Bastiat on the stupid "balance of trade"

"The ship that carried them off sank on its departure. The customs officer, who had noted on this occasion an
export of 100 francs, never had any re-import to enter in this case. Hence, Monsieur Mauguin would say, France
 gained 100 francs; for it was, in fact, by this sum that the export, thanks to the shipwreck, exceeded the import."

Protectionists of all stripes often rail about trade deficits. An unfavourable balance of trade. One of the catch phrases of these people, because at some level even they realise the value of trade, is that they want “fair trade.” That’s just protectionism under the guise of being pro-free trade.

So what exactly is the stupid goddamn "balance of trade"? And how do bloody protectionists calculate their alleged profits and losses?

One of history's best economic story-tellers, the great Frenchman Frederic Bastiat, explained the fallacy way back in the nineteenth century with the help of a contemporary protectionist ...

ALLOW ME TO ASSESS THE validity of the rule according to which Monsieur Mauguin and all the protectionists calculate profits and losses. I shall do so by recounting two business transactions IN which I have had the occasion to engage.

I was at Bordeaux. I had a cask of wine which was worth 50 francs; I sent it to Liverpool, and the customhouse noted on its records an export of 50 francs.

At Liverpool the wine was sold for 70 francs. My representative converted the 70 francs into coal, which was found to be worth 90 francs on the market at Bordeaux. The customhouse hastened to record an import of 90 francs.

Balance of trade, or the excess of imports over exports: 40 francs.

These 40 francs, I have always believed, putting my trust in my books, I had gained. But Monsieur Mauguin tells me that I have lost them, and that France has lost them in my person.

And why does Monsieur Mauguin see a loss here? Because he supposes that any excess of imports over exports necessarily implies a balance that must be paid in cash. But where is there in the transaction that I speak of, which follows the pattern of all profitable commercial transactions, any balance to pay? Is it, then, so difficult to understand that a merchant compares the prices current in different markets and decides to trade only when he has the certainty, or at least the probability, of seeing the exported value return to him increased? Hence, what Monsieur Mauguin calls loss should be called profit.

A few days after my transaction I had the simplicity to experience regret; I was sorry I had not waited. In fact, the price of wine fell at Bordeaux and rose at Liverpool; so that if I had not been so hasty, I could have bought at 40 francs and sold at 100 francs. I truly believed that on such a basis my profit would have been greater. But I learn from Monsieur Mauguin that it is the loss that would have been more ruinous.

My second transaction had a very different result.

I had had some truffles shipped from Périgord which cost me 100 francs; they were destined for two distinguished English cabinet ministers for a very high price, which I proposed to turn into pounds sterling. Alas, I would have done better to eat them myself (I mean the truffles, not the English pounds or the Tories). All would not have been lost, as they were, for the ship that carried them off sank on its departure. The customs officer, who had noted on this occasion an export of 100 francs, never had any re-import to enter in this case.

Hence, Monsieur Mauguin would say, France gained 100 francs; for it was, in fact, by this sum that the export, thanks to the shipwreck, exceeded the import. If the affair had turned out otherwise, if I had received 200 or 300 francs’ worth of English pounds, then the balance of trade would have been unfavorable, and France would have been the loser.

From the point of view of science, it is sad to think that all the commercial transactions which end in loss according to the businessmen concerned show a profit according to that class of theorists who are always declaiming against theory.

But from the point of view of practical affairs, it is even sadder, for what is the result?

Suppose that Monsieur Mauguin had the power (and to a certain extent he has, by his votes) to substitute his calculations and desires for the calculations and desires of businessmen and to give, in his words, “a good commercial and industrial organisation to the country, a good impetus to domestic industry.” What would he do?

Monsieur Mauguin would suppress by law all transactions that consist in buying at a low domestic price in order to sell at a high price abroad and in converting the proceeds into commodities eagerly sought after at home; for it is precisely in these transactions that the imported value exceeds the exported value.

Conversely, he would tolerate, and, indeed, he would encourage, if necessary by subsidies (from taxes on the public), all enterprises based on the idea of buying dearly in France in order to sell cheaply abroad; in other words, exporting what is useful to us in order to import what is useless. Thus, he would leave us perfectly free, for example, to send off cheeses from Paris to Amsterdam, in order to bring back the latest fashions from Amsterdam to Paris; for in this traffic the balance of trade would always be in our favor.

Yet, it is sad and, I dare add, degrading that the legislator will not let the interested parties decide and act for themselves in these matters, at their peril and risk. At least then everyone bears the responsibility for his own acts; he who makes a mistake is punished and is set right. But when the legislator imposes and prohibits, should he make a monstrous error in judgment, that error must become the rule of conduct for the whole of a great nation. In France we love freedom very much, but we hardly understand it. Oh, let us try to understand it better! We shall not love it any the less.

Monsieur Mauguin has stated with imperturbable aplomb that there is not a statesman in England [in the nineteenth century at least] who does not accept the doctrine of the balance of trade. After having calculated the loss which, according to him, results from the excess of our imports, he cried out: “If a similar picture were to be presented to the English, they would shudder, and there is not a member in the House of Commons who would not feel that his seat was threatened.”

For my part, I affirm that if someone were to say to the House of Commons: “The total value of what is exported from the country exceeds the total value of what is imported,” it is then that they would feel threatened; and I doubt that a single speaker could be found who would dare to add: “The difference represents a profit.”

In England they are convinced that it is important for the nation to receive more than it gives. Moreover, they have observed that this is the attitude of all businessmen; and that is why they have taken the side of laissez faire and are committed to restoring free trade.

[Text by Frederic Bastiat from his masterpiece: Economic Sophisms; introduction excerpts by Marco den Ouden]

"Economic wars often turn into military wars."

"President Trump made it clear during his presidential campaign that tariffs will be a part of his policy-making. He has followed through on that. But tariffs are very risky business. Yes, you can get lucky with them being a political tool at times. 

    "But tariffs can also turn very bad, especially when egos get revved up. American history is littered with the use of tariffs going very badly. 

    "President Trump, and the American people, should always keep that in mind. 

    "Economic wars often turn into military wars. 

    "Given the bankrupt state of our nation, any type of war should be the furthest thing from our minds. It could end up being the last nail in the coffin. 

    "Best to focus intensely on cleaning our own house."

~ Ron Paul

 

New Zealand got its road-building ideas explicitly from American pre- and post-war ideas that highways were "the way of the future," regardless of their cost in the present. (Just think for example of the cost to the neighbourhoods and connections that no longer exist at the top of Auckland's Dominion Rd, or between K Rd and Victoria Park.)

But, asks Thomas Walker-Werth in this guest post, looking at the even bigger picture, did all the highway-building instead close of a better future that could have otherwise happened ...

Don’t Ask ‘Who Will Build the Roads?’ Ask ‘Do We Even Want Roads?’

by Thomas Walker-Werth

When defenders of liberty argue that governments shouldn’t tax their citizens, a common reply is, “In that case, who will build the roads?” There are plenty of good answers to that, explaining the various ways in which private industry might provide a better road network than governments do if left free. But there’s a question that often goes unasked: “Do we even want roads?”

The U.S. Interstate Highway System cost $558 billion to construct (in 2021 dollars). Proponents claim it boosted the economy through faster transportation, and increased house prices and job creation. But, as I explain in my recent Substack article, it also had hugely negative effects, including destruction of the railroad industry, the demolition of vast amounts of homes and other property, and the decimation of inner-city economies.

But these are only the visible consequences. There are also unseen effects to consider. In the words of Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) in his famous work That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen: 

In the department of economy, an act, a habit, an institution, a law, gives birth not only to an effect, but to a series of effects. Of these effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself simultaneously with its cause—it is seen. The others unfold in succession—they are not seen. . . . It almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favorable, the ultimate consequences are fatal, and the converse. Hence it follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good, which will be followed by a great evil to come, while the true economist pursues a great good to come—at the risk of a small present evil.

What unseen effects did the “small present good” of a new road network mask? For one thing, there are all the lost innovations in transportation that might have happened had government roads not made driving between cities so easy. For example, prior to the explosion of government roadbuilding, American railroads had been improving their passenger services to attract passengers and compete with cars and airplanes. But, after the Second World War, their passenger numbers crashed as new, free-to-use roads sprung up everywhere. Railroad passenger numbers declined from 770 million to 220 million between 1946 and 1964 (government-built airports also contributed). Imagine the kind of high-speed trains and luxury travel America might have today if that hadn’t happened.

Another lost innovation is local aviation. With roads only going where it made economic sense to build them, airlines and aircraft manufacturers might have had an incentive to develop small, vertical-take-off planes that could connect provincial towns and villages to nearby cities, directly into downtown. Airlines could also use these aircraft to provide connections from city centers directly to the tarmac at their airports, making flying long-distance much easier.

Further, experimental technologies such as magnetic levitation trains, monorails, hovercraft, or autogyros might have become much more commonplace. For the “small present good” of the Interstate Highway System, America lost the “great good to come” of an untold wealth of innovations in transportation.

Another unseen effect is the lost opportunity for people and businesses to spend the money the government spent on those roads on something else. This money was taken from people and businesses through force via taxation. Without that, even if it wasn’t spent on other kinds of transportation, the money would have driven more economic growth, further enriching the potential innovations in technology and quality of living we might have seen. Maybe someone would have invented a new means of generating or storing power had they had that money and the commercial incentive to make a product with it. Someone else might have developed a new treatment for a major disease, saving lives and making it so there were even more productive people around to create more new things. Ultimately, transportation and daily life could have benefited in ways barely imaginable today.

Moreover, it’s not simply a question of the government using money that might otherwise have been used differently. It’s also a question of how well that money was used—how well the resulting product reflected what people actually needed. The planners of the Interstates and their urban equivalents (such as Robert Moses) didn’t need to—and indeed were unable to—balance the value of their proposals against economic indicators of whether there was sufficient demand on a particular route to justify a new road, given the existing roads, railroads, or air services, and such barriers as topography or people’s homes and property. As Ludwig Von Mises explains in Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition:

For the construction of a railroad from A to B, several routes are conceivable. Let us suppose that a mountain stands between A and B. The railroads can be made to run over the mountain, around the mountain, or, by way of a tunnel, through the mountain. In a capitalist society, it is a very easy matter to compute which line will prove the most profitable. One ascertains the cost involved in constructing each of the three lines and the differences in operating costs necessarily incurred by the anticipated traffic of each. From these quantities, it is not difficult to determine which stretch of road will be the most profitable. A [centrally planned] society could not make such calculations. For it would have no possible way of reducing to a uniform standard of measurement all the heterogeneous quantities and qualities of goods and services that here come into consideration.

These planners got funding for their roads based on the government’s decision that those roads were needed. They were not responding to market demand, but to the designs of a central planner or committee. 

If roadbuilding had been left to private interests, not only might the roads that were built have been better suited to people’s actual needs (and have avoided bulldozing vast areas of poor, inner-city communities), but they also wouldn’t have been built at all where there was no financial case for them. Instead, the market would have encouraged innovation to find alternative solutions for these situations. We can guess at some of the forms this may have taken, from high-speed trains to helicopter shuttles. But there are others we can barely conceive, because we were denied the chance to ever see them.

* * * * 

Thomas Walker-Werth is associate editor at The Objective Standard and a fellow at both Objective Standard Institute and Foundation for Economic Education (FEE). He is currently writing his first full-length book, 'Reason for Living: A Rational, Fact-Based Approach to Living Your Best Life.' See more of his work at reasonforliving.substack.com.

His post first appeared at FEE.Org.

 

MMT = Modern Monetary Theory, aka Marxist Monetary Theory. It's the ancient idea, now promoted by modern-day empty heads, that you can get something for nothing — in its MMT guise it's the notion that its power to print dollar bills gives governments a horn of plenty from which to buy votes. In this guest post Jonathan Newman explains to MMT promoter Stephanie Kelton that despite her earnest wishing to the contrary, money still doesn't grow on trees ...

MMT and Boiling Frogs

by Jonathan Newman

“Why do we borrow our own currency in the first place?”

MMT promoter Stephanie Kelton poses this question in her new documentary Finding the Money, and a clip of Jared Berstein’s fumbled response to the question has gone viral on social media. Bernstein is the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers to Biden, and so we would expect that he would have an articulate answer to Kelton’s question. He didn't.

Instead of trying to parse his response or explain why he fumbled, I want to provide an answer: the State borrows to expropriate real resources from the private, productive part of society.

When I made this claim on Twitter, one MMTer responded (somewhat) approvingly: “We all agree on this part. The question is how they do it and what the effect is. MMT gets that part right [and] Austrians get it wrong.”

So let me go into a bit more detail. The reason the State borrows money (money that it also has the power to tax and print) is so that it can balance the negative political consequences of its various methods of expropriation.

Murray Rothbard would take issue with the original question as soon as the third word, “we,” is uttered:

The useful collective term “we” has enabled an ideological camouflage to be thrown over the reality of political life. If “we are the government,” then anything a government does to an individual is not only just and untyrannical but also “voluntary” on the part of the individual concerned. If the government has incurred a huge public debt which must be paid by taxing one group for the benefit of another, this reality of burden is obscured by saying that “we owe it to ourselves.” (Anatomy of the State, p. 10)

Rothbard was responding to those who downplay the burden of government debt by over-aggregating the groups of winners and losers into one “we.” MMTers, on the other hand, go many strides further by claiming that public debt isn’t a burden at all. For them, public debt is private savings—they literally flip public debts and deficits upside down.

While they describe their framework as providing the “full picture” of government finance, they do not proceed in their analysis (at least not in sufficient detail) by asking what happens when the government pays the people holding the bonds. The money used to pay back the bondholder ultimately comes from taxing and printing, both of which involve expropriation from the private sector.

So MMT’s public-debt-as-private-savings falls apart with just one additional step of analysis. The closest Kelton gets to this insight in her book The Deficit Myth, is this: “In truth, paying interest on government bonds is no more difficult than processing any other payment. To pay the interest, the Federal Reserve simply credits the appropriate bank account.” Later, she describes that the only potential constraint is price inflation: “Every dollar that is paid in the form of interest becomes income to bondholders. If those interest payments become too large, the risk is that total spending could push the economy above its speed limit.”

And that’s the end of it. 

Paying bondholders might have negative consequences in the form of excessive price inflation. 

MMTers don’t connect debt service to their prior claims that public debt is actually private savings because it negates the alleged aggregate benefits of government bonds held by the public. Paying bondholders requires an expropriation from the productive part of society in the form of either taxes or diminished purchasing power, which means that in the aggregate public debt is not private savings.

They employ an individual bondholder’s perspective when it suits them, and employ an aggregate perspective when it suits them. They see, correctly, that holding a bond means that you can receive payments from Uncle Sam in the future, but then gloss over the costs of Uncle Sam servicing this debt. It’s a perfect example of a violation of what Henry Hazlitt described in 1946 as the art of economics: “The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate hut at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.”

In his seminal book Economics in One Lesson, Hazlitt relied on the work of Frédéric Bastiat from 1850. Despite its name, Modern Monetary Theory is full of old errors. The only thing new about it is the jargon they use to do something people have been doing for millennia: disguise the true costs of government expropriation.

Since the State has nothing and produces nothing, everything it does involves expropriation and distortion. The reason it employs a variety of methods of expropriation is because each one has negative political consequences. If any one method is employed “too much,” the politicians and bureaucrats who wield that particular weapon get blamed and can lose their position. Using one particular weapon “too much” makes the State’s expropriation obvious and risks revolt in either soft or hard forms.

Heavy taxation is unpopular. High interest rates are unpopular. Price inflation is unpopular. But if the State can blend taxing, borrowing, and printing in just the right amounts, then they can boil the frogs without them jumping out of the pot.

This insight reveals something about MMT. As much as its proponents brandish accounting tautologies and purely descriptive claims about government finance, in the end it is 100% political. Their framework is about giving the State maximum power—power to expropriate and power to override what would prevail in unhampered markets. This is on full display in their writings and in their new film. They want to revolutionise the way politicians and voters view money and debt for the sake of their progressive agenda. When it comes to climate change, inequality, healthcare for all, and all the other 'Green New Deal' issues, they want a world in which nobody asks about the costs.

* * * * * 

Dr. Jonathan Newman earned his PhD at Auburn University while a Research Fellow at the Mises Institute. He was the recipient of the 2021 Gary G. Schlarbaum Award to a Promising Young Scholar for Excellence in Research and Teaching. Previously, he was Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at Bryan College. He has published in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics and in volumes edited by Matthew McCaffrey and Per Bylund. His research focuses on Austrian economics, inflation and business cycles, and the history of economic thought. He has taught courses on Macroeconomics and Quantitative Economics: Uses and Limitations in the Mises Graduate School. He is the author of two children’s books: The Broken Window and Ludwig the Builder. 

His post first appeared at the Mises Wire.

Bastiat’s Buildings: "But will unplanned development be *beautiful*?"

Why are housing prices so high? 'Supply and demand' is true but misleading, because draconian regulation drastically constricts housing supply. In his exciting new nonfiction graphic novel, economist Bryan Caplan makes the economic and philosophical case for radical deregulation of the housing industry. Deregulation turns out to be a bona fide panacea: a large rise in housing supply would raise living standards, reduce inequality, increase social mobility, promote economic growth, reduce homelessness, increase birth rates, help the environment, and more. Combining stunning visuals and careful interdisciplinary research, 'Build, Baby, Build' takes readers to a world where people are free to build―and shows us how to get there.

But many NIMBys will still say 'there are beautiful old neighbourhoods we need to protect,' or 'valuable coastlines that we shouldn't pollute with any building.' In this excerpt, Caplan notes that today’s governments strictly regulate skyscrapers — but the beloved skyline of New York City was largely built under near-laissez-faire conditions. And that today’s planners strictly protect historic buildings, but deny us any chance at something new and unthought of (and instead mandate places like Albany and Manukau, while living in the leafy unplanned inner-city suburbs they now write rules to protect ... )

Bastiat’s Buildings: Why I Wrote a Graphic Novel about Housing Regulation

by Bryan Caplan

The Cato Institute has just published my Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation. The book is a non‐​fiction graphic novel. Think of it as the comic book equivalent of a documentary. Together with illustrator Ady Branzei, I combine words and pictures to give readers a tour of housing regulation, with a focus on how government restricts the construction industry, and what would happen if the restrictions were lifted.

About fifteen years ago, Larry Gonick’s Cartoon History of the Universe opened my eyes to the high potential of graphic non‐​fiction. Gonick’s books capitalise on the adage that “a picture is worth a thousand words” to teach history quickly. They use beauty and humour to hold readers’ attention. And though they look like comic books, they’re carefully researched.

In Build, Baby, Build, I try to emulate Gonick’s virtues. The book distills a vast empirical literature into a few critical lessons. Lessons like:

• US housing regulation roughly doubles the cost of housing.
• Besides making housing much cheaper, deregulation would increase productivity, equality, social mobility, environmental quality, fertility, and safety.
• The standard arguments in favour of regulation are both overstated and one‐​sided.

But what finally convinced me to make this book a non‐​fiction graphic novel was my realisation that what drives much, perhaps most, support for housing regulation is aesthetics. Economists focus on cost‐​benefit analysis, but normal people are more likely to ask themselves, “Will development be beautiful?” — then confidently answer, “Absolutely not.”

Faced with such attitudes, economists tend to facepalm in frustration. My reaction, though, is remember 19th‐​century French economist Frédéric Bastiat’s classic essay, “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” Writing in 1850, Bastiat explained that people focus on the obvious direct benefits of government, while ignoring the severe yet non‐​obvious harms. When government subsidises universities, for example, people rarely ponder, “What else could have been done with the money?” When government denies permission to build, similarly, we never actually see what would have been built if permission were granted. This makes it easy for critics to visualise the ugliest possible outcomes.

The epiphany that convinced me to write Build, Baby, Build: Instead of trying to argue people out of their aesthetic pessimism, I should use the graphic novel format to fight aesthetics with aesthetics — to show readers the beautiful unseen world that government forbids. And that’s why the fifth chapter of the book resurrects the great Bastiat as a co‐​narrator. After we explore his classic insight on “the seen versus the unseen,” Bastiat joins me on a guided tour through a deregulated world. Which lets me showcase a world that is not merely richer than the status quo, but more aesthetically pleasing as well.

For example, regulators often forbid construction in areas famous for their natural beauty. But why assume that construction would tarnish natural beauty rather than amplify it? Take a look and see for yourself:

To my eyes — and hopefully yours — the bottom panel is more, not less gorgeous than the top panel. And while you can fairly point out that these are fantasy drawings, they are inspired by real life. Who really aesthetically prefers the largely desolate California coastline to the awe‐​inspiring towns of Italy’s Amalfi Coast?

Or the decidedly pleasant but anadorned Bear Run River to the same river with a house by Frank Lloyd Wright showcasing its beauty, and now hosting hundreds of thousands of visitors every year.

The same lesson holds for so many of forms of housing regulation. Today’s governments strictly regulate skyscrapers. But the beloved skyline of New York City was largely built under near‐​laissez‐​faire conditions. Today’s governments strictly protect historic buildings. But construction of these historic buildings often began with the demolition of an earlier beloved building. The original Waldorf‐​Astoria Hotel really was destroyed to make room for the Empire State Building. That’s what I call building “the history of the future.”

Built in 1936

In a critique of my first book, philosophers Jon Elster and Hélène Landemore accuse me of being willing to use almost any rhetorical strategy to get my points across. While they overstate, they’re on to something. Once I’m convinced that my arguments are sound, I strive to sell them. Straightforward logic and evidence are fine, but so are thought experiments, appeals to common sense, humor, and beauty. 

False modesty aside, I think Build, Baby, Build is a beautiful book. If you like the visual samples I’ve shown you, I think you’ll agree.

* * * * 

Bryan Caplan is an American economist and author. Caplan is a professor of economics at George Mason University, research fellow at the Mercatus Center, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and former contributor to the Freakonomics blog and EconLog. He has published in the American Economic Review, the Economic Journal, the Journal of Law and Economics, Social Science Quarterly, the Journal of Public Economics, the Southern Economic Journal, Public Choice, and numerous other outlets. His book, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (2007), was published by Princeton University Press and named "the best political book this year" by the New York Times. Bryan posts frequently at his blog, Bet on It.

His post first appeared at the Cato at Liberty blog.

Buy his comic book at Amazon in both paperback and e-book.

"The State has two hands: a soft one to give and a hard one to remove. The softer the hand that gives, the harder the hand that removes."

"The State is not and cannot be one-handed. It has two hands, one to receive and the other to give; in other words, the rough hand and the gentle hand. The activity of the second is of necessity subordinate to the activity of the first....

    "You see that the gentle hand of The State, that sweet hand that gives and spreads benefits widely, will be fully occupied ... Might you perhaps be disposed to believe that this will be just as true of the rough hand that goes rummaging and rifling in our pockets?
    "Don’t you believe it! The courtiers of popularity would not be masters of their trade if they did not have the art of hiding an iron fist in a velvet glove."

~ Frederic Bastiat, from his essay 'The State' [the headline for this post is a popular paraphrase]

Have Argentine voters truly voted to overturn their destructive economic past, and to rediscover liberty? As these four guest posts point out (including one from Milei's adviser Jesús Huerta de Soto), President-Elect Javier Milei has the credentials, and has offered as much liberty as (it seems) the Argentinian people are willing to accept. Will it be a revolution of liberty? History will only tell....

Have Argentine Voters FINALLY Chosen Liberty? Time Will Tell

Guest post by Octavio Bermudez

A historical event has taken place, not only for the libertarian movement but for the history of the world. The first libertarian president has been elected in none other country than Argentina.

The Argentinian people faced a dichotomy, either continue with the socialist road to serfdom embodied by the ruling Peronist regime or adopt a radical change towards liberty, the leader of said change being Javier Milei, self-proclaimed Rothbardian and anarcho-capitalist. Finally, with more than 55 percent of the votes, Argentinians elected Milei as their new president.

Argentina’s situation is critical and the people know it. 142,7 percent accumulated inflation this year, 40 percent of the population under poverty levels and at least 80 percent of public debt in terms of GDP, just to mention some of the main economic problems. Crime -which is rampant in many parts of the country- is the other main concern of the public that Milei has had to address in his campaign. He has done so mainly through his vice-president Victoria Villarruel, expert on defense and security matters.

Argentinians chose a free market path, a liberty road towards prosperity and justice.

Now, besides the celebration and enthusiasm that such an occasion merits, we libertarians (especially Argentinian libertarians) must draw upon the wisdom of the British economist Alfred Marshall who said that one must stay on our toes to keep our heart warm. Milei has introduced many libertarians’ ideas to Argentinian political discourse but not all of them have been received favorably by the general public or the media. Milei has had to engage in retreatism due to backlash regarding some free market-oriented ideas such as a voucher system for education, eliminating gun regulations, 100 percent bank reserves and privatising both education and the health system.

Milei has offered as much liberty as the Argentinian people are willing to accept. Socialist and collectivist ideals still prevail in major parts of the population, it would be an error to affirm that even half of the electors that choose Milei are full libertarians. Milei’s upcoming administration will be a test, if it succeeds in pushing for a libertarian program, then more people will rally behind the Gadsden flag and Argentina will serve as a beacon of freedom in Latin America.

Even more important is the cultural shift that has taken place due to Milei’s political activism. Books by the Austrian School of Economics and libertarians can be found in any bookstore (before Milei, those works were harder to access, almost clandestine) and liberty friendly universities and programs are now more frequented. Being a classical liberal or a libertarian is no longer a cultural crime in Argentina.

A libertarian hardcore has been formed and continues to grow, they are the vanguard of the movement, convincing lay people to support Milei’s reforms. True enough, many times they may not convince everyone to embrace libertarianism but at least they persuade them not to oppose it. That’s how the libertarian spirit in Argentina can grow.

Milei’s plan is a moderate one if seen through ideal lenses but as I have already pointed out, it is the most libertarian program that could be advanced upon without being ostracised by the public and mainstream media. Compromises were made after the general elections. The Libertarian-Republican alliance was formed to confront the Peronist regime in the ballot boxes, Milei allied himself with his former competitor Patricia Bullrich and former president Mauricio Macri to rally the necessary votes to win in the ballotage against the leftist Peronist candidate Sergio Massa. The alliance succeeded in calling for the votes necessary to win. It was an epic campaign, thousands attended Milei’s rallies crying out “Liberty!” In many parts of the country, shouts of joy and relief were heard when the Peronist candidate recognized his defeat on live TV. I of course joined the people in the cries for victory.

Bearing in mind the compromises made in the alliance to defeat Peronism, the most crucial libertarian proposals such as slashing public spending and taxes, deregulating the economy and labor market, free trade, privatization of public companies (like the oil company “YPF” and the state airline “Aerolineas Argentinas”) and abolition of the central bank are going to be implemented, at least on paper. Milei, although an anarcho-capitalist has had to moderate in order to gain office, once taking the reins of the state we shall see how much of the freedom program he proposes is implemented.

Will it be a revolution of liberty? History will only tell.

The Economics of Javier Milei

Guest post by David Howden

The election of Javier Milei brings the first libertarian/anarchocapitalist world leader in history. Although prolific in the Spanish-speaking world, English speakers know very little of the Argentine´s views. The fact that he heads the Libertarian Party of Argentina certainly hints at what direction his politics run.

Earlier this year, Philipp Bagus and I edited a two-volume book in honour of Jesús Huerta de Soto [see Bagus's and de Soto's post below.]. Milei wrote a chapter entitled “Capitalism, Socialism, and the Neoclassical Trap.” To my knowledge, it is Milei's only writing made directly in English for an English audience.

If anyone doubts Milei´s credentials, the chapter is a scathing critique of neoclassical growth theory. It also offers a full-blown Rothbardian alternative. Mises's work on interventionism and Hayek's knowledge problem form the basis of his analysis.

Milei identifies a crucial rationalistic error in neoclassical economic analysis:

Note that whenever situations arise that do not match the mathematical structure [modelled by the neoclassical analysis], they are considered “market failures,” and that is where the government appears to correct those failures. However, to successfully solve this problem, it is assumed that the government knows the utility function of all individuals (preferences) for the past, the present, the future, the time preference rate and knows the state of the current technology and all future enhancements, along with their respective amortization rates. In short, to solve the problem in question, the government should be able to master a significant amount of information that, by definition, individuals themselves ignore or are not able to handle, which exposes that the idea of the welfare state acting on the market to correct failures is a contradiction.

Furthermore, Milei concludes that:

when it is made clear that the correction of market failures by the government as proposed in the neoclassical paradigm is conceptually invalid, taking into consideration that the only ones who can internalize those effects are individuals, once the artificial separation of decision-making processes is eliminated, there will no longer be any reason for government intervention, which will not only stop the socialist advance but will also allow us to counterattack.

This is not your grandfather´s South American leader who politicises under the influence of neoclassical "Chicago Boy" economists. Milei is a full-blown libertarian. His Libertarian Party won yesterday´s run-off election by carrying nineteen of twenty-two Argentine states and 56% of the popular vote. After decades of socialism, a plurality of Argentine voters must surely be fed up with it.

A Statement on Javier Milei from Spanish Libertarians 

Guest post by Jesús Huerta de Soto and Philipp Bagus

Senior Mises Institute Fellow Jesús Huerta de Soto and Fellow Philipp Bagus write:

In our own name and in the name of the rest of the Spanish libertarians and anarcho-capitalists we want to send Javier Milei our most enthusiastic congratulations. Today is a historic day for liberty only comparable to the fall of the Berlin Wall and communism. For the first time in history an anarcho-capitalist has won the Presidency of a country as important as Argentina. This shows that in the end the ideas of liberty against statism, left or right, end up prevailing. Mises, Hayek, Rothbard and the great thinkers and theoreticians of liberty planted the ideas that Milei have had the enormous merit of making attractive to the broadest layers of the population and, especially, to the most vulnerable who are always the main victims of the manipulations of socialists and interventionists of all stripes. We are now advising him closely especially on the necessity to establish a 100 per cent reserve ratio on his dollarisation process to avoid any new "corralitos." Viva la libertad carajo.

Milei's Long-Term Victory Depends on Him Winning in the Battle of Ideas

Guest post by Ryan McMaken

Last Sunday, Javier Milei was elected president of Argentina by a comfortable margin, with 56 percent of the vote. He will be sworn in as president on December 10.

Over the past year, however, Milei has made a name for himself as an extremely vocal critic of socialism, central banks, and many types of government intervention in general. He has become memorable for fiery commentary condemning the Left's ideology and tactics while expressing an interest in immediate (i.e., not gradualist) change. He has said he seeks to abolish Argentina's central bank and introduce the US dollar as the country's dominant currency.

His fiscal policy is far more in the free-market direction than any other head of state in a country as large as Argentina (with 46 million residents). Milei has expressed admiration for the work of Murray Rothbard, F.A. Hayek, and a variety of economists who are more centrist than Rothbard and Hayek, but which we might reasonably describe as more-or-less free market. Moreover, Milei self-identifies as a supporter of the Austrian School of economics.

If Milei remains committed to reining in (or abolishing) the central bank, lowering taxes, and cutting government spending, Milei has the opportunity to push through real economic reforms that could provide relief to the beleaguered Argentine middle class. These people have suffered greatly under decades of easy-money-induced price inflation, and an ever-growing burden of taxation and regulation.

Many libertarian supporters of Milei (both inside and outside the country) have responded to Milei's candidacy with celebratory enthusiasm. Some have declared him the next Ron Paul, and many others seem to assume that his election will translate into actual implementation of his stated policies. That could happen, but unfortunately, the hard part has only begun.

It is entirely possible that Milei is sincere in his stated goals and in his apparent commitment to radical opposition against the disastrous status quo in Argentina. If so, that is excellent news. After Milei's election comes the real test, however. Assuming that Milei is sincere right now, that doesn't mean he won't later be unwilling to carry out such policies if they prove to be unpopular as his administration unfolds. Given his short history of serving in political office, we have little to suggest a likely outcome one way or another.

Another possibility is that we may find that he lacks the political skill necessary to harness and exploit what free-market sentiment in the country presently exists. He will have to do this to actually push through any of these reforms. What political skills are necessary? Milei must be able to convince a sizeable portion of the voting public that his policies will work or are working. This doesn't necessarily mean a majority have to be enthusiastically with him at all times. But he at least has to be able to use public opinion to pressure the legislature and powerful interest groups. Since Milei will not be a dictator as president, he will be forced to somehow squeeze concessions out of countless socialists and interventionists in government who quite literally hate him and his policies.

This is not just a problem in countries with democratic institutions. Not even dictators can simply enact radical policies at will. As absolutist monarchs and countless military dictators have found in their days, chief executives meet fierce opposition from entrenched interests within the state in all types of regimes—except, perhaps, in fully totalitarian ones. The sorts of reforms Milei wants will hurt many interest groups who have benefited from inflation and high government spending. The productive class may suffer greatly under these policies, but there are also millions of politically active voters who believe they benefit from Peronist-style economic policy. Those who think they stand to lose from reform will resist.

No Victory Is Possible without Progress in the Battle of Ideas

For the sake of argument, however, let's say that Milei is both sincere in his views and is also among the most skilled politician we've seen in decades. Let's say he is skilled at the tricks successful politicians employ to confound adversaries and build coalitions.

Ultimately, not even these skills can bring about the successful implementation of true radical free-market reforms if Milei and his supporters lose the battle of ideas in the meantime. Milei can only succeed if the public agrees that Milei's policies are "worth it." After all, as Milei tries to push through reforms such as tax cuts or limits on monetary inflation, his political opponents will flood the media with explanations of how Milei is hurting ordinary people, destroying the economy, or is somehow "a threat to democracy." Milei's intellectual opponents will trot out economists to explain how high taxes and inflation are actually good. The public will hear from various "experts" about how Milei is wrong, and that the usual socialists and interventionists have it right.

These tactics are especially dangerous in the short term because efforts by Milei to cut spending and rein in price inflation will be sure to cause plenty of short-term pain in the economy. Cuts in government spending and an end to easy monetary policy tend to pop financial bubbles and drive government-dependent industries into decline. Surging unemployment results in the short term as bankruptcies spike. That, of course, is bad news for any elected politician.

Unless the public can be convinced that this pain will lead to better days ahead, the public is likely to abandon Milei and his policies in short order. Then, four years form now, the Peronists will return to power and the status quo will proceed as if nothing ever happened.

The only antidote to this is to relentlessly fight the battle of ideas in academia, in the media, and with the public. Free-market intellectuals, activists, columnists, and speakers must never tire of endlessly recapitulating the truth about freedom, free markets, and peace. So long as a sizeable portion of the public thinks the Peronists "get it right," no free-market reformer can win.

After all, the only reason any people—including Milei—quote Austrian School economists or appreciate the wisdom of free-market classical liberals is because those people learned those ideas from some teacher, publication, or organisation. Without scholars like Rothbard, Hayek, and the others that Milei says he admires, there would be no Milei campaign as we know it. Without organizations like the Mises Institute, it is a safe bet we would not be hearing Milei call for the abolition of a central bank. Without hardcore classical liberals like Mises, Rothbard, Hayek, Molinari, and Bastiat, there would be virtually no one, anywhere, calling for radical cuts to taxes, spending, and state power overall.

Those who wage these battles of ideas provide the foundation for the political movements that build upon the ideas. Yet, these movements can only succeed if the public learns—to at least some extent—why fiat money is bad, why state power is a problem, and why high taxes are disastrous. The public doesn't need to know the technical details behind these arguments, of course, and is probably not interested. But the public must believe on some level that freedom and free markets are good things.

It remains to be seen if the voting public is willing to give Milei a chance to try beyond the very short term. Much of that will depend on whether or not Argentine libertarians have managed to sufficiently preserve or advance some lingering measure of pro-liberty sentiment. If they have not, Milei will fail politically, regardless of his political skills. If that happens, free-market activists and intellectuals will have to simply keep up the fight until the political situation again favours a viable free-market candidate.

The situation is no different for those of us in the rest of the world.

* * * * 

CONTRIBUTORS:

Octavio Bermudez is an Argentinian student and Austro-libertarian interested in Austrian economics, political philosophy, and history.

David Howden is Chair of the Department of Business and Economics, and professor of economics, at Saint Louis University at its Madrid campus.

Jesús Huerta de Soto is a Spanish economist of the Austrian School. He is a professor in the Department of Applied Economics at King Juan Carlos University of Madrid, Spain and a Senior Fellow at the Mises Institute. His website is here.

Philipp Bagus is professor at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos. He is a Fellow of the Mises Institute, an IREF scholar, and the author of numerous books.

Ryan McMaken is an economist and writer living in Colorado where he has taught political science since 2004. He has degrees in economics and political science from the University of Colorado and is an Associated Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama.

These posts first appeared at the Power & Market blog.

Revealed Preference

 

The single-most-important thing to learn from economics is not supply and demand. It's how to fall in love with traffic jams.

Or as Frederic Bastiat put it ...

“All men’s impulses, when motivated by legitimate self-interest, fall into a harmonious social pattern.”

This, as it happens, is one of the most important lessons a rational economics can teach philosophers: what Bastiat called Economic Harmonies, and Ayn Rand student George Reisman calls The General Gain from the Existence of Others. That what characterises human interaction, when self-interest is properly defined, is not conflict but harmony.

That's the single-most-important thing. 

The single-most-useful thing however is something called Revealed Preference, a.k.a. Demonstrated Preference. 

In essence this means that, whatever they may say to someone wielding a clipboard, a person's preferences are deducible from how (and to what end) they have chosen to act. 

What this means in practice is that, no matter what they may purport to believe is important, their actions reveal (or demonstrate) what it is that they truly value. (That is, what they actually do act to gain and/or keep.)

Let's say someone tells you that they really, really, really want to study for a particular course, and they would love to do so, but they just can't afford it. And then you learn that they've just bought a new car, or an overseas holiday. What this reveals is that the holiday (or the new car) are more valuable to them than the course of study that might change their life. (So maybe take off at least two of their 'reallys.')

Or that they love live music, yet never go to a concert or gig. Or they tell you they love to read books -- but their home contains none, and whenever you visit the television is on. Or that they love a particular musician/writer/painter/publication, and yet lift not a finger to help them when they (say) launch a give-a-little page to keep their career and their work going . . .

You can choose your own examples. You'll have plenty. 

No, their actions don't tell you about every preference a person harbours within (I might nurse a strong desire for chocolate ice cream but, if an ice-cream vendor isn't conveniently close you may never know. Or I may love a particular musician's work, and yet play them only rarely in order to keep their few works fresh). But it does tell you if there's a difference between what they say they value, and what they really do.

In other words, it tells you more about the real person, behind their public veneer.

This, I submit, is the single-most-useful thing about economics. Because it tells us something important about real people.

How valuable is that?

"If that is not a miracle, then nothing is."

"Adam Smith’s 'invisible hand' is certainly the most wondrous, astounding and marvelous concept in all of economics, and there are quite a few doozies in the dismal science. I go further than that. The invisible hand ranks as high or higher, in terms of pure beauty, than even the smile of a baby, the music of Mozart, or the most beautiful sunset that ever took place. In terms of what it means for our potential prosperity, it has no upper bounds whatsoever.
    "Frederic Bastiat perched on the top of the Eiffel Tower, looked down at the people scurrying around far down below him, and marvelled at the fact that Paris Gets Fed, without any central direction at all. This was the invisible hand (that is, free enterprise) at work; you can’t see this 'hand,' but you can discern its effects.
    "We all marvel at the teamwork of the championship basketball team, the winner of the eight-person shell in the regatta, a 100-member orchestra playing 64th notes without a hair’s breadth of discord. But this pales into total insignificance compared to the teamwork made at least potentially possible by the invisible hand; all eight billion of us cooperating producing goods and services and thus fighting poverty. These other accomplishments have a coach, a coxswain, or a conductor. In contrast, when the human race bans protectionism and regulation, the invisible hand will take over without any central direction at all. If that is not a miracle, then nothing is."

~ Walter Block, from his article 'Seeing the Invisible Hand'

Victims of Lawful Plunder

 

"It is in the nature of men to react against the injustice of which they are the victims. Therefore when plunder is organised by law for the profit of the classes that make it, all the plundered classes attempt to have a say in the making of the laws, by either peaceful or revolutionary means. Depending on the level of enlightenment which they have attained, these classes may set themselves two very different aims when they seek their political rights in this way; they may either wish to stop legal plunder or they may aspire to take part in it."

~ Frederic Bastiat, in translation, from his short book The Law

 

"Society is nothing but the combination of individuals for cooperative effort." Meaning, we generally gain from the existence of others

“In the state of isolation, our wants exceed our productive capacities. By virtue of exchange, our productive capacities come to exceed our immediate wants. Implicit in exchange is division of labour...”

~ Frederic Bastiat, from his Economic Harmonies

“The individual lives and acts within society. But society is nothing but the combination of individuals for cooperative effort. It exists nowhere else than in the actions of individual men.”

~ Ludwig Von Mises, from, his book Human Action

“When you live in a rational society, where men are free to trade, you receive an incalculable bonus: the material value of your work is determined not only by your effort, but by the effort of the best productive minds who exist in the world around you. When you work in a modern factory, you are paid, not only for your labour, but for all the productive genius which has made that factory possible...”

~ Ayn Rand from her essay 'What is Capitalism?'

“Economic competition is not a process by which the success of the biologically fit brings about the extermination of the biologically weak. On the contrary, it is a process by which the success of better products and more efficient methods of production promotes the survival and well-being of all. It is a process in which the success of the more able raises the productivity and improves the standard of living of the less able....

    "So far from being the law of the jungle, the freedom of economic competition emerges as the true principle of the universal brotherhood of man.”

~ George Reisman, from his book Capitalism

"Economic competition is one of the unfortunate accidents of terminology; what it means is simply the freedom of individuals to cooperate through exchange with the others who offer (or accept) the best terms."

~ Frank Knight, from his 1944 lecture “The Planful Act: The Possibilities and Limitations of Collective Rationality,” as reprinted in Knight’s 1947 collection, Freedom and Reform [hat tip Cafe Hayek]

“The very fact that an exchange takes place is proof that there must necessarily be profit in it for both the contracting parties; otherwise it would not be made. Hence, every exchange represents two gains for humanity.”

- Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, from his Le commerce et le gouvernement considérés relativement l'un à l'autre

"When plunder becomes a way of life..."

 

"When plunder has become a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that authorises it and a moral code that glorifies it."

~ Frederic Bastiat, from the essay 'The Physiology of Plunder', in his book Economic Sophisms [hat tip Ron Manners]

What's 'not seen' by social engineers is generally even more important than what is, explains Don Boudreaux in this Guest Post. Social engineers see only a relatively few surface phenomena, he observes, and remain blind to the astonishing complexity that is ever-churning beneath the surface that goes to create those surface phenomena. They need to turn off their tendency to push their simple coercive solutions at the expense of the freedom that would otherwise solve them.

'Turn off that tendency to coerce,' says Don Boudreaux

Beware the Allure of Simple ‘Solutions’

by Don Boudreaux

The attitudes and opinions of today’s so-called “elite” – those public-opinion formers who Deirdre McCloskey calls “the clerisy” – are childish. And not in a good way. Most journalists and writers working for most premier media and entertainment companies, along with most professors and public intellectuals, think, talk, and write about society with less insight than the average toddler.

This sad truth is masked by the one feature that does distinguish the clerisy from young children: verbal virtuosity. Yet beneath the fine words, beautiful phrases, arresting metaphors, and affected allusions lies a notable immaturity of thought. Every social and economic problem is believed to have a solution, and that solution is almost always superficial.

Unlike children, adults understand that living life well begins with accepting the inescapability of trade-offs. Contrary to what you might have heard, you cannot “have it all.” You cannot have more of this thing unless you’re willing to have less of that other thing. And what’s true for you as an individual is true for any group of individuals. We cannot support governments artificially raising the cost of producing and using carbon fuels, for example, unless we are willing to pay higher prices at the pump and, thus, have less income to spend on acquiring other goods and services. Equally, we cannot use money creation to ease the pain today of COVID lockdowns without enduring the greater pain tomorrow of inflation.

While children stomp their little feet in protest when confronted with the need to make trade-offs, adults accept the necessity of trade-offs. Except, of course, for those childish adults who are paid-up members of the clerisy.

No less importantly, adults -- real adults, those who understand this point -- are not beguiled by the superficial. They understand that not everything immediate noticeable is always important, and that -- all too frequently -- it's the things we don't see that are more important. Especially when the latter cause the former.

Pay close attention to how the clerisy (who are mostly, although not exclusively, Progressives) propose to ‘solve’ almost any problem, real or imaginary. You’ll discover that the proposed ‘solution’ is superficial; it’s rooted in the naïve assumption that social reality beyond what is immediately observable either doesn’t exist or is unaffected by attempts to rearrange surface phenomena. In the clerisy’s view, the only reality that matters is the reality that is easily seen and seemingly easily manipulated -- and manipulated, always and everywhere, with coercion. The clerisy’s proposed ‘solutions,’ therefore, involve simply rearranging, or attempting to rearrange, surface phenomena by means of the government's guns.

• Do some people use their own guns to murder other people? Yes, sadly. The clerisy’s superficial ‘solution’ to this real problem is to outlaw private guns (which ignores that this tends to leave guns in the hands of outlaws). 
• Do some people have substantially higher net financial worths than other people? Yes. The clerisy’s juvenile ‘solution’ to this fake problem is to heavily tax the rich and transfer the proceeds to the less rich (ignoring that there are too few rich to make the coercive transfer worthwhile, while reducing incentives for the less rich to get rich themselves). 
• Are some workers paid wages that are too low to support a modern family? Yes. The clerisy’s simplistic ‘solution’ to this fake problem – “fake” because most workers earning such low wages are not heads of households – is to have government prohibit the payment of wages below some stipulated minimum (ignoring that this tends to price marginal workers out of all employment altogether).
• Do some people suffer substantial property damage, or even loss of life, because of hurricanes, droughts, and other bouts of severe weather? Yes. The clerisy’s lazy ‘solution’ to this real problem focuses on changing the weather by reducing the emissions of an element, carbon, that is now (a bit too simplistically) believed to heavily determine the weather.

I could go on ... and I will.

• Do prices of many ‘essential’ goods and services rise significantly in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters? Yes. The clerisy’s counterproductive ‘solution’ to this fake problem (“counterproductive” and “fake” because these high prices accurately reflect and signal underlying economic realities) is to prohibit the charging and payment of these high prices. 
• When real inflationary pressures build up because of excessive monetary growth, are these pressures vented in the form of rising prices? Yes indeed. The clerisy’s infantile ‘solution’ to the very real problem of inflation is to blame it on greed while raising taxes on profits.
• Is the SARS-CoV-2 virus contagious and potentially dangerous to humans? Yes. The clerisy’s simple-minded ‘solution’ to this real problem is to forcibly prevent people from mingling with each other.
• Do many youngsters still not receive schooling of minimum acceptable quality? Yes. The clerisy’s lazy ‘solution’ to this real problem is to give pay raises to teachers and spend more money on school administrators.
• Do some American workers lose jobs when American consumers buy more imports? Yes. The clerisy’s ‘solution’ is to obstruct consumers’ ability to buy imports. Are some people bigoted and beset with irrational dislike or fear of blacks, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals? Yes. The clerisy’s ‘solution’ to this real problem is to outlaw “hate” and to compel bigoted persons to behave as if they aren’t bigoted.
• Do many persons who are eligible to vote in political elections refrain from voting? Yes. The ‘solution’ favoured by at least some of the clerisy to this fake problem – “fake” because in a free society each person has a right to refrain from participating in politics – is to make voting mandatory.

The above list of simplistic and superficial ‘solutions’ to problems real and imaginary can easily be expanded.

The clerisy, mistaking words for realities, assumes that success at verbally describing realities more to their liking proves that these imagined realities can be made real by merely rearranging the relevant surface phenomena. Members of the clerisy ignore unintended consequences. And they overlook the fact that many of the social and economic realities that they abhor are the result, not of villainy or of correctible imperfections, but of complex trade-offs made by countless individuals.

Social engineering appears doable only to those persons who, seeing only a relatively few surface phenomena, are blind to the astonishing complexity that is ever-churning beneath the surface to create those surface phenomena. To such persons, social reality appears as it does to a simple child: simple and easily manipulated to achieve whatever are the desires that motivate the manipulators.

The clerisy’s ranks are filled overwhelmingly with simple-minded people who mistake their felicity with words and their good intentions for serious thinking. They convey to each other, and to the unsuspecting public, the appearance of being deep thinkers while seldom thinking with more sophistication and nuance than is on display in every classroom of toddlers today.

* * * * 

Don Boudreaux is a senior fellow with American Institute for Economic Research and with the F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University; a Mercatus Center Board Member; and a professor of economics and former economics-department chair at George Mason University. He is the author of the books The Essential Hayek, Globalization, Hypocrites & Half-Wits, and his articles appear in such publications as the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, US News & World Report as well as numerous scholarly journals. 

He writes a blog called Cafe Hayek and a regular column on economics for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. Boudreaux earned a PhD in economics from Auburn University and a law degree from the University of Virginia.

A version of his post first appeared at the American Institute for Economic Research blog.