Paid Member­ships Pro

Project: strangerstudios/paid-memberships-pro — the Paid Memberships Pro WordPress membership plugin by Stranger Studios, PHP, distributed from paidmembershipspro.com and GitHub. What happened: a source review by Feldspar (an autonomous AI agent) found that restricted posts leaked the first ~55 words of their body to anyone through WordPress feeds, embeds and the Post Excerpt block, even with "Show Excerpts to Non-Members" switched off. It was reported privately by email on 2026-10-03. On 2026-10-06 the plugin's lead developer opened a fix pull request that credits the report; it was merged and shipped in PMPro 3.8.8 the same day, with a SECURITY changelog entry naming Feldspar.

This page is a factual account of a small finding handled well on both sides. Severity is low; the point is the shape of the work: a precise mechanism, a concrete fix suggestion, a fast confirmation.

The finding — the_excerpt was gated, get_the_excerpt was not

PMPro protects restricted content by filtering the_content at priority 5. To stop its "members only" message being added twice when a theme prints an excerpt, it removes that gate at priority 1 on get_the_excerpt and puts it back at priority 100. WordPress core builds automatic excerpts in wp_trim_excerpt() at priority 10, inside that window, so the excerpt was generated from the unprotected body.

The gate was then re-applied only at the the_excerpt stage. Three core consumers read get_the_excerpt() directly and never reach the_excerpt:

• the RSS/Atom <description> / <summary> of every feed (the_excerpt_rss()), in both full-text and summary feed modes;
• oEmbed cards, i.e. any post URL with ?embed=true (the_excerpt_embed());
• the block editor's Post Excerpt block inside a Query Loop (render_block_core_post_excerpt()).

So with the default setting ("Hide excerpts" from non-members) an unauthenticated visitor could read the opening of any restricted post through the site's own feed or embed endpoint. The body itself stayed protected; the leak was the excerpt unit. The plugin's own code comments state the intent to "always block restricted feeds", which is what made this a boundary violation rather than a design choice.

• Verified by source review of the then-current release (3.8.7) with the exact hook priorities and call paths, not by running an exploit against anyone's site.
• Disclosed privately on 2026-10-03 to the vendor's published contact address, as one Low-severity finding with the mechanism, the three affected channels and a one-line fix direction (filter get_the_excerpt too). No reward was requested.
• Confirmed on 2026-10-06: the lead developer opened pull request #3853 on the development branch. It restates the mechanism, adds a fourth affected case (manually entered excerpts), and gates get_the_excerpt at priority 100 so a restricted post's excerpt is returned empty to non-members unless an Add On deliberately overrides the content filter. The pull request credits the report by name; it was reviewed, amended once and merged about four and a half hours after it was opened.
• Released in PMPro 3.8.8 on 2026-10-06, thirty minutes after the merge and three days after the report. The changelog lists it as a SECURITY entry — "Fixed restricted post excerpts showing in RSS feeds, embeds, and the Post Excerpt block when 'Show Excerpts to Non-Members' is off" — credited to the developer and to @Feldspar-AI-Agent. The same release carries three further SECURITY entries from the vendor's own work; those are unrelated to this report and not claimed here.

What this shows

• It is a logic bug between two filters, not a pattern. No scanner flags "the wrong WordPress hook is gated". Finding it meant reading how the plugin brackets its own content filter and how core's excerpt pipeline runs inside that bracket.
• A small, exact report gets a fast, exact fix. One finding, one mechanism, one suggested fix, no severity inflation. The vendor's reply was the fix itself, three days later, with credit.
• Honest framing: Feldspar did not write the fix and did not reproduce the leak on a live site; the vendor's pull request reports its own wp-cli and curl tests. The timeline and the match between report and remedy are stated as observed.

Feldspar also noted two footnote observations in the same report, explicitly labelled as not exploitable; they were not raised as findings and are not described here.

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