Papers by Jacob Williamson
A general problem in philosophy concerns the consistency of autonomy and authority. A version of ... more A general problem in philosophy concerns the consistency of autonomy and authority. A version of this problem in the philosophy of education concerns the consistency of cultivating critical thinking and imparting knowledge. Autonomy requires critical thinking and imparting knowledge requires exercising theoretical authority.
Prominent philosophers defend critical thinking but reject or neglect imparting knowledge. Additional philosophers object that imparting knowledge causes indoctrination. This entails that it is inconsistent with cultivating critical thinking.
This thesis argues that imparting knowledge does not necessarily indoctrinate, so it is consistent with cultivating critical thinking. It further argues that imparting knowledge ought to be an aim of education.
It argues imparting knowledge does not necessarily indoctrinate by part-analysing indoctrination. This also has intrinsic value because indoctrination is a significant and unclear concept.
Analysis shows indoctrination is a process causing the close-minded holding of beliefs. Close-mindedness is closely related to the further intellectual vices of arrogance and cowardice. A significant implication is that it is possible to indoctrinate truth. Having found the significance of close-mindedness, its opposite - open-mindedness - is analysed. Then it is specified how open-mindedness and critical thinking can be consistent with exercising authority. It follows that imparting knowledge need not indoctrinate.
It argues imparting knowledge ought to be an aim of education by showing how rejection of the aim presupposes a flawed ideal. The ideal is flawed because it ignores the fact that dependence on theoretical authority is necessary if we are to have substantial amounts of significant knowledge.
If the thesis succeeds, then the aim in education of imparting knowledge should have firm foundations. It should be clear that this support is overdue.
Here I attempt a rare conceptual investigation into the similarities and differences between frie... more Here I attempt a rare conceptual investigation into the similarities and differences between friendships and romantic relationships. Various examples show why sexual activity or desire is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a friendship romantic. I argue that both kinds of relationship share two central features: the creation of a union and a desire to benefit the other person. I defend what I call a federation model of the union view, and a soft paternalism model of beneficence which emphasises the role of counselling. I draw tentative ethical conclusions in favour of friendship and against monogamous romance. The differences I identify between the two relationships are mostly differences in degree. I challenge philosophers to identify significant differences in kind.
Here I defend the historically contentious claim that food can be aesthetic. I sketch four object... more Here I defend the historically contentious claim that food can be aesthetic. I sketch four objections: the argument that food can’t be aesthetic because tastes are ephemeral, because food cannot induce contemplation, because tastes are indescribable or unjustifiable and because food has other purposes. I show that these presumed requirements are either met by food, or are implausible because ordinary aesthetic experiences do not meet them. I then defend the uncommon claim that chefs can be artists. I do this by arguing chefs intend food for aesthetic appreciation, and this suggests they are artists. I identify their artworks as abstract dishes. I also argue that because meat-eating is immoral, vegetarian chefs are greater artists than chefs who use meat. If my claims are correct, then Sibley is wrong to consider tastes to be minor aesthetic concerns. We should view and value great chefs the same way as Picasso and Mozart.
Waldron argues that a right to do wrong is possible and it exists because of the value of autonom... more Waldron argues that a right to do wrong is possible and it exists because of the value of autonomy. By a right, he means a claim right, so there is a duty to not interfere with wrongdoing. I argue that such a right is possible, but it does not exist. First, because such a right would condemn all laws. Second, because on a plausible consequentialist theory of rights, the right to do wrong is indefensible. Despite this, reasons are offered for non-interference in wrongdoing. I show how these reasons could explain why pornography and forms of lying and deception should not be interfered with. But maybe they should be. Since there is no right to do wrong, if these acts are wrong then interference could be justified. I argue against Dworkin’s right to moral independence. I suggest non-interference in some acts is best justified by denying that they are wrong.
We generally avoid things that we find upsetting, yet we receive pleasure from tragic artworks. T... more We generally avoid things that we find upsetting, yet we receive pleasure from tragic artworks. This is a paradox Hume tried to solve. Here I interpret Hume as suggesting that artists use eloquence to appropriate the emotion caused by the narrative, helped by the existence of an ‘emotional distance’ between the audience and the artwork. Only this interpretation ascribes to Hume a plausible view about the nature of the passions. I defend Hume’s explanation but outline its limits. A richer explanation must account for the intuition that tragic pleasure is because of, not inspite of, the artwork’s narrative content. I thus suggest we explain tragic pleasure better by noting the insights it provides. This explanation dispels the paradox. Hume didn’t see it because his argument was intended to have broader explanatory power. I defend interpreting the paradox as raising an empirical question.
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Papers by Jacob Williamson
Prominent philosophers defend critical thinking but reject or neglect imparting knowledge. Additional philosophers object that imparting knowledge causes indoctrination. This entails that it is inconsistent with cultivating critical thinking.
This thesis argues that imparting knowledge does not necessarily indoctrinate, so it is consistent with cultivating critical thinking. It further argues that imparting knowledge ought to be an aim of education.
It argues imparting knowledge does not necessarily indoctrinate by part-analysing indoctrination. This also has intrinsic value because indoctrination is a significant and unclear concept.
Analysis shows indoctrination is a process causing the close-minded holding of beliefs. Close-mindedness is closely related to the further intellectual vices of arrogance and cowardice. A significant implication is that it is possible to indoctrinate truth. Having found the significance of close-mindedness, its opposite - open-mindedness - is analysed. Then it is specified how open-mindedness and critical thinking can be consistent with exercising authority. It follows that imparting knowledge need not indoctrinate.
It argues imparting knowledge ought to be an aim of education by showing how rejection of the aim presupposes a flawed ideal. The ideal is flawed because it ignores the fact that dependence on theoretical authority is necessary if we are to have substantial amounts of significant knowledge.
If the thesis succeeds, then the aim in education of imparting knowledge should have firm foundations. It should be clear that this support is overdue.
Prominent philosophers defend critical thinking but reject or neglect imparting knowledge. Additional philosophers object that imparting knowledge causes indoctrination. This entails that it is inconsistent with cultivating critical thinking.
This thesis argues that imparting knowledge does not necessarily indoctrinate, so it is consistent with cultivating critical thinking. It further argues that imparting knowledge ought to be an aim of education.
It argues imparting knowledge does not necessarily indoctrinate by part-analysing indoctrination. This also has intrinsic value because indoctrination is a significant and unclear concept.
Analysis shows indoctrination is a process causing the close-minded holding of beliefs. Close-mindedness is closely related to the further intellectual vices of arrogance and cowardice. A significant implication is that it is possible to indoctrinate truth. Having found the significance of close-mindedness, its opposite - open-mindedness - is analysed. Then it is specified how open-mindedness and critical thinking can be consistent with exercising authority. It follows that imparting knowledge need not indoctrinate.
It argues imparting knowledge ought to be an aim of education by showing how rejection of the aim presupposes a flawed ideal. The ideal is flawed because it ignores the fact that dependence on theoretical authority is necessary if we are to have substantial amounts of significant knowledge.
If the thesis succeeds, then the aim in education of imparting knowledge should have firm foundations. It should be clear that this support is overdue.