 'mutating neoliberalism' which seeks to incorporate depoliticized and commercially oriented state ownership into its mainframe.
Global governance institutions have increasingly 'opened up' to non-state actors, leading to more... more Global governance institutions have increasingly 'opened up' to non-state actors, leading to more formally inclusive governance arrangements. This has prompted inquiry into the extent and the drivers of this inclusivity, patterns of participation, and the consequences for the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance. However, while the measurement of formal openness has expanded, the quality of inclusion remains underexplored. We therefore introduce a framework centred on the notion of 'meaningful inclusion' , distinguishing between formal (de jure) structures and the perceived quality of actual (de facto) engagement. Drawing on extensive empirical data, we then examine the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. This case exemplifies strong formal mechanisms for inclusion that are contrasted sharply by significant shortcomings in effective engagement. Our findings suggest that improvements in formal global governance structures alone cannot ensure meaningful inclusion. Instead, we highlight the centrality of power dynamics and vested interests in shaping inclusivity dynamics in practice.
The promise and potential of private sector engagement (PSE) in activities supported by developme... more The promise and potential of private sector engagement (PSE) in activities supported by development cooperation has garnered significant interest and importance. This recent salience mirrors the broad recognition that key international agreements such as the 2030 Agenda necessitate efforts and contributions beyond what governments alone can provide. Nonetheless, PSE through development co-operation provided by emerging powers has had a long and rich history; one that has been characterised by complex cooperation modalities that are driven by a number of objectives. However, despite this long-established practice there exists a clear lack of evidence on, and understanding of, PSE supported by emerging economies. In addressing this gap, the purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it proposes a typological framework to conceptualise how emerging economies support PSE in partner countries through development co-operation. Second, it explores how stakeholders regard issues related to ...
Review of International Political Economy, Dec 3, 2020
Global governance is widely perceived to be ‘gridlocked’, ‘unravelling’, and ‘unfit for purpose’.... more Global governance is widely perceived to be ‘gridlocked’, ‘unravelling’, and ‘unfit for purpose’. The legitimacy of old institutions is breaking down, yet new institutions struggle to establish the...
Review of International Political Economy, May 18, 2023
This article examines the emergence, spread, and potential future of 'multistakeholderism... more This article examines the emergence, spread, and potential future of 'multistakeholderism' in global governance: A global norm specifying that global public problems ought to be addressed by all actors who affect or are affected by them. While some suggest that multistakeholderism may dominate twenty first century global governance, its origins are unclear, and its spread is limited globally. Furthermore, the implications of the end of Liberal International Order and the emergence of a 'post-hegemonic' world raises questions on the future of multistakeholderism and global norm dynamics more broadly. To address these concerns, this article advances a Gramscian approach to norm dynamics. The empirical analysis examines the origins and uneven spread of the multistakehodler norm, finding that its emergence and varying influence in global governance are intertwined with hegemonic power struggles across different policy fields. We contend that dominant actors use multistakeholderism to assimilate recalcitrant actors while advancing Northern state and corporate power, yet powerful Southern states resist the norm. In a post-hegemonic world order, the internalization of multistakeholderism is highly limited, and it is unlikely to supplant the dominant norm of interstate multilateralism. Ultimately, the article concludes by reflecting on the fraught fate of multistakeholderism and on global norms more broadly.
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two d... more The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two deficits within the field of global development cooperation. First, through its inclusive and multi-stakeholder composition, the GPEDC was created to redress the legitimacy deficit associated with the 'old' Northern, donor-dominated governance of global development cooperation. Second, by leveraging the strengths of the 'new' actors that now comprise the field, the GPEDC was created to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, the GPEDC has faced consistent criticism, and currently, there is no space where all actors can convene to advance progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. This thesis explores stakeholder perspectives on, and dynamics within, this highly politicised and unique global partnership. This thesis is research-driven, drawing primarily upon interviews with key public, private, and civic representatives, and it is complemented by insider-insight derived from having worked for the GPEDC. The thesis explores: how stakeholders evaluate the legitimacy of the partnership; whether it constitutes a transformative governance arrangement, or whether it re-inscribes power relations, and; what these perspectives tell us about broader prospects for global multilateral cooperation. This thesis finds that the field is characterised by competing dispositions towards multilateralism, approaches to 'development', and diverse perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance demands. This thesis contributes to two debates. First, it contributes to debates on the possibility for legitimate governance beyond the nation-state. In this regard, the thesis provides an original framework that can be used to explore diverse stakeholder perspectives. Second, it contributes to debates on the promises and pitfalls of multi-stakeholder governance within the field of development cooperation. Here, the thesis provides several policy recommendations that, if implemented, could provide more legitimate and effective governance in the post-2015 development era. 8.3.1 Retroliberalism 8.3.2 Economic Nationalism 8.3.3 Neo-Structuralism of 2 357 8.3.4 Inclusive Social Development 8.4 Conclusion 9. Conclusion 9.1 The Value of a Normative-Sociological Approach to Legitimacy 9.2 Methodological Reflections 9.3 Policy Recommendations 9.4 Suggestions for future research
In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partne... more In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). The GPEDC promised to replace the old donor–recipient dynamic in international development with ‘an equator-less landscape of multistakeholder global partnership’ (Eyben & Savage, 2013). Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) have since become the global governance modality of choice for the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Advocates maintain that MSPs provide more legitimate and effective governance than interstate multilateralism. But critics contend that MSPs co-opt subaltern voices and reinscribe power asymmetries: MSPs may, thus, constitute a ‘New Tyranny’ within global development governance (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Drawing on extensive empirical research, this article examines the extent to which the GPEDC provides more legitimate governance or effects akin to a ‘New Tyranny’. Against dichotomous portrayals of MSPs as either inherently ‘legitimate’ or ‘tyrannical’, the article finds that MSPs such as the GPEDC constitute spaces wherein normative principles of world order are negotiated. Nevertheless, the article finds that we are no closer to a global develop- ment partnership than we were at Busan.
A dialectical relationship between ‘big D’ Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, inte... more A dialectical relationship between ‘big D’ Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, international Development sector) and little ‘d’ development (the immanent structures and processes of capitalism) is a concept widely invoked in Geography and Development Studies. In this paper, we ask how the d/Development dialectic is evolving under current conjunctures of emergent state capitalism(s). We suggest that, going beyond ‘containment’, Development is ever more deeply inhabited by (capitalist) development; with implications for its palliative and restructuring roles, and for praxis, contestation and transformation.
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two d... more The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two deficits within the field of global development cooperation. First, through its inclusive and multi-stakeholder composition, the GPEDC was created to redress the legitimacy deficit associated with the 'old' Northern, donor-dominated governance of global development cooperation. Second, by leveraging the strengths of the 'new' actors that now comprise the field, the GPEDC was created to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, the GPEDC has faced consistent criticism, and currently, there is no space where all actors can convene to advance progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. This thesis explores stakeholder perspectives on, and dynamics within, this highly politicised and unique global partnership. This thesis is research-driven, drawing primarily upon interviews with key public, private, and civic representatives, and it is complemented by insider-insight derived from having worked for the GPEDC. The thesis explores: how stakeholders evaluate the legitimacy of the partnership; whether it constitutes a transformative governance arrangement, or whether it re-inscribes power relations, and; what these perspectives tell us about broader prospects for global multilateral cooperation. This thesis finds that the field is characterised by competing dispositions towards multilateralism, approaches to 'development', and diverse perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance demands. This thesis contributes to two debates. First, it contributes to debates on the possibility for legitimate governance beyond the nation-state. In this regard, the thesis provides an original framework that can be used to explore diverse stakeholder perspectives. Second, it contributes to debates on the promises and pitfalls of multi-stakeholder governance within the field of development cooperation. Here, the thesis provides several policy recommendations that, if implemented, could provide more legitimate and effective governance in the post-2015 development era. 8.3.1 Retroliberalism 8.3.2 Economic Nationalism 8.3.3 Neo-Structuralism of 2 357 8.3.4 Inclusive Social Development 8.4 Conclusion 9. Conclusion 9.1 The Value of a Normative-Sociological Approach to Legitimacy 9.2 Methodological Reflections 9.3 Policy Recommendations 9.4 Suggestions for future research
We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and argue that such is ... more We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and argue that such is neither automatic nor inexorable. We review and extend a body of recent research that underscores the extensive 'work' required by 'big D' Development actors to render target contexts legible, attractive, and amenable to private finance and investment. We introduce the framework of 'rendering (Development) investible' to help us unpack the attendant governmental rationality of Development institutions and professionals in the current financialised conjuncture. We reveal the drivers and primary characteristics of this rationality and we discuss its significant, yet unintended, consequences for Development thought and practice.
The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, ... more The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, has led to a qualitative shift in Global Development Governance (GDG) towards what we term ‘GDG 2.0’. Realising accountability in this context presents challenges due to growing actor diversity, institutional plurality and a lack of formalised accountability structures. Building on the introduction to this special section, we explore the potential of ‘forward-looking’ approaches to ac- countability, notably collective deliberation, learning and competition. Despite the importance of these mechanisms for GDG processes, conceptualising them as accountability tools may have limited gains and indeed reinforce the pref- erences of established actors, dilute useful monitoring approaches and divert attention from longstanding agendas. We argue that prioritising enabling en- vironments for more circumscribed ‘backward-looking’ accountability—with a focus on standard-setting and monitoring—may be more feasible and effective towards holding decision-makers to account within the GDG 2.0 context.
In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partne... more In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). The GPEDC promised to replace the old donor–recipient dynamic in international development with ‘an equator-less landscape of multistakeholder global partnership’ (Eyben & Savage, 2013). Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) have since become the global governance modality of choice for the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Advocates maintain that MSPs provide more legitimate and effective governance than interstate multilateralism. But critics contend that MSPs co-opt subaltern voices and reinscribe power asymmetries: MSPs may, thus, constitute a ‘New Tyranny’ within global development governance (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Drawing on extensive empirical research, this article examines the extent to which the GPEDC provides more legitimate governance or effects akin to a ‘New Tyranny’. Against dichotomous portrayals of MSPs as either inherently ‘legitimate’ or ‘tyrannical’, the article finds that MSPs such as the GPEDC constitute spaces wherein normative principles of world order are negotiated. Nevertheless, the article finds that we are no closer to a global develop- ment partnership than we were at Busan.
A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, inte... more A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, international Development sector) and little 'd' development (the immanent structures and processes of capitalism) is a concept widely invoked in Geography and Development Studies. In this paper, we ask how the d/ Development dialectic is evolving under current conjunctures of emergent state capitalism(s). We suggest that, going beyond 'containment', Development is ever more deeply inhabited by (capitalist) development; with implications for its palliative and restructuring roles, and for praxis, contestation and transformation.
A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, inte... more A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, international Development sector) and little 'd' development (the immanent structures and processes of capitalism) is a concept widely invoked in Geography and Development Studies. In this paper, we ask how the d/ Development dialectic is evolving under current conjunctures of emergent state capitalism(s). We suggest that, going beyond 'containment', Development is ever more deeply inhabited by (capitalist) development; with implications for its palliative and restructuring roles, and for praxis, contestation and transformation.
We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and arg... more We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and argue that such is neither automatic nor inexorable. We review and extend a body of recent research that underscores the extensive 'work' required by 'big D' Development actors to render target contexts legible, attractive, and amenable to private finance and investment. We introduce the framework of 'rendering (Development) investible' to help us unpack the attendant governmental rationality of Development institutions and professionals in the current financialised conjuncture. We reveal the drivers and primary characteristics of this rationality and we discuss its significant, yet unintended, consequences for Development thought and practice.
The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, ... more The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, has led to a qualitative shift in Global Development Governance (GDG) towards what we term ‘GDG 2.0’. Realising accountability in this context presents challenges due to growing actor diversity, institutional plurality and a lack of formalised accountability structures. Building on the introduction to this special section, we explore the potential of ‘forward-looking’ approaches to ac- countability, notably collective deliberation, learning and competition. Despite the importance of these mechanisms for GDG processes, conceptualising them as accountability tools may have limited gains and indeed reinforce the pref- erences of established actors, dilute useful monitoring approaches and divert attention from longstanding agendas. We argue that prioritising enabling en- vironments for more circumscribed ‘backward-looking’ accountability—with a focus on standard-setting and monitoring—may be more feasible and effective towards holding decision-makers to account within the GDG 2.0 context.
European journal of international relations, Jan 31, 2024
To what extent is neoliberal global economic governance transforming in a world where states play... more To what extent is neoliberal global economic governance transforming in a world where states play greater roles as promoters, supervisors and owners of capital? Do these transformations signal a potential paradigm shift? To answer these questions, we focus on global financial governance and the trade and investment regime. We analyse recent policy documents from the IMF, World Bank and WTO-the 'Unholy Trinity' of neoliberal global governance. Our analysis reveals a growing acceptance of state interventionism within and across these organizations. Although this accommodation is significant, we argue that it constitutes a limited transformation. We observe attempts to incorporate emerging state interventionist practices and state-owned entities into established governance arrangements in order to discipline, curtail and control them. We argue that this does not signify a shift towards post-neoliberal plurality within Western-dominated global economic governance, but rather a defensive, 'mutating neoliberalism' which seeks to incorporate depoliticized and commercially oriented state ownership into its mainframe.
Global governance institutions have increasingly 'opened up' to non-state actors, leading to more... more Global governance institutions have increasingly 'opened up' to non-state actors, leading to more formally inclusive governance arrangements. This has prompted inquiry into the extent and the drivers of this inclusivity, patterns of participation, and the consequences for the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance. However, while the measurement of formal openness has expanded, the quality of inclusion remains underexplored. We therefore introduce a framework centred on the notion of 'meaningful inclusion' , distinguishing between formal (de jure) structures and the perceived quality of actual (de facto) engagement. Drawing on extensive empirical data, we then examine the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. This case exemplifies strong formal mechanisms for inclusion that are contrasted sharply by significant shortcomings in effective engagement. Our findings suggest that improvements in formal global governance structures alone cannot ensure meaningful inclusion. Instead, we highlight the centrality of power dynamics and vested interests in shaping inclusivity dynamics in practice.
The promise and potential of private sector engagement (PSE) in activities supported by developme... more The promise and potential of private sector engagement (PSE) in activities supported by development cooperation has garnered significant interest and importance. This recent salience mirrors the broad recognition that key international agreements such as the 2030 Agenda necessitate efforts and contributions beyond what governments alone can provide. Nonetheless, PSE through development co-operation provided by emerging powers has had a long and rich history; one that has been characterised by complex cooperation modalities that are driven by a number of objectives. However, despite this long-established practice there exists a clear lack of evidence on, and understanding of, PSE supported by emerging economies. In addressing this gap, the purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it proposes a typological framework to conceptualise how emerging economies support PSE in partner countries through development co-operation. Second, it explores how stakeholders regard issues related to ...
Review of International Political Economy, Dec 3, 2020
Global governance is widely perceived to be ‘gridlocked’, ‘unravelling’, and ‘unfit for purpose’.... more Global governance is widely perceived to be ‘gridlocked’, ‘unravelling’, and ‘unfit for purpose’. The legitimacy of old institutions is breaking down, yet new institutions struggle to establish the...
Review of International Political Economy, May 18, 2023
This article examines the emergence, spread, and potential future of 'multistakeholderism... more This article examines the emergence, spread, and potential future of 'multistakeholderism' in global governance: A global norm specifying that global public problems ought to be addressed by all actors who affect or are affected by them. While some suggest that multistakeholderism may dominate twenty first century global governance, its origins are unclear, and its spread is limited globally. Furthermore, the implications of the end of Liberal International Order and the emergence of a 'post-hegemonic' world raises questions on the future of multistakeholderism and global norm dynamics more broadly. To address these concerns, this article advances a Gramscian approach to norm dynamics. The empirical analysis examines the origins and uneven spread of the multistakehodler norm, finding that its emergence and varying influence in global governance are intertwined with hegemonic power struggles across different policy fields. We contend that dominant actors use multistakeholderism to assimilate recalcitrant actors while advancing Northern state and corporate power, yet powerful Southern states resist the norm. In a post-hegemonic world order, the internalization of multistakeholderism is highly limited, and it is unlikely to supplant the dominant norm of interstate multilateralism. Ultimately, the article concludes by reflecting on the fraught fate of multistakeholderism and on global norms more broadly.
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two d... more The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two deficits within the field of global development cooperation. First, through its inclusive and multi-stakeholder composition, the GPEDC was created to redress the legitimacy deficit associated with the 'old' Northern, donor-dominated governance of global development cooperation. Second, by leveraging the strengths of the 'new' actors that now comprise the field, the GPEDC was created to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, the GPEDC has faced consistent criticism, and currently, there is no space where all actors can convene to advance progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. This thesis explores stakeholder perspectives on, and dynamics within, this highly politicised and unique global partnership. This thesis is research-driven, drawing primarily upon interviews with key public, private, and civic representatives, and it is complemented by insider-insight derived from having worked for the GPEDC. The thesis explores: how stakeholders evaluate the legitimacy of the partnership; whether it constitutes a transformative governance arrangement, or whether it re-inscribes power relations, and; what these perspectives tell us about broader prospects for global multilateral cooperation. This thesis finds that the field is characterised by competing dispositions towards multilateralism, approaches to 'development', and diverse perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance demands. This thesis contributes to two debates. First, it contributes to debates on the possibility for legitimate governance beyond the nation-state. In this regard, the thesis provides an original framework that can be used to explore diverse stakeholder perspectives. Second, it contributes to debates on the promises and pitfalls of multi-stakeholder governance within the field of development cooperation. Here, the thesis provides several policy recommendations that, if implemented, could provide more legitimate and effective governance in the post-2015 development era. 8.3.1 Retroliberalism 8.3.2 Economic Nationalism 8.3.3 Neo-Structuralism of 2 357 8.3.4 Inclusive Social Development 8.4 Conclusion 9. Conclusion 9.1 The Value of a Normative-Sociological Approach to Legitimacy 9.2 Methodological Reflections 9.3 Policy Recommendations 9.4 Suggestions for future research
In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partne... more In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). The GPEDC promised to replace the old donor–recipient dynamic in international development with ‘an equator-less landscape of multistakeholder global partnership’ (Eyben & Savage, 2013). Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) have since become the global governance modality of choice for the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Advocates maintain that MSPs provide more legitimate and effective governance than interstate multilateralism. But critics contend that MSPs co-opt subaltern voices and reinscribe power asymmetries: MSPs may, thus, constitute a ‘New Tyranny’ within global development governance (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Drawing on extensive empirical research, this article examines the extent to which the GPEDC provides more legitimate governance or effects akin to a ‘New Tyranny’. Against dichotomous portrayals of MSPs as either inherently ‘legitimate’ or ‘tyrannical’, the article finds that MSPs such as the GPEDC constitute spaces wherein normative principles of world order are negotiated. Nevertheless, the article finds that we are no closer to a global develop- ment partnership than we were at Busan.
A dialectical relationship between ‘big D’ Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, inte... more A dialectical relationship between ‘big D’ Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, international Development sector) and little ‘d’ development (the immanent structures and processes of capitalism) is a concept widely invoked in Geography and Development Studies. In this paper, we ask how the d/Development dialectic is evolving under current conjunctures of emergent state capitalism(s). We suggest that, going beyond ‘containment’, Development is ever more deeply inhabited by (capitalist) development; with implications for its palliative and restructuring roles, and for praxis, contestation and transformation.
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two d... more The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two deficits within the field of global development cooperation. First, through its inclusive and multi-stakeholder composition, the GPEDC was created to redress the legitimacy deficit associated with the 'old' Northern, donor-dominated governance of global development cooperation. Second, by leveraging the strengths of the 'new' actors that now comprise the field, the GPEDC was created to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, the GPEDC has faced consistent criticism, and currently, there is no space where all actors can convene to advance progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. This thesis explores stakeholder perspectives on, and dynamics within, this highly politicised and unique global partnership. This thesis is research-driven, drawing primarily upon interviews with key public, private, and civic representatives, and it is complemented by insider-insight derived from having worked for the GPEDC. The thesis explores: how stakeholders evaluate the legitimacy of the partnership; whether it constitutes a transformative governance arrangement, or whether it re-inscribes power relations, and; what these perspectives tell us about broader prospects for global multilateral cooperation. This thesis finds that the field is characterised by competing dispositions towards multilateralism, approaches to 'development', and diverse perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance demands. This thesis contributes to two debates. First, it contributes to debates on the possibility for legitimate governance beyond the nation-state. In this regard, the thesis provides an original framework that can be used to explore diverse stakeholder perspectives. Second, it contributes to debates on the promises and pitfalls of multi-stakeholder governance within the field of development cooperation. Here, the thesis provides several policy recommendations that, if implemented, could provide more legitimate and effective governance in the post-2015 development era. 8.3.1 Retroliberalism 8.3.2 Economic Nationalism 8.3.3 Neo-Structuralism of 2 357 8.3.4 Inclusive Social Development 8.4 Conclusion 9. Conclusion 9.1 The Value of a Normative-Sociological Approach to Legitimacy 9.2 Methodological Reflections 9.3 Policy Recommendations 9.4 Suggestions for future research
We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and argue that such is ... more We critically engage with the so-called 'Financialisation of Development' and argue that such is neither automatic nor inexorable. We review and extend a body of recent research that underscores the extensive 'work' required by 'big D' Development actors to render target contexts legible, attractive, and amenable to private finance and investment. We introduce the framework of 'rendering (Development) investible' to help us unpack the attendant governmental rationality of Development institutions and professionals in the current financialised conjuncture. We reveal the drivers and primary characteristics of this rationality and we discuss its significant, yet unintended, consequences for Development thought and practice.
The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, ... more The proliferation of state and non-state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, has led to a qualitative shift in Global Development Governance (GDG) towards what we term ‘GDG 2.0’. Realising accountability in this context presents challenges due to growing actor diversity, institutional plurality and a lack of formalised accountability structures. Building on the introduction to this special section, we explore the potential of ‘forward-looking’ approaches to ac- countability, notably collective deliberation, learning and competition. Despite the importance of these mechanisms for GDG processes, conceptualising them as accountability tools may have limited gains and indeed reinforce the pref- erences of established actors, dilute useful monitoring approaches and divert attention from longstanding agendas. We argue that prioritising enabling en- vironments for more circumscribed ‘backward-looking’ accountability—with a focus on standard-setting and monitoring—may be more feasible and effective towards holding decision-makers to account within the GDG 2.0 context.
In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partne... more In 2011, the Busan Forum on Development Effectiveness announced the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). The GPEDC promised to replace the old donor–recipient dynamic in international development with ‘an equator-less landscape of multistakeholder global partnership’ (Eyben & Savage, 2013). Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) have since become the global governance modality of choice for the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Advocates maintain that MSPs provide more legitimate and effective governance than interstate multilateralism. But critics contend that MSPs co-opt subaltern voices and reinscribe power asymmetries: MSPs may, thus, constitute a ‘New Tyranny’ within global development governance (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Drawing on extensive empirical research, this article examines the extent to which the GPEDC provides more legitimate governance or effects akin to a ‘New Tyranny’. Against dichotomous portrayals of MSPs as either inherently ‘legitimate’ or ‘tyrannical’, the article finds that MSPs such as the GPEDC constitute spaces wherein normative principles of world order are negotiated. Nevertheless, the article finds that we are no closer to a global develop- ment partnership than we were at Busan.
A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, inte... more A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, international Development sector) and little 'd' development (the immanent structures and processes of capitalism) is a concept widely invoked in Geography and Development Studies. In this paper, we ask how the d/ Development dialectic is evolving under current conjunctures of emergent state capitalism(s). We suggest that, going beyond 'containment', Development is ever more deeply inhabited by (capitalist) development; with implications for its palliative and restructuring roles, and for praxis, contestation and transformation.
A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, inte... more A dialectical relationship between 'big D' Development (broadly, the formal interventionist, international Development sector) and little 'd' development (the immanent structures and processes of capitalism) is a concept widely invoked in Geography and Development Studies. In this paper, we ask how the d/ Development dialectic is evolving under current conjunctures of emergent state capitalism(s). We suggest that, going beyond 'containment', Development is ever more deeply inhabited by (capitalist) development; with implications for its palliative and restructuring roles, and for praxis, contestation and transformation.
Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the emergence of new state capitalism does not inherently opp... more Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the emergence of new state capitalism does not inherently oppose neoliberalism; rather, the two coexist and intertwine. Analysing the evolving relationship between both, this article makes three interrelated arguments. First, notwithstanding long historical lineages, some of the main contemporary dimensions of the new state capitalism are a product of neoliberalism and its contradictions, instabilities, crises and conflicts. The new state capitalism is, thus, both deeply shaped by neoliberal path-dependencies and institutional legacies, and the deepening of neoliberalisation, albeit through new modalities. Second, the new state capitalism constitutes a form of evolving and mutating neoliberalism, rather than an alternative to it (at least for now). That said, neoliberal mutations, like greater accommodation of state ownership and enhanced statist interventionism within the neoliberal mainframe, are themselves the source of major fault lines within neoliberalism, exacerbating geoeconomic antagonisms and the geopoliticisation of economic relations. Third, the new state capitalism accelerates the development of neoliberal forms of economic nationalism. Scalar contradictions are thus exacerbated through the tensions produced by the nationalist promotion of competitive corporate champions amid (an evolving) global neoliberal architecture.
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Papers by Jack Taggart
article makes three interrelated arguments. First, notwithstanding long historical lineages, some of the main contemporary dimensions of the new state capitalism are a product of neoliberalism and its contradictions,
instabilities, crises and conflicts. The new state capitalism is, thus, both deeply shaped by neoliberal path-dependencies and institutional legacies, and the deepening of neoliberalisation, albeit through new modalities.
Second, the new state capitalism constitutes a form of evolving and mutating neoliberalism, rather than an alternative to it (at least for now). That said, neoliberal mutations, like greater accommodation of state
ownership and enhanced statist interventionism within the neoliberal mainframe, are themselves the source of major fault lines within neoliberalism, exacerbating geoeconomic antagonisms and the geopoliticisation of economic relations. Third, the new state capitalism accelerates the development of neoliberal forms of economic nationalism. Scalar contradictions are thus exacerbated through the tensions produced by the nationalist promotion of competitive corporate champions amid (an evolving) global neoliberal architecture.