Papers by Michael Jacovides
History of Philosophy Quarterly
In the “Contrary Miracles Argument,” Hume argues that the occurrence of miracle stories in rival ... more In the “Contrary Miracles Argument,” Hume argues that the occurrence of miracle stories in rival religions should undermine our belief in the trustworthiness of these reports. In order for this argument to have any merit, it has to be understood in its historical, religious context. Miracle stories are used in support of religions, and it's part of religion as we find it to reject miracle stories from rival traditions. A defender of miracle stories could avoid the argument by breaking the connection between miracles and religious doctrine, but then miracles won't justify revealed religion.
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 2010
Locke Studies, 2019
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the APA Eastern Division's 115th annual mee... more This is a revised version of a paper presented at the APA Eastern Division's 115th annual meeting in New York on Monday January 07, 2019. It was presented at session 2O Author Meets Critics: Michael Jacovides, Locke’s Image of the World. The session chair was Antonia LoLordo (University of Virginia), the critics were Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado Boulder) and Kathryn Tabb (Columbia University), and the author was Michael Jacovides (Purdue University).
A Companion to Locke, 2015
For Locke, the first step in an investigation of perception should be reflection: "What Perceptio... more For Locke, the first step in an investigation of perception should be reflection: "What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine" (2.9.2). 1 As a second step, I say, we may learn from reading him. Locke's use of the term 'perception' is somewhat broad. At one point, he tells us that "having Ideas and Perception" are "the same thing" (2.1.9). Elsewhere, he includes perceiving the agreement of ideas and perceiving the meaning of signs among the varieties of perception (2.21.5). What I have to say will be about what psychologists today classify as perception. After sketching the background to Locke's theory, I'll describe the general psychophysical principle that governs his approach to sensation and two exceptions to that principle. I'll then elucidate some of the subtleties of Locke's account of the visual perception of shape, subtleties that end up supporting an orthodox interpretation of his answer to the Molyneux question. I'll close with some remarks on his account of time perception, in which I'll explain his reasons for thinking that we get the idea of succession and duration from reflection, even though he believes that we get ideas of our measures of duration from sensation. 1 I'm grateful to Lex Newman and Matthew Stuart for helpful comments. 2 1 General Considerations on Sensation 1.1 Corpuscularianism and Sensation At Essay 2.1.23, Locke defines sensation as a sort of corporeal cause: "Sensation. .. is such an Impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the Understanding" (see also 2.1.3). Elsewhere, he defines sensation as a kind of perception, a "Perception, which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the Body, made by an external Object, being distinct from all other Modification of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct Idea, which we call Sensation" (2.19.1). The terminological variance isn't of deep importance, since the underlying account is the same. Locke argues that external bodies affect our sense organs through the mediation of a sea of imperceptibly small particles (2.8.12-14; McCann 1994: 62). If an external object affects a sense organ, the object acts through impulse, either immediately or through bodies in between the external object and the organ (2.8.11). Our eyes, ears, and noses sense distant objects, which can't push on them immediately, so those objects affect our organs through intermediate bodies. There are no perceptible bodies between external objects and our eyes, ears, and noses, so these intermediate bodies must be imperceptibly small. According to Locke, sensation gives us our first ideas (2.1.23). Fetuses in the womb, he guesses, have sensations of hunger and warmth (2.9.5). The ideas produced by sensation then go on to become raw material for other operations (2.1.23). Not only are ideas of sensation temporally first in Locke's system, but in some respects, they are cognitively first. He defines a simple ideas as 'clear,' "when they are such as the Objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered Sensation or Perception, present them" (2.29.2). Locke's definition of clear ideas follows Descartes's in some respects
The Cambridge Companion to Locke's 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding'
Is there a distinction between primary and secondary qualities? The question may rest on a confus... more Is there a distinction between primary and secondary qualities? The question may rest on a confusion. It is not obvious that it would be raised if the questioner knew what he meant by 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities. There is at least this distinction. We may distinguish between the basic explanatory features of things and the derivative features they explain. In the disciplines that gave rise to chemistry, there's a long tradition of calling the fundamental explanatory qualities or principles 'firsts' (Maier 1968: 17-18, Anstey 2000: 20-30). Aristotle's 'first qualities' are hot, cold, dry, and wet; Paracelsus's tria prima ('three firsts') are salt, sulphur, and mercury. Boyle was willing to follow Aristotelian usage in calling hot, cold, dry, and wet 'first qualities'; he called what he considered to be the more fundamental attributes of size, shape, motion, and rest "Primary Modes of the parts of Matter, since from these simple Attributes or Primordiall Affections all the Qualities are deriv'd" (Boyle [1670] 1999: 6.267). If Locke were only interested in advocating mechanistic physics, his discussion of primary and secondary qualities would be of marginal interest. Long before the publication of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Boyle offers a defense of the thesis that "allmost all sorts of Qualities. .. may be produced Mechanically-I mean by such Corporeall Agents as do not appear, either to Work otherwise than by vertue of the Motion, Size, Figure, and Contrivance of their own Parts" (Boyle [1666] 1999: 5.302) which is clearer and more developed than Locke's defense. The account in the Essay remains worth careful study
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2011
Locke and the Visual Array 1 I presented this material to the Oxford Seminar in Early Modern Phil... more Locke and the Visual Array 1 I presented this material to the Oxford Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, and I'm grateful to the audience for its criticisms and to Paul Lodge for his hospitality. I also presented this paper to Wayne State's philosophy department, and I thank that audience as well. I had useful discussions on the subject with Jan Cover. I'm grateful to Antonia LoLordo for helpful comments and for not telling me that the paper is crazy. I thank Dan Kelly for helping me track down duck-rabbit references. I thank Eric Schwitzgebel for gracious and illuminating correspondence, and I also thank my anonymous reviewers for their comments. 2 References with three Arabic numerals separated by periods are to Book, Chapter, and Section of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). References to Locke with two Arabic numerals are to volume and page of The Works of John Locke, 10 vols. (London: Thomas Tegg, 1823). References to Descartes are first to volume and page of the Adam and Tannery edition of Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols (Paris: Vrin, 1973) and then to volume and page of Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch's edition of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols.
The Philosophical Review, 1999
Locke asserts that "the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and their... more Locke asserts that "the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; But the Ideas, produced in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all." 1 On an unsophisticated way of taking his words, he means that ideas of primary qualities are like the qualities they represent and ideas of secondary qualities are unlike the qualities they represent. 2 I will show that if we take his assertions in this unsophisticated way, our reward will be a straightforward and satisfying interpretation of the central arguments of his chapter on primary and secondary qualities. With these arguments, Locke attempts to justify his assertions about resemblance. Some may be skeptical, thinking that the assertions, interpreted literally, are either too absurd or too obvious to have reasons supporting them. I take this skepticism to rest on deep foundations of charity, so half of the paper will be devoted to undermining these foundations by giving a sympathetic and historical exposition of Locke's positive thesis that primary qualities resemble the ideas that represent them. I criticize rival interpretations of Lockean resemblance, say what it means to believe that ideas resemble qualities, explain the plausibility of the belief in Locke's environment, and examine his descriptions of how ideas resemble particular primary qualities. Once I establish that we should take Locke's resemblance theses literally, I can describe their place in his theory of representation. After that, I can describe his reasons for believing the resemblance theses. I will conclude by showing how Locke's belief that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in bodies leads him to conclude that secondary qualities are merely powers to produce ideas. Let me begin near the end, however. Before defending a literal interpretation of the resemblance theses, I want to criticize three rival interpretations. In order to motivate two of these rivals, I need to make a quick pass over our destination and give an abridged account of Locke's argument for his theses. He seems to suppose that they follow from his corpuscularian explanation of sense perception. At 2.8.11, on the grounds that the alternatives are inconceivable, he argues that the bodies involved in 2 perception only interact by impulse. From this doctrine of physics, and the premise that the bodies we perceive at a distance must causally interact with our sense organs, he concludes that unperceived intermediate bodies must be knocking about between the perceived objects and our senses (2.8.12). Locke spends three sections on the resulting theory of perception. He devotes one section to the perception of extension, figure, number, and motion, one to the perception of color and smell, and one to the perception of taste and sound, and conceives of the production of all these ideas as occurring "after the same manner. .. viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our Senses" (2.8.13). 3 After giving these parallel accounts of the production of ideas, Locke concludes that "it is easie to draw [the] Observation" that ideas of primary qualities resemble the corresponding qualities in bodies and ideas of secondary qualities do not (2.8.15). Commentators attempting to understand Locke's notion of resemblance have naturally begun by trying to understand his puzzling inference from premises concerning the physics of perception to a conclusion concerning the relation between qualities and our ideas. 2 Literal Resemblance 2.1 Literal Resemblance and Three Rival Interpretations One group of interpreters emphasizes Locke's allusions to the scholastic theory of perception. On this theory, at least as most early moderns understand it, bodies transmit real qualities through transparent media. These qualities or species fly through the air, strike our sense organs, and inhere there. 4 Locke explicitly associates the term 'resemblance' with the scholastic theory of perception in his "Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God" (see Woolhouse 1977, 95-96; Heyd 1994, 16). There he describes as "learned gibberish" the "peripatetic doctrine of the species" that "material species, carrying the resemblance of things by a continual flux from the body we perceive, bring the perception of them to our senses" (Locke 1823, 9:215). By denying that the ideas of secondary qualities resemble anything in bodies, Locke intends in part to reject the scholastic theory of perception. Edwin McCann (1994, 64) and Thomas Heyd (1994, 13) imply that this background alone should enable us to understand the resemblance theses (see also Palmer 1974). However, as John Carriero observes (1990, 28-30), even if the contrast with scholastic theory explains the meaning of Locke's negative thesis that secondary qualities do not resemble our ideas of them, this contrast cannot explain his positive
Philosophical Review, 2007
Let me first acknowledge the justice of Matthew Stuart's criticism of my earlier treatment of Loc... more Let me first acknowledge the justice of Matthew Stuart's criticism of my earlier treatment of Locke's semantics for secondary-quality words and offer a revised account in its place. I'll then argue that Locke's thesis that secondary qualities are powers to produce ideas in us is not offered as a careful description of a being in the world but rather as a corollary to his semantics. I'll go on to criticize some of what Stuart writes in defense of his own interpretation, according to which Locke believes that objects are only colored when they are seen. Finally, I'll try to show that emphasizing Locke's denial that secondary qualities are real beings helps us understand his flexible use of secondary-quality predicates. 1. Concessive Remarks I had thought, and I still think, that in order to make sense of Locke's semantics of secondary-quality words we need to understand his statement that "Flame is denominated Hot and Light; Snow White and Cold; and Manna White and Sweet, from the Ideas they produce in us" (2.8.16). In earlier work (Jacovides 1999, 492-93), following Michael Ayers (1991, 1.63-64, 207), I had said that Locke's use of secondary-quality words fit the Aristotelian pattern of focal meaning. In focal meaning, a word is used in a primary sense for one kind of thing-as with 'being' for substance or 'healthy' for living things-and in a derivative sense for things merely connected to the primary referent-as with 'being' for qualities or 'healthy' for food (Metaphysics 4.2, explained in Owen 1986). On my old analysis, Locke believes that ideas are called 'red' in the primary sense and that apples are called 'red' in the derivative sense of producing something that's red in the primary sense. 'cold' derivatively from the names of those ideas. This fits better than my old view not only with Locke's use of the expression 'denominates' but also with the theory of Essay 3.8 ("Of Abstract and Concrete Terms") and the practice of Essay 2.8 ("Some farther Considerations concerning our simple Ideas"). Locke presents a partial semantics for term endings at Essay 3.8, where he distinguishes 'abstract' and 'concrete' terms. Abstract terms include 'humanity,' 'animality,' 'rationality,' and 'whiteness.' They are set off by the suffixes '-ity,' '-ness,' '-ice,' and, in some Latin examples, '-itas' and '-ietas'. Locke borrows the distinction from the scholastic textbooks that he assigned to his students at Oxford. In the opening pages of his Compendious Philosophy, Christoph Scheibler distinguishes among simple words as "either 1. Concrete, which expresses something fusedly, that is to say, jointly, for example, 'expert' or 2. Abstract, which indicates something separated off from all other things, for example, 'expertise'." 2 Scheibler's point is that concrete words such as 'doctus' refer to a fusion of human being and learning, while 'doctrina' indicates the learning on its own. 3 On Locke's account, abstract words are "Names of abstract Ideas" (3.8.1). As a consequence, he writes, "every one, at first hearing, perceives the falshood of these Propositions; Humanity is Animality, or Rationality, or Whiteness" (ibid.). According to Locke, these are false because they assert that one idea is identical to another. In ordinary assertions about external things, we therefore use concrete terms, such as 'man,' 'animal,' 'rational,' and 'white'.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000
Locke's porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconst... more Locke's porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconstruction, Locke argues from the premise that porphyry undergoes a mere Cambridge change of color in different lighting conditions to the conclusion that porphyry's colors do not belong to it as it is in itself. I argue that his argument is not quite sound, but it would be if Locke chose a different stone, alexandrite. Examining his argument teaches us something about the relation between explanatory qualities and real alterations and something about the ways that colors inhere in bodies. Cambridge Changes of Color Michael Jacovides "But perhaps electricity changes their colour and they change back again in daylight?" "That would be a queer kind of change, wouldn't it?" says Jim. "I suppose so," says bewildered John. Wilfred Sellars "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" I. The Porphyry Argument A philosopher occasionally has the pleasure of finding an argument that improves with contemplation. I want to explain and evaluate an argument in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding that repays close attention particularly well. Locke asks us to
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2007
References to The Works of John Locke, 10 vols. London: Thomas Tegg, 1823 are by short title, vol... more References to The Works of John Locke, 10 vols. London: Thomas Tegg, 1823 are by short title, volume, page, and section (where present). The short titles are as follows: 1 st Reply 'Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worchester's Answer to his Letter' 2 nd Reply 'Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worchester's Answer to his Second Letter' Books 'Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris's Books Wherein He Asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of our Seeing All Things in God' Conduct 'Of the Conduct of the Understanding' Elements 'Elements of Natural Philosophy' Exam 'An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God' Letter 'A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of Worchester, Concerning Some Passages Relating to Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding, in a Late Discourse of his Lordship's, in Vindication of the Trinity' Miracles 'A Discourse of Miracles' WORKS BY CLASSICAL GREEK AUTHORS My reference to Democritus uses the translation in Early Greek Philosophy, edited and translated by Jonathan Barnes. London: Penguin Books, 1987. Cited by Diels-Kranz number. QDA Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima liber secundus, de tertia lectura, in Sobol 1984.
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2010
Annotations to the Speech of the Muses (Plato Republic 54?bc) ... Oxyrhynchus Papyrus XV 1808 is ... more Annotations to the Speech of the Muses (Plato Republic 54?bc) ... Oxyrhynchus Papyrus XV 1808 is a carefully written second-century ... 1 For the names of ancient authors and works we use the abbreviations adopted for LSJ. Papyrological references are from JF Oates et al, ...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2010
... Each experience constitutes, in Ryle's phrase, a sub-stretch of my life-story ... more ... Each experience constitutes, in Ryle's phrase, a sub-stretch of my life-story (1954, 103). ... Depending on context, 'Hannah's experience of a hot tub' might mean Hannah's experience of owning a hot tub, or Hannah's experience of soaking in a hot tub, or Hannah's experience of ...
Philosophia, 2009
The author defends attributing to Berkeley the thesis that we can't conceive of extension in a mi... more The author defends attributing to Berkeley the thesis that we can't conceive of extension in a mind-independent body against criticism from Smalligan Marusic. The author also specifies the resemblance requirements that Berkeley places on conceivability, concedes that the principle that ideas can only be like other ideas is not, strictly speaking, a premise in the Master Argument, and clarifies his views on the relation between possibility and conceivability.
Locke's porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconst... more Locke's porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconstruction, Locke argues from the premise that porphyry undergoes a mere Cambridge change of color in different lighting conditions to the conclusion that porphyry's colors do not belong to it as it is in itself. I argue that his argument is not quite sound, but it would be if Locke chose a different stone, alexandrite. Examining his argument teaches us something about the relation between explanatory qualities and real alterations and something about the ways that colors inhere in bodies.
The intelligibility of our artifacts suggests to many seventeenth century thinkers that nature wo... more The intelligibility of our artifacts suggests to many seventeenth century thinkers that nature works along analogous lines, that the same principles that explain the operations of artifacts explain the operations of natural bodies. 1 We may call this belief 'corpuscularianism' when conjoined with the premise that the details of the analogy depend upon the sub-microscopic textures of ordinary bodies and upon the rapidly moving, imperceptibly tiny corpuscles that surround these bodies. 2
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Papers by Michael Jacovides