If gratuitous evils exist, then God does not exist. Therefore, God does not exist. An evil, in th... more If gratuitous evils exist, then God does not exist. Therefore, God does not exist. An evil, in this context, is either a natural or a moral evil. Moral evils are the morally bad things that we do as free moral agents (we start wars, steal, murder each other, and so on). Natural evils are the natural diseases and disasters that cause suffering. A gratuitous evil, in this context, is an evil that God lacks an adequate reason to allow. Note that this version of the evidential argument from evil is a valid deductive argument: necessarily, if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. The second premise looks very plausible. Perhaps God-by which we mean a being that is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-goodwill allow some evils if that's required for certain greater goods. But will God allow gratuitous evils-evils he has no adequate reason to allow? Presumably not. An omnipotent and supremely benevolent deity won't allow pointless, unjustified suffering, for example. And yet the world is filled not just with a great deal of evil, but also what appears to be a great deal of gratuitous evil. Hundreds of millions of years of animal suffering, for example, seems unjustified from a divine perspective. For couldn't God easily have created the world with us in it but without such a horrific past? Is this a good argument against the existence of God?
This short article looks at a move made by some theists in defence of theism: the suggestion is t... more This short article looks at a move made by some theists in defence of theism: the suggestion is that because the atheist (e.g. Richard Dawkins) has failed fully to grasp what the theist means by ‘God’ etc. so the…
In ‘Radical Externalism’ Ted Honderich offers an ingenious and radical new solution to the proble... more In ‘Radical Externalism’ Ted Honderich offers an ingenious and radical new solution to the problem of consciousness — a solution that promises, among other things, to do justice to two important features of consciousness — to both its subjectivity and its causal efficacy. According to Honderich, the main alternatives to his own Radical Externalism are certain forms of dualism, or, as he puts it, ‘spiritualism’, and ‘devout physicalism’. Honderich’s central argument for Radical Externalism is that it succeeds in respecting those features of consciousness to which these two main alternatives fail to do justice. It is, therefore, the superior theory. But is Radical Externalism superior? Does it have this advantage over its two main rivals? I don’t believe it does. The central argument of this paper is that Radical Externalism falls foul of much the same kinds of problems concerning causal interaction that plague spiritualism. Indeed, ironically, it turns out that Radical Externalism is...
Many of us are familiar with the Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Fallacy ('after this, therefore becaus... more Many of us are familiar with the Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Fallacy ('after this, therefore because of this'-Post Hoc Fallacy for short). It's the fallacy of supposing that, because B occurred after A, A must be the cause of B. For example: My car stopped working after I changed the oil, so changing the oil caused it to stop working. Or: I wore my red jumper to the exam and I passed, so that jumper is lucky: it caused me to pass. This fallacy is so common, it gets a Latin name. However, there's a related common fallacy that I think also deserves a name. I am going to call it the Non Post Hoc Fallacy ('not after of this, therefore not because of this'), or, perhaps more memorably, the David Cameron Fallacy. Every now and then someone desperate to 'prove' that X is not causally responsible for Yfor example, poverty is not a cause of crimewill commit the following fallacy. They will argue that as X has often occurred without Y following, therefore X was not the cause of Y in this case. Back in 2011 many right-wingers were desperate to show that poverty was not the, or even a, cause of the London riots. In order to try to show that, they pointed to poor people and areas where no rioting occurred. UK Prime Minister David Cameron said: 'These riots were not about poverty. That insults the millions of people who, whatever the hardship, would never dream of making others suffer like this.' A letter to Newsweek magazine argued: 'Saskia
Skeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the eviden... more Skeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.
The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus' exi... more The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus' existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assesseda principle I call the contamination principle-entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of good independent evidence for an historical Jesus, remain sceptical about his existence.
Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that naturalism is, as he p... more Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that naturalism is, as he puts it, ‘incoherent or self defeating’. Plantinga supposes that, in the absence of any God-like being to guide the process, natural selection is unlikely to favour true belief. Plantinga overlooks the fact that adherents of naturalism may plausibly hold that there exist certain conceptual links between belief content and behaviour. Given such links, natural selection will favour true belief. A further rather surprising consequence of the existence of such links is this: even if semantic properties are epiphenomenal, unguided evolution will still favour true belief
Faith' and 'Hope' are feel-good words with a built-in warm, rosy glow. People who have faith and ... more Faith' and 'Hope' are feel-good words with a built-in warm, rosy glow. People who have faith and hope are held up for our admiration and emulation. We are encouraged to be like them-to believe and anticipate that, ultimately, all will be well. Of course, faith can be good thing. It's good to have a little faith in those around us-to trust in others. Indeed, without at least some faith in your spouse, your bank manager, in other car drivers, and so on, modern life becomes impossible. Hope, too, can be important-without at least some hope of success we are unlikely to bother even trying. Still, I believe faith and hope are vastly overrated. We'd be better off prioritizing compassionate action grounded in gritty realism. First off, faith and hope can be misplaced. Yes, placing our trust in others can be reasonable-I have good grounds for supposing my bank manager won't run off with all my money. But the parent who-lacking money to buy presents for his children himself-trusts in Santa to provide the gifts on Xmas day, is an irrational fool. A life lived in the hope of pie in the sky when you die is likely to be a life wasted. Secondly, that warm, fuzzy, feel-good glow surrounding words like 'faith' and 'hope' can make us vulnerable to the wiles of the snakeoil sellers. Spiritualists and mediums exploit vulnerable people by exploiting their faith and hope that loved ones are not gone forever but have merely 'passed over' to the other side: they're merely temporarily hidden behind a cosmic veil that the medium can helpfully penetrate, for a fee. The vulnerable poor are among those most easily exploited by bookies and lotteries selling them false hope. The sick are
Wittgenstein's views on religious belief are cryptic. We have comparatively few of his comments o... more Wittgenstein's views on religious belief are cryptic. We have comparatively few of his comments on religion, and most of what we do have were neither recorded by Wittgenstein himself nor intended by him for publication. Here I aim to assess some of the arguments that have been attributed to Wittgenstein in support of a view about religious belief that I call No Contradiction: No Contradiction. When atheists deny the beliefs they take to be expressed by such sentences as (a) 'God exists' (b) 'God created the world' (c) 'Jesus rose from the dead' (d) 'We will face a Judgement Day' they fail to contradict the religious beliefs such sentences are used to express. Often associated with No Contradiction is a further related i thesis that I call Immunity: Immunity. Even if an atheist were successfully to refute the belief they took such a sentence to express (by providing empirical evidence to the contrary, say), they would fail thereby to refute the religious belief expressed. There are passages in which Wittgenstein does appear to commit himself to something like No Contradiction. Consider:
Brian Loar believes he has refuted all those antiphysicalist arguments that take as their point o... more Brian Loar believes he has refuted all those antiphysicalist arguments that take as their point of departure observations about what is or isn’t conceivable. I argue that there remains an important, popular and plausible-looking form of conceivability argument that Loar has entirely overlooked. Though he may not have realized it, Saul Kripke presents, or comes close to presenting, two fundamentally different forms of conceivability argument. I distinguish the two arguments and point out that while Loar has succeeded in refuting one of Kripke’s arguments he has not refuted the other. Loar is mistaken: physicalism still faces an apparently insurmountable conceptual obstacle. 1. Antiphysicalist arguments and intuitions In his paper Phenomenal States, Brian Loar makes the following claim: Antiphysicalist arguments and intuitions take off from a sound intuition about concepts. Phenomenal concepts are conceptually irreducible in this sense: they neither imply, nor are implied by, physical...
Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rig... more Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.
Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rig... more Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.
If gratuitous evils exist, then God does not exist. Therefore, God does not exist. An evil, in th... more If gratuitous evils exist, then God does not exist. Therefore, God does not exist. An evil, in this context, is either a natural or a moral evil. Moral evils are the morally bad things that we do as free moral agents (we start wars, steal, murder each other, and so on). Natural evils are the natural diseases and disasters that cause suffering. A gratuitous evil, in this context, is an evil that God lacks an adequate reason to allow. Note that this version of the evidential argument from evil is a valid deductive argument: necessarily, if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. The second premise looks very plausible. Perhaps God-by which we mean a being that is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-goodwill allow some evils if that's required for certain greater goods. But will God allow gratuitous evils-evils he has no adequate reason to allow? Presumably not. An omnipotent and supremely benevolent deity won't allow pointless, unjustified suffering, for example. And yet the world is filled not just with a great deal of evil, but also what appears to be a great deal of gratuitous evil. Hundreds of millions of years of animal suffering, for example, seems unjustified from a divine perspective. For couldn't God easily have created the world with us in it but without such a horrific past? Is this a good argument against the existence of God?
This short article looks at a move made by some theists in defence of theism: the suggestion is t... more This short article looks at a move made by some theists in defence of theism: the suggestion is that because the atheist (e.g. Richard Dawkins) has failed fully to grasp what the theist means by ‘God’ etc. so the…
In ‘Radical Externalism’ Ted Honderich offers an ingenious and radical new solution to the proble... more In ‘Radical Externalism’ Ted Honderich offers an ingenious and radical new solution to the problem of consciousness — a solution that promises, among other things, to do justice to two important features of consciousness — to both its subjectivity and its causal efficacy. According to Honderich, the main alternatives to his own Radical Externalism are certain forms of dualism, or, as he puts it, ‘spiritualism’, and ‘devout physicalism’. Honderich’s central argument for Radical Externalism is that it succeeds in respecting those features of consciousness to which these two main alternatives fail to do justice. It is, therefore, the superior theory. But is Radical Externalism superior? Does it have this advantage over its two main rivals? I don’t believe it does. The central argument of this paper is that Radical Externalism falls foul of much the same kinds of problems concerning causal interaction that plague spiritualism. Indeed, ironically, it turns out that Radical Externalism is...
Many of us are familiar with the Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Fallacy ('after this, therefore becaus... more Many of us are familiar with the Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Fallacy ('after this, therefore because of this'-Post Hoc Fallacy for short). It's the fallacy of supposing that, because B occurred after A, A must be the cause of B. For example: My car stopped working after I changed the oil, so changing the oil caused it to stop working. Or: I wore my red jumper to the exam and I passed, so that jumper is lucky: it caused me to pass. This fallacy is so common, it gets a Latin name. However, there's a related common fallacy that I think also deserves a name. I am going to call it the Non Post Hoc Fallacy ('not after of this, therefore not because of this'), or, perhaps more memorably, the David Cameron Fallacy. Every now and then someone desperate to 'prove' that X is not causally responsible for Yfor example, poverty is not a cause of crimewill commit the following fallacy. They will argue that as X has often occurred without Y following, therefore X was not the cause of Y in this case. Back in 2011 many right-wingers were desperate to show that poverty was not the, or even a, cause of the London riots. In order to try to show that, they pointed to poor people and areas where no rioting occurred. UK Prime Minister David Cameron said: 'These riots were not about poverty. That insults the millions of people who, whatever the hardship, would never dream of making others suffer like this.' A letter to Newsweek magazine argued: 'Saskia
Skeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the eviden... more Skeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.
The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus' exi... more The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus' existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assesseda principle I call the contamination principle-entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of good independent evidence for an historical Jesus, remain sceptical about his existence.
Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that naturalism is, as he p... more Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that naturalism is, as he puts it, ‘incoherent or self defeating’. Plantinga supposes that, in the absence of any God-like being to guide the process, natural selection is unlikely to favour true belief. Plantinga overlooks the fact that adherents of naturalism may plausibly hold that there exist certain conceptual links between belief content and behaviour. Given such links, natural selection will favour true belief. A further rather surprising consequence of the existence of such links is this: even if semantic properties are epiphenomenal, unguided evolution will still favour true belief
Faith' and 'Hope' are feel-good words with a built-in warm, rosy glow. People who have faith and ... more Faith' and 'Hope' are feel-good words with a built-in warm, rosy glow. People who have faith and hope are held up for our admiration and emulation. We are encouraged to be like them-to believe and anticipate that, ultimately, all will be well. Of course, faith can be good thing. It's good to have a little faith in those around us-to trust in others. Indeed, without at least some faith in your spouse, your bank manager, in other car drivers, and so on, modern life becomes impossible. Hope, too, can be important-without at least some hope of success we are unlikely to bother even trying. Still, I believe faith and hope are vastly overrated. We'd be better off prioritizing compassionate action grounded in gritty realism. First off, faith and hope can be misplaced. Yes, placing our trust in others can be reasonable-I have good grounds for supposing my bank manager won't run off with all my money. But the parent who-lacking money to buy presents for his children himself-trusts in Santa to provide the gifts on Xmas day, is an irrational fool. A life lived in the hope of pie in the sky when you die is likely to be a life wasted. Secondly, that warm, fuzzy, feel-good glow surrounding words like 'faith' and 'hope' can make us vulnerable to the wiles of the snakeoil sellers. Spiritualists and mediums exploit vulnerable people by exploiting their faith and hope that loved ones are not gone forever but have merely 'passed over' to the other side: they're merely temporarily hidden behind a cosmic veil that the medium can helpfully penetrate, for a fee. The vulnerable poor are among those most easily exploited by bookies and lotteries selling them false hope. The sick are
Wittgenstein's views on religious belief are cryptic. We have comparatively few of his comments o... more Wittgenstein's views on religious belief are cryptic. We have comparatively few of his comments on religion, and most of what we do have were neither recorded by Wittgenstein himself nor intended by him for publication. Here I aim to assess some of the arguments that have been attributed to Wittgenstein in support of a view about religious belief that I call No Contradiction: No Contradiction. When atheists deny the beliefs they take to be expressed by such sentences as (a) 'God exists' (b) 'God created the world' (c) 'Jesus rose from the dead' (d) 'We will face a Judgement Day' they fail to contradict the religious beliefs such sentences are used to express. Often associated with No Contradiction is a further related i thesis that I call Immunity: Immunity. Even if an atheist were successfully to refute the belief they took such a sentence to express (by providing empirical evidence to the contrary, say), they would fail thereby to refute the religious belief expressed. There are passages in which Wittgenstein does appear to commit himself to something like No Contradiction. Consider:
Brian Loar believes he has refuted all those antiphysicalist arguments that take as their point o... more Brian Loar believes he has refuted all those antiphysicalist arguments that take as their point of departure observations about what is or isn’t conceivable. I argue that there remains an important, popular and plausible-looking form of conceivability argument that Loar has entirely overlooked. Though he may not have realized it, Saul Kripke presents, or comes close to presenting, two fundamentally different forms of conceivability argument. I distinguish the two arguments and point out that while Loar has succeeded in refuting one of Kripke’s arguments he has not refuted the other. Loar is mistaken: physicalism still faces an apparently insurmountable conceptual obstacle. 1. Antiphysicalist arguments and intuitions In his paper Phenomenal States, Brian Loar makes the following claim: Antiphysicalist arguments and intuitions take off from a sound intuition about concepts. Phenomenal concepts are conceptually irreducible in this sense: they neither imply, nor are implied by, physical...
Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rig... more Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.
Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rig... more Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.
An overview of some the issues, with particualrl focus on Popper and on James Ladyman's character... more An overview of some the issues, with particualrl focus on Popper and on James Ladyman's characterisation of pseudoscience in terms of bullshit.
This chapter looks at a range of objections to theism that one might class as 'logical'. Some of ... more This chapter looks at a range of objections to theism that one might class as 'logical'. Some of these objections aim to show that theism involves an internal logical contradiction. Others aim to show that theism is at least logically incompatible with other beliefs to which the theist is also typically committed. Also included are objections grounded in the thought that theism is nonsensical or meaningless. The chapter provides both an overview of this broad terrain, including a map of possible responses to different kinds of objection, and then a number of examples.
This chapter looks at a range of objections to theism that one might class as 'logical'. Some of ... more This chapter looks at a range of objections to theism that one might class as 'logical'. Some of these objections aim to show that theism involves an internal logical contradiction. Others aim to show that theism is at least logically incompatible with other beliefs to which the theist is also typically committed. Also included are objections grounded in the thought that theism is nonsensical or meaningless. The chapter provides both an overview of this broad terrain, including a map of possible responses to different kinds of objection, and then a number of examples.
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