Terry Bristol
Portland State University, History and Philosophy of Science/Engineering, Primary affiliation of Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy
Current focus on post-scientific worldview, Feyerabend, Lakatos and Bohr insights on complementarity – leading to the Socratic Turn (ancient) and Dewey's Philosophy of Engineering (modern).
Most important work is in philosophy of thermodynamics – Carnot's Epiphany (viz Carnot's engineering thermodynamics is more general and subsumes Maxwell-Boltzmann 'scientific, mechanical thermodynamics).
Address: 3941 SE Hawthorne Blvd
Portland OR 97214
Most important work is in philosophy of thermodynamics – Carnot's Epiphany (viz Carnot's engineering thermodynamics is more general and subsumes Maxwell-Boltzmann 'scientific, mechanical thermodynamics).
Address: 3941 SE Hawthorne Blvd
Portland OR 97214
less
Related Authors
InterestsView All (22)
Uploads
Papers by Terry Bristol
of reality. In the mechanistic, analytic thermodynamics both the nature and evolution of reality had been represented as largely chance-governed and tending to a maximum entropic disorganization. Bejan stresses that in
the engineering thermodynamic worldview practicing engineers are participants, in the irreversible, constructive evolution of the organizational design of reality. This essay reports my investigation into Bejan's Constructal
insight, my attempt to understand it in the context of the philosophical and historical foundations of engineering thermodynamics and the engineering worldview.
theory’. Yet, experimentalists tell us quantum theory
is the most successful theory in history. Quantum
theory cannot be understood as a classical mechanical
theory since it arose through the ‘interpolation’ of
two highly successful but complementary classical
mechanics: Newtonian particle mechanics and
Maxwellian wave mechanics. The two-slit experiment
illustrates that what is experienced depends on
choice of experimental set-up. Quantum theory
is properly understood within the more general
framework of engineering thermodynamics. In
Part One, I point to four essential characteristics
of quantum theory that cannot be understood in
any framework defined by the classical mechanical
presuppositions of symmetry and conservation.
These four characteristics are the participatory, the
complementary, the indeterminate and the new
non-commutative geometry. In Part Two, articulating
engineering thermodynamics, I note there are two
histories and two formulations of thermodynamics:
Carnot’s engineering thermodynamics and the
‘rational mechanical’ tradition of Clausius-Boltzmann.
These four essential characteristics of quantum
theory are also characteristics of engineering
thermodynamics. In Part Three, I trace the precursors
of Lazare Carnot’s engineering thermodynamics to
earlier insights of Huygens, d’Alembert, Leibniz and the Bernoullis. Leibniz brought these forth in his meta-paradigm shift from Statics to
Dynamics.
of reality. In the mechanistic, analytic thermodynamics both the nature and evolution of reality had been represented as largely chance-governed and tending to a maximum entropic disorganization. Bejan stresses that in
the engineering thermodynamic worldview practicing engineers are participants, in the irreversible, constructive evolution of the organizational design of reality. This essay reports my investigation into Bejan's Constructal
insight, my attempt to understand it in the context of the philosophical and historical foundations of engineering thermodynamics and the engineering worldview.
theory’. Yet, experimentalists tell us quantum theory
is the most successful theory in history. Quantum
theory cannot be understood as a classical mechanical
theory since it arose through the ‘interpolation’ of
two highly successful but complementary classical
mechanics: Newtonian particle mechanics and
Maxwellian wave mechanics. The two-slit experiment
illustrates that what is experienced depends on
choice of experimental set-up. Quantum theory
is properly understood within the more general
framework of engineering thermodynamics. In
Part One, I point to four essential characteristics
of quantum theory that cannot be understood in
any framework defined by the classical mechanical
presuppositions of symmetry and conservation.
These four characteristics are the participatory, the
complementary, the indeterminate and the new
non-commutative geometry. In Part Two, articulating
engineering thermodynamics, I note there are two
histories and two formulations of thermodynamics:
Carnot’s engineering thermodynamics and the
‘rational mechanical’ tradition of Clausius-Boltzmann.
These four essential characteristics of quantum
theory are also characteristics of engineering
thermodynamics. In Part Three, I trace the precursors
of Lazare Carnot’s engineering thermodynamics to
earlier insights of Huygens, d’Alembert, Leibniz and the Bernoullis. Leibniz brought these forth in his meta-paradigm shift from Statics to
Dynamics.
“Continuity and Change: Perspective on Science and Religion”
“Continuum, Discontinuum and the Middle Way”
Summary and Comments 15 years later.
The 2006 essay argues that there are two opposite scientific metaphysical frameworks that are irreducibly involved in all approaches to understanding the nature of the universe. In the science of the pre-Socratics the opposition was between the Parmenidean and Heraclitan frameworks. In modern physics the opposition is between the Newtonian particle mechanics and the Maxwellian field mechanics. Per hypothesis, a version of the same opposition arises in all scientific disciplines.
Each of the scientific metaphysics, taken by itself, is unable to account for all phenomena. They are both false (inherently incomplete) is their claim to universality. Yet each is clearly essential in account for its own paradigmatic type of phenomena. For instance, in modern terms the Newtonian accounts for particle phenomena and the Maxwellian accounts for wave/field phenomena. But there are no particles (in the Newtonian sense) in the Maxwellian fields. And with the exception of gravity (as a continuing separate issue) there are no fields in Newtonian mechanics (viz. only the three laws).
I argue that the opposition of the two types of scientific metaphysics is unresolvable within any possible scientific (mechanical) framework. Because these opposites, per hypothesis, are complementary neither can be reducible to the other. One way to express this is to say that reality is more ample than can be captured by any one scientific conception. The unresolvable, yet unavoidable opposition, poses for us, what I call, a Dialectical Dilemma.
The overall theme of the essay is that we are forced to a Third Metaphysics that is more general and can subsume the complementary scientific metaphysics as limited idealizing special cases. The Third must also supersede the scientific metaphysics, meaning that it understands them, their successes and limitations, in a new way. The Third metaphysics involves a conceptually more comprehensive understanding of reality – a reality where we, as observers and inquirers, are essential components.
The explication of the Third is only cursory. I argue, following Bartlett, that the ancient response to the Dialectical Dilemma, was the Socratic Turn. And I suggest that this is quite analogous to the modern Pragmatic Turn. There is a fundamental shift, a meta-paradigm shift, involved wherein the question, and the nature of inquiry changes. In the scientific representation of inquiry, the question is about ‘how the (objective) universe – out there – works’, independent of our presence or actions. With the turn to the more general Third, the question has to do with ‘how to work in the world’. Dewey characterizes these as the Spectator and Participant representations of inquiry. The key point is that the questions and the nature of questioning is more general, more comprehensive in the Participant Third.
Following Kant, our actions, as characterized in his Critique of Practical Reason, are concern with developing ‘how we live and work in the world’. In the Critique of Judgment Kant notes that the indeterminate nature of the question ‘how we should live’, thus requiring judgment. He further notes that the question ‘how should we live’ is the fundamental, defining question of morality. Socrates similarly maintains that the question ‘how should we live’ is the most important question. In the Third, the question ‘how should we live’ defines the framework of inquiry and action. The scientific questions are important but idealizing and subsidiary.