Showing posts with label Surveillance State. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Surveillance State. Show all posts

Wednesday, 27 April 2022

Piketty's (and David Parker's) blind spot


Since Revenue Minister David Parker is such a fan of French statistics-diddler Thomas Piketty (the man who claims the world is ripe for “participatory socialism”), and it is Piketty's principles that seem to be guiding Parker's just-announced "far-reaching" fiddling with the tax-and-surveillance system, it's worth reminding ourselves of one of Piketty's major blind spots; that, as Steve Fritzinger points out in this guest post, while they're both happy to attack (and tax) wealth, neither he (nor Parker) apparently have any idea how that wealth was created, and whom it really benefits ...

Piketty's (and Parker's) Blind Spot

Guest Post by Steve Fritzinger

In an old joke, President Bush (it doesn’t matter which one) claims that the problem with the French is that they have no word for "entrepreneur." I don’t know if that joke is supposed to be on the Bushes, the French, or both. I do know that readers of French economist Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty-First Century might be convinced that the joke is actually true.

Piketty’s opus is an economic tome 700 pages long. It purports to show that the central problem with capitalism is that return on investments automatically grows faster than the economy as a whole. If true, that phenomenon would allow a small group of investors to grab an ever-increasing share of the world’s wealth. Eventually, those economic overlords would essentially own everything. All the land. All the machines. All the opportunities to live a happy life.

In Piketty’s view, the only thing that has saved us from this fate so far is the wholesale destruction caused by a pair of world wars. If not for that silver lining in an otherwise very dark cloud, average people would already be little more than serfs, living at the pleasure of a filthy-rich leisure class that produces nothing.

Since its publication, Piketty’s book has received its share of praise and criticism. On the left, progressives believe Capital is the ultimate justification for their political program. Free-market economists, on the other hand, have questioned his data sources and methods. Pundits on both sides have debated his policy recommendation of a global wealth tax to leech away the riches’ ill-gotten gains.

Other commentators are better qualified than I am to judge the empirical quality of Piketty’s work. I’d like to concentrate instead on his peculiar blind spot.

For a book about wealth, Piketty is shockingly incurious about where wealth comes from. In the first half of the book, the word "entrepreneur" is only used in the technical accounting sense of income earned by working for oneself. The idea that the entrepreneur takes risks and works hard to build new businesses is almost completely absent.

To Piketty, wealth is something that is inherited or something that one lucks into. People who receive income from investments aren’t frugal. They aren’t engaged in the socially useful activity of capital formation. They are not funding new businesses or shepherding new products to market.

In Piketty’s view, they are “rentiers,” a word that a French-speaking acquaintance tells me has unseemly, possibly even dirty, connotations. It implies that the rentier never lifts a finger. Like a Mafia Don, the rentier receives a cut of all the economic activity that occurs in his “territory” simple because he controls it.

As someone who has had his share of success and failure with investing, I can tell you that generating above-average returns for decades is not as easy as Piketty thinks. As famed tech investor Marc Andreesen noted in a recent interview, “The funny thing about Piketty is that he has a lot more faith in returns on invested capital than any professional investor I've ever met.... He assumes it's really easy to put money in the market for 40 years or 80 years or 100 years and have it compound at these amazing rates. He never explains how that's supposed to happen.”

About halfway through the book, Piketty admits that his depiction of the rentier might be a little harsh. He assures the reader that he uses the word only in a narrow, technical sense and means no insult by it.

But this admission comes after hundreds of pages discussing rentiers and would-be rentiers who are willing to lie, cheat, and even murder to keep or gain their coveted status. Piketty frequently turns to characters from Jane Austen and Honoré de Balzac novels to illustrate just how bad “rentiers” are. After that litany of capitalist villains, methinks the economist doth protest too much. An inattentive reader might miss Piketty’s disclaimer and come away thinking pitchforks and torches are in order.

Though his ideas of how productive capital works might be a bit off, there is one form of capital that does closely match Piketty’s expectation. That is political capital. Having powerful friends is the closest you’re likely to get to a risk-free, high-yield investment.

Take, for example, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton claims that when she and President Clinton left the White House in 2001, they were worse than “dead broke." They were actually drowning in debt. Today, the Clintons enjoy a fortune estimated to be worth more than $100 million. From dead broke to the 1 percent of the 1 percent in 12 short years. That’s a rate of return that should make professor Piketty quake in his boots.

Far from fearing the returns on political power, Piketty sees it as the solution to our problems. He proposes the creation of a worldwide 80 percent annual wealth tax, with periodic extra assessments, to both tax away huge fortunes and fund government programs Piketty thinks are needed to reduce inequality. Enforcing this tax would require the equivalent of a global, financial NSA capable of tracking every economic transaction everywhere and a global police force to make sure no one dodges his or her obligations.

Piketty seems oblivious to the abuses inherent in such an organisation.

Seeking to protect us from a potential economic elite who would have too much control over our lives, Piketty would give more power to the existing political elite that already has too much control over our lives. Fortunately, Piketty himself admits that there is no chance of nations implementing his schemes. That won’t stop progressives from trying, though. The amount of damage they are likely to inflict on the world might make the rest of us wish we were living in a Balzac novel.

* * * * 

Steve Fritzinger is a business consultant in the Washington, D.C., metro area. He the regular Economics Commentator on the BBC World Service Business Daily programme, where he uses Austrian Economic ideas to explain current events and other puzzles. He wrote the annotated version of “Fear the Boom and Bust,” the first Keynes/Hayek rap video, and blogs at 2nd Hand Ideas. Steve is a founding member of Liberty Toastmasters, a DC-based group dedicated to helping liberty advocates develop public speaking skills, and is a member of Liberty on the Rocks DC.



Tuesday, 9 April 2019

"Under pressure, democracies have a nasty habit of acting like panicked crowds, suppressing anything frightening or just different in a search for security and conformity... a grim illustration of just how vulnerable the "liberal" element of liberal democracy can be." BONUS #QotD


"Under pressure, democracies have a nasty habit of acting like panicked crowds, suppressing anything frightening or just different in a search for security and conformity...   "In the wake of [the brutal mass murders committed at two mosques in Christchurch], the country's government has succumbed to blind reaction by restricting speech, depriving innocent people of arms, and heightening domestic surveillance—intrusions into individual rights that are inherent whether or not governments and majorities formally respect them.  
  "It's a grim illustration of just how vulnerable the 'liberal' element of liberal democracy can be." 
          ~ Jerome Tuccille, from Reason magazine's 'In New Zealand, a Democracy Turns Against Itself'.

Wednesday, 27 March 2019

The knee jerks, and, after having jerked, what's left?


IN THE WAKE OF the Christchurch atrocity, there are calls to ban outright so-called hate speech, and the pitchforks for it are already out: Already the temporary bans against websites hosting the murderer's video have been extended, and black lists are being drawn up to permanently ban websites, workers, speakers and Twitter feeds for offending against the self-righteous mores of the mob.
Atrocity begins with cheap opportunistic hate speech against minorities [declared the Greens' Golriz Ghahraman at a 'vigil' shortly after the event]. It began with hate speech, allowed to spread here online. History has taught us that hate speech is a slippery slope to atrocity. We now know that New Zealand needs to address this.
This was us, she insists. All of us, not just one Australian with a gun. Hate speech is always a slippery slope to atrocity she proclaims -- erroneously (and narcissistically) offering up as as partial proof of both, in her speech immediately after this atrocity: the barrage of hate she says she herself receives online. The conclusion she draws from the "barrage": that this was not an aberration from overseas.

And address this, she demands: but how? By damning all white people as colonialist oppressors, as her colleague Ms Davidson was at that same vigil? By 'calling out' anyone who expresses reservations about being encouraged to wear a Muslim headdress (a headdresss damned by by many Muslimas themselves as a symbol of feminine oppression)? By decrying anyone as "racist" who adheres to what they call "Islamophobia" (despite the General Secretary of Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim organisation, declaring it to be"factually incorrect and counter-productive to define Islamophobia as 'rooted in racism'”)?

In any case, the demands are being addressed now, however, by those listening to her calls and those much like them: by the black lists being sent to police, to Twitter, to ISPs and Facebook and to every guardian of real or online communication who can enact a permanent or temporary ban on speech they deem hateful (black lists based almost wholly upon the authors' views of what they themselves just don't like). Addressed by immediate bans on publications and videos. Addressed by the knee-jerk calls to give more power to security services to carry out their own interventions, their own investigations, their own intrusions  -- security services who failed utterly to avert this atrocity despite the millions of dollars and already intrusive power they already possess, and before the just-announced inquiry into their abject failure has even been held. (“When it comes to Simon Bridges calling for enhanced powers for NZ spy agencies," observes security specialist Paul Buchanan, "he is like a guy who says that he needs a telescope because his binoculars don’t work well enough, only to find out that the lens caps are still on the binoculars.”)

And how good a diagnosis is Golriz's anyway? For what, after all, is this thing Ms Ghahrahman calls "hate speech"? "Hate speech" is so amorphous a thing it is crying out for definition.

And maybe that's the real point of the term: precisely that it is so very hard to define.

You see, for a censor, or for any high priest of the public square, that of course is so much the beauty of this anti-concept of "hate speech." Because if you yourself get to define what "hate speech" is, and this "hate speech" thing is being banned, then you yourself get to ban whatever sort of speech (and speakers) you yourself dislike.

It's a beautiful thing, censorship, when you're the one holding the whip.

Or would like to.

Especially when you've devised this apparently elegant way -- this anti-concept -- of keeping the whip hidden.

TO REMIND YOU (SINCE we've been talking about this idea of anti-concepts several times in recent years), an "anti-concept" is
an artificial, unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concept. The use of anti-concepts gives the listeners a sense of approximate understanding. But in the realm of cognition, nothing is as bad as the approximate ...
    Observe the technique involved . . . . It consists of creating an artificial, unnecessary, and (rationally) unusable term, designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concepts—a term which sounds like a concept, but stands for a “package-deal” of disparate, incongruous, contradictory elements taken out of any logical conceptual order or context, a “package-deal” whose (approximately) defining characteristic is always a non-essential. This last is the essence of the trick...
    [I]f a man accepts a term with a definition by non-essentials, his mind will substitute for it the essential characteristic of the objects he is trying to designate . . . . Thus the real meaning of the term will automatically replace the alleged meaning.
This is why "anti-concepts" like "hate speech" and "Islamophobia" are witch-doctored up in the first place -- to dismiss ideas (and those who hold them) without even a hearing in return.

So-called "hate speech" is an anti-concept witch-doctored up to obliterate free speech. The process is working. Observe that "hate speech" itself is so suitably amorphous that even Wikipedia struggles to wrap its head around the concept:
Hate speech [says Wikipedia's authors] is speech that attacks a person or a group on the basis of attributes such as race, religion, ethnic origin, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity.
So we have allegedly three ingredients to hate speech: 
  1. speech that attacks; and 
  2. the objects of those attacks; and 
  3. the attacks are based on "membership" of some group.
The objects of attack are clearly defined. The speech itself: not so much. 

And that itself is really the whole point.

Leave ill-defined in advance what an "attack" looks like -- an "attack" that is wholly and solely verbal -- and there is instantly a chill felt down the collar of anyone who wants to say anything about anyone.

It is doubtful even today that someone could declare that all arguments have been settled and all debate prohibited. It is enough to achieve that aim today, however, simply by declaring that someone or other has or may have been "offended." Or "violated." Or "threatened." Threatened by speech that in itself constitutes on threat. And on that basis of offence alone, every would-be speaker can be silenced, and every debate declared "settled" before it even starts. So it is today after Christchurch:

->Mainstream news sites are announcing a "crackdown" on their online comments sections, and calls to remove so-called "extremist" content.

->Demands are being made for platforms like Facebook and Twitter to "deplatform" people on lists being rabidly drawn up by the woke.

->Commentators as innocuous as Duncan Garner and Sean Plunkett also face calls  to be deplatformed by their media managers. "It's now a public safety issue," declares Golriz.

->Websites are being blocked by ISPs here and in Australia (who, immediately after the atrocity, blocked any website who posted the live video of the murders) but who have since elected to continue those blocks after being asked to by the government.

->And other websites are being blocked, or face blockage, because they just somehow quietly slip onto someone's black list (including this one, gentle readers, which someone elected to place in the category of "hate and racism" on one popular website filter used by companies around the world) and then face up to a future of gentle but gradual suffocation.

->Meanwhile, un-woken workers are being sacked and "panel discussions" are being urgently held around the country about how to do all this grassroots censorship even better: Russell Brown for example leading a panel discussion tomorrow "on how Artificial Intelligence and other technology can help us create safer societies"-- or as Brown himself describes it: "about the place of technical solutions in quelling online hate speech and fake news. Are human moderators enough?" Or (the unwritten implication here) should we immediately implement censorship by robot.

->And of course knee-jerk censorship will already make it almost impossible to determine and understand the views of the only person who actually (presumably) does know why he did it, i.e., the author of the atrocity himself, whose rambling so-called "manifesto" faces disappearance down a near-permanent black hole at the behest of the government.

It has become so insane that Martyn Bradbury (yes, Martyn Bradbury) is looking like a fount of wisdom in summing up some of the (over-)reaction:
Attempting to connect the violence on Friday with right wing opinions, the defence of free speech or concerns about immigration and conflate that with all white people as racist murderers is a sure fire way of eroding the solidarity in sorrow that has bound many.
MUCH OF IT MAY be well-meaning (if not "Davidson and Ghahraman's ... determination to leverage-off the Christchurch Mosque Shootings to unleash an uncompromising anti-racist campaign encompassing the whole of Pakeha New Zealand"), but the chilling effect of the suffocation is real enough. And real even if bans, black lists and blocking don't work out. If I may paraphrase a post by Amy Peikoff on this principle, it occurs to me that this down-home version of Attack Watch is a case study in the application of Ayn Rand’s observation that force stops thinking:
In Chapter 8 of his book, 'Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand,' Leonard Peikoff writes, “[I]f and to the extent that someone’s gun becomes a man’s epistemological court of final appeal, replacing the law of identity [A is A], then the man cannot think.” 
    So, to those who have not joined the chorus conflating all white people with racist murderers, or who still have reservations about Islamists and Islamic culture, or who identify and condemn the seething identity politics of both right and left as being culpable: When you think thus independently and then hear about these sackings, de-platformings and black lists, do you say to yourself, even for a millisecond, that you will now have to be more careful when criticising Golriz or Islamism or the Prime Minister publicly? Never mind that, if you’re reading this blog, you’re probably the kind of person who would go ahead and act as you had before anyway. That’s not the point. People decide to resist the institution of government controls all the time, but that does not mean that those controls, if and to the extent that they are imposed, do not stop thinking. 
    Some might argue that this kind of grassroots 'Attack Watch' doesn’t threaten the use of force of any kind, nor the imposition of any penalties, so this is in fact not an example coming under the principle. (The black lists and block lists, for example, are not being drawn up by governments but by networks of private volunteers.) But if you think about it, the only reason that people even care about the existence of these lists, is because they know that, even if there has not yet been a threat of penalties of any kind, such penalties might not be far behind. [Sections 61 and 131 of the ill-named Human Rights Act 1993 for example already threatens you with severe punishment for what it calls "Inciting Racial Disharmony"--and this is even before Ms Ghahraman et al get started on revising it, as they will.] 
    This is why phrases like “enemies list” might occur to you when reading these approving and widespread calls for this grassroots censorship. If you feel the slightest bit intimidated by the creation of these lists, for example, or these "technical solutions"–even if you tell yourself you will not be affected by it, that you will continue on, as before–then you have experienced a small taste of what Ayn Rand meant. [As have, for example, the websites already blocked by ISPs for hosting, wittingly or unwittingly, the live video -- and the ISPs themselves who are "asked" by the government o continue the ban to please the government, even though there is not, at this point, any legislation compelling them to do so.) 
    The initiation of force, or threatening to use force, is evil. This is why even a fairly heavily veiled threat of force by our government is cause for concern.
You should never compromise with those who want to use acts of violence to extinguish freedom, reminds Margaret Thatcher, because if you do you then the very things for which you stand are extinguished.

Let us resolve not to extinguish freedom here. Especially not by the jerk of this knee.
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Wednesday, 8 March 2017

Trump’s wiretap dance

 

Trump1

It started with a Trump tweetstorm out of the blue on a fine, clear Saturday Morning – a flurry of tweets from 6:35 to 7:02 am claiming a Watergate-level conspiracy. By 8:12am he was on to tweeting about reality TV, and then by 9:26am he was at golf. (Never let it be said that this president does not take these matters seriously.)

Trump2

Trump3

Julian Sanchez outlines in this guest post how the story has evolved since Saturday....

I’ve already explained, in a post over at Just Security, some of the law and background surrounding what we know about Donald Trump’s incendiary claim that his predecessor wiretapped his phones at Trump Tower during the presidential campaign, and I’d suggest reading that if you want to delve into some of the wonky details, but I thought it might be worth a separate point to pull out some of the critical points and remark on how the story has evolved since Saturday.

  • There’s no basis on the public record to support the allegation that phones at Trump Tower were wiretapped, or that the Trump campaign was targeted for electronic surveillance, let alone on the orders of Barack Obama. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has publicly denied it, and FBI Director James Comey has reportedly been pressing for a disavowal from the Justice Department.
        This appears to be something Trump concocted on the basis of (deep breath now) his own misreading of a misleading Breitbart News article based on a talk radio host’s summary of months-old reports in the British press. Those news stories—which conspicuously haven’t been reported out by the deeply-sourced intelligence journalists at U.S. outlets, and so should be taken with a grain of salt—concern some sort of order, purportedly sought by the FBI from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, targeting Russian banks in order to follow up intelligence leads concerning possible transfers of funds from Russia to Trump aides.
        If the reports are true, that’s vastly different from what Trump alleged, and not obviously improper on its face, though when intelligence surveillance intersects domestic politics, even indirectly, there’s always an elevated risk of abuse.
  • The White House has been dodging and weaving a bit in its public statements following Trump’s allegations on Twitter.
        Initially, aides told multiple reporters that they thought the president had been reacting to the Breitbart piece, which was circulated internally on Friday. But, as I explain in more detail in my Just Security post, the sources drawn on for the Breitbart piece don’t actually support Trump’s claims.
        More recently, spokeswoman Kellyanne Conway insinuated that Trump may have some other classified basis for his accusations. She’s called on the FBI to release more information, while other White House officials have suggested it should fall to Congress to investigate.
        This is all, to put it mildly, grossly irresponsible. If the president has classified information about improper surveillance of his campaign, he is empowered to declassify it. If he’s not sure whether to believe what he reads on the Internet, the head of the executive branch is not limited to relying on Breitbart News to learn about the activities of his own intelligence community. But it should be wholly unacceptable for Trump to level serious accusations of criminal abuse of intelligence authorities by his predecessor,  then punt to Congress when pressed to produce evidence.  
  • The fact that Trump is apparently unshakable in his conviction on this point, with one spokesman indicating that he doesn’t believe Comey’s denial, is one more data point confirming that the relationship between the White House and the intelligence community had become untenably dysfunctional.  At the most recent Cato Surveillance Conference, a panel of former senior intelligence professionals voiced concern that Trump might be unwilling to accept intelligence that conflicted with his preconceptions.
        Some skepticism of the intelligence community is, to be sure, both healthy and justified, but if the president is more inclined to trust thinly-sourced conspiracy theories on talk radio than his own FBI director, that seems to quite starkly validate the panellists' concerns. Signalling that intelligence output is going to be disregarded whenever the facts aren’t to the president’s liking is how you get politicised intelligence, which is detrimental to national security and, in the worst case, can lead to outcomes like foreign wars over seemingly non-existent Weapons of Mass Destruction.
  • Notwithstanding all that, it could not hurt for Congress to kick the tyres a bit and ask to be briefed on what intelligence tools have been employed in the course of the Russia inquiry, to what extent they may have ensnared either the communications or other records pertaining to Trump associates, and how widely any such information was subsequently disseminated. Not, again, because there’s any reason to credit Trump’s dramatic claims, but because the crossroads where foreign intelligence meets domestic politics is inherently a high-risk territory.
        Our history is, alas, replete with instances of information gleaned from foreign intelligence surveillance—often pursuant to investigations that were, in their inception, perfectly legitimate—later being improperly used to advance a political agenda. Quite apart from Trump’s most recent allegations, news headlines over the past month have been dominated by intelligence leaks that create the appearance of a war between the administration and elements of the intelligence community, which as I’ve written previously, is unlikely to end well for American democracy whichever side comes out on top.  
  • To the extent all this has awakened some members of Congress to the potential for abuse inherent in so-called “incidental” collection of Americans’ communications and other information as a by-product of foreign-targeted surveillance, one hopes that newfound awareness outlives this news cycle. Because if it’s wrong to wiretap a presidential candidate without a warrant (if, indeed, that ever happened) it is equally wrong to wiretap any American citizen without a warrant.
        Many of the same officials now incensed by leaks harmful to the Trump administration have however pooh-pooed concerns about the scale of collection on U.S. citizens under §702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which must be re-authorised—and ought to be reformed—by the end of the year. Several pundits have made the Obama administration’s loosening of the rules for sharing raw intelligence collected by the NSA pursuant to Executive Order 12333 part of their narrative about a “soft coup” against Trump by the “Deep State.” Surely they should be even more worried about the fact that the FBI can query NSA’s vast databases of §702 intercepts for the communications of Americans, exempt even from the statutory requirement (which does apply to CIA and NSA) to count and report on how often such “backdoor searches” occur.
        If such easy access to intercepts presents an unacceptable risk of political abuse, surely the solution is not simply to purge the current intelligence bureaucracy and stuff it with more devout loyalists, but to change the rules that make it possible.

I’ll have more, no doubt, as this strange story continues to play out.


Julian Sanchez is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and studies issues at the busy intersection of technology, privacy, and civil liberties, with a particular focus on national security and intelligence surveillance. Before joining Cato, Sanchez served as the Washington editor for the technology news site Ars Technica, where he covered surveillance, intellectual property, and telecom policy. He has also worked as a writer for The Economist’s blog Democracy in America and as an editor for Reason magazine, where he remains a contributing editor.
    Sanchez has written on privacy and technology for a wide array of national publications, ranging from the National Review to The Nation, and is a founding editor of the policy blog Just Security. He studied philosophy and political science at New York University.
This post previously appeared at the Cato at Liberty blog.

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Thursday, 23 June 2016

Get your effing hands out of my car!

 

The Automobile Association says GPS devices could be installed in every Auckland car, tracking where and when the driver goes around the city, as part of governent moves to introduce a form of road tolling in the city.

You know what: fuck you.

AA principal adviser Barney Irvine said the system would not be a road toll as we traditionally know it, but would cover the whole Auckland region and replace the fuel tax.
    Motorists would receive a bill based on the number of kilometres they travelled on which roads and at what times.
    "This is a very different proposition to what we saw come out of Auckland Council last year with a proposed motorway user charge," Irvine said.

The idea is that stealing from Auckland drivers as they travel around the city, or try to, will “manage demand” and make it easy to get around – and, not incidentally, to make a pile of money out of mototists at the same time (because anyone who believes this would replace a fuel tax should be immediately removed of the power to vote on the grounds of  being too simple to understand how politics works.)

However, there were numerous issues to consider, Irvine said. [You think? – Ed.]
    Fitting every car in the city with a GPS device would be a big job.
    "It's no easy task when you consider the average age of our fleet is 13-14 years old. It would be a stretch for a lot of people."

It would be a stretch even getting one into my car, which like many classic cars is well over 14 years old and entirely devoid of electronics, thank you very much.

There were also privacy concerns, he said. [You think!? – Ed.] "There's no precedent here for something as ubiquitous as this that spans the whole city and all drivers."

My immediate reaction is this: Keep your effing hands out of my car!

And you know what? After some thought, that’s my considered response as well. We roll over on this stuff far too easily.

You want a toll network, that’s a whole different question. And we can have that discussion if you wish. We can talk about choosing to use toll roads; about choosing to install a reader for those roads; about the increasing importance of making these roads private to keep our private information about how and where we’re getting around away from Big Brother.  But to blandly suggest ongoing govt surveillance simply for their pricing convenience shows how little respect is left for privacy and property. Because to quote from the blogger at No Right Turn, who mercifully lives miles away from this increasingly-congested place:

A GPS in every car, tracking you everywhere you go? This isn't a toll system - its a fucking surveillance network.
Again, once the information is collected, it is useable by other government agencies. The police can already access toll-road records through the production order system (or
simply by asking); this would let them get everywhere you have ever been. And they wouldn't even have to pay for the tracking device - you'd have to buy it for them in order to be allowed to drive.
    Fuck that shit. Lets keep our privacy. Lets say "no" to spy-roads.

Yes. Let’s.

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Thursday, 18 February 2016

Good for Apple

 

Apple is being “asked” by the FBI to “unlock” the security settings on the iPhone used by one of the San Bernadino murderers. Apple has refused: the reason being that if it were able and willing to unlock this one phone for this one enquiry, they would soon be required to unlock every phone in every inquiry in virtually every jurisdition in which there phones operate.

In a letter sent to their customers they explain:

The United States government has demanded that Apple take an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order, which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand. …
    Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple, clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and the significance of what the government is demanding in this case. … The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable person would find that acceptable.
    The government is asking Apple to hack our own users and undermine decades of security advancements that protect our customers — including tens of millions of American citizens — from sophisticated hackers and cybercriminals. The same engineers who built strong encryption into the iPhone to protect our users would, ironically, be ordered to weaken those protections and make our users less safe.
    We can find no precedent for an American company being forced to expose its customers to a greater risk of attack. For years, cryptologists and national security experts have been warning against weakening encryption. Doing so would hurt only the well-meaning and law-abiding citizens who rely on companies like Apple to protect their data. Criminals and bad actors will still encrypt, using tools that are readily available to them...
    Opposing this order is not something we take lightly. We feel we must speak up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the U.S. government.
    We are challenging the FBI’s demands with the deepest respect for American democracy and a love of our country. We believe it would be in the best interest of everyone to step back and consider the implications.
    While we believe the FBI’s intentions are good, it would be wrong for the government to force us to build a backdoor into our products. And ultimately, we fear that this demand would undermine the very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.

Good for Apple.

Tuesday, 24 November 2015

Quote of the day: On stopping suicide bombers with cameras . . .

The former German Federal Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich told Der Spiegel that surveillance cameras are effective in stopping suicide bombers . . .

[Translation]: DER SPIEGEL: Widespread video surveillance in the US could not prevent [the Boston Marathon] attacks. Rather, the perpetrators seem to have been fully aware of the monitoring.
Friedrich: A suicide bomber, who includes his own death in his planning of the attack won't be discouraged by surveillance cameras.
DER SPIEGEL: So the cameras are ineffective?
Friedrich: That'd be a wrong conclusion. If we catch the attacker after the first time, he can't act a second or third time.  That alone is already a success.

[Hat tip Felix Mueller]

Wednesday, 28 October 2015

Nickey Hager: Ugly man, ugly invasion of his property

I’m surprised it’s taken so long for this story to become a thing.

In searching for the source of the data used in his book Dirty Politics, the police enlisted the aid of Hager’s bank, Westpac, who happily handed over to them all his private banking information including over 10 months of his banking transactions from all of his accounts. This was all handed over without a warrant.

The revelation Westpac handed over author Nicky Hager's bank records to the police - without so much as a by-your-leave from the courts - should send a shiver down the spine.
    It ought, too, to be a wake-up call to any other corporates out there who think their customers' records are fair game for any authority figure that comes knocking.
    They are not.
    Kudos to the likes of Spark, Vodafone, Air New Zealand, Jetstar and TradeMe for recognising that - and refusing a similar request from the police.
    In the case of Hager's records - sought when the police were trying to find who hacked blogger Cameron Slater's computer (providing the material for Hager's book
Dirty Politics) - there is more at stake than simply tracking down a potential criminal.

Yes, there is.

Leave aside for the moment that Hager himself publishes book based on illegal access to people’s private data (Whale Oil’s, Don Brash’s, Helen Clark’s, anyone you like really).

(And leave aside that Mr Whale Oil himself ended up in court for publishing a businessman’s illegal data.)

And leave aside if you can the fact Hager’s legal team calls this a “privacy breach.”

So the irony does go all the way down.

But there’s something very wrong with a bank handing over a person’s private banking information to the authorities without that person’s permission, without their knowledge and without the appropriate legal warrant.

Even if that person is Nicky Hager.

There’s something very wrong because to gain that information properly the authorities should provide a warrant—and I include in that number the Inland Revenue. The need to provide a warrant issued by a different branch of government, to whom the authorities requesting it must provide some proof of your culpability—is a small but valuable piece of due process providing all individuals some legal protection against abuse by the authorities of their authority.

It is not something that should be ignored. The more it is, the less protection we have.

And the fact is that small but valuable piece of due process has been ignored too much too recently—banks being required to hand over private information to the Inland Revenue without a warrant whenever Inland Revenue care to ask for it, and to the police whenever the bank thinks you might be handling too much of the folding stuff. So banks are probably so used to handing over to the authorities whatever is asked for and whenever they ask for it—and to give it up three bags full.

Doesn’t make it right.

RELATED POSTS:

  • “The broader concept which a so-called privacy right obscures is our legitimate property rights…”
    Privacy, Property and the #SurveillanceState
  • “The ‘right to privacy’ is a misguided attempt to save some shreds of certain [legitimate] rights while retaining a way to eviscerate others.”
    Some propositions on privacy
  • “In ‘the old days’ the need to obtain a search warrant was your protection against every state agency except the IRD. But we are now in a new age.”
    “The Moment of Truth”: Too many agendas
  • “’Politics is: the gutless in thrall to the clueless. Therein lies its real dirtiness, not in the machinations, grubby though they may be, revealed in equally grubby Nicky Hager’s latest dump of stolen e-mails’.”
    The Real Dirtiness in NZ Politics
  • “The #DirtyPolitics saga saw the commentariat almost immediately begin comparing John Key to their favourite modern-day bogeyman, Richard Nixon. The real connection is not so much dirty trick s or Judith Collins’s alleged enemies list; the real connection is ideology – or, to be precise, the lack of one.”
    The #1 reason for #dirtypolitics: the barrenness of the "centre-right"

Monday, 20 July 2015

Surprise: I agree with Martyn Bradbury

How often is it possible to agree with a Martyn Bradbury post?

For me, it’s never happened before. Then astonishingly, over the weekend, I went from zero to two in as many minutes.

First when he attacked the outrage of private prisons – “If you voted National or ACT at the last election, you voted for this [“fight club”] atrocity at Serco.” And so you did. You voted for the ultimate in cronyism: the actual privatisation of force, with all the temptation to corruption and abuse that goes with it. The moral argument against private prisons is that the concept puts the gun in the service of the dollar. The practical argument is that it puts profits at the whim of bureaucratic management. The necessary outcome of both is what we now see in your headlines.

My second agreement with Bradbury was his defence of someone we both loathe, “but no one, not even Rodney Hide deserves to be treated like this…” Rodney’s story of state harassment suggests the surveillance state is already taking its powers so much for granted it doesn’t bother them who they bully, and for what.

You won’t hear me say this often, and maybe never again, but you should probably read both of Martyn Bradbury’s weekend posts:

RELATED POSTS:

Tuesday, 2 June 2015

Quote of the Day: On the right to privacy ...

"Arguing that you don't care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don't care about free speech because you have nothing to say."
- Edward Snowden, from the article 'In One Quote, Snowden Just Destroyed the Biggest                                                             Myth About Privacy'
[Hat tip  Julian Pistorius]

Monday, 30 March 2015

The Law of Unintended Consequences makes another unexpected appearance online

The unintended consequences of security theatre imposed on airline travel is replicated in the security theatre of mass online state surveillance – also supposedly for our protection against terrorists, but whose indiscriminate application has encouraged tech firms to improve encryption for perfectly legitimate non-terrorists, making  surveillance of any real threat more difficult rather than less.

A European police chief says the sophisticated online communications are the biggest problem for security agencies tackling terrorism…
"[Tech firms] are doing it, I suppose, because of a commercial imperative driven by what they perceive to be consumer demand for greater privacy of their communications."

Ya think?

[Hat tip Duncan B.]

Tuesday, 10 March 2015

Quote of the afternoon: On justifying the #SurveillanceState

“When you justify security measures with quotes from
Leviathan, you should remember what the Leviathan is.”
- Keith Ng, On Point

Quote of the morning: On the art of dissembling [updated]

Question: You’ve said you’ll resign if there’s mass surveillance by the GCSB.
Key: Yep.
Question: Does that promise apply to mass collection of information as well?
Key: No.

- Prime Minister John Key at his Monday media conference

UPDATE: Or, in English: NZ PM retracts vow to resign if mass surveillance is shown.
[Hat tip Philip Matthews]

Wednesday, 11 February 2015

Quote of the day: “an unexpected side-effect of the modern surveillance state”

This could be an unexpected side-effect of the modern surveillance state: our ancestors will get really kick-ass biographies.
- Danyl McLauchlan reviewing books he read over the summer holidays

Wednesday, 3 December 2014

Terror at 24 hours notice

Thank goodness for Andrew Little’s timely intervention, so that 48 hours of “emergency” warrantless surveillance by spy agencies was reduced from 48 hours to only 24 in National’s new rushed-through anti-terrorism bill – and the bill’s “sunset clause” for when its powers expire was  brought forward to 2017.

Because those 24 hours make so much difference.

Yes, that is sarcasm you’re hearing there. 

In his explanation for agreeing to vote for the bill, Little appeared more concerned about its timetable than its content.

"People should always be sceptical when there are demands and plans for extra powers by security agencies that intrude on rights and freedoms, and when that happens there should be a decent amount of time for every citizen to have their say if they want to have it," he said.

As if it makes a difference to intrusions on your rights and freedoms if they’ve been discussed for four months rather than four days.

The sunset itself is of little moment. Almost every parliamentary term since and during Helen Clark’s reign we’ve seen another anti-terrorism bill introduced, often under urgency, usually botched, and always adding new things the state can do to you simply because the state would like to.

Don’t get me wrong: it’s the state’s legitimate job to protect our legitimate rights, yours and mine, and we do need spy agencies to counter the very real threats that do exist.

But threats from the surveillance state are just as real as terrorist threats – and much, much closer to home – which is why proper protections against state abuse of its surveillance powers need proper legal power: needing a warrant before embarking on surveillance being one primary protection the state should afford its citizens.

Greens co-leader Russel Norman is right when he says: "Unwarranted surveillance is still unwarranted surveillance even if it's only for 24 hours."

A pity there’s little sympathy for that position around the parliament.

NOTE: Some puns were harmed in the making of this post, and will undoubtedly be harmed again in future.

Tuesday, 25 November 2014

Quote of the Day: On National’s Security Service

“Not entirely convinced that the government really ought to be rushing through
stronger powers for the security apparatus until they've sorted out perhaps a few
better control mechanisms preventing partisan use of the security apparatus.”
- Eric Crampton, ‘No, sir, I don't like it

Wednesday, 17 September 2014

Privacy, Property and the #SurveillanceState

Have you ever wondered why the right to privacy seems to have risen in importance even as rights in property have diminished?

It is not altogether coincidental.

“The ‘right to privacy’,” says legal scholar Arline Mann, “is a misguided attempt to save some shreds of certain [legitimate] rights while retaining a way to eviscerate others.”

Yes, we each of us need privacy. But our need for something is not a claim on someone else. Privacy is a good, not a right. It’s not something to be recognised, it’s something to be earned.

Civilisation itself is the progress toward a society of privacy, argues Ayn Rand. “The savage's whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free from men.”

A right to privacy however while a compelling idea, is not persuasive. The right to privacy, if it exists, “stands as a bulwark against meddlesome other people, especially governments,” says philosopher Tibor Machan.  And when all other bulwarks are being banished, that is not unimportant.

But while we have the legitimate right to take actions to protect our privacy, and while our own private communications for example remain our property as long as we wish them to, this doesn’t make privacy itself an actual right. The broader concept which a privacy right obscures is our legitimate property rights which, says Arline Mann, so-called privacy rights –which are inherently vague and conflict-ridden – are actually designed to obscure.

“The claim that some information is private (or that some observation is an intrusion) is [itself] a value judgment,” says Amy Peikoff,

often substantially dependent upon the individual’s personal preferences. In contrast, the law should just concern factual, perceptual judgments about whether force was initiated or not… Consequently, upholding a right to privacy means that people cannot protect their privacy to whatever degree they please, but rather must depend upon the government’s idea of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ as set by community standards and limited by community welfare.

My reasonable expectation of privacy is clearly not John Key’s. Or (since she helped shape today’s system of surveillance) Helen Clark’s. Their standards are not mine, and no law or legal principle should be built on such vagaries.

“Privacy is a good -- like food, music, or love,” concludes Amy Peikoff. “So while we have the right to take the actions required to secure our privacy via judicious use of our property and voluntary contracts with others, we have no direct right to privacy per se. . . Laws designed to protect privacy undermine genuine rights to property and contract.”

Like the property we have in our communications. Protect that – properly protect that – and not just this election but the whole debate about surveillance would be very different indeed.

Tuesday, 16 September 2014

“The Moment of Truth”: Too many agendas

“A proper government is the agent of its citizens, not the master. In its role
as the agent, the default should be openness, not secrecy;  in very few
contexts is it appropriate for the government to operate in secrecy. Only
when the government can convince its citizens that secrecy is necessary
for protecting their rights is it acceptable. With respect to the NSA [and
GCSB
and SIS] surveillance programs, that burden has not been met.”
- Yaron Brook, YARON BROOK'S POV — NSA MONITORING: SHOULD WE BE WORRIED?

IT HAD BEEN BILLED by Kim DotCon as “The Moment of Truth” – "a political bomb" – THE moment when he would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that John Key knew about DotCon before the raid on his house, and by implication that Key had conspired to get him into the country so as to get him into American hands.

It wasn’t that moment. The shred of evidence DotCon floated earlier yesterday had already been shot down as fraudulent, and nothing more on that score made any appearance at all.

It was billed by Laila Harre as being “framed” by Hager’s #DirtyPolitics, hyped by DotCon’s lawyer as being “Watergate on emails.”

It wasn’t that either (and really never was).

And it was promoted by the likes of Martin/Martyn Bradbury as something that would make your head blow off.

It may well have done that for him (but how would the rest of us ever know the difference.)

There was a wrestle of agendas going on among an ill-sorted collection of folk: a copyright thief keen to make it about him; a political party leader and activists running an election rally; a public launch of the fat German’s “communications suite”; the fat German’s lawyer launching anti-corporate barbs and trying to turn it into an anti-TPPA rally…

Take away the puffery of these poseurs, and the rambling irrelevance of Julian Assange, and in the end what you had was a story presented by Glenn Greenwald and Edward Snowden that needs sober consideration -- but will hardly get them given the context in which they were put, and the company in which these two global figures allowed themselves to appear.

And there was still a glaring absence of smoking guns.

Snowden claimed NZ’s GCSB as part of Five Eyes has been ramping up towards a system of mass state surveillance which, if true, is worrying. But what was his evidence?

He said the American National Security Agency (NSA) has a base in Auckland “and in the north of the country.” Sounds ominous, but Paul Buchanan suggested this morning the Auckland connection is probably no more than an NSA agent at the American Consulate in Auckland, who may have the services of a satellite dish. The facility up north one assumes is the Warkworth satellite station, which he suggests by implication is subject to monitoring. This deserves further investigation.

Snowden claimed that when working for the NSA in Hawaii he routinely handled metadata from NZ’s GCSB, and could easily drill down into the metadata to investigate content. But he had no specifics, no documentary evidence, just a discussion (on which he had expanded in his Intercept article earlier yesterday) about a checkbox on the XKEYSCORE system used to compile and analyse data.

That solitary checkbox, the Five Eyes Defeat … is what separates our most sacred rights from the graveyard of lost liberty.

Snowden has always appeared genuine, and unlike others at this event appears to understand the importance and basis of “our most sacred rights” – not a gift from government, he said last night, but part of our nature as human beings.

When these things are collected, by any arm of government, without an individualised, particularised suspicion of wrongdoing, on the individual level, that is a violation ... of human rights -- that are not given to us by government,but are inherent to our nature.

He’s right, you know. But unless I missed it somewhere, he’s offered no direct evidence for his claims about mass surveillance in NZ than his testimony last night, his earlier documents about XKEYSCORE, and the reluctance of PMs, leaders of opposition, and former and present heads of GCSB to discuss XKEYSCORE.

He took a swing at the Prime Minister for his public claim that “there is not and there never has been any mass surveillance.” This is false, says Snowden, and only defended now by a Prime Minister “throwing classified documents in the air like Julian Assange.”

Clearly, Snowden sees himself as more careful with classified documents than Julian Assange, and the PM, but he still brought nothing more to back his claims but his cogent discussion and believable demeanour.

If there was a smoking gun last night, it was brought by Glenn Greenwald. While John Key was throwing classified documents in the air defending the non-commissioning of something called CORTEX, Greenwald was documenting a programme called SPEARGUN.

According to Greenwald, [and I’m relying for this summary on Keith Ng’s report] this project involved the "covert installation of 'cable access' equipment" on the Southern Cross cable (i.e. Tapping into New Zealand's traffic with the rest of the world). The existence of this capability cannot be denied.
    In response to the Southern Cross cable's operators saying that such a thing was impossible, Snowden (who videoconferenced into the event) asked (I'm paraphrasing): What makes the Southern Cross cable so special that it cannot be accessed undetected by the NSA, when everyone else around the world can be?
    The new documents show that the GCSB had a cable access project underway, followed by another document that Phase 1 was "achieved". More crucially, he has a message showing:

        (TS//SI//NF) New Zealand: GCSB's cable access program SPEARGUN Phase 1; awaiting new GCSB
    Act expected July 2013; first metadata probe mid 2013.

This shows that they had to wait for the GCSB Act to be passed before SPEARGUN could be used. i.e. The new GCSB Act - the one that supposedly wouldn't expand GCSB powers - expanded GCSB powers to allow them operate a metadata probe on the this cable which they'd tapped.

If there was a case to answer that was presented last night, then that was it.

THE BIGGER PICTURE TO all this is realising that the time-honoured protections against state intrusion into our lives has been breaking down philosophically, legally and politically, just at a  time when new technology makes the possibilities of this intrusion so much more widespread.

“We want to bring down Five Eyes,” said the fat German trying to get a chant going. Well, no “we” don’t. In a world with many threats, intelligence gathering is essential.

The reason we have state security is to protect our most sacred liberties – to protect them against the slings and arrows of war and outrageous criminality. That’s government’s job. But to protect our liberties against those agencies themselves, especially as the power of surveillance and analysis increases, we need more than just checkboxes. 

It is not a matter of left or right. Yes, the centre-right here are defending the GCSB’s alleged excesses and the left are running the argument against the abuse of power, but reverse political power and the positions would be reversed. The left are always against the abuse of power until they have it themselves. And remember too that this process started here under Helen Clark’s Labour, and has been carried out in US under the Democrats’s Obama.

The issue is not party political. It is protection against the state.

In “the old days” the need to obtain a search warrant was your protection against every state agency except the IRD. But we are now in a new age.

In this new age when searches of your data so much more easy than rummaging through your rubbish bins (as easy as tapping a cable, it seems), and analysis of data is as easy as writing a good data mining algorithm (still not that easy, to be fair) what separates our most sacred rights from the graveyard of lost liberty seems to be only the scruples of security agents themselves – and in New Zealand, so the claim goes, those scruples are being sacrificed for the excitement of being part of a world intelligence network in which New Zealand can be a player just as long as it supplies the (meta)data that keeps it in the big tent.

It is really a time for a new consideration of the checks and balances that tie up the agencies who act purportedly in our defence – and those who think it’s all okay now because a nice man is overseeing date collection might like to contemplate how they might feel if it were all overseen by the former PM, or her successor.

But that sober and serious job needs better “framing” than it did with all the agendas on display last night.

PS: I’ll be updating this post over the day as new info and analysis comes to light.

RELATED POSTS (TODAY):

RELATED POSTS (PAST):

TWITTER, AS IT HAPPENED (oldest to newest)…

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Monday, 15 September 2014