Papers by Raphael Lefevre
The Journal of North African Studies, Mar 21, 2016
The accumulating weight of the political, economic and security challenges shouldered by Algeria ... more The accumulating weight of the political, economic and security challenges shouldered by Algeria has recently led a number of observers to sound the regime’s death knell in blunt terms. Whilst, on the one hand, in December 2015 former Prime Minister Ali Benflis warned that the country was entering a phase of ‘putrefaction’, the intellectual Boualem Sansal, on the other, predicted a ‘Syrian scenario’ for Algeria. Even in France, the former colonial master which has become over time a key partner of the Algerian government, anxiety is rising about the prospect of instability in Algiers, with the French daily, Le Figaro, qualifying the looming crisis as a ‘time bomb’ and the influential columnist, Nicolas Baverez, arguing that the country might be on the verge of another ‘civil war’ (‘Pourquoi l’Algérie fait peur à l’Europe’, 2016). The source for all these concerns is the turbulent period into which Algeria has recently entered. Its President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, turned 79 in March and has been partially disabled since he suffered a stroke in April 2013, thus leaving the Algerian political arena free for the opaque network of political advisers, intelligence officers and businessmen who make up ‘le pouvoir’ to manoeuvre for influence. In addition, this crisis for political succession takes place within a highly volatile economic environment prone to social unrest; a consequence of the rapid decrease in the state budget due to the collapse in the prices of oil and gas, the sale of which represents 58% of government revenues. The fear is that extreme Islamist movements, on the rise in Libya and Mali, could well take advantage of social and political instability in Algeria. The Algerian regime has attempted to answer to these concerns by projecting a sense of self-confidence. It has ordered the construction of a mosque in the capital boasting the world’s tallest minaret. Its foreign minister, Ramtane Lamamra, routinely argues that the relative ‘tranquillity’ enjoyed by Algeria since the Arab Spring has turned it into an ‘exporter of security and stability’. And to drive its point about self-confidence and prudence home,
The Journal of North African Studies, Mar 15, 2014
As soon as he landed in Rabat on 3 April for the opening session of the 2 Morocco-US strategic di... more As soon as he landed in Rabat on 3 April for the opening session of the 2 Morocco-US strategic dialogue, Secretary of State John Kerry lauded the Kingdom’s role as a “driver of prosperity and of security in the Maghreb and in Africa” and as a “stabilizing force in the region” (Le Matin, a). Ironically enough, the timing of his visit could not have been better for Moulay Hichem, a selfexiled cousin of King Mohammed VI, for it coincided with the publication of his insider’s account of the Moroccan monarchy, entitled Journal d’un prince banni (published by Grasset) which gave a very different view of Morocco. His book is a scathing critique of the Makhzen, the shadowy network of Palace advisers who defend the entrenched economic and political interests of the monarchy. It also draws a blunt and worrisome picture of the Kingdom’s future. For the author, “there will be no real progress for Morocco with the Makhzen-State as it stands”. When the Arab Spring erupted, he argued in the columns of Spanish daily El Pais that the Moroccan political system would “not stand as an exception” to the wave of authoritarian regimes being overthrown and, when protests indeed reached Rabat, he rapidly endorsed the “February 20 movement” spearheading them (El Pais). Mohammed VI swiftly reacted to the growing turmoil in his country by putting forward a new, more politically liberal, Constitution which was overwhelmingly approved by referendum in July 2011, and called for parliamentary elections three months later that were won by the Islamists of the Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD). Yet, for Moulay Hichem, even though these cosmetic changes may have allowed Mohammed VI to temporarily outpace his opponents in the “20 February movement”, the daunting scope of Morocco’s socio-economic and political challenges mean that the stability of the monarchy remains under threat in the medium and long term. He writes: “Just as with the Arab Spring in the rest of the region, there will be no going back to the past in Morocco. Is the ‘20 February movement’ falling apart? Without a doubt [... ]. But the popular prophets who demonstrated in the streets, week after week, lose neither my deep respect nor my political sympathy – and I am certainly not alone. In the ears of many Moroccans, who have now overcome the fear of Authority, their free spirit continues to resonate: ‘Where is the money of the people? It’s the Makhzen that stole it!’, ‘Makhzen, get out! We’re not afraid of your sticks anymore!’” (Tel Quel, a). For now, particularly in the light of the growing political instability in neighbouring Algeria and
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
The Journal of North African Studies, Jul 25, 2014
Three years and a half after the fall of Mu’ammar Qadhafi, and as parliamentary elections were be... more Three years and a half after the fall of Mu’ammar Qadhafi, and as parliamentary elections were being held on 25 June; Libya is still faced with a series of daunting challenges. The country’s transition to democracy suffered major setbacks in recent months after a deepening rift between secular and Islamist politicians brought the new political system to the verge of collapse. In parallel, the security situation severely deteriorated as major militias refused to disband and to hand in the weapons they had seized during the country’s 2011 civil war. Some even resorted to violence against protestors who had called on them to relinquish their equipment and to merge into the state’s general security apparatus. It is against this backdrop that Libyan general Khalifa Haftar is trying to emerge as the country’s new strongman, promising to solve Libya’s multifaceted crises by pressuring the legislature to resign and by eradicating the Islamist militias he blames for much of the chaos. Khalifa Haftar is a defector from Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s army who became a refugee in the USA in 1990 and returned to Libya to fight on the rebellion’s side in 2011 before eventually threatening, last February, to organise a coup against the country’s new rulers. That attempt failed but he still claimed to represent the armed forces and, most recently, he even managed to gather around him an alliance of army elements, tribes and nationalists who support his bid for power and his war on Libya’s powerful Islamists. The Libyan general seems to draw his main source of inspiration from the recent election of former army head Abdelfattah al-Sissi as Egyptian President. Besides their common military background, the rhetoric of both men strikes the same chord when it comes to the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation Khalifa Haftar refers to as ‘a malignant disease seeking to spread throughout the bones of the Arab world’ and which has to be ‘completely purged’ from his country (Asharq al-Awsat 2014a). In addition, the Libyan general makes no secret of his political ambitions. ‘Haftar will follow Al-Sissi’s footsteps if the Libyan people ask him to run for president’, recently declared his spokesman (Anadolu Agency 2014). These parallels have prompted a number of analysts to predict that Libya could follow the Egyptian model of a post-Arab Spring return to an authoritarian and military-driven political order. A pundit went as far as confidently arguing that ‘the Egyptian scenario is meant to be restated in Libya’ (Gulf News 2014a).
The Journal of North African Studies, Dec 27, 2016
On 28 October 2016, a gruesome incident in the small Moroccan port of alHoceima made global headl... more On 28 October 2016, a gruesome incident in the small Moroccan port of alHoceima made global headlines. Muhsen Fikri, a 31-year-old fish wholesaler, was crushed to death by a garbage truck as he sought to recover his confiscated catch of swordfish, reportedly worth $11,000, after local police officers had impounded it for violating a seasonal ban on fishing for it. The details are still unclear, but there have been widespread allegations on social media that one of the officers had demanded a bribe and, when Fkiri refused, he had impounded the fish. Muhsen Fikri’s subsequent death and funeral brought local activity to a standstill – thousands of people poured into the streets of al-Hoceima to demand the end to hoghra, the term now used for such arbitrary abuses routinely committed by the authorities, including violence and bribe-taking. Protests continued for several days and nights, quickly spreading to nearby towns before eventually reaching major cities and even the capital, Rabat. This was the largest protest movement in the country since the demonstrations during the Arab Spring, leading some analysts to wonder whether Fikri’s death would be Morocco’s ‘Bouazizi moment’ – a reference to the revolutionary wave triggered by the self-immolation of the Tunisian vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi, in late December 2010 (Fakir 2016). Indeed, there is little doubt that, in Morocco, many of the grievances which had prompted the birth of the ‘20 February’ protest movement in 2011 still resonate. Corruption and police brutality have continued unabated, whilst public trust in the political class and the institutions of the state remains low. In addition, many people are still economically marginalised, a trend that is particularly pronounced in Morocco’s countryside and in some cities. The resulting sense of social despair and political disenfranchisement was key in mobilising protesters beyond Fikri’s hometown of al-Hoceima. Yet it remains to be seen whether these largely spontaneous reactions can be channelled into a more sustainable protest movement.
The Journal of North African Studies, Oct 17, 2016
While much of the international coverage on the Maghreb has focused on the 'new threats' the regi... more While much of the international coverage on the Maghreb has focused on the 'new threats' the region faces, such as attacks by Islamic extremists, civil conflict or state collapse, its stability continues to be undermined by more traditional, but equally threatening challenges. The most intractable of these is the simmering geopolitical tension pitting Morocco against Algeria, which increasingly resembles North Africa's version of an 'Arab Cold War'a term coined in 1965 by political scientist Malcom Kerr to describe the struggle for regional primacy between Saudi Arabia and Egypt which had by then begun to emerge through proxy wars throughout the region. Yet, the deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations may seem surprising at first glance. While the two countries have obvious common interests, such as the struggle against terrorism and smuggling in the Sahara, they also share historical, social and cultural ties and a legacy of resistance to French colonialism. In short, the fate of the two countries long seemed tied together. Yet, behind the façade of diplomatic exchanges and a genuine sense of shared history, there also lies a long-standing and increasingly bitter struggle for regional leadership. The roots of the conflict are related to the diverging priorities of post-independence Morocco, ruled by a nationalist monarchy, and Algeria, led by a group of revolutionary politicians and officers. Origins of the conflict reach even further back; to what Moroccans long considered an unfair territorial delimitation of the common border between Morocco and Algeria foisted on the country by the colonial authorities in Algiers. It burst out in 1963 during the 'War of the Sands' when they briefly fought over this common border. It then took on even bigger proportions in 1975-6 when Morocco annexed parts of Western Saharaa vast stretch of land at the border with Algeria long held by Spain but which is also home to indigenous Arab-speaking Berber tribes who laid claims to the territory too and created the Polisario Front to defend it. Back then, the Algerian government perceived the Moroccan annexation as a threat and a betrayal of the principle of self-determination, while Morocco saw it as the legitimate recovery of national territory after colonial amputation, and recurring tensions have
The Journal of North African Studies, Sep 1, 2013
While violence is gripping Cairo, political instability simmers in Tunis and chaos still reigns i... more While violence is gripping Cairo, political instability simmers in Tunis and chaos still reigns in the streets of Tripoli, Rabat is often seen in the foreign media as a beacon of tranquility in an increasingly turbulent post-Arab Spring North Africa. There, King Mohammed VI seemed to have responded to the demands of many protesters by introducing a series of constitutional reforms reducing his prerogatives, and called for early elections which paved the way for the resounding victory of the Islamist Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD) that now leads the government. On the surface, the formula seems to have worked. According to a poll conducted in March 2013, 64% of the Moroccan electorate are satisfied or very satisfied by the new government’s handling of the political and socio-economic situation – down 22 points from November 2011 when it was elected but still a firm majority (L’Economiste 2013). This led some foreign analysts to hail Morocco enthusiastically as a ‘model’ of reform and progress in the region (Morocco World News 2013). But how much has really changed in Rabat since the advent of the Arab Spring? Is the PJD really in charge of policy or does the King remain Morocco’s most powerful political actor? And what does the rise of the anti-monarchy Justice et Charité (JC) Islamist movement, which, although not a formal political party, is perhaps the most powerful and coherent opposition to Royal policies in the country, tell us about the medium and long-term stability of the Moroccan Kingdom?
The Journal of North African Studies, Mar 1, 2012
While many analysts hailed the successive elections of parties affiliated to political Islam in T... more While many analysts hailed the successive elections of parties affiliated to political Islam in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt as significant developments in the history of North Africa, and point out to the ‘Algerian exception’ in this respect, few remember that, in fact, Islamist forces had won the first round of the parliamentary elections organised in Algeria on 26 December 1991. There never was a second round as, fearing an Islamist takeover of all state institutions, the army seized power and started a relentless campaign of repression against known militants, thereby also drawing the country into a decade-long bloody civil war. The troubled legacy left by Algerian Islamists has been quoted as one of the reasons behind their disappointing electoral results in last May’s election. Some went as far as arguing that such scars made Algeria largely ‘immune’ from the Arab Spring (Al Jazeera 2012). Is this description accurate? Why does Algeria seem to stand out from a regional atmosphere instinctively privileging Islamist parties? What will be the consequences of the ‘cultures war’, which seems to be increasingly tearing the region’s Islamists apart from their secular counterparts?
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Mar 1, 2013
In January 2011 President Bashar al-Assad told the Wall Street Journal that Syria was 'stable... more In January 2011 President Bashar al-Assad told the Wall Street Journal that Syria was 'stable' and immune from revolt. In the months that followed, and as regimes fell in Egypt and Tunisia, thousands of Syrians took to the streets calling for freedom, with many dying at the hands of the regime. In Revolt: Eye-Witness to the Syrian Uprising, Stephen Starr delves deep into the lives of Syrians whose destiny has been shaped by the state for almost fifty years. In conversations with people from all strata of Syrian society, Starr draws together and makes sense of perspectives illustrating why Syria, with its numerous sects and religions, was so prone to violence and civil strife. Through his unique access to a country largely cut off from the international media during the unrest, Starr delivers compelling first hand testimony from both those who suffered and benefited most at the hands of the regime. Revolt details why many Syrians wanted Assad's government to stay as the threat of civil war loomed large, the long-standing gap between the state apparatus and its people and why the country's youth stood up decisively for freedom. Starr also sets out the positions adhered to by the country's minorities and explains why many Syrians believe that enforced regime change might precipitate a region-wide conflict.
Maghreb Machrek, 2012
Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour ESKA. © ESKA. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La r... more Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour ESKA. © ESKA. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.
The Journal of North African Studies, Mar 1, 2013
From the September 2012 killing of the US Ambassador in Benghazi, and the subsequent storming of ... more From the September 2012 killing of the US Ambassador in Benghazi, and the subsequent storming of the US Embassy in Tunis, to the January 2013 hostage crisis in Algeria, Western security attention s...
The Journal of North African Studies, Aug 8, 2015
Long predicted on the decline, the French language seems to have regained some of its strength in... more Long predicted on the decline, the French language seems to have regained some of its strength in recent years. A survey carried out between 2010 and 2014 by the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) noted a 6% global increase in the number of people who are francophone. Such expansion is a natural consequence of the high levels of demographic growth experienced in the French-speaking countries of West Africa. Yet it also stems from the resilience of French in the Middle East – a region which recorded a 7% increase in the number of people learning the ‘language of Moliere’ (OIF, 2014). It is the Maghrib, comprising 10% of the worldwide French-speaking population, which acts as the engine of that particular dynamic. There, French is routinely used in business, public administration, advertisement and politics. Its prominent role, however, could soon be challenged under the growing weight of Islamist and nationalist parties in North African politics. These conservative voices have long advocated a return to the region’s Arab and Islamic roots and argued in favour of getting rid of what they call the ‘francophone cancer’ (Tel Quel, 2014). The ‘Arab Spring’ empowered them to different extents. They recently proposed to replace French with English in the Moroccan education system while pushing to give a greater place to classical Arabic in Tunisia. These controversies on language policy may partially stem from the bitter legacy of French colonialism in North Africa. Yet they also reflect some of the deeper political and socio-economic challenges faced by the region. The use of French has come to crystallise underlying tensions pitting liberals against conservatives, rich against poor and city against countryside. It is in this wider context that North Africa’s ‘language wars’ are taking place.
Tawhid was a militant Islamist group which implemented Islamic law at gunpoint in the Lebanese ci... more Tawhid was a militant Islamist group which implemented Islamic law at gunpoint in the Lebanese city of Tripoli during the 1980s. In retrospect, some have called it 'the first ISIS-style Emirate'. Drawing on two hundred interviews with Islamist fighters and their mortal enemies, as well as on a trove of new archival material, Raphaël Lefèvre provides a comprehensive account of this Islamist group. He shows how they featured religious ideologues determined to turn Lebanon into an Islamic Republic, yet also included Tripolitan rebels of all stripes, neighbourhood strongmen with scores to settle, local subalterns seeking social revenge as well as profit-driven gangsters, who each tried to steer Tawhid's exercise of violence to their advantage. Providing a detailed understanding of the multi-faceted processes through which Tawhid emerged in 1982, implemented its 'Emirate' and suddenly collapsed in 1985, this is a story that shows how militant Islamist groups are impacted by their grand ideology as much as by local contexts – with crucial lessons for understanding social movements, rebel groups and terrorist organizations elsewhere too.
The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views r... more The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees.
Tawhid was a militant Islamist group which implemented Islamic law at gunpoint in the Lebanese ci... more Tawhid was a militant Islamist group which implemented Islamic law at gunpoint in the Lebanese city of Tripoli during the 1980s. In retrospect, some have called it 'the first ISIS-style Emirate'. Drawing on two hundred interviews with Islamist fighters and their mortal enemies, as well as on a trove of new archival material, Raphaël Lefèvre provides a comprehensive account of this Islamist group. He shows how they featured religious ideologues determined to turn Lebanon into an Islamic Republic, yet also included Tripolitan rebels of all stripes, neighbourhood strongmen with scores to settle, local subalterns seeking social revenge as well as profit-driven gangsters, who each tried to steer Tawhid's exercise of violence to their advantage. Providing a detailed understanding of the multi-faceted processes through which Tawhid emerged in 1982, implemented its 'Emirate' and suddenly collapsed in 1985, this is a story that shows how militant Islamist groups are impacted by their grand ideology as much as by local contexts – with crucial lessons for understanding social movements, rebel groups and terrorist organizations elsewhere too.
The Journal of North African Studies, 2016
In April 2016, dozens of thousands of people marched through the streets of Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou... more In April 2016, dozens of thousands of people marched through the streets of Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou, the largest cities of the restive East Algerian province of Kabylia, to commemorate the 36th anniversary of the 1980 Berber Spring and to demandmore cultural and political rights. In past decades, these yearly protests had involved chants demanding the recognition of Tamazight as an official language equal in status to Arabic, but this year was marked by more radical slogans asking for the ‘independence’ of Berber-dominated Kabylia. Such a development, taking place within the context of the Berber cultural and political ‘awakening’ currently taking place across North Africa, poses the question of whether the region is witnessing the birth of a pan-Berber (Amazigh) secessionism similar to Kurdish irredentism. Pan-Berber sentiment is certainly on the rise in the Maghrib. Amazigh communities are often treated by observers as an ethnic group in its own right, although it is more accurate to consider them a linguistic and cultural entity – Berberophone as opposed to the majority Arabophone population which is ethnically indistinguishable from the Amazigh. It is made up of 20 million people concentrated primarily in Morocco (an estimated 40% of the population) and Algeria (20%), with smaller communities in Libya (8–9%) and Tunisia (1–2%) as well as one million traditionally nomadic Tuareg who reside in Mali and Niger, as well as in much smaller communities in Libya and Algeria. Despite being geographically scattered, Berber communities share a set of common linguistic and cultural roots as North Africa’s indigenous people and a long history of resistance to Arab invasions. Yet Berber nationalism is not North Africa’s equivalent of the Levant’s ‘Kurdish Question’. The community is incredibly fragmented along social, ideological and even religious lines. And Kabyle secessionism may be as much about socio-political issues as about ‘Berberism’.
The Journal of North African Studies, 2017
Tension has long characterised the Qatari-Saudi relationship, mainly because of Doha’s financial ... more Tension has long characterised the Qatari-Saudi relationship, mainly because of Doha’s financial support for Al-Jazeera, a TV channel which has over the years been intensely critical of Saudi foreign and domestic policy, and also in consequence of its backing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist organisation that is seen by policymakers in Riyadh as a threat to the Kingdom’s survival. These concerns had already pushed Saudi Arabia into withdrawing its ambassador to Qatar from 2002 until 2008. The row worsened in March 2014 when the United Arab Emirates and Bahrein joined Riyadh in breaking off all diplomatic relations with Doha for eight months. The ripple effects of that crisis became visible even outside the Gulf, particularly within Syrian opposition groups and in Egypt. The tension in the Gulf reached new heights in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates cut ties to Qatar yet again but this time went much further than before by halting all land, air and sea traffic with Doha as well as by formulating thinly-veiled threats of a coup against the Emir of Qatar unless he were to address their concerns. Once more, the ramifications of the crisis are being felt far more widely than in the Gulf. It is already splitting African ranks with countries such as Mauritania, Senegal and Chad quickly siding with the Saudi-led camp and recalling their ambassadors from Doha while others such as Mali, Sudan and Somalia have expressed neutrality. But it is in the Maghrib that the effects of the crisis could perhaps be most strongly felt, given the growing role of Gulf countries there since 2011 – and their diverging interests as well as priorities in the region.
The Journal of North African Studies, 2015
The Journal of North African Studies, 2015
Scholars and policy-makers often explain the rise of Sunni fundamentalism in Syria and Iraq as th... more Scholars and policy-makers often explain the rise of Sunni fundamentalism in Syria and Iraq as the by-product of rampant sectarianism in the Levant. Yet they have struggled to grasp the factors behind the spread of Islamic radicalism to the Sunni-inhabited region of North Africa. There, despite the absence of a sizable Shi’a community, the puritan Salafi interpretation of Islam has grown more popular in recent years. Most Salafis in North Africa eschew violence. But the so-called Islamic State has nonetheless been able to recruit up to 3000 Tunisians, 1.500 Moroccans and 600 Libyans – turning North Africans into the single largest contingent of foreign fighters within the group. There are a number of reasons behind this Salafi surge. Socio-economic factors such as high youth unemployment and regional underdevelopment play a prominent role. The persistence of grievances such as authoritarianism and corruption also contribute to fuelling a dynamic of political and religious radicalization. Yet one equally important factor, though still vastly under-researched, lies in North Africa’s Maliki crisis. The Maliki rite is one of Sunni Islam’s four schools of religious law. It is known for the importance it places on adapting Islamic teachings to the local socio-political context. Some have thus called it particularly ‘open’ and ‘tolerant’. The Maliki rite has traditionally dominated Islamic practice and jurisprudence in much of Sub-Saharan and West Africa. Historically it was strongest in North Africa. But authoritarian regimes co-opted large parts of the religious elite and have failed to provide state-sanctioned religious education to the youth. This eroded the Maliki rite’s very legitimacy. In turn, Salafi preachers exploited the structural weakness of ‘traditional Islam’ to bolster their own popularity. Now their rise cannot be countered simply through a security approach. Instead, more may need to be done to revive the local appeal of Maliki teachings and to strengthen the importance of places of traditional Islamic learning in North Africa.
The Journal of North African Studies, 2017
Although the struggle against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) still rages in parts o... more Although the struggle against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) still rages in parts of Iraq, Syria and Egypt’s Sinai, the jihadi group has already suffered many setbacks in North Africa over the past year. While it had initially succeeded in enrolling close to 8000 Maghribis – mainly Tunisians and Moroccans – and in seizing significant portions of Libyan territory, ISIS has, since 2016, been largely on the retreat in the region, first failing to seize the Tunisian border town of Ben Guerdane after a bloody fight with the army in March 2016, then being driven out of Sirte in Libya, which had acted as its hub for operations in the Maghrib. Naturally, the security threat posed by ISIS has not entirely disappeared, as the terrorist operations still regularly carried out by the jihadi group in Southern Libya show, but the momentum for its expansion has passed and it is soon about to face the spectre of dispersion and internal division. Yet the decline of ISIS does not mean that the struggle against jihadism is now settled. Instead, it paves the way for the resurgence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM), a jihadi group which, perhaps as a symbol of its resilience, celebrated the tenth year of its existence in 2017. While AQIM, much like Al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan, was initially negatively affected by the rise of ISIS in several respects, the rivalry between them has also prompted forces loyal to Al-Qaeda in North Africa and the Sahel to unify forces, reflect critically on past mistakes and develop new strategies – with the end result that, by the time of its tenth ‘anniversary’, it was again a powerful and effective group. AQIM’s comeback, together with its associated groups, may present a more diffuse threat than ISIS to regional security, but its attempt at exploiting local grievances and ability to wage complex operations should not be underestimated.
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Papers by Raphael Lefevre