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JP Messina

Purdue University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

University of California, San Diego, Philosophy, Graduate Student

Wellesley College, The Freedom Project, Post-Doc

University of New Orleans, Department of History and Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I am associate professor of philosophy at Purdue University. My work covers several areas but is unified around philosophical notions of freedom. Currently, my major projects include an book-length inquiry into the ethics and politics of private censorship (just published with OUP), several article-length projects on Kantian political philosophy, and minor projects on distributive justice and methods in political theorizing.
Address: 100 N. University St.
West Lafayette, IN 47907

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Anatoly Oleksiyenko

The Education University of Hong Kong

Budapest Business School

San Diego State University

Augustin Stanciu

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Papers by JP Messina

Kant against Legal Paternalism: A Conditional Defense

The Court of Reason, 2021

Reasonable Pluralism about Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

W. (2005). Match Point. Home Entertainment. 2 As Joel Feinberg has it, "To say that a person dese... more

The postulate of private right and Kant’s semi-historical principles of property

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

ABSTRACT Whereas several commentators have held that Kant’s argument for the postulate of private... more ABSTRACT Whereas several commentators have held that Kant’s argument for the postulate of private right fails insofar as it begs the question, I argue here that this criticism misses the mark. Critics have erroneously supposed that the postulate is designed to secure a right to a system of private property. In fact, Kant’s ambitions were more modest: to show that someone (be it an individual, a community, or a state) must be capable of enjoying dominion over external objects of choice. Understood this way, Kant’s argument does not beg the question. Rather, it establishes clearly that freedom requires human dominion over objects, a fact that not all parties to debates over property have recognized. In response to the objection that my interpretation leaves Kant’s account problematically indeterminate, I argue that the question of what system of property is justified cannot be settled from the armchair, independently of the history of acquisition.

The Impact of Political Ideology on Concern and Behavior During COVID-19

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020

Beliefs about objective matters of fact are caused in no small part by political identity. This i... more Beliefs about objective matters of fact are caused in no small part by political identity. This includes beliefs regarding the seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic, which tend to align with ideological commitments. These linkages between beliefs and political identity matter for behavior, and not just in the voting booth. Decisions about whether (and how) to adopt measures like social distancing rely in part upon how one evaluates the seriousness of the risk posed by the virus. In this paper we investigate the relationship between one’s political ideology, sources of information and news consumption, and COVID-19 oriented behavioral changes. We find that liberals and moderates make fewer trips than conservatives and are more likely to change their behavior in ways suggested by government recommendations and guidelines. The results further show little effect of state-level orders, but we do find some indication that concern about COVID-19, and beliefs about the behavior of others can predict behavior changes.

Situationism and the Neglect of Negative Moral Education

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2015

This paper responds to the recent situationist critique of practical rationality and decision-mak... more This paper responds to the recent situationist critique of practical rationality and decision-making. According to that critique, empirical evidence indicates that our choices (1) are governed by morally irrelevant situational factors and not durable character traits, and (2) rarely result from overt rational deliberation. This critique is taken to indicate that popular moral theories in the Western tradition (i.e., virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, and utilitarian ethics) are descriptively deficient, even if normatively plausible or desirable. But we believe that the situationist findings regarding the sources of, or influences over, our moral agency do not reflect durable features of human nature, and claim that these findings are a byproduct of a deficient approach to moral education. Existing models of moral education, which are "positive" in nature, do a poor job of developing virtuous people. Instead, we argue that a "negative" approach to moral education, traceable to Locke, Smith, and Rousseau, would be more successful. This strategy represents something of a compromise between the strategies adopted by thinkers like Rachana Kamtekar

Desert in liberal justice: beyond institutional guarantees

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2016

I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does n... more I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does not require an institutional scheme that prevents individuals from treating one another as they deserve, and (2) requires a desert ethos. A desert ethos is a set of principles that, though not embodied in a society’s basic coercive structure, nevertheless governs interpersonal relations between citizens. These two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for ‘giving desert its due’ in a theory of justice. I therefore reject the received view that a desert-sensitive theory must endeavor to guarantee distributions patterned according to desert.

Kant’s Provisionality Thesis

Kantian Review, 2019

I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the provisionality thesis. The provisiona... more I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the provisionality thesis. The provisionality thesis asserts that in a world like ours, populated with beings sufficiently like us, acquired rights (rights to external objects of choice, including property, sovereignty and territory) are necessarily provisional. I motivate the standard view, which restricts the notion of provisional right to the state of nature and the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition. I then provide two textual arguments against it. I conclude by reflecting on the normative implications of the provisionality thesis, arguing that they are more modest than has been formerly appreciated.

The Paradox of Outer Necessitation in (and after) Kant’s 1784 course on Naturrecht

Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend, 2019

Political Obligations and Provisional Rights: A Study in Kant's Politics of Freedom

Author(s): Messina, James | Advisor(s): Watkins, Eric; Arneson, Richard | Abstract: This disserta... more Author(s): Messina, James | Advisor(s): Watkins, Eric; Arneson, Richard | Abstract: This dissertation argues (with Ellis 2005) that Kant’s political philosophy must be re-read in view of his commitment to the Provisionality Thesis (PT). PT states that, in our world, external rights are provisional, never peremptory. In Chapter 1, I lay the grounds for such a reading by showing how Kant’s notion of external freedom, properly understood, drives the development of his political theory (by generating duties to leave the state of nature, to form a body of international law, and to respect each person’s cosmopolitan rights). Chapter 2 then establishes (against competitors), that Kant’s theory so understood is committed to the Provisionality Thesis. Chapter 3 locates the language of provisionality in the political writings of Leibniz and Rousseau, and shows that Kant’s usage differs considerably from his predecessors’. Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 examine the conditions and meaning of provisio...

Morals from rationality alone? Some doubts

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2020

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone... more Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler’s recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel ‘two-level’ social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant’s categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler’s informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler’s conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler’s contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conce...

Freedom of Expression and the Liberalism of Fear: A Defense of the Darker Mill

Philosophers' Imprint, 2020

Although many recent free speech skeptics claim Millian credentials, they neglect the more pessim... more Although many recent free speech skeptics claim Millian credentials, they neglect the more pessimistic elements of Mill's account of human nature. Once we recover the darker elements of Mill's thought, American-style laissez-faire in the domain of expression looks significantly more attractive. Indeed, this paper argues that if Mill is correct about human nature, we have good reason to oppose recent proposed restrictions on expression and to embrace a legal regime that tolerates much speech that is false, obscene, demeaning, and even hateful. While philosophers are right to worry about the substantial moral costs of such regimes, we ought to attempt to address these costs in ways that do not amount to rejecting the regimes themselves.

The Postulate of Private Right and Kant's Semi-Historical Principles of Property

British Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2020

Whereas several commentators have held that Kant's argument for the postulate of private right fa... more Whereas several commentators have held that Kant's argument for the postulate of private right fails insofar as it begs the question, I argue here that this criticism misses the mark. Critics have erroneously supposed that the postulate is designed to secure a right to a system of private property. In fact, however, Kant's ambitions were more modest: to show that someone (be it an individual, a community, or a state) must be capable of enjoying dominion over external objects of choice. Understood this way, Kant's argument does not beg the question. Rather, it establishes clearly that freedom requires human dominion over objects, a fact that not all parties to debates over property have clearly recognized. In response to the objection that my interpretation leaves Kant's account problematically indeterminate, I argue that the question of what system of property is justified cannot be settled from the armchair, independently of the history of acquisition.

Morals From Rationality Alone? Some Doubts

by JP Messina and David Wiens

Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2020

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone... more Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler's recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel "two-level" social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant's categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler's informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler's conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler's contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.

Kant's Provisionality Thesis KR final

Kantian Review, 2019

I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the Provisionality Thesis. The provisiona... more I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the Provisionality Thesis. The provisionality thesis asserts that in a world like ours, populated with beings sufficiently like us, acquired rights (rights to external objects of choice, including property and territory) are necessarily provisional. I motivate the standard view, which restricts the notion of provisional right to the state of nature and the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition. I then provide two textually well-grounded arguments against it. I conclude by reflecting on the normative implications of the provisionality thesis, arguing that they are more modest than has been formerly appreciated.

Reasonable Pluralism about Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense

Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

When approaching the question of whether human beings ought to be held morally responsible in the... more When approaching the question of whether human beings ought to be held morally responsible in the basic desert sense, differently situated agents with different evaluative commitments arrive at different answers. Recent philosophical work defending the centrality of our desert-presupposing practices has the ironic result of showing that this is as it should be. For since Strawson's seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment,” many have argued that the practical rationality of upholding these practices turns as much on their full significance to our lives as on questions of the complex metaphysics of agency. But, I argue, the question of the significance of the reactive attitudes to our practical lives has no single rationally required answer. Some agents (faultlessly) hold our desert-presupposing moral responsibility practices to be centrally important to their living good lives, while others (faultlessly) hold that we would be better off without such practices. This entails reasonable pluralism about desert presupposing responsibility practices. The paper concludes by exploring several possible responses to such reasonable pluralism about moral responsibility, finding none of them satisfactory.

David O. Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2014

Desert in liberal justice: beyond institutional guarantees

I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does n... more I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does not require an institutional scheme that prevents individuals from treating one another as they deserve, and (2) requires a desert ethos. A desert ethos is a set of principles that, though not embodied in a society's basic coercive structure, nevertheless governs interpersonal relations between citizens. These two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for 'giving desert its due' in a theory of justice. I therefore reject the received view that a desert-sensitive theory must endeavor to guarantee distributions patterned according to desert.

Books by JP Messina

Private Censorship

Oxford University Press, 2023

Concerns about censorship have once again reached a fever pitch across the liberal West. In other... more Concerns about censorship have once again reached a fever pitch across the liberal West. In other historical periods, such concerns may have marked reactions to book bans and burnings. Often, they followed prosecutions and subsequent jailtime for things spoken or written. During the red scare, they were the hushed response to chilling state-sponsored watch-lists and employer-supported blacklists designed to ensure victory against communism. Against this history, complaints about the new censorship appear different. With respect to the new censorship, there are no books burnings, no prosecutions, no laws or committees. Indeed, there is no coercive state involvement at all. With a few notable exceptions, complaints about censorship in the 21st-century West are complaints about the behavior of private parties: social groups, employers, media conglomerates, social media platforms, and search engines. To better understand the concerns surrounding non-state interference with speech, Private Censorship offers an account of censorship, as well as an assessment of the ethical and political issues it raises across contexts. In addition, the book casts a critical eye on many popular proposals for responding to these complaints. Unlike these popular approaches, Private Censorship foregrounds the importance of rights to property, association, and free expression.

Kant against Legal Paternalism: A Conditional Defense

The Court of Reason, 2021

Reasonable Pluralism about Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

W. (2005). Match Point. Home Entertainment. 2 As Joel Feinberg has it, "To say that a person dese... more

The postulate of private right and Kant’s semi-historical principles of property

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

ABSTRACT Whereas several commentators have held that Kant’s argument for the postulate of private... more ABSTRACT Whereas several commentators have held that Kant’s argument for the postulate of private right fails insofar as it begs the question, I argue here that this criticism misses the mark. Critics have erroneously supposed that the postulate is designed to secure a right to a system of private property. In fact, Kant’s ambitions were more modest: to show that someone (be it an individual, a community, or a state) must be capable of enjoying dominion over external objects of choice. Understood this way, Kant’s argument does not beg the question. Rather, it establishes clearly that freedom requires human dominion over objects, a fact that not all parties to debates over property have recognized. In response to the objection that my interpretation leaves Kant’s account problematically indeterminate, I argue that the question of what system of property is justified cannot be settled from the armchair, independently of the history of acquisition.

The Impact of Political Ideology on Concern and Behavior During COVID-19

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020

Beliefs about objective matters of fact are caused in no small part by political identity. This i... more Beliefs about objective matters of fact are caused in no small part by political identity. This includes beliefs regarding the seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic, which tend to align with ideological commitments. These linkages between beliefs and political identity matter for behavior, and not just in the voting booth. Decisions about whether (and how) to adopt measures like social distancing rely in part upon how one evaluates the seriousness of the risk posed by the virus. In this paper we investigate the relationship between one’s political ideology, sources of information and news consumption, and COVID-19 oriented behavioral changes. We find that liberals and moderates make fewer trips than conservatives and are more likely to change their behavior in ways suggested by government recommendations and guidelines. The results further show little effect of state-level orders, but we do find some indication that concern about COVID-19, and beliefs about the behavior of others can predict behavior changes.

Situationism and the Neglect of Negative Moral Education

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2015

This paper responds to the recent situationist critique of practical rationality and decision-mak... more This paper responds to the recent situationist critique of practical rationality and decision-making. According to that critique, empirical evidence indicates that our choices (1) are governed by morally irrelevant situational factors and not durable character traits, and (2) rarely result from overt rational deliberation. This critique is taken to indicate that popular moral theories in the Western tradition (i.e., virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, and utilitarian ethics) are descriptively deficient, even if normatively plausible or desirable. But we believe that the situationist findings regarding the sources of, or influences over, our moral agency do not reflect durable features of human nature, and claim that these findings are a byproduct of a deficient approach to moral education. Existing models of moral education, which are "positive" in nature, do a poor job of developing virtuous people. Instead, we argue that a "negative" approach to moral education, traceable to Locke, Smith, and Rousseau, would be more successful. This strategy represents something of a compromise between the strategies adopted by thinkers like Rachana Kamtekar

Desert in liberal justice: beyond institutional guarantees

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2016

I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does n... more I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does not require an institutional scheme that prevents individuals from treating one another as they deserve, and (2) requires a desert ethos. A desert ethos is a set of principles that, though not embodied in a society’s basic coercive structure, nevertheless governs interpersonal relations between citizens. These two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for ‘giving desert its due’ in a theory of justice. I therefore reject the received view that a desert-sensitive theory must endeavor to guarantee distributions patterned according to desert.

Kant’s Provisionality Thesis

Kantian Review, 2019

I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the provisionality thesis. The provisiona... more I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the provisionality thesis. The provisionality thesis asserts that in a world like ours, populated with beings sufficiently like us, acquired rights (rights to external objects of choice, including property, sovereignty and territory) are necessarily provisional. I motivate the standard view, which restricts the notion of provisional right to the state of nature and the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition. I then provide two textual arguments against it. I conclude by reflecting on the normative implications of the provisionality thesis, arguing that they are more modest than has been formerly appreciated.

The Paradox of Outer Necessitation in (and after) Kant’s 1784 course on Naturrecht

Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend, 2019

Political Obligations and Provisional Rights: A Study in Kant's Politics of Freedom

Author(s): Messina, James | Advisor(s): Watkins, Eric; Arneson, Richard | Abstract: This disserta... more Author(s): Messina, James | Advisor(s): Watkins, Eric; Arneson, Richard | Abstract: This dissertation argues (with Ellis 2005) that Kant’s political philosophy must be re-read in view of his commitment to the Provisionality Thesis (PT). PT states that, in our world, external rights are provisional, never peremptory. In Chapter 1, I lay the grounds for such a reading by showing how Kant’s notion of external freedom, properly understood, drives the development of his political theory (by generating duties to leave the state of nature, to form a body of international law, and to respect each person’s cosmopolitan rights). Chapter 2 then establishes (against competitors), that Kant’s theory so understood is committed to the Provisionality Thesis. Chapter 3 locates the language of provisionality in the political writings of Leibniz and Rousseau, and shows that Kant’s usage differs considerably from his predecessors’. Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 examine the conditions and meaning of provisio...

Morals from rationality alone? Some doubts

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2020

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone... more Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler’s recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel ‘two-level’ social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant’s categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler’s informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler’s conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler’s contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conce...

Freedom of Expression and the Liberalism of Fear: A Defense of the Darker Mill

Philosophers' Imprint, 2020

Although many recent free speech skeptics claim Millian credentials, they neglect the more pessim... more Although many recent free speech skeptics claim Millian credentials, they neglect the more pessimistic elements of Mill's account of human nature. Once we recover the darker elements of Mill's thought, American-style laissez-faire in the domain of expression looks significantly more attractive. Indeed, this paper argues that if Mill is correct about human nature, we have good reason to oppose recent proposed restrictions on expression and to embrace a legal regime that tolerates much speech that is false, obscene, demeaning, and even hateful. While philosophers are right to worry about the substantial moral costs of such regimes, we ought to attempt to address these costs in ways that do not amount to rejecting the regimes themselves.

The Postulate of Private Right and Kant's Semi-Historical Principles of Property

British Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2020

Whereas several commentators have held that Kant's argument for the postulate of private right fa... more Whereas several commentators have held that Kant's argument for the postulate of private right fails insofar as it begs the question, I argue here that this criticism misses the mark. Critics have erroneously supposed that the postulate is designed to secure a right to a system of private property. In fact, however, Kant's ambitions were more modest: to show that someone (be it an individual, a community, or a state) must be capable of enjoying dominion over external objects of choice. Understood this way, Kant's argument does not beg the question. Rather, it establishes clearly that freedom requires human dominion over objects, a fact that not all parties to debates over property have clearly recognized. In response to the objection that my interpretation leaves Kant's account problematically indeterminate, I argue that the question of what system of property is justified cannot be settled from the armchair, independently of the history of acquisition.

Morals From Rationality Alone? Some Doubts

by JP Messina and David Wiens

Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2020

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone... more Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler's recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel "two-level" social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant's categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler's informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler's conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler's contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.

Kant's Provisionality Thesis KR final

Kantian Review, 2019

I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the Provisionality Thesis. The provisiona... more I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the Provisionality Thesis. The provisionality thesis asserts that in a world like ours, populated with beings sufficiently like us, acquired rights (rights to external objects of choice, including property and territory) are necessarily provisional. I motivate the standard view, which restricts the notion of provisional right to the state of nature and the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition. I then provide two textually well-grounded arguments against it. I conclude by reflecting on the normative implications of the provisionality thesis, arguing that they are more modest than has been formerly appreciated.

Reasonable Pluralism about Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense

Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

When approaching the question of whether human beings ought to be held morally responsible in the... more When approaching the question of whether human beings ought to be held morally responsible in the basic desert sense, differently situated agents with different evaluative commitments arrive at different answers. Recent philosophical work defending the centrality of our desert-presupposing practices has the ironic result of showing that this is as it should be. For since Strawson's seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment,” many have argued that the practical rationality of upholding these practices turns as much on their full significance to our lives as on questions of the complex metaphysics of agency. But, I argue, the question of the significance of the reactive attitudes to our practical lives has no single rationally required answer. Some agents (faultlessly) hold our desert-presupposing moral responsibility practices to be centrally important to their living good lives, while others (faultlessly) hold that we would be better off without such practices. This entails reasonable pluralism about desert presupposing responsibility practices. The paper concludes by exploring several possible responses to such reasonable pluralism about moral responsibility, finding none of them satisfactory.

David O. Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2014

Desert in liberal justice: beyond institutional guarantees

I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does n... more I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does not require an institutional scheme that prevents individuals from treating one another as they deserve, and (2) requires a desert ethos. A desert ethos is a set of principles that, though not embodied in a society's basic coercive structure, nevertheless governs interpersonal relations between citizens. These two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for 'giving desert its due' in a theory of justice. I therefore reject the received view that a desert-sensitive theory must endeavor to guarantee distributions patterned according to desert.

Private Censorship

Oxford University Press, 2023

Concerns about censorship have once again reached a fever pitch across the liberal West. In other... more Concerns about censorship have once again reached a fever pitch across the liberal West. In other historical periods, such concerns may have marked reactions to book bans and burnings. Often, they followed prosecutions and subsequent jailtime for things spoken or written. During the red scare, they were the hushed response to chilling state-sponsored watch-lists and employer-supported blacklists designed to ensure victory against communism. Against this history, complaints about the new censorship appear different. With respect to the new censorship, there are no books burnings, no prosecutions, no laws or committees. Indeed, there is no coercive state involvement at all. With a few notable exceptions, complaints about censorship in the 21st-century West are complaints about the behavior of private parties: social groups, employers, media conglomerates, social media platforms, and search engines. To better understand the concerns surrounding non-state interference with speech, Private Censorship offers an account of censorship, as well as an assessment of the ethical and political issues it raises across contexts. In addition, the book casts a critical eye on many popular proposals for responding to these complaints. Unlike these popular approaches, Private Censorship foregrounds the importance of rights to property, association, and free expression.