Pettit argues that republican freedom is feasible; I argue here that it is impossible. For the pe... more Pettit argues that republican freedom is feasible; I argue here that it is impossible. For the people to be free from domination by the government, they must have the power to resist it. But if they have this power, they must also have the power to dominate any individual. There is thus a contradiction at the heart of Pettit's republicanism: the citizens must be powerful, but they also must not be. Individual citizens are dominated either by the state or by the people. Republicanism has traditionally emphasised the necessity of civic virtue. Although parts of Pettit's work suggest that he endorses this view, he cannot do so consistently. His conception of freedom as non-domination allows him to give at most a contingent, instrumental role to civic virtue. He must reject any stronger reliance: civic virtue must not be necessary for freedom. For if one must rely on others' virtue to keep them from restricting one's freedom, one would then be subject to another's will and so dominated. Instead, institutions must ensure that individuals are free. My critique vindicates the traditional view. The structure of the paper is as follows. I outline Pettit's republicanism, identifying some central claims (§1). I then present two cases that-if they are both instances of domination, as I argue-entail that citizens are always un-free (§2). I develop the objection by rebutting possible replies, showing that Pettit is committed to the possibility of what I term 'polyadic' domination (§ §3-4). In conclusion, I distinguish my objection from other critiques, and defend the traditional republican view that civic virtue is necessary for freedom (§5). 1. Freedom as non-domination The case for republicanism is often made by appeal to this example: Master-Slave A benevolent Master allows her Slave to do as he wants. He does so but only by her leave. This shows that non-interference is not extensionally equivalent to non-domination, and suggests that the latter is a more important form of freedom than the former. Suppose a person, A, has a choice among various options. On Pettit's account, A enjoys freedom as non-interference-liberal freedom-if her choice is unrestricted. That is, if A decided to take one of those options, she would be able to; and there is no other agent, B, who has restricted the choice, or is likely to restrict it, by removing options or attaching a penalty to any. A enjoys freedom as non-domination-republican freedom-to the extent that there is no B who has a power of interfering in her choice in a way that is not controlled by A. B's power of interference is controlled by A if it can be exercised only on terms imposed by A; that is, and in Pettit's formulation, in a direction that A has the influence to determine. 1 According to Pettit's account, liberal freedom does not entail republican freedom. Nor does republican freedom entail liberal freedom. My outline of his theory summarises the argument for and significance of these central non-entailment claims. In outlining his theory, I
In 2011, after their base in the Helmand River valley had come under attack, a patrol of Royal Ma... more In 2011, after their base in the Helmand River valley had come under attack, a patrol of Royal Marines Commandos found a severely wounded Taliban fighter. Gunfire from a supporting Apache attack helicopter had left the fighter with a sucking chest wound and unable to defend himself. The prisoner was dragged to where he and the patrol could not be seen by the Apache or the ground-based radar system at the base. Sgt Alexander Blackman-referred to as 'Marine A' at the subsequent trial-then shot him in the chest with his pistol. Blackman was convicted of murder by a court martial in 2013. At the time of writing he is serving an 8-year prison sentence. Nigel Biggar's In Defence of War is a stimulating read, synthetic in scope, and is a robust re-articulation of the just war tradition. In particular, Biggar defends the Grotian and Augustinian claim that war is sometimes properly retributive (see
We outline a narrative of how attempts to solve the principal-agent problem for financial manager... more We outline a narrative of how attempts to solve the principal-agent problem for financial managers have eroded moral restraint, leading to fewer principled agents. Bonus-based compensation inspired by Jensen and Meckling (1976) appears to have contributed to unfavourable attitudes, through motivational crowding out (Simpson, 2016). We classify the moral restraint of earlier times as either 'moral optimization'-standard utility theory appended with other-regarding preferences (Becker, 1981)-or as 'moral prioritization'-a commitment to not doing wrong (Sen, 1976). Disciplining unethical managers in a post deregulation world by competition policy runs into serious practical difficulties, rendering it necessary to address their moral motivations. In contrast, trustworthiness sustains trust.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (‘LAWS’) are here. Technological development will see them becom... more Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (‘LAWS’) are here. Technological development will see them become widespread in the near future. This is in a matter of years rather than decades. When the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meets on 10-14th November 2014, well-considered guidance for a decision on the general policy direction for LAWS is clearly needed. While there is widespread opposition to LAWS—or ‘killer robots’, as they are popularly called—and a growing campaign advocates banning them outright, we argue the opposite.
Testimony is a central theme in John's Gospel and he has a developed view on how it works. This p... more Testimony is a central theme in John's Gospel and he has a developed view on how it works. This paper makes two contributions. First, I show the complexity and sophistication with which John handles different kinds of testimony in his narrative; this constitutes a category of evidence for the centrality of testimony not noted hitherto. Second, I address the central puzzle, namely the prima facie contradiction between 5:31 and 8:14. At issue is whether Jesus' testimony about himself requires corroborating testimony for it rationally to be believed. I argue that 8:14 has interpretative priority: according to John, no such corroboration is required.
Trust is central to our social lives in both epistemic and practical ways. Often, it is rational ... more Trust is central to our social lives in both epistemic and practical ways. Often, it is rational only given evidence for trustworthiness, and with that evidence is made available by communication. New technologies are changing our practices of communication, enabling increasing rich and diverse ways of 'being there', but at a distance. This paper asks: how does telepresent communication support evidenceconstrained trust? In answering it, I reply to the leading pessimists about the possibility of the digital mediation of trust, Philip Pettit and Hubert Dreyfus. I also rebut Media Richness Theory, which proposes a linear relationship between the volume of mediated information and the quality of communication. Positively, I develop a speech-act theory of digitally mediated communication, drawing on Austen's identification of the illocutionary act. The choice of a particular technology of communication constitutes part of what is communicated, including a setting of the social 'frame', and thus the possibilities for trust to be sustained or eroded. How something is said is part of what it is that is said.
Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially import... more Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one's interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possession of moral character is a plausible explanation of some socially important instances when people are trustworthy. I defend this conclusion against the influential account of trust as 'encapsulated interest', given by Russell Hardin, on which most trustworthiness is explained by the interest of continuing relationship.
Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially import... more Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one’s interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possession of moral character is a plausible explanation of some socially important instances when people are trustworthy. I defend this conclusion against the influential account of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, given by Russell Hardin, on which most trustworthiness is explained by the interest of continuing relationship.
Cyberattacks raise tricky and important moral questions. When is it permissible to attack an oppo... more Cyberattacks raise tricky and important moral questions. When is it permissible to attack an opponent’s Information and Computing Technology systems (ICTs)? Or obligatory? Could a cyberattack be a legitimate casus belli, being justifiably responded to by physical force, or are the only justifiable responses those that are in-kind? Existing discussion of the moral framework with which to evaluate the ethics of cyberattacks has consisted either in the application of Just War theory, or in claims that Just War theory is not fit-for-purpose for twenty-first Century warfare and that a new kind of ethical theory is required. Both sides are partly right and partly wrong. Advocates of Just War theory are correct that it applies to cyberattacks, but are wrong to suppose that this constitutes a sufficient basis on which morally to evaluate all cyberattacks. The dissenters are correct that an alternative framework is required for the ethical evaluation of cyberattacks, but they are wrong to suppose it must be novel. This judgment is justified by my substantive thesis: we already have a concept which is fit for purpose in evaluating a great proportion of the moral significance of cyberattacks, namely that of harm to property. Property rights provide an ethical framework within which cyberattacks should be assessed. An important advantage of such an approach is that it makes sense of how cyberattacks can be both bloodless but constitute real harm. A result is that a cyberattack could be a legitimate casus belli, given sufficient harm to property that was sufficiently (morally) valuable.
This article develops a social epistemological analysis of Web-based search engines, addressing t... more This article develops a social epistemological analysis of Web-based search engines, addressing the following questions. First, what epistemic functions do search engines perform? Second, what dimensions of assessment are appropriate for the epistemic evaluation of search engines? Third, how well do current search engines perform on these? The article explains why they fulfil the role of a surrogate expert, and proposes three ways of assessing their utility as an epistemic tool—timeliness, authority prioritisation, and objectivity. “Personalisation” is a current trend in Internet-delivered services, and consists in tailoring online content to the interests of the individual user. It is argued here that personalisation threatens the objectivity of search results. Objectivity is a public good; so there is a prima facie case for government regulation of search engines.
Trust is difficult to define. Instead of doing so, I propose that the best way to understand the ... more Trust is difficult to define. Instead of doing so, I propose that the best way to understand the concept is through a genealogical account. I show how a root notion of trust arises out of some basic features of what it is for humans to live socially, in which we rely on others to act cooperatively. I explore how this concept acquires resonances of hope and threat, and how we analogically apply this in related but different contexts. The genealogical account explains both why the notion has such value for us and why it is difficult to define.
Putting robots on the battlefield is clearly appealing for policymakers. Why risk human lives, wh... more Putting robots on the battlefield is clearly appealing for policymakers. Why risk human lives, when robots could take our place, and do the dirty work of killing and dying for us? Against this, I argue that robots will be unable to win the kind of wars that we are increasingly drawn into. Modern warfare tends towards asymmetric conflict. Asymmetric warfare cannot be won without gaining the trust of the civilian population; this is ‘the hearts and minds’, in the hackneyed phrase from counter-insurgency manuals. I claim that the very feature which makes it attractive to send robots to war in our place, the absence of risk, also makes it peculiarly difficult for humans to trust them. Whatever the attractions, sending robots to war in our stead will make success in counter-insurgency elusive. Moreover, there is ethical reason to be relieved at this conclusion. For if war is potentially costly, then this does much to ensure that it will be a choice only of last resort, in accordance with the traditional doctrine of jus ad bellum. In this instance, morality and expediency— fortunately— coincide.
Is there a justified presumption that a speaker is testifying sincerely? Anti-reductionism about ... more Is there a justified presumption that a speaker is testifying sincerely? Anti-reductionism about testimony claims that there is, absent reasons to the contrary. Yet why believe this, given the actuality and prevalence of lies and deception? I examine one argument that may be appropriated to meet this challenge, David Lewis's claim that truthfulness is a convention. I argue that it fails, and that the supposition that there is a presumption of sincerity remains unsupported. The failure of Lewis's argument is instructive, however, for it shows us a better way of approaching language use than the standard anti-reductionist treatment. As speech is an intentional action, so a presumption of the sincerity or otherwise of others' testimony must be explicable in the terms we normally use to explain action.
Trust online can be a hazardous affair; many are trustworthy, but some people use the anonymity o... more Trust online can be a hazardous affair; many are trustworthy, but some people use the anonymity of the web to behave very badly indeed. So how can we improve the quality of evidence for trustworthiness provided online? I focus on one of the devices we use to secure others' trustworthiness: tracking past conduct through online reputation systems. Yet existing reputation systems face problems. I analyse these, and in the light of this develop some principles for system design, towards overcoming these challenges. In providing better evidence for trustworthiness online, so we can also encourage people actually to be trustworthy more often, which is an ethically welcome outcome.
Pettit argues that republican freedom is feasible; I argue here that it is impossible. For the pe... more Pettit argues that republican freedom is feasible; I argue here that it is impossible. For the people to be free from domination by the government, they must have the power to resist it. But if they have this power, they must also have the power to dominate any individual. There is thus a contradiction at the heart of Pettit's republicanism: the citizens must be powerful, but they also must not be. Individual citizens are dominated either by the state or by the people. Republicanism has traditionally emphasised the necessity of civic virtue. Although parts of Pettit's work suggest that he endorses this view, he cannot do so consistently. His conception of freedom as non-domination allows him to give at most a contingent, instrumental role to civic virtue. He must reject any stronger reliance: civic virtue must not be necessary for freedom. For if one must rely on others' virtue to keep them from restricting one's freedom, one would then be subject to another's will and so dominated. Instead, institutions must ensure that individuals are free. My critique vindicates the traditional view. The structure of the paper is as follows. I outline Pettit's republicanism, identifying some central claims (§1). I then present two cases that-if they are both instances of domination, as I argue-entail that citizens are always un-free (§2). I develop the objection by rebutting possible replies, showing that Pettit is committed to the possibility of what I term 'polyadic' domination (§ §3-4). In conclusion, I distinguish my objection from other critiques, and defend the traditional republican view that civic virtue is necessary for freedom (§5). 1. Freedom as non-domination The case for republicanism is often made by appeal to this example: Master-Slave A benevolent Master allows her Slave to do as he wants. He does so but only by her leave. This shows that non-interference is not extensionally equivalent to non-domination, and suggests that the latter is a more important form of freedom than the former. Suppose a person, A, has a choice among various options. On Pettit's account, A enjoys freedom as non-interference-liberal freedom-if her choice is unrestricted. That is, if A decided to take one of those options, she would be able to; and there is no other agent, B, who has restricted the choice, or is likely to restrict it, by removing options or attaching a penalty to any. A enjoys freedom as non-domination-republican freedom-to the extent that there is no B who has a power of interfering in her choice in a way that is not controlled by A. B's power of interference is controlled by A if it can be exercised only on terms imposed by A; that is, and in Pettit's formulation, in a direction that A has the influence to determine. 1 According to Pettit's account, liberal freedom does not entail republican freedom. Nor does republican freedom entail liberal freedom. My outline of his theory summarises the argument for and significance of these central non-entailment claims. In outlining his theory, I
In 2011, after their base in the Helmand River valley had come under attack, a patrol of Royal Ma... more In 2011, after their base in the Helmand River valley had come under attack, a patrol of Royal Marines Commandos found a severely wounded Taliban fighter. Gunfire from a supporting Apache attack helicopter had left the fighter with a sucking chest wound and unable to defend himself. The prisoner was dragged to where he and the patrol could not be seen by the Apache or the ground-based radar system at the base. Sgt Alexander Blackman-referred to as 'Marine A' at the subsequent trial-then shot him in the chest with his pistol. Blackman was convicted of murder by a court martial in 2013. At the time of writing he is serving an 8-year prison sentence. Nigel Biggar's In Defence of War is a stimulating read, synthetic in scope, and is a robust re-articulation of the just war tradition. In particular, Biggar defends the Grotian and Augustinian claim that war is sometimes properly retributive (see
We outline a narrative of how attempts to solve the principal-agent problem for financial manager... more We outline a narrative of how attempts to solve the principal-agent problem for financial managers have eroded moral restraint, leading to fewer principled agents. Bonus-based compensation inspired by Jensen and Meckling (1976) appears to have contributed to unfavourable attitudes, through motivational crowding out (Simpson, 2016). We classify the moral restraint of earlier times as either 'moral optimization'-standard utility theory appended with other-regarding preferences (Becker, 1981)-or as 'moral prioritization'-a commitment to not doing wrong (Sen, 1976). Disciplining unethical managers in a post deregulation world by competition policy runs into serious practical difficulties, rendering it necessary to address their moral motivations. In contrast, trustworthiness sustains trust.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (‘LAWS’) are here. Technological development will see them becom... more Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (‘LAWS’) are here. Technological development will see them become widespread in the near future. This is in a matter of years rather than decades. When the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meets on 10-14th November 2014, well-considered guidance for a decision on the general policy direction for LAWS is clearly needed. While there is widespread opposition to LAWS—or ‘killer robots’, as they are popularly called—and a growing campaign advocates banning them outright, we argue the opposite.
Testimony is a central theme in John's Gospel and he has a developed view on how it works. This p... more Testimony is a central theme in John's Gospel and he has a developed view on how it works. This paper makes two contributions. First, I show the complexity and sophistication with which John handles different kinds of testimony in his narrative; this constitutes a category of evidence for the centrality of testimony not noted hitherto. Second, I address the central puzzle, namely the prima facie contradiction between 5:31 and 8:14. At issue is whether Jesus' testimony about himself requires corroborating testimony for it rationally to be believed. I argue that 8:14 has interpretative priority: according to John, no such corroboration is required.
Trust is central to our social lives in both epistemic and practical ways. Often, it is rational ... more Trust is central to our social lives in both epistemic and practical ways. Often, it is rational only given evidence for trustworthiness, and with that evidence is made available by communication. New technologies are changing our practices of communication, enabling increasing rich and diverse ways of 'being there', but at a distance. This paper asks: how does telepresent communication support evidenceconstrained trust? In answering it, I reply to the leading pessimists about the possibility of the digital mediation of trust, Philip Pettit and Hubert Dreyfus. I also rebut Media Richness Theory, which proposes a linear relationship between the volume of mediated information and the quality of communication. Positively, I develop a speech-act theory of digitally mediated communication, drawing on Austen's identification of the illocutionary act. The choice of a particular technology of communication constitutes part of what is communicated, including a setting of the social 'frame', and thus the possibilities for trust to be sustained or eroded. How something is said is part of what it is that is said.
Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially import... more Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one's interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possession of moral character is a plausible explanation of some socially important instances when people are trustworthy. I defend this conclusion against the influential account of trust as 'encapsulated interest', given by Russell Hardin, on which most trustworthiness is explained by the interest of continuing relationship.
Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially import... more Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one’s interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possession of moral character is a plausible explanation of some socially important instances when people are trustworthy. I defend this conclusion against the influential account of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, given by Russell Hardin, on which most trustworthiness is explained by the interest of continuing relationship.
Cyberattacks raise tricky and important moral questions. When is it permissible to attack an oppo... more Cyberattacks raise tricky and important moral questions. When is it permissible to attack an opponent’s Information and Computing Technology systems (ICTs)? Or obligatory? Could a cyberattack be a legitimate casus belli, being justifiably responded to by physical force, or are the only justifiable responses those that are in-kind? Existing discussion of the moral framework with which to evaluate the ethics of cyberattacks has consisted either in the application of Just War theory, or in claims that Just War theory is not fit-for-purpose for twenty-first Century warfare and that a new kind of ethical theory is required. Both sides are partly right and partly wrong. Advocates of Just War theory are correct that it applies to cyberattacks, but are wrong to suppose that this constitutes a sufficient basis on which morally to evaluate all cyberattacks. The dissenters are correct that an alternative framework is required for the ethical evaluation of cyberattacks, but they are wrong to suppose it must be novel. This judgment is justified by my substantive thesis: we already have a concept which is fit for purpose in evaluating a great proportion of the moral significance of cyberattacks, namely that of harm to property. Property rights provide an ethical framework within which cyberattacks should be assessed. An important advantage of such an approach is that it makes sense of how cyberattacks can be both bloodless but constitute real harm. A result is that a cyberattack could be a legitimate casus belli, given sufficient harm to property that was sufficiently (morally) valuable.
This article develops a social epistemological analysis of Web-based search engines, addressing t... more This article develops a social epistemological analysis of Web-based search engines, addressing the following questions. First, what epistemic functions do search engines perform? Second, what dimensions of assessment are appropriate for the epistemic evaluation of search engines? Third, how well do current search engines perform on these? The article explains why they fulfil the role of a surrogate expert, and proposes three ways of assessing their utility as an epistemic tool—timeliness, authority prioritisation, and objectivity. “Personalisation” is a current trend in Internet-delivered services, and consists in tailoring online content to the interests of the individual user. It is argued here that personalisation threatens the objectivity of search results. Objectivity is a public good; so there is a prima facie case for government regulation of search engines.
Trust is difficult to define. Instead of doing so, I propose that the best way to understand the ... more Trust is difficult to define. Instead of doing so, I propose that the best way to understand the concept is through a genealogical account. I show how a root notion of trust arises out of some basic features of what it is for humans to live socially, in which we rely on others to act cooperatively. I explore how this concept acquires resonances of hope and threat, and how we analogically apply this in related but different contexts. The genealogical account explains both why the notion has such value for us and why it is difficult to define.
Putting robots on the battlefield is clearly appealing for policymakers. Why risk human lives, wh... more Putting robots on the battlefield is clearly appealing for policymakers. Why risk human lives, when robots could take our place, and do the dirty work of killing and dying for us? Against this, I argue that robots will be unable to win the kind of wars that we are increasingly drawn into. Modern warfare tends towards asymmetric conflict. Asymmetric warfare cannot be won without gaining the trust of the civilian population; this is ‘the hearts and minds’, in the hackneyed phrase from counter-insurgency manuals. I claim that the very feature which makes it attractive to send robots to war in our place, the absence of risk, also makes it peculiarly difficult for humans to trust them. Whatever the attractions, sending robots to war in our stead will make success in counter-insurgency elusive. Moreover, there is ethical reason to be relieved at this conclusion. For if war is potentially costly, then this does much to ensure that it will be a choice only of last resort, in accordance with the traditional doctrine of jus ad bellum. In this instance, morality and expediency— fortunately— coincide.
Is there a justified presumption that a speaker is testifying sincerely? Anti-reductionism about ... more Is there a justified presumption that a speaker is testifying sincerely? Anti-reductionism about testimony claims that there is, absent reasons to the contrary. Yet why believe this, given the actuality and prevalence of lies and deception? I examine one argument that may be appropriated to meet this challenge, David Lewis's claim that truthfulness is a convention. I argue that it fails, and that the supposition that there is a presumption of sincerity remains unsupported. The failure of Lewis's argument is instructive, however, for it shows us a better way of approaching language use than the standard anti-reductionist treatment. As speech is an intentional action, so a presumption of the sincerity or otherwise of others' testimony must be explicable in the terms we normally use to explain action.
Trust online can be a hazardous affair; many are trustworthy, but some people use the anonymity o... more Trust online can be a hazardous affair; many are trustworthy, but some people use the anonymity of the web to behave very badly indeed. So how can we improve the quality of evidence for trustworthiness provided online? I focus on one of the devices we use to secure others' trustworthiness: tracking past conduct through online reputation systems. Yet existing reputation systems face problems. I analyse these, and in the light of this develop some principles for system design, towards overcoming these challenges. In providing better evidence for trustworthiness online, so we can also encourage people actually to be trustworthy more often, which is an ethically welcome outcome.
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Papers by Thomas Simpson