Mark Cain

Oxford Brookes University, Department of History, Philosophy and Religion, Department Member

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I have worked at Oxford Brookes University since 2002 and am currently a Reader in Philosophy and Programme Lead for Philosophy and Religion. Prior to coming to Brookes I held a Leverhulme Special Research Fellowship at the University of Nottingham (2000-2002) and taught at Birkbeck College and King's College London (1996-200) after completing a PhD at The University of St Andrews (1991-1996).

My research interests are in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Mind and Language. In particular, I am interested in understanding the process by which humans develop from a state of seeming ignorance at birth to one in which they are able to speak a language and grasp a vast array of concepts only a few years later. I have published two books, namely:
(2002) Fodor: Mind Language and Philosophy. Cambridge: Polity.
(2015) The Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Polity.

I am currently working on a book entitled Innateness and Cognition that is to be published by Routledge in their New Problems of Philosophy series.

I am also interested in how school children can benefit from philosophy. I run a programme that places Brookes undergraduate students in schools in the Oxford area to lead philosophy sessions and I offer training to teachers who wish to explore how to introduce philosophy into their classrooms.

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Concept Learning and Psychological Essentialism

In this article I will evaluate the popular view that we acquire most of our concepts by means of... more In this article I will evaluate the popular view that we acquire most of our concepts by means of learning. I will do this through an examination of Jerry Fodor's dissenting views and those of some of his most persistent and significant critics. Although I will be critical of Fodor's central claim that it is impossible to learn a concept, I will ultimately conclude that we should be more sceptical than is normal about the power of learning when it comes to concept acquisition, particularly with respect to natural kind concepts. Central to my argument for this conclusion will be an examination of the bearings of psychological essentialism on concept acquisition.

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Conventions and their Role in Language

Two of the most fundamental questions about language are these: what are languages?; and, what is... more Two of the most fundamental questions about language are these: what are languages?; and, what is it to know a given language? Many philosophers who have reflected on these questions have presented answers that attribute a central role to conventions. In one of its boldest forms such a view runs as follows. Languages are either social entities constituted by networks of social conventions or abstract objects where when a particular community speaks a given language they do so in virtue of the conventions operative within that community. Consequently, for an individual to know a given language is for them to be party to the relevant conventions. Call this view conventionalism. In this article my aim is to evaluate conventionalism. I will argue that although there are linguistic conventions and that they do play an important role in language development and communication conventionalism should be rejected in favour of a more psychologistically orientated position. the conventions operative within that community. Consequently, for an individual to know a given language is for them to be party to the relevant conventions. For the purposes of this article I will call this view conventionalism. Conventionalism has had many prominent advocates including David Lewis, Paul Grice, Michael Dummett, Ruth Garrett Millikan and Michael Devitt. Yet despite this popularity not all theorists of language wish to endorse the conventionalist position. One prominent line of opposition has come from Noam Chomsky and his followers and another from Donald Davidson.

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Essentialism, Externalism and Human Nature

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Linguistics, Psychology and the Scientific Study of Language

In this paper I address the issue of the subject matter of linguistics. According to the prominen... more In this paper I address the issue of the subject matter of linguistics. According to the prominent Chomskyan view linguistics is the study of the language faculty, a component of the mind-brain, and is therefore a branch of cognitive psychology. In his recent book Ignorance of Language Michael Devitt attacks this psychologistic conception of linguistics. I argue that the prominent Chomskyan objections to Devitt's position are not decisive as they stand. However, Devitt's position should ultimately be rejected as there is nothing outside of the mind of a typical speaker that could serve to fix determinate syntactic rules of her language or constitute the supervenience base of her connection to any such rules.

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Concept Learning and Psychological Essentialism

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Conventions and their Role in Language

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Essentialism, Externalism and Human Nature

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Linguistics, Psychology and the Scientific Study of Language

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Mark Cain

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