Papers in English by Michał Paluch
E-pub before print
Published: “Doctor Communis”, 2016, Fasc.1-2: Religione e religioni. Uno sguar... more E-pub before print
Published: “Doctor Communis”, 2016, Fasc.1-2: Religione e religioni. Uno sguardo tomista. Religion and religions. A Thomistic Look. The Proceedings of the XV Plenary Session: 19-21 June 2015, pp. 181–193
The paper presents a concise reconstruction of Aquinas’s doctrine of providence, a short dossier ... more The paper presents a concise reconstruction of Aquinas’s doctrine of providence, a short dossier on the main Thomistic debate on it and some suggestions for the future research and presentations of this doctrine. The reconstruction is organized in four main claims: 1ᵒ the guidance of the divine providence embraces all beings; 2ᵒ rational beings are guided in a special way; 3ᵒ providential guidance includes in itself contingent events and free actions by humans; 4ᵒ the analogy that helps us to conceive the operation of providence is that of the virtue of prudence. The many centuries lasting debate that started with the positions of Luis de Molina and Dominic Bañez (De auxiliis) is discussed in its main twentieth century “edition”, that is to say, the exchange of papers between Jacques Maritain and Jean-Hervé Nicolas. The suggestions for the future research and presentations of Aquinas’s doctrine of providence in the context of contemporary theology take into account the following elements: a double perspective in the analysis of the divine will; a better articulation of the transcendence of the divine activity and the stress on Christological dimension.
Analogy is one of the most important crossroads of philosophy and theology: it has helped for cen... more Analogy is one of the most important crossroads of philosophy and theology: it has helped for centuries to explain how we are (not) able to reach God with our words. Noticed by Aristotle, developed by his neoplatonic and Arabic commentators, analogy found its “classical” expression in the work of Aquinas and became on that basis a subject of passionate debates up to our days. The paper gives an opportunity to enter into this debate: it conveys a concise description of Aquinas’s position, presents the reasons for the enduring dissensions and in light of contemporary criticisms considers a possibility of making analogy a convincing proposal in our time.
„Angelicum” 2003, No. 80, pp. 327–336 , 2003
In one of the first chapters of his Enchiridion (ch. 3) Augustin formulates his famous principle ... more In one of the first chapters of his Enchiridion (ch. 3) Augustin formulates his famous principle “the Omnipotent God…. would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil.” In the 13th century this principle, which is at the heart of the Augustinian theodicy, is cited as an adagium in two slightly different forms: “God permits the evil because he is able to bring forth good out of evil” and “God permits the evil because he is able to bring forth greater good out of evil”.
This paper has two purposes. It is to investigate the relationship between these two different formulations and their theological background. I argue that they may express two various positions concerning the History of Salvation. The second purpose of the paper is to place Thomas Aquinas’s late work in relation to the mentioned positions. He uses, in a quite consistent way, the first formulation. Only one text (STh III, 1, 3, ad 3) seems to be in the line of thought represented by the second formulation. Should it be understood as a sign of internal movements or changes of Aquinas’s doctrine?
Aquinas on the Poor Widow (Mk 12:41-44), 2022
According to the Gospels, Jesus only said about one person that she offered her whole life (Mk 12... more According to the Gospels, Jesus only said about one person that she offered her whole life (Mk 12:44; Lk 21:4). He could have made a similar statement about himself as well. Interestingly, he did not say this about any of the apostles or prophets of the Old Testament, nor about any of the important participants in public life at the time. This was a woman whose name was not recorded in the Gospels. She entered into salvation history as a poor widow. The purpose of this paper is to explore the reaches of the narrative about her with the help of Aquinas’s work.
Aquinas’s research and reflection on the narrative of the Poor Widow is multidimensional. In his patristic research (the Catena Aurea) he presents a rich range of comments and insights, starting with precise exegetical comments on the intriguing details of the story and finishing with bold allegorical proposals. The allegorical readings go far. The Poor Widow’s gesture is compared to the kenosis of Christ, described in the Letter to the Philippians (« emptying herself of her whole substance ») and she is presented as the representation of the purity and simplicity of the Church in respect to the Jewish cult.
In spite of the fact that the Catena Aurea was the only work Saint Thomas used to carry always with him, there are no traces of the use of the patristic insights in Aquinas’s systematic works. The Poor Widow’s narrative helps mainly (1) to stress in them the priority of the spiritual dimension in our offerings and (2) to articulate the proportional – taking into account what we really are able to give – value of our gifts. Her example appears sometimes in the reflections in which we would expect to find references to it (almsgiving, importance of external acts), sometimes in the reflections in which such references are rather surprising (our meritorious acts versus the ones of the first man, satisfactory power of the Eucharist). Nevertheless, the role of the reference to the Poor Widow’s story is, in the end, limited to the two above-mentioned topics. One can draw the conclusion on this basis that the narrative « had a life » in Aquinas’s systematic research, but with a very definite and limited meaning.
All this, however, does not mean that intriguing details cannot be found in Thomas' texts.
Aquinas on the Poor Widow, in: Nicole Awais, Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, Doris Rey-Meier (ed.), Une théologie à l’école de saint Thomas d’Aquin. Hommage au prof. Gilles Emery op à l’occasion de ses 60 ans, Paris – Fribourg: Les éditions du Cerf – Studia Friburgensia, 2022, pp. 63–80.
The paper focuses on the Universal Doctor’s revolutionary approach to the master-pupil relationsh... more The paper focuses on the Universal Doctor’s revolutionary approach to the master-pupil relationship, in which the pupil is supposed to seek the truth autonomously while the master merely guides and assists him in his quest. This approach stemmed from an understanding of reason as the greatest gift we have received from the Creator, who is a Divine Teacher in whom we ought to trust and whom we should allow to guide us.
Oikonomia , 2019
This paper aims to draft an overview of the most fundamental strategies of Christian reaction to ... more This paper aims to draft an overview of the most fundamental strategies of Christian reaction to secularization and it proposes their basic evaluation. At the beginning it presents the complex origins of this process.
Papers in Polish by Michał Paluch
Studia Bobolanum 35/2 , 2024
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) belongs to the philosophers whose work has significantly influenced ... more Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) belongs to the philosophers whose work has significantly influenced a considerable part of the theological tradition in the 20th century. The purpose of this paper is to briefly present the main claims of his philosophy, indicate the place of theology in his work and sketch the summary of the impact of his work on theological reflection. Since Heidegger's project falls within the framework of existential philosophy, which consistently emphasizes the role of personal commitment and formulates the postulate of searching for a path to a truly authentic existence, the presentation of the philosopher's views is preceded by recalling the main elements of his biography. The stimulation of interest for anthropological search along with the exploration of the mystery of being (Sein), or the search for a new language are certainly Heidegger's important contributions to 20th century research. Unfortunately, each of the topics he addressed leaves the Christian with a sense of inadequacy. The best description of the outcome of his influence is ambivalence.
Prawda objawiona? Propozycja podejścia zawarta w Konstytucji Dei Verbum, 2023
This paper is an attempt to briefly describe how Christians of the last few centuries - immersed ... more This paper is an attempt to briefly describe how Christians of the last few centuries - immersed in a discussion with the philosophical culture of their time - tried to point out the proper place for revealed truth in interpreting reality. In response to the growing secularism of the modern era, philosophical projects were born (Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard) that, taking up the demands of their time, attempted to "run forward," to establish a place for revealed truth in a new way that would help it elude critics. These philosophical attempts later inspired theologians (including Schleiermacher, Cullmann, Barth), who tried to translate philosophical ideas into concrete interpretations of revelation. In turn, all these discussions, carried out mainly, though not exclusively, on the Protestant side, led on the Catholic side to the modernist crisis, which will eventually - thanks to the work of theologians from the circle of la nouvelle théologie (Congar, de Lubac) – be surpassed in the Second Vatican Council's constitution Dei Verbum. The paper presents the various elements of the development thus outlined, leading to finding the right perspective to appreciate the groundbreaking significance of Vatican II's Dei Verbum constitution.
Średniowieczne dykusje o wszechmocy – katalizator woluntaryzmu? [The medieval discussions on omnipotence – a catalyst of voluntarism?], 2022
Medieval discussions on omnipotence may seem an obvious space of speculation in which voluntarist... more Medieval discussions on omnipotence may seem an obvious space of speculation in which voluntarist interpretations of the divine, and in time human, action matured. It seems that the medieval struggle to intellectually articulate God's absolute sovereignty and to found it must have entailed emphasizing the role of the will in divine action and giving it features of arbitrariness.
The aim of the text is to look at the origins of this process and to ask to what extent the interpretative perspectives adopted in thinking about omnipotence by Augustine, Peter Damiani and Anselm can be seen as the trigger for the voluntarism that flourished in the West in the late Middle Ages.
The text consists of two parts. In the first, after sketching the biblical starting point, I briefly report on Augustine's, Peter Damiani's, and Anselm's understanding of omnipotence. In the second, I refer to their voluntaristic-sounding theses - trying to suggest some interpretative perspectives that allow these theses to be adequately understood.
In my view, the concepts adopted by Augustine, Peter Damiani and Anselm can hardly be unequivocally qualified as theological voluntarism. Speaking of God's volitional activities is the standard way for a Christian theologian to distinguish divine involvement in creation from intrinsic divine activities (I), while God's actions themselves in the created world are always the expression of a divine design which, although partly elusive and mysterious to us, is an expression of divine wisdom; these actions are, moreover, always carried out by the persons of the Trinity together, with the participation of the divine Logos (II).
This does not mean, however, that the texts of the aforementioned authors do not contain the seeds of thought that paved the way for the voluntarist interpretations of the divine will of the late Middle Ages. All the aforementioned authors used very strong language to articulate the sovereignty of God's will. The germ of voluntarism contained in their work will, however, only be able to have its full effect when the divine will distinguished as a separate power, is contrasted with the intellect, recognized as superior to it and capable of independent action (at some point even including cognition). This, however, will take place several centuries after the death of the last of the authors in question. Taking all this into account, it seems that the voluntarist texts found in discussions of the omnipotence of the early Middle Ages should be interpreted as voluntarism of the body rather than of the spirit.
The publication is the result of research project No. 2014/13/B/HS1/01386, funded by the National Science Center (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland.
Średniowieczne dykusje o wszechmocy – katalizator woluntaryzmu? [The medieval discussions on omnipotence – a catalyst of voluntarism?], in: Jan Kiełbasa (ed.), Historia pojęcia woli od starożytności do XIII wieku [History of the concept of will from antiquity to the 13th century], Kraków: Nomos, 2022, pp. 177–205.
One of the most important theses of St. Thomas Aquinas’ teaching on omnipotence is linked to the ... more One of the most important theses of St. Thomas Aquinas’ teaching on omnipotence is linked to the principle of non-contradiction: God may do that which is not internally contradictory; He may not do that which is internally contradictory and thus does not fulfill the basic requirements of being. This article examines the road this thesis traveled before it was adopted and developed by St. Thomas. The seed of the idea of divine omnipotence limited by the principle of non-contradiction can be found in St. Augustine’s Contra Faustum, but the thesis first appears in a systematic form in Regulae caelestis iuris by Alain de Lille (†1202). Thirteenth-century authors who preceded St. Thomas readily described the limits of divine omnipotence in reference to the principle of non-contradiction, but Thomas was the first to make the notion that God cannot do that which is internally contradictory one of the speculative pillars of his ref lection on omnipotence.
This thesis plays a major role in St. Thomas’ thought because of Aquinas’ concern for the structural transparency of his proposed solution and due to the metaphysics that St. Thomas had previously accepted: according to Aquinas, God is ipsum esse subsistens, so it must have seemed appropriate to describe the limits of God’s omnipotence by appealing to the limits of being itself (i.e., to the requirements of being).
![Research paper thumbnail of Wolność czy konieczność? Nauka o predestynacji a koncepcja woli od IX do XIII wieku [Liberty or necessity? The teaching on predestination and the doctrine of will from the 9th to the 13th century]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/92747010/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Wolność czy konieczność? Nauka o predestynacji a koncepcja woli od IX do XIII wieku [Liberty or necessity? The teaching on predestination and the doctrine of will from the 9th to the 13th century], 2022
The doctrine of predestination is one of the most controversial and multifaceted themes of the Ju... more The doctrine of predestination is one of the most controversial and multifaceted themes of the Judeo-Christian tradition. God's determination to eternally predestine the elect to salvation intrigues and raises questions. Does divine election include all or only some? Since it is eternal, does it take place with human freedom, or is it independent of it? Are we able to point to any of its motives - its reasons - or must it remain incomprehensible or even arbitrary to us?
The aim of this text is to identify the elements of the doctrine of predestination which may have had the greatest influence on the deepening of reflection on the will and the formation of medieval voluntarism. It is not, however, an attempt to sketch the history of the doctrine of predestination. The aim is rather to formulate a working hypothesis about the significant stages of speculation in the time between the ninth and thirteenth centuries; stages that had their significance for reflection on the will.
There are, in my view, four of them and, although they can be shown in chronological order, they should rather be thought of as the main fields of tension determining the direction of reflection on the subject in the Middle Ages: the need to define the relation between knowledge and will in God (stage I), identifying the kind of volitional involvement of God (stage II), articulating the transcendence of the divine will (stage III) and linking the proposed doctrine to the experience available to us (stage IV).
The publication is the result of research project No. 2014/13/B/HS1/01386, funded by the National Science Center (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland.
Wolność czy konieczność? Nauka o predestynacji a koncepcja woli od IX do XIII wieku [Liberty or necessity? The teaching on predestination and the doctrine of will from the 9th to the 13th century], in: Jan Kiełbasa (ed.), Historia pojęcia woli od starożytności do XIII wieku [History of the concept of will from antiquity to the 13th century], Kraków: Nomos, 2022, pp. 206–231.
Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus on contingency, freedom and individuation
The paper attempts to p... more Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus on contingency, freedom and individuation
The paper attempts to present the fundamental perspectives which are necessary to understand Aquinas’s position on contingency, freedom and individuation in order to compare his thinking with Duns Scotus’s. The author wants to take into account Gilson’s warning: it is useless to compare chosen details of the aforementioned philosophical proposals, if there is no understanding of the deep difference between the compared metaphysics.
The first section presents the difference in the understanding of the relationship between nature and will. Duns Scotus interprets the will as opposed to nature and sees the truly personal, free and Christian acting as opposed to the deterministic operations of nature. For Aquinas the truly personal acting may be inscribed in nature as its free fulfilment. The difference is based on the different readings of Aristotle’s philosophy. The second section describes the difference in the understanding of the transcendence of the divine actions. Thomas uses a very strong concept of transcendence that allows him to accept the thesis: God’s immutable (=necessary) will achieves its purposes through necessary and free (sic!) actions of the creatures (cf. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Scotus looks for a more intuitive understanding of the relationship between the divine and the human acting. Because of that he describes the divine actions as contingent, undertaken in the eternal “now”. The third section deals with the doctrine of individuation. The proposal by Duns Scotus to solve the problem is his famous form of haecceitas. Although also for Thomas it is the form as the source of substantiality that is the portent of the individuality, that has been achieved through individuation, and although he must have been aware of some difficulties of the classical Aristotelian position (matter as the main factor for individuation), he sticks to the Aristotelian solution slightly reformulating it (materia quantitate signata). There are two reasons for his fidelity to Aristotle in spite of some doubts of Albert the Great and Bonaventure: the stress on the hylemorphic structure of being and the attempt to articulate the consistency of the conceptual genera. The last problem leads to the main metaphysical difference of the analysed proposals. Duns Scotus as essentialist has to inscribe everything that is real inside the order of essence; Thomas articulates the reality taking into account essence and existence. His position opens wider possibilities for the understanding of being.
Streszczenie
Tekst jest próbą przedstawienia fundamentalnych perspektyw, które są konieczne dla zrozumienia stanowiska Akwinaty na temat przygodności, wolności i indywiduacji w zestawieniu z propozycją Dunsa Szkota. Autor stara się wziąć pod uwagę ostrzeżenie Gilsona: niewiele da porównywanie wybranych szczegółów wspomnianych pozycji filozoficznych bez zrozumienia fundamentalnej różnicy między porównywanymi metafizykami.
Pierwsza część przedstawia różnicę rozumienia relacji między naturą i wolą. Duns Szkot interpretuje wolę przeciwstawiając ją naturze i rozumie prawdziwie osobowe, wolne i chrześcijańskie działanie w opozycji do deterministycznych działań natury. Dla Akwinaty prawdziwie osobowe działanie może być wpisane w naturę jako jej wolne dopełnienie. Różnica jest ufundowana w rozmaitych interpretacjach filozofii Arystotelesa. Druga część opisuje różnicę w rozumieniu transcendencji boskich działań. Tomasz posługuje się bardzo mocnym rozumieniem transcendencji, które pozwala przyjąć tezę: niezmienność (=konieczność) woli Boga uzyskuje swoje cele zarówno przez konieczne, jak i wolne (!) działania stworzeń (por. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Szkot szuka bardziej intuicyjnie dostępnego rozumienia relacji między boskimi i ludzkimi działaniami. Z tego powodu opisuje boskie działania jako przygodne, podejmowane w wiecznym „teraz”. Trzecia część zajmuje się doktryną indywiduacji. Duns Szkot proponował rozwiązać problem przez odwołanie do słynnej formy haecceitas. Chociaż dla Tomasza nośnikiem indywidualności po zindywidualizowaniu bytu jest także forma jako źródło substancjalności i chociaż Tomasz musiał być świadomy trudności klasycznego stanowiska, odwołującego się do Arystotelesa (materia jako główny czynnik indywiduacji), trzyma się stanowczo arystotelesowskiego rozwiązania, nieznacznie je przeformułowując (materia quantitate signata). Były najprawdopodobniej dwa powody wiernego podążania Tomasza za Arystotelesem, mimo wątpliwości Alberta Wielkiego i Bonawentury: chęć podkreślenia hylemorficznej struktury bytu i próba wskazania trwałej podstawy dla pojęciowych genera. Ostatni problem prowadzi do najważniejszej metafizycznej różnicy między analizowanymi propozycjami. Duns Szkot jako esencjalista musi wpisać wszystko, co rzeczywiste, w porządek istotowy. Tomasz artykułuje rzeczywistość bytu biorąc pod uwagę istotę i istnienie. Jego stanowisko daje tym sposobem więcej możliwości dla odczytania bytu.
Is Aquinas a voluntarist? A few comments on an ongoing discussion
The paper deals with the widely... more Is Aquinas a voluntarist? A few comments on an ongoing discussion
The paper deals with the widely discussed problem of the change in Aquinas’s interpretation of the relationship between the intellect and the will. The change may be placed in his work around 1270, between the Prima Pars and the Prima Secundae/De malo 6. It comprises three main elements. (1) At the beginning Thomas explains the role of the intellect in the act of the liberum arbitrium by final causality and the role of the will by efficiency; after the change of his position the role of the intellect is understood by formal causality and the role of the will by final causality. (2) After the change the will is described as having the capacity to be a source of motion on its own (not only responding to the activity of the intellect). (3) It is the will and not the intellect, according to Aquinas’s later interpretation, that is set in motion by the first cause.
The paper presents the discussion on the divergent interpretations of the above-mentioned evolution, started by several famous texts by Otto Lottin in the 20-ties and 30-ties of the 20th century and followed up to a book by Yul Kim published in 2007. The new position adapted by Aquinas at the end of his career has been evaluated as a voluntaristic one, intellectualistic or a middle one.
Taking into account that (1) Thomas always understands the act of liberum arbitrium as the only one act of the intellect and the will operating together, (2) Aquinas’s philosophy of action has never been a kind of deterministic Aristotelianism and (3) for Aquinas the first cause, always understood as transcendent, cannot be a danger to human freedom, it can be concluded that the position adapted by Thomas after 1270 remains in substantial agreement with his former interpretation.
The act of the liberum arbitrium is rooted in the will. If one wants to judge Aquinas’s position according to this aspect, it should be labelled voluntarism. But the act of the liberum arbitrium cannot be executed without the cooperation of the intellect; according to Aquinas it is never a fruit of some blind force. If one wants to focus on this aspect, one must describe Thomas’s solution as intellectualism. As it was mentioned above, the act of the liberum arbitrium is the only one act of the intellect and the will operating together. If one wants to consider that aspect as the most important, one will be probably inclined to describe Aquinas’s position as the middle one between voluntarism and intellectualism. What is the most important, each of the above mentioned descriptions of his position is the same before and after the change.
Teologia w Polsce 3,1 (2009), s. 97-109, 2009
SUMMARY
“Did the Angelic Doctor Underestimate Christ?” examines the role of Christology in the t... more SUMMARY
“Did the Angelic Doctor Underestimate Christ?” examines the role of Christology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. At the end of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas offers a discussion of the Incarnation in which he tends toward the view that Christ would not
have taken human form had man not sinned. This position gives rise to the suspicion that the Dominican treated the Incarnation too lightly; that he understood it instrumentally, merely as a means to resolve the “problem” of sin.
The author shows that the position accorded to the discussion of Christ in Aquinas’s work comes out of St. Thomas’ approach to Salvation History as a whole. The style of reasoning known as ex convenientia (“from suitability”), common among medieval
theologians, permitted them to regard their interpretations of Salvation History as belonging to scientia in the Aristotelian sense while also allowing them to produce a balanced, two-sided analysis of every event. On the one hand, the Incarnation was deemed not absolutely necessary, since a transcendent God cannot be constrained by any one scenario. On the other hand, it was considered consistent with the logic of the divine design of love
for Christ to have assumed a human nature. This bilateral analysis enabled theologians to admire the Incarnation as an act performed by God out of love, in freedom.
The influence of G.F. Hegel’s metaphysics has caused the suggestion that the Incarnation was not absolutely necessary to appear suspect. Theologians inspired by the synthesis of the sage from Berlin tend to see the Incarnation as part of a necessary process. The metaphysical perspective they occupy – different from that of Aquinas – usually yields a distorted view of the medieval master. Yet St. Thomas’ approach to Salvation History, in which respect for God’s transcendence and appreciation for divine freedom each have a place, remains the more interesting and well-balanced proposition and should have a prominent voice in contemporary discussions.
Epoka nowożytna nauczyła nas koncentrować się na drodze, która może doprowadzić nas do Boga. Zade... more Epoka nowożytna nauczyła nas koncentrować się na drodze, która może doprowadzić nas do Boga. Zadecydowało o tym wiele zjawisk. Sekularyzowanie kolejnych dziedzin życia indywidualnego i społecznego odbierało stopniowo oczywistość odniesieniu do Boga, postęp nauk doświadczalnych prowadził do krytycznego zajęcia się wszelkimi prawdami uznawanymi za pewne, a rosnąca świadomość wielości religijnych doświadczeń ludzkości kazała domagać się przekonujących uzasadnień dla proponowanych form religijności. Wszystko to prowadziło do wyodrębnienia w teologii osobnej dziedziny zwanej duchowością, która miała za zadanie systematyzować refleksję dotyczącą doświadczania obecności Boga, i do rozwoju rozmaitych jej szkół z karmelitańskim wstępowaniem na górę Karmel i jezuickimi ćwiczeniami duchowymi na czele. Wydawało się, że w oddalającym się od Boga świecie należało zabiegać o przestrzeń w sobie, by ocalić miejsce dla Boga. Akwinata o modlitwie, czyli pochwała prostoty Michał Paluch OP Teolog i doktor habilitowany filozofii. Regens studiów Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów. Wykładowca w Kolegium Filozoficzno-Teologicznym Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów.
Teofil, 2018
At the beginning the author drafts the biblical background of the doctrine of God. On this canvas... more At the beginning the author drafts the biblical background of the doctrine of God. On this canvas he present two different approaches to the doctrine of God: the Augustinian – Thomistic one on the one hand and the Pseudo-Dionysian one on the other. According to the first of them God is incomprehensible because He is the absolute fullness of being, according to the second one God is incomprehensible because He is beyond being. Both approaches has their different genesis and they are based on a different understanding of the role of language.
At the end of the paper is a summary in English.
Tekst przedstawia próbę obrony wiarygodności tei... more At the end of the paper is a summary in English.
Tekst przedstawia próbę obrony wiarygodności teizmów zaprezentowaną przez Davida Bentleya Harta w książce The Experience of God i formułuje na tej podstawie kilka postulatów pod adresem współczesnych prób obrony wiary. W związku z krytyką misyjnego ateizmu Hart zabiera głos w imieniu głównych tradycji religijnych, by zwrócić uwagę na redukcyjny obraz Boga zakładany w dziełach ateistycznych polemistów. Stara się pokazać, nawiązując głównie do religii monoteistycznych, choć czyniąc także wysiłki, by uwzględnić wrażliwość religii dalekowschodnich, że najważniejsze religie ludzkości interpretują Boga jako radykalnie wykraczającego poza ten świat – transcendentnego – i właśnie dlatego zdolnego do immanentnej w nim obecności. Tezę tę pomaga mu uzasadnić analiza trzech doświadczeń związanych z bytem, świadomością i rozkoszą, które odpowiadają triadzie Upaniszad: sat, chit i ananda. Pierwsze z nich to przygodność, drugie to ekstaza poza to, co materialne, ludzkiej świadomości, trzecie to wykraczanie poza fizyczne przyczyny i skutki, dokonujące się w celowym ludzkim działaniu. Uważna analiza tych doświadczeń, dokonywana z przywołaniem współczesnych filozoficznych dyskusji na ich temat, prowadzi Harta do wniosku, że można je przekonująco zinterpretować tylko w świetle teizmu szanującego boską transcendencję, naturalizm okazuje się zaś irracjonalnym i najbardziej ubogim sposobem rozumienia otaczającej nas rzeczywistości.
Projekt Harta jest zdaniem autora artykułu zaproszeniem do prób apologetycznych, które (1) będą integrować odniesienie się do narracji współczesnej nauki, najważniejszych wyrastających stąd filozoficznych dyskusji oraz sytuacji religijnej chrześcijanina, który musi swoją wiarę wpisać w różnorodny religijnie świat; (2) będą czerpać z dziedzictwa klasycznej teologii pierwszego tysiąclecia, szczególnie w opisywaniu relacji Stwórca – stworzenie; (3) będą przedstawiać chrześcijańską propozycję bez kompleksów wobec postoświeceniowej narracji na temat religii.
At a Crossroads. The post-conciliar search for a model of theology. The paper presents two differ... more At a Crossroads. The post-conciliar search for a model of theology. The paper presents two different post-conciliar projects of theology presented by Hans Küng (Menschwerdung Gottes) and by Marie-Joseph Le Guillou (Le mystère du Père). According to the first one, we need to develop theology on the basis of the Hegelian synthesis that presents an opportunity to reconcile Christianity with modernity. Such a development leads to a transgression of the teaching of the Ecumenical Councils of the first millennium with the hope of putting into practice their deep intentions. According to the second one, we should find the courage to judge contemporary philosophy in the light of theological principles established during the first millennium (regula fidei). The divine eternal plan of salvation should become the decisive perspective to develop sound theology and to correct its various errors. Although both proposals have been presented ca. 50 years ago, the choice between them seems still of crucial importance.
How should a Christian react to secularization?
The two types of reactions represented by German ... more How should a Christian react to secularization?
The two types of reactions represented by German theologians.
Summary
Secularization is understood in this paper as the process of excluding subsequent areas of social and individual life from the influence of religion. The paper presents (I) the causes and dynamics of secularization, (II) the standpoints of the two chosen German theologians – Romano Guardini and Dietrich Bonhoeffer and (III) the standpoint of the Gaudium et spes. The main cause of secularization is the change of the worldview – the transition from theocentrism to anthropocentrism in the modern era. Yet there are multiple causes of this transition: the Copernican revolution, geographic discoveries, religious divisions and wars among Christians, industrial revolution, emancipation of reason, crisis of authority, the rejection of the final and formal causality, the use of the theory of evolution against Christianity. The process of secularization has concerned subsequent spheres of the social and individual life: power, science, economy and, recently, the family.
The span of Christian reactions to secularization may be illustrated by the proposals of a Catholic priest, Romano Guardini, on the one hand, and of a Lutheran pastor, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, on the other. Guardini in his famous essay The end of the modern world criticizes the modern understanding of nature (cf. Goethe) and of person (cf. Kant). Both concepts have been cut off from the Christian background. But without the religious context, they must disappear. Christians are invited in such circumstances to bear witness to their faith. The modern world should experience all the consequences of wrong ideological decisions. Bonhoeffer in his Letters from prison formulates a deeply different proposal of reaction to the modern world. In his opinion Christians should adopt a non-religious attitude of confessing faith to discover a mature way of living Christianity in the modern era. His project of non-religious Christianity was undertaken by the next generation of theologians, both Lutheran and Catholic, who developed different forms of theology of secularization and of political theology.
The Constitution Gaudium et spes of the Second Vatican Council does not use the world secularization but it proposes a reflection on the “new conditions” that have had their impact on religion. The main direction of the proposed reaction to the transformations of the modern era is closer to Guardini’s proposal. Nevertheless, there are some accents that take into account the sensibility articulated by Bonhoeffer and his followers (esp. no. 7: “a more critical ability to distinguish religion from a magical view of the world and from the superstitions which still circulate purifies it and exacts day by day a more personal and explicit adherence to faith”). Equally important, the Constitution gives a useful criterion for the evaluation of different elements of the social transformations. This criterion is the quality of human autonomy (no. 36). If this autonomy is treated and experienced as a gift of the Creator, it should be accepted. If it is understood as a rebellion against God, it is to be avoided by Christians. In this way, the text of the Gaudium et spes helps to show when and under what condition anthropocentrism may not diverge from theocentrism.
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Papers in English by Michał Paluch
Published: “Doctor Communis”, 2016, Fasc.1-2: Religione e religioni. Uno sguardo tomista. Religion and religions. A Thomistic Look. The Proceedings of the XV Plenary Session: 19-21 June 2015, pp. 181–193
This paper has two purposes. It is to investigate the relationship between these two different formulations and their theological background. I argue that they may express two various positions concerning the History of Salvation. The second purpose of the paper is to place Thomas Aquinas’s late work in relation to the mentioned positions. He uses, in a quite consistent way, the first formulation. Only one text (STh III, 1, 3, ad 3) seems to be in the line of thought represented by the second formulation. Should it be understood as a sign of internal movements or changes of Aquinas’s doctrine?
Aquinas’s research and reflection on the narrative of the Poor Widow is multidimensional. In his patristic research (the Catena Aurea) he presents a rich range of comments and insights, starting with precise exegetical comments on the intriguing details of the story and finishing with bold allegorical proposals. The allegorical readings go far. The Poor Widow’s gesture is compared to the kenosis of Christ, described in the Letter to the Philippians (« emptying herself of her whole substance ») and she is presented as the representation of the purity and simplicity of the Church in respect to the Jewish cult.
In spite of the fact that the Catena Aurea was the only work Saint Thomas used to carry always with him, there are no traces of the use of the patristic insights in Aquinas’s systematic works. The Poor Widow’s narrative helps mainly (1) to stress in them the priority of the spiritual dimension in our offerings and (2) to articulate the proportional – taking into account what we really are able to give – value of our gifts. Her example appears sometimes in the reflections in which we would expect to find references to it (almsgiving, importance of external acts), sometimes in the reflections in which such references are rather surprising (our meritorious acts versus the ones of the first man, satisfactory power of the Eucharist). Nevertheless, the role of the reference to the Poor Widow’s story is, in the end, limited to the two above-mentioned topics. One can draw the conclusion on this basis that the narrative « had a life » in Aquinas’s systematic research, but with a very definite and limited meaning.
All this, however, does not mean that intriguing details cannot be found in Thomas' texts.
Aquinas on the Poor Widow, in: Nicole Awais, Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, Doris Rey-Meier (ed.), Une théologie à l’école de saint Thomas d’Aquin. Hommage au prof. Gilles Emery op à l’occasion de ses 60 ans, Paris – Fribourg: Les éditions du Cerf – Studia Friburgensia, 2022, pp. 63–80.
Papers in Polish by Michał Paluch
The aim of the text is to look at the origins of this process and to ask to what extent the interpretative perspectives adopted in thinking about omnipotence by Augustine, Peter Damiani and Anselm can be seen as the trigger for the voluntarism that flourished in the West in the late Middle Ages.
The text consists of two parts. In the first, after sketching the biblical starting point, I briefly report on Augustine's, Peter Damiani's, and Anselm's understanding of omnipotence. In the second, I refer to their voluntaristic-sounding theses - trying to suggest some interpretative perspectives that allow these theses to be adequately understood.
In my view, the concepts adopted by Augustine, Peter Damiani and Anselm can hardly be unequivocally qualified as theological voluntarism. Speaking of God's volitional activities is the standard way for a Christian theologian to distinguish divine involvement in creation from intrinsic divine activities (I), while God's actions themselves in the created world are always the expression of a divine design which, although partly elusive and mysterious to us, is an expression of divine wisdom; these actions are, moreover, always carried out by the persons of the Trinity together, with the participation of the divine Logos (II).
This does not mean, however, that the texts of the aforementioned authors do not contain the seeds of thought that paved the way for the voluntarist interpretations of the divine will of the late Middle Ages. All the aforementioned authors used very strong language to articulate the sovereignty of God's will. The germ of voluntarism contained in their work will, however, only be able to have its full effect when the divine will distinguished as a separate power, is contrasted with the intellect, recognized as superior to it and capable of independent action (at some point even including cognition). This, however, will take place several centuries after the death of the last of the authors in question. Taking all this into account, it seems that the voluntarist texts found in discussions of the omnipotence of the early Middle Ages should be interpreted as voluntarism of the body rather than of the spirit.
The publication is the result of research project No. 2014/13/B/HS1/01386, funded by the National Science Center (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland.
Średniowieczne dykusje o wszechmocy – katalizator woluntaryzmu? [The medieval discussions on omnipotence – a catalyst of voluntarism?], in: Jan Kiełbasa (ed.), Historia pojęcia woli od starożytności do XIII wieku [History of the concept of will from antiquity to the 13th century], Kraków: Nomos, 2022, pp. 177–205.
This thesis plays a major role in St. Thomas’ thought because of Aquinas’ concern for the structural transparency of his proposed solution and due to the metaphysics that St. Thomas had previously accepted: according to Aquinas, God is ipsum esse subsistens, so it must have seemed appropriate to describe the limits of God’s omnipotence by appealing to the limits of being itself (i.e., to the requirements of being).
The aim of this text is to identify the elements of the doctrine of predestination which may have had the greatest influence on the deepening of reflection on the will and the formation of medieval voluntarism. It is not, however, an attempt to sketch the history of the doctrine of predestination. The aim is rather to formulate a working hypothesis about the significant stages of speculation in the time between the ninth and thirteenth centuries; stages that had their significance for reflection on the will.
There are, in my view, four of them and, although they can be shown in chronological order, they should rather be thought of as the main fields of tension determining the direction of reflection on the subject in the Middle Ages: the need to define the relation between knowledge and will in God (stage I), identifying the kind of volitional involvement of God (stage II), articulating the transcendence of the divine will (stage III) and linking the proposed doctrine to the experience available to us (stage IV).
The publication is the result of research project No. 2014/13/B/HS1/01386, funded by the National Science Center (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland.
Wolność czy konieczność? Nauka o predestynacji a koncepcja woli od IX do XIII wieku [Liberty or necessity? The teaching on predestination and the doctrine of will from the 9th to the 13th century], in: Jan Kiełbasa (ed.), Historia pojęcia woli od starożytności do XIII wieku [History of the concept of will from antiquity to the 13th century], Kraków: Nomos, 2022, pp. 206–231.
The paper attempts to present the fundamental perspectives which are necessary to understand Aquinas’s position on contingency, freedom and individuation in order to compare his thinking with Duns Scotus’s. The author wants to take into account Gilson’s warning: it is useless to compare chosen details of the aforementioned philosophical proposals, if there is no understanding of the deep difference between the compared metaphysics.
The first section presents the difference in the understanding of the relationship between nature and will. Duns Scotus interprets the will as opposed to nature and sees the truly personal, free and Christian acting as opposed to the deterministic operations of nature. For Aquinas the truly personal acting may be inscribed in nature as its free fulfilment. The difference is based on the different readings of Aristotle’s philosophy. The second section describes the difference in the understanding of the transcendence of the divine actions. Thomas uses a very strong concept of transcendence that allows him to accept the thesis: God’s immutable (=necessary) will achieves its purposes through necessary and free (sic!) actions of the creatures (cf. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Scotus looks for a more intuitive understanding of the relationship between the divine and the human acting. Because of that he describes the divine actions as contingent, undertaken in the eternal “now”. The third section deals with the doctrine of individuation. The proposal by Duns Scotus to solve the problem is his famous form of haecceitas. Although also for Thomas it is the form as the source of substantiality that is the portent of the individuality, that has been achieved through individuation, and although he must have been aware of some difficulties of the classical Aristotelian position (matter as the main factor for individuation), he sticks to the Aristotelian solution slightly reformulating it (materia quantitate signata). There are two reasons for his fidelity to Aristotle in spite of some doubts of Albert the Great and Bonaventure: the stress on the hylemorphic structure of being and the attempt to articulate the consistency of the conceptual genera. The last problem leads to the main metaphysical difference of the analysed proposals. Duns Scotus as essentialist has to inscribe everything that is real inside the order of essence; Thomas articulates the reality taking into account essence and existence. His position opens wider possibilities for the understanding of being.
Streszczenie
Tekst jest próbą przedstawienia fundamentalnych perspektyw, które są konieczne dla zrozumienia stanowiska Akwinaty na temat przygodności, wolności i indywiduacji w zestawieniu z propozycją Dunsa Szkota. Autor stara się wziąć pod uwagę ostrzeżenie Gilsona: niewiele da porównywanie wybranych szczegółów wspomnianych pozycji filozoficznych bez zrozumienia fundamentalnej różnicy między porównywanymi metafizykami.
Pierwsza część przedstawia różnicę rozumienia relacji między naturą i wolą. Duns Szkot interpretuje wolę przeciwstawiając ją naturze i rozumie prawdziwie osobowe, wolne i chrześcijańskie działanie w opozycji do deterministycznych działań natury. Dla Akwinaty prawdziwie osobowe działanie może być wpisane w naturę jako jej wolne dopełnienie. Różnica jest ufundowana w rozmaitych interpretacjach filozofii Arystotelesa. Druga część opisuje różnicę w rozumieniu transcendencji boskich działań. Tomasz posługuje się bardzo mocnym rozumieniem transcendencji, które pozwala przyjąć tezę: niezmienność (=konieczność) woli Boga uzyskuje swoje cele zarówno przez konieczne, jak i wolne (!) działania stworzeń (por. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Szkot szuka bardziej intuicyjnie dostępnego rozumienia relacji między boskimi i ludzkimi działaniami. Z tego powodu opisuje boskie działania jako przygodne, podejmowane w wiecznym „teraz”. Trzecia część zajmuje się doktryną indywiduacji. Duns Szkot proponował rozwiązać problem przez odwołanie do słynnej formy haecceitas. Chociaż dla Tomasza nośnikiem indywidualności po zindywidualizowaniu bytu jest także forma jako źródło substancjalności i chociaż Tomasz musiał być świadomy trudności klasycznego stanowiska, odwołującego się do Arystotelesa (materia jako główny czynnik indywiduacji), trzyma się stanowczo arystotelesowskiego rozwiązania, nieznacznie je przeformułowując (materia quantitate signata). Były najprawdopodobniej dwa powody wiernego podążania Tomasza za Arystotelesem, mimo wątpliwości Alberta Wielkiego i Bonawentury: chęć podkreślenia hylemorficznej struktury bytu i próba wskazania trwałej podstawy dla pojęciowych genera. Ostatni problem prowadzi do najważniejszej metafizycznej różnicy między analizowanymi propozycjami. Duns Szkot jako esencjalista musi wpisać wszystko, co rzeczywiste, w porządek istotowy. Tomasz artykułuje rzeczywistość bytu biorąc pod uwagę istotę i istnienie. Jego stanowisko daje tym sposobem więcej możliwości dla odczytania bytu.
The paper deals with the widely discussed problem of the change in Aquinas’s interpretation of the relationship between the intellect and the will. The change may be placed in his work around 1270, between the Prima Pars and the Prima Secundae/De malo 6. It comprises three main elements. (1) At the beginning Thomas explains the role of the intellect in the act of the liberum arbitrium by final causality and the role of the will by efficiency; after the change of his position the role of the intellect is understood by formal causality and the role of the will by final causality. (2) After the change the will is described as having the capacity to be a source of motion on its own (not only responding to the activity of the intellect). (3) It is the will and not the intellect, according to Aquinas’s later interpretation, that is set in motion by the first cause.
The paper presents the discussion on the divergent interpretations of the above-mentioned evolution, started by several famous texts by Otto Lottin in the 20-ties and 30-ties of the 20th century and followed up to a book by Yul Kim published in 2007. The new position adapted by Aquinas at the end of his career has been evaluated as a voluntaristic one, intellectualistic or a middle one.
Taking into account that (1) Thomas always understands the act of liberum arbitrium as the only one act of the intellect and the will operating together, (2) Aquinas’s philosophy of action has never been a kind of deterministic Aristotelianism and (3) for Aquinas the first cause, always understood as transcendent, cannot be a danger to human freedom, it can be concluded that the position adapted by Thomas after 1270 remains in substantial agreement with his former interpretation.
The act of the liberum arbitrium is rooted in the will. If one wants to judge Aquinas’s position according to this aspect, it should be labelled voluntarism. But the act of the liberum arbitrium cannot be executed without the cooperation of the intellect; according to Aquinas it is never a fruit of some blind force. If one wants to focus on this aspect, one must describe Thomas’s solution as intellectualism. As it was mentioned above, the act of the liberum arbitrium is the only one act of the intellect and the will operating together. If one wants to consider that aspect as the most important, one will be probably inclined to describe Aquinas’s position as the middle one between voluntarism and intellectualism. What is the most important, each of the above mentioned descriptions of his position is the same before and after the change.
“Did the Angelic Doctor Underestimate Christ?” examines the role of Christology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. At the end of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas offers a discussion of the Incarnation in which he tends toward the view that Christ would not
have taken human form had man not sinned. This position gives rise to the suspicion that the Dominican treated the Incarnation too lightly; that he understood it instrumentally, merely as a means to resolve the “problem” of sin.
The author shows that the position accorded to the discussion of Christ in Aquinas’s work comes out of St. Thomas’ approach to Salvation History as a whole. The style of reasoning known as ex convenientia (“from suitability”), common among medieval
theologians, permitted them to regard their interpretations of Salvation History as belonging to scientia in the Aristotelian sense while also allowing them to produce a balanced, two-sided analysis of every event. On the one hand, the Incarnation was deemed not absolutely necessary, since a transcendent God cannot be constrained by any one scenario. On the other hand, it was considered consistent with the logic of the divine design of love
for Christ to have assumed a human nature. This bilateral analysis enabled theologians to admire the Incarnation as an act performed by God out of love, in freedom.
The influence of G.F. Hegel’s metaphysics has caused the suggestion that the Incarnation was not absolutely necessary to appear suspect. Theologians inspired by the synthesis of the sage from Berlin tend to see the Incarnation as part of a necessary process. The metaphysical perspective they occupy – different from that of Aquinas – usually yields a distorted view of the medieval master. Yet St. Thomas’ approach to Salvation History, in which respect for God’s transcendence and appreciation for divine freedom each have a place, remains the more interesting and well-balanced proposition and should have a prominent voice in contemporary discussions.
Tekst przedstawia próbę obrony wiarygodności teizmów zaprezentowaną przez Davida Bentleya Harta w książce The Experience of God i formułuje na tej podstawie kilka postulatów pod adresem współczesnych prób obrony wiary. W związku z krytyką misyjnego ateizmu Hart zabiera głos w imieniu głównych tradycji religijnych, by zwrócić uwagę na redukcyjny obraz Boga zakładany w dziełach ateistycznych polemistów. Stara się pokazać, nawiązując głównie do religii monoteistycznych, choć czyniąc także wysiłki, by uwzględnić wrażliwość religii dalekowschodnich, że najważniejsze religie ludzkości interpretują Boga jako radykalnie wykraczającego poza ten świat – transcendentnego – i właśnie dlatego zdolnego do immanentnej w nim obecności. Tezę tę pomaga mu uzasadnić analiza trzech doświadczeń związanych z bytem, świadomością i rozkoszą, które odpowiadają triadzie Upaniszad: sat, chit i ananda. Pierwsze z nich to przygodność, drugie to ekstaza poza to, co materialne, ludzkiej świadomości, trzecie to wykraczanie poza fizyczne przyczyny i skutki, dokonujące się w celowym ludzkim działaniu. Uważna analiza tych doświadczeń, dokonywana z przywołaniem współczesnych filozoficznych dyskusji na ich temat, prowadzi Harta do wniosku, że można je przekonująco zinterpretować tylko w świetle teizmu szanującego boską transcendencję, naturalizm okazuje się zaś irracjonalnym i najbardziej ubogim sposobem rozumienia otaczającej nas rzeczywistości.
Projekt Harta jest zdaniem autora artykułu zaproszeniem do prób apologetycznych, które (1) będą integrować odniesienie się do narracji współczesnej nauki, najważniejszych wyrastających stąd filozoficznych dyskusji oraz sytuacji religijnej chrześcijanina, który musi swoją wiarę wpisać w różnorodny religijnie świat; (2) będą czerpać z dziedzictwa klasycznej teologii pierwszego tysiąclecia, szczególnie w opisywaniu relacji Stwórca – stworzenie; (3) będą przedstawiać chrześcijańską propozycję bez kompleksów wobec postoświeceniowej narracji na temat religii.
The two types of reactions represented by German theologians.
Summary
Secularization is understood in this paper as the process of excluding subsequent areas of social and individual life from the influence of religion. The paper presents (I) the causes and dynamics of secularization, (II) the standpoints of the two chosen German theologians – Romano Guardini and Dietrich Bonhoeffer and (III) the standpoint of the Gaudium et spes. The main cause of secularization is the change of the worldview – the transition from theocentrism to anthropocentrism in the modern era. Yet there are multiple causes of this transition: the Copernican revolution, geographic discoveries, religious divisions and wars among Christians, industrial revolution, emancipation of reason, crisis of authority, the rejection of the final and formal causality, the use of the theory of evolution against Christianity. The process of secularization has concerned subsequent spheres of the social and individual life: power, science, economy and, recently, the family.
The span of Christian reactions to secularization may be illustrated by the proposals of a Catholic priest, Romano Guardini, on the one hand, and of a Lutheran pastor, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, on the other. Guardini in his famous essay The end of the modern world criticizes the modern understanding of nature (cf. Goethe) and of person (cf. Kant). Both concepts have been cut off from the Christian background. But without the religious context, they must disappear. Christians are invited in such circumstances to bear witness to their faith. The modern world should experience all the consequences of wrong ideological decisions. Bonhoeffer in his Letters from prison formulates a deeply different proposal of reaction to the modern world. In his opinion Christians should adopt a non-religious attitude of confessing faith to discover a mature way of living Christianity in the modern era. His project of non-religious Christianity was undertaken by the next generation of theologians, both Lutheran and Catholic, who developed different forms of theology of secularization and of political theology.
The Constitution Gaudium et spes of the Second Vatican Council does not use the world secularization but it proposes a reflection on the “new conditions” that have had their impact on religion. The main direction of the proposed reaction to the transformations of the modern era is closer to Guardini’s proposal. Nevertheless, there are some accents that take into account the sensibility articulated by Bonhoeffer and his followers (esp. no. 7: “a more critical ability to distinguish religion from a magical view of the world and from the superstitions which still circulate purifies it and exacts day by day a more personal and explicit adherence to faith”). Equally important, the Constitution gives a useful criterion for the evaluation of different elements of the social transformations. This criterion is the quality of human autonomy (no. 36). If this autonomy is treated and experienced as a gift of the Creator, it should be accepted. If it is understood as a rebellion against God, it is to be avoided by Christians. In this way, the text of the Gaudium et spes helps to show when and under what condition anthropocentrism may not diverge from theocentrism.
Published: “Doctor Communis”, 2016, Fasc.1-2: Religione e religioni. Uno sguardo tomista. Religion and religions. A Thomistic Look. The Proceedings of the XV Plenary Session: 19-21 June 2015, pp. 181–193
This paper has two purposes. It is to investigate the relationship between these two different formulations and their theological background. I argue that they may express two various positions concerning the History of Salvation. The second purpose of the paper is to place Thomas Aquinas’s late work in relation to the mentioned positions. He uses, in a quite consistent way, the first formulation. Only one text (STh III, 1, 3, ad 3) seems to be in the line of thought represented by the second formulation. Should it be understood as a sign of internal movements or changes of Aquinas’s doctrine?
Aquinas’s research and reflection on the narrative of the Poor Widow is multidimensional. In his patristic research (the Catena Aurea) he presents a rich range of comments and insights, starting with precise exegetical comments on the intriguing details of the story and finishing with bold allegorical proposals. The allegorical readings go far. The Poor Widow’s gesture is compared to the kenosis of Christ, described in the Letter to the Philippians (« emptying herself of her whole substance ») and she is presented as the representation of the purity and simplicity of the Church in respect to the Jewish cult.
In spite of the fact that the Catena Aurea was the only work Saint Thomas used to carry always with him, there are no traces of the use of the patristic insights in Aquinas’s systematic works. The Poor Widow’s narrative helps mainly (1) to stress in them the priority of the spiritual dimension in our offerings and (2) to articulate the proportional – taking into account what we really are able to give – value of our gifts. Her example appears sometimes in the reflections in which we would expect to find references to it (almsgiving, importance of external acts), sometimes in the reflections in which such references are rather surprising (our meritorious acts versus the ones of the first man, satisfactory power of the Eucharist). Nevertheless, the role of the reference to the Poor Widow’s story is, in the end, limited to the two above-mentioned topics. One can draw the conclusion on this basis that the narrative « had a life » in Aquinas’s systematic research, but with a very definite and limited meaning.
All this, however, does not mean that intriguing details cannot be found in Thomas' texts.
Aquinas on the Poor Widow, in: Nicole Awais, Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, Doris Rey-Meier (ed.), Une théologie à l’école de saint Thomas d’Aquin. Hommage au prof. Gilles Emery op à l’occasion de ses 60 ans, Paris – Fribourg: Les éditions du Cerf – Studia Friburgensia, 2022, pp. 63–80.
The aim of the text is to look at the origins of this process and to ask to what extent the interpretative perspectives adopted in thinking about omnipotence by Augustine, Peter Damiani and Anselm can be seen as the trigger for the voluntarism that flourished in the West in the late Middle Ages.
The text consists of two parts. In the first, after sketching the biblical starting point, I briefly report on Augustine's, Peter Damiani's, and Anselm's understanding of omnipotence. In the second, I refer to their voluntaristic-sounding theses - trying to suggest some interpretative perspectives that allow these theses to be adequately understood.
In my view, the concepts adopted by Augustine, Peter Damiani and Anselm can hardly be unequivocally qualified as theological voluntarism. Speaking of God's volitional activities is the standard way for a Christian theologian to distinguish divine involvement in creation from intrinsic divine activities (I), while God's actions themselves in the created world are always the expression of a divine design which, although partly elusive and mysterious to us, is an expression of divine wisdom; these actions are, moreover, always carried out by the persons of the Trinity together, with the participation of the divine Logos (II).
This does not mean, however, that the texts of the aforementioned authors do not contain the seeds of thought that paved the way for the voluntarist interpretations of the divine will of the late Middle Ages. All the aforementioned authors used very strong language to articulate the sovereignty of God's will. The germ of voluntarism contained in their work will, however, only be able to have its full effect when the divine will distinguished as a separate power, is contrasted with the intellect, recognized as superior to it and capable of independent action (at some point even including cognition). This, however, will take place several centuries after the death of the last of the authors in question. Taking all this into account, it seems that the voluntarist texts found in discussions of the omnipotence of the early Middle Ages should be interpreted as voluntarism of the body rather than of the spirit.
The publication is the result of research project No. 2014/13/B/HS1/01386, funded by the National Science Center (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland.
Średniowieczne dykusje o wszechmocy – katalizator woluntaryzmu? [The medieval discussions on omnipotence – a catalyst of voluntarism?], in: Jan Kiełbasa (ed.), Historia pojęcia woli od starożytności do XIII wieku [History of the concept of will from antiquity to the 13th century], Kraków: Nomos, 2022, pp. 177–205.
This thesis plays a major role in St. Thomas’ thought because of Aquinas’ concern for the structural transparency of his proposed solution and due to the metaphysics that St. Thomas had previously accepted: according to Aquinas, God is ipsum esse subsistens, so it must have seemed appropriate to describe the limits of God’s omnipotence by appealing to the limits of being itself (i.e., to the requirements of being).
The aim of this text is to identify the elements of the doctrine of predestination which may have had the greatest influence on the deepening of reflection on the will and the formation of medieval voluntarism. It is not, however, an attempt to sketch the history of the doctrine of predestination. The aim is rather to formulate a working hypothesis about the significant stages of speculation in the time between the ninth and thirteenth centuries; stages that had their significance for reflection on the will.
There are, in my view, four of them and, although they can be shown in chronological order, they should rather be thought of as the main fields of tension determining the direction of reflection on the subject in the Middle Ages: the need to define the relation between knowledge and will in God (stage I), identifying the kind of volitional involvement of God (stage II), articulating the transcendence of the divine will (stage III) and linking the proposed doctrine to the experience available to us (stage IV).
The publication is the result of research project No. 2014/13/B/HS1/01386, funded by the National Science Center (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland.
Wolność czy konieczność? Nauka o predestynacji a koncepcja woli od IX do XIII wieku [Liberty or necessity? The teaching on predestination and the doctrine of will from the 9th to the 13th century], in: Jan Kiełbasa (ed.), Historia pojęcia woli od starożytności do XIII wieku [History of the concept of will from antiquity to the 13th century], Kraków: Nomos, 2022, pp. 206–231.
The paper attempts to present the fundamental perspectives which are necessary to understand Aquinas’s position on contingency, freedom and individuation in order to compare his thinking with Duns Scotus’s. The author wants to take into account Gilson’s warning: it is useless to compare chosen details of the aforementioned philosophical proposals, if there is no understanding of the deep difference between the compared metaphysics.
The first section presents the difference in the understanding of the relationship between nature and will. Duns Scotus interprets the will as opposed to nature and sees the truly personal, free and Christian acting as opposed to the deterministic operations of nature. For Aquinas the truly personal acting may be inscribed in nature as its free fulfilment. The difference is based on the different readings of Aristotle’s philosophy. The second section describes the difference in the understanding of the transcendence of the divine actions. Thomas uses a very strong concept of transcendence that allows him to accept the thesis: God’s immutable (=necessary) will achieves its purposes through necessary and free (sic!) actions of the creatures (cf. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Scotus looks for a more intuitive understanding of the relationship between the divine and the human acting. Because of that he describes the divine actions as contingent, undertaken in the eternal “now”. The third section deals with the doctrine of individuation. The proposal by Duns Scotus to solve the problem is his famous form of haecceitas. Although also for Thomas it is the form as the source of substantiality that is the portent of the individuality, that has been achieved through individuation, and although he must have been aware of some difficulties of the classical Aristotelian position (matter as the main factor for individuation), he sticks to the Aristotelian solution slightly reformulating it (materia quantitate signata). There are two reasons for his fidelity to Aristotle in spite of some doubts of Albert the Great and Bonaventure: the stress on the hylemorphic structure of being and the attempt to articulate the consistency of the conceptual genera. The last problem leads to the main metaphysical difference of the analysed proposals. Duns Scotus as essentialist has to inscribe everything that is real inside the order of essence; Thomas articulates the reality taking into account essence and existence. His position opens wider possibilities for the understanding of being.
Streszczenie
Tekst jest próbą przedstawienia fundamentalnych perspektyw, które są konieczne dla zrozumienia stanowiska Akwinaty na temat przygodności, wolności i indywiduacji w zestawieniu z propozycją Dunsa Szkota. Autor stara się wziąć pod uwagę ostrzeżenie Gilsona: niewiele da porównywanie wybranych szczegółów wspomnianych pozycji filozoficznych bez zrozumienia fundamentalnej różnicy między porównywanymi metafizykami.
Pierwsza część przedstawia różnicę rozumienia relacji między naturą i wolą. Duns Szkot interpretuje wolę przeciwstawiając ją naturze i rozumie prawdziwie osobowe, wolne i chrześcijańskie działanie w opozycji do deterministycznych działań natury. Dla Akwinaty prawdziwie osobowe działanie może być wpisane w naturę jako jej wolne dopełnienie. Różnica jest ufundowana w rozmaitych interpretacjach filozofii Arystotelesa. Druga część opisuje różnicę w rozumieniu transcendencji boskich działań. Tomasz posługuje się bardzo mocnym rozumieniem transcendencji, które pozwala przyjąć tezę: niezmienność (=konieczność) woli Boga uzyskuje swoje cele zarówno przez konieczne, jak i wolne (!) działania stworzeń (por. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Szkot szuka bardziej intuicyjnie dostępnego rozumienia relacji między boskimi i ludzkimi działaniami. Z tego powodu opisuje boskie działania jako przygodne, podejmowane w wiecznym „teraz”. Trzecia część zajmuje się doktryną indywiduacji. Duns Szkot proponował rozwiązać problem przez odwołanie do słynnej formy haecceitas. Chociaż dla Tomasza nośnikiem indywidualności po zindywidualizowaniu bytu jest także forma jako źródło substancjalności i chociaż Tomasz musiał być świadomy trudności klasycznego stanowiska, odwołującego się do Arystotelesa (materia jako główny czynnik indywiduacji), trzyma się stanowczo arystotelesowskiego rozwiązania, nieznacznie je przeformułowując (materia quantitate signata). Były najprawdopodobniej dwa powody wiernego podążania Tomasza za Arystotelesem, mimo wątpliwości Alberta Wielkiego i Bonawentury: chęć podkreślenia hylemorficznej struktury bytu i próba wskazania trwałej podstawy dla pojęciowych genera. Ostatni problem prowadzi do najważniejszej metafizycznej różnicy między analizowanymi propozycjami. Duns Szkot jako esencjalista musi wpisać wszystko, co rzeczywiste, w porządek istotowy. Tomasz artykułuje rzeczywistość bytu biorąc pod uwagę istotę i istnienie. Jego stanowisko daje tym sposobem więcej możliwości dla odczytania bytu.
The paper deals with the widely discussed problem of the change in Aquinas’s interpretation of the relationship between the intellect and the will. The change may be placed in his work around 1270, between the Prima Pars and the Prima Secundae/De malo 6. It comprises three main elements. (1) At the beginning Thomas explains the role of the intellect in the act of the liberum arbitrium by final causality and the role of the will by efficiency; after the change of his position the role of the intellect is understood by formal causality and the role of the will by final causality. (2) After the change the will is described as having the capacity to be a source of motion on its own (not only responding to the activity of the intellect). (3) It is the will and not the intellect, according to Aquinas’s later interpretation, that is set in motion by the first cause.
The paper presents the discussion on the divergent interpretations of the above-mentioned evolution, started by several famous texts by Otto Lottin in the 20-ties and 30-ties of the 20th century and followed up to a book by Yul Kim published in 2007. The new position adapted by Aquinas at the end of his career has been evaluated as a voluntaristic one, intellectualistic or a middle one.
Taking into account that (1) Thomas always understands the act of liberum arbitrium as the only one act of the intellect and the will operating together, (2) Aquinas’s philosophy of action has never been a kind of deterministic Aristotelianism and (3) for Aquinas the first cause, always understood as transcendent, cannot be a danger to human freedom, it can be concluded that the position adapted by Thomas after 1270 remains in substantial agreement with his former interpretation.
The act of the liberum arbitrium is rooted in the will. If one wants to judge Aquinas’s position according to this aspect, it should be labelled voluntarism. But the act of the liberum arbitrium cannot be executed without the cooperation of the intellect; according to Aquinas it is never a fruit of some blind force. If one wants to focus on this aspect, one must describe Thomas’s solution as intellectualism. As it was mentioned above, the act of the liberum arbitrium is the only one act of the intellect and the will operating together. If one wants to consider that aspect as the most important, one will be probably inclined to describe Aquinas’s position as the middle one between voluntarism and intellectualism. What is the most important, each of the above mentioned descriptions of his position is the same before and after the change.
“Did the Angelic Doctor Underestimate Christ?” examines the role of Christology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. At the end of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas offers a discussion of the Incarnation in which he tends toward the view that Christ would not
have taken human form had man not sinned. This position gives rise to the suspicion that the Dominican treated the Incarnation too lightly; that he understood it instrumentally, merely as a means to resolve the “problem” of sin.
The author shows that the position accorded to the discussion of Christ in Aquinas’s work comes out of St. Thomas’ approach to Salvation History as a whole. The style of reasoning known as ex convenientia (“from suitability”), common among medieval
theologians, permitted them to regard their interpretations of Salvation History as belonging to scientia in the Aristotelian sense while also allowing them to produce a balanced, two-sided analysis of every event. On the one hand, the Incarnation was deemed not absolutely necessary, since a transcendent God cannot be constrained by any one scenario. On the other hand, it was considered consistent with the logic of the divine design of love
for Christ to have assumed a human nature. This bilateral analysis enabled theologians to admire the Incarnation as an act performed by God out of love, in freedom.
The influence of G.F. Hegel’s metaphysics has caused the suggestion that the Incarnation was not absolutely necessary to appear suspect. Theologians inspired by the synthesis of the sage from Berlin tend to see the Incarnation as part of a necessary process. The metaphysical perspective they occupy – different from that of Aquinas – usually yields a distorted view of the medieval master. Yet St. Thomas’ approach to Salvation History, in which respect for God’s transcendence and appreciation for divine freedom each have a place, remains the more interesting and well-balanced proposition and should have a prominent voice in contemporary discussions.
Tekst przedstawia próbę obrony wiarygodności teizmów zaprezentowaną przez Davida Bentleya Harta w książce The Experience of God i formułuje na tej podstawie kilka postulatów pod adresem współczesnych prób obrony wiary. W związku z krytyką misyjnego ateizmu Hart zabiera głos w imieniu głównych tradycji religijnych, by zwrócić uwagę na redukcyjny obraz Boga zakładany w dziełach ateistycznych polemistów. Stara się pokazać, nawiązując głównie do religii monoteistycznych, choć czyniąc także wysiłki, by uwzględnić wrażliwość religii dalekowschodnich, że najważniejsze religie ludzkości interpretują Boga jako radykalnie wykraczającego poza ten świat – transcendentnego – i właśnie dlatego zdolnego do immanentnej w nim obecności. Tezę tę pomaga mu uzasadnić analiza trzech doświadczeń związanych z bytem, świadomością i rozkoszą, które odpowiadają triadzie Upaniszad: sat, chit i ananda. Pierwsze z nich to przygodność, drugie to ekstaza poza to, co materialne, ludzkiej świadomości, trzecie to wykraczanie poza fizyczne przyczyny i skutki, dokonujące się w celowym ludzkim działaniu. Uważna analiza tych doświadczeń, dokonywana z przywołaniem współczesnych filozoficznych dyskusji na ich temat, prowadzi Harta do wniosku, że można je przekonująco zinterpretować tylko w świetle teizmu szanującego boską transcendencję, naturalizm okazuje się zaś irracjonalnym i najbardziej ubogim sposobem rozumienia otaczającej nas rzeczywistości.
Projekt Harta jest zdaniem autora artykułu zaproszeniem do prób apologetycznych, które (1) będą integrować odniesienie się do narracji współczesnej nauki, najważniejszych wyrastających stąd filozoficznych dyskusji oraz sytuacji religijnej chrześcijanina, który musi swoją wiarę wpisać w różnorodny religijnie świat; (2) będą czerpać z dziedzictwa klasycznej teologii pierwszego tysiąclecia, szczególnie w opisywaniu relacji Stwórca – stworzenie; (3) będą przedstawiać chrześcijańską propozycję bez kompleksów wobec postoświeceniowej narracji na temat religii.
The two types of reactions represented by German theologians.
Summary
Secularization is understood in this paper as the process of excluding subsequent areas of social and individual life from the influence of religion. The paper presents (I) the causes and dynamics of secularization, (II) the standpoints of the two chosen German theologians – Romano Guardini and Dietrich Bonhoeffer and (III) the standpoint of the Gaudium et spes. The main cause of secularization is the change of the worldview – the transition from theocentrism to anthropocentrism in the modern era. Yet there are multiple causes of this transition: the Copernican revolution, geographic discoveries, religious divisions and wars among Christians, industrial revolution, emancipation of reason, crisis of authority, the rejection of the final and formal causality, the use of the theory of evolution against Christianity. The process of secularization has concerned subsequent spheres of the social and individual life: power, science, economy and, recently, the family.
The span of Christian reactions to secularization may be illustrated by the proposals of a Catholic priest, Romano Guardini, on the one hand, and of a Lutheran pastor, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, on the other. Guardini in his famous essay The end of the modern world criticizes the modern understanding of nature (cf. Goethe) and of person (cf. Kant). Both concepts have been cut off from the Christian background. But without the religious context, they must disappear. Christians are invited in such circumstances to bear witness to their faith. The modern world should experience all the consequences of wrong ideological decisions. Bonhoeffer in his Letters from prison formulates a deeply different proposal of reaction to the modern world. In his opinion Christians should adopt a non-religious attitude of confessing faith to discover a mature way of living Christianity in the modern era. His project of non-religious Christianity was undertaken by the next generation of theologians, both Lutheran and Catholic, who developed different forms of theology of secularization and of political theology.
The Constitution Gaudium et spes of the Second Vatican Council does not use the world secularization but it proposes a reflection on the “new conditions” that have had their impact on religion. The main direction of the proposed reaction to the transformations of the modern era is closer to Guardini’s proposal. Nevertheless, there are some accents that take into account the sensibility articulated by Bonhoeffer and his followers (esp. no. 7: “a more critical ability to distinguish religion from a magical view of the world and from the superstitions which still circulate purifies it and exacts day by day a more personal and explicit adherence to faith”). Equally important, the Constitution gives a useful criterion for the evaluation of different elements of the social transformations. This criterion is the quality of human autonomy (no. 36). If this autonomy is treated and experienced as a gift of the Creator, it should be accepted. If it is understood as a rebellion against God, it is to be avoided by Christians. In this way, the text of the Gaudium et spes helps to show when and under what condition anthropocentrism may not diverge from theocentrism.
that are still relevant today and may be considered as a kind of doctrinal foundation for the encounters with non-Christian believers. The basis for such encounters should be a strong identity and the respect for the supernatural gift of faith. The participants should make appeal only to the authorities accepted by the other part. John Paul II’s proposal has its basic convergence with Aquinas’s thought, although the Polish pope enriches the Thomistic vision by the idea of integral dialogue, engaging all the human being, inspired by the philosophy of M. Buber and E. Levinas. The strong identity desired by both Aquinas and John Paul II as the foundational condition for a fruitful encounter with non-Christian believers may play its appropriate role only if it is a really converted identity. John Paul II showed us with many gestures and actions during his pontificate what this conversion of our identity should be.