Kallum Pembro
I gained a BA in Philosophy from the University of Sussex in 2015 and an MLitt in Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews in 2017. I'm currently completing an MRes in International Politics and Business at Queen Marry, University of London.
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Jeffrie Murphy has argued that there is a “paradox” at the heart of Locke’s account: the necessary conditions for the application of the concept of punishment cannot be met in the state of nature. Thus, the claim that individuals possess a natural right to punish presupposes a conceptual error. It follows that Locke’s arguments for the moral foundations of government’s right to punish are undermined.
This essay is a response to Murphy on Locke’s behalf. I argue that, although Murphy’s definition of punishment is insightful, his analysis presupposes a restrictive definition of ‘authority’. In my rejoinder to Murphy, I present an ostensive counter-example to his analysis of authority. Without this partisan definition of authority Murphy’s definition of punishment can be legitimately applied to individuals in the state of nature. I argue that punishment in the state of nature is morally defensible and that objections, such as Murphy’s, that seek to undermine Locke’s theory of political legitimacy by attempting establish a qualitative difference between a natural right and a state power are misguided. We shall find that there is no “paradox” at the heart of Locke’s theory.
Jeffrie Murphy has argued that there is a “paradox” at the heart of Locke’s account: the necessary conditions for the application of the concept of punishment cannot be met in the state of nature. Thus, the claim that individuals possess a natural right to punish presupposes a conceptual error. It follows that Locke’s arguments for the moral foundations of government’s right to punish are undermined.
This essay is a response to Murphy on Locke’s behalf. I argue that, although Murphy’s definition of punishment is insightful, his analysis presupposes a restrictive definition of ‘authority’. In my rejoinder to Murphy, I present an ostensive counter-example to his analysis of authority. Without this partisan definition of authority Murphy’s definition of punishment can be legitimately applied to individuals in the state of nature. I argue that punishment in the state of nature is morally defensible and that objections, such as Murphy’s, that seek to undermine Locke’s theory of political legitimacy by attempting establish a qualitative difference between a natural right and a state power are misguided. We shall find that there is no “paradox” at the heart of Locke’s theory.