Papers by Georgi Gardiner
Syndicate Philosophy, 2016
In Reason and Explanation Ted Poston advances an explanatory coherentist view of justification, a... more In Reason and Explanation Ted Poston advances an explanatory coherentist view of justification, according to which the justification of a person’s beliefs consists in how well those beliefs fit within a virtuous explanatory system. Poston argues that epistemic conservatism, which holds that in at least some cases belief itself generates epistemic merit, plays an essential role in such an account. Poston’s version of conservatism holds that “mere belief” – belief in cases of empty symmetrical evidence, where the subject lacks any evidence for or against the claim – generates justification for that belief. In this essay I challenge epistemic conservatism; I focus on concerns arising from Poston’s account of conservatism. I then suggest Poston’s view does not need epistemic conservatism and conclude that his project would be more cohesive and compelling if he were to jettison conservatism.
The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, 2018
A skilled birdwatcher and a novice walk in the forest. 'That is a flycatcher' observes the birdwa... more A skilled birdwatcher and a novice walk in the forest. 'That is a flycatcher' observes the birdwatcher carefully, whilst the other randomly guesses 'That is a flycatcher'. Margaret reviews her understanding of thermodynamics and concludes 'I will pass the upcoming test'. Lauren worries about the test, but wishfully believes she will also pass. In each pair of cases the first person knows the relevant proposition, whilst the second person doesn't. Plausibly this is because in the first case of each pair, the person forms their belief through appropriate cognitive skills and capacities such as perception and good reasoning. In the second, the person does not use appropriate skills and capacities. Instead the belief is formed through guesswork and wishful thinking. As these cases indicate, epistemic character and capacities play an important role in coming to know. A belief that was formed irresponsibly, rashly, or without requisite epistemic abilities does not qualify as knowledge, even if true. Virtue epistemology holds we can understand the nature and value of knowledge through the notions of epistemic character and virtues (Baehr 2004; Baehr 2008; Battaly 2008; Turri, Alfano, and Greco 2017). Some virtue epistemologists posit that a true belief's being virtuously formed is a necessary condition on knowledge; a belief does not qualify as knowledge, in other words, unless formed through epistemic virtue. A stronger claim holds that a true belief's being virtuous formed is both necessary and sufficient for knowledge. 1 A natural first attempt to develop this view holds that a belief is known iff it is both true and virtuously formed. But this view soon faces problems. Consider a standard Gettier case (Gettier 1963), adapted from Chisholm (1966). Roddy the Shepherd. Roddy the shepherd observes a sheep-shaped object in normal lighting across a field. As a shepherd with keen eyesight, Roddy is usually able to recognize sheep. Roddy accordingly forms the belief 'there is a sheep in that part of the field'. But what Roddy sees is not a sheep but a sheep-shaped rock. Unbeknownst to Roddy, a sheep grazes behind the rock. This hidden sheep renders Roddy's belief true. Roddy's belief is both true and virtuously formed, but is not knowledge: the belief was only luckily true and Roddy's epistemic abilities were disconnected from the truth of his belief. This example suggests a belief's being both true and virtuously formed does not suffice for knowledge. The key response to Gettier cases examines why Roddy lacks knowledge, and applies this diagnosis to amend the account of knowledge. I articulated above two central defects in
The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, 2018
This essay is forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, eds. David Coady and... more This essay is forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, eds. David Coady and James Chase. Routledge. 1. The Golden Thread The presumption of innocence is a keystone of many criminal justice systems. In criminal trials, the defendant is formally considered "innocent until proven guilty." The burden of proof is on the state to prove the defendant committed all elements of the crime; the defendant, by contrast, need not prove his innocence. This asymmetry was famously dubbed "the golden thread" of criminal law. 1 Correspondingly in many legal systems, such as Anglo-American common law, the defendant in civil cases enjoys a presumption of non-culpability; the burden falls to the plaintiff to establish the facts of the case. A legal burden of proof generates a formal standard of proof. This is the standard to which the facts must be established to satisfy the burden. Formal standards include the "reasonable suspicion" standard in the US, which is required for a brief stop and search. 2 A slightly higher standard, "probable cause," is required for detentions, arrests and indictments, and for more substantial searches of persons and property. When quantified, the thresholds for satisfying the standards are typically glossed as around 10-50% and 30-60% confidence, respectively, that the person is participating in criminal activity (
Synthese, 2020
The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for ... more The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival 'relevant alternatives' framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where those consequences are significant if the belief is false. The second locus concerns whether beliefs themselves-regardless of action-can be risky, costly, or harmful. The third locus concerns epistemic risks we confront as social epistemic agents. I aim to motivate the relevant alternatives framework as a fruitful approach to the epistemology of risk. I first articulate a 'relevant alternatives' model of the relationship between stakes, evidence, and action. I then employ the relevant alternatives framework to undermine the motivation for moral encroachment. Finally, I argue the relevant alternatives framework illuminates epistemic phenomena such as gaslighting, conspiracy theories, and crying wolf, and I draw on the framework to diagnose the undue skepticism endemic to rape accusations.
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2019
Adversity can provide an opportunity to grow through forcing us to rework our understanding of th... more Adversity can provide an opportunity to grow through forcing us to rework our understanding of the world and our place in it. In this brief piece we suggest that one way adversity may help us grow is by fostering humility and, ultimately, wisdom. A psychologist renowned for studying self-control is said to have left valuable, breakable objects within his young children's reach. His reason? He believed giving children the opportunity to exercise self-control would help them develop it. Along the same lines, we wonder if adversity provides an opportunity to exercise and develop humility. Adversity confronts us with our limitations-be they limits of what we know and are able to explain, and limits of what we can control. Adversity therefore provides a chance to reckon with, properly attend to, and own these limits (Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, & Howard-Snyder, 2017). Understanding one's limits is critical to humility and it is also important for wisdom because to the degree that a person has an inaccurate view of her limits, that person is at risk for making unwise decisions based on the overestimation (or sometimes underestimation) of her knowledge or abilities. In order to be wise, it is necessary to respond appropriately to our many limitations (Tiberius, 2016). Indeed, scholars agree that acknowledging one's limitations relates to wisdom (e.g., see Bortolotti, 2011; Tiberius, 2016; Walsh, 2015), with some placing it at the core of wise reasoning (Grossmann & Kross, 2012). However, theory and research have not clarified exactly how humility and wisdom relate. Perhaps, as we suggest, seeing one's limits more clearly in the form of humility can set the stage for greater wisdom in the future. Or, perhaps humility is both a precursor to and a component of wisdom, similar to reflection (Westrate & Glück, 2017). Another possibility is that wiser people are more apt to respond with humility to various circumstances, including adverse ones.
Synthese Library, 2018
Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral fa... more Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as 'that woman is probably an administrative assistant'-based on the evidence that most women employees at the firm are administrative assistantsmotivate moral encroachment. I then describe weaknesses of moral encroachment. Finally I explain how we can countenance the moral properties of such beliefs without endorsing moral encroachment, and I argue that the moral status of such beliefs cannot be evaluated independently from the understanding in which they are embedded. Stroud doubts the third option is viable, and dubs it 'unattractive' and 'dubiously available'. 6 Epistemic norms, Stroud holds, seem to answer to attaining the truth and avoiding falsehood, reflecting evidential considerations, and aiming at knowledge and understanding. The epistemic domain is independent from other pursuits, such as friendship or happiness. 7 3
Inquiry, 2015
Market is public place of people have sales, also have to earn to give productive and healthy env... more Market is public place of people have sales, also have to earn to give productive and healthy environment for merchant, organizer of market, and also buyer.sanitation environment in market is very important remember market be a place for propagation of disease vector. Ugly market sanitation will also affecting ugly for health. This research aims is to know description of condition facilities and basic facilities of sanitationi of market of Shopping Centre in Sub-District Of Kayubulan District Of Limboto Gorontalo's Regency in Year 2012. This research is research descriptive survey. Population in this research are Market of Shopping Centre which consist of 61 wet food materials kiosk, 59 dry merchandise kiosk, 40 place sale of matured food and also 6 toilet. The example is the overall of population unit. Data is analysed by description then is presented in table and graph and then percentage. Research result use inspection sheet obtained pursuant to healh minister's regulation of RI about environment health clauses of market, that condition wet food materials kiosk 5 (8 %) kiosk is including in up to standard category, while 56 (92%) including in ineligible category. Dry merchandise kiosk 55 (93%) up to standard, 4 (7%) ineligibility. Matured Food kiosk 33(83%) up to standard and 7 (17%) ineligibility. Toilet 100% ineligibility health and environment. Expected to merchant and organizer of market to cooperate to provide facilities and basic facilities of sanitasi market and also paying attention environment as preventive effort the happening of disease base on environment.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2016
In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant'... more In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant's guilt. The most widely used and important standard of proof for criminal conviction is the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt' standard. But what legitimates this standard, rather than an alternative? One view holds the standard of proof should be determined or justified – at least in large part – by its consequences. In this spirit, Laudan uses crime statistics to estimate risks the average citizen runs of being violently victimised and falsely convicted. He argues that since the former risk is higher, and the aggregate harms are worse, the standard of proof should be substantially lowered. He presents a formula for calculating the preferred standard. In this article I outline various ways Laudan's uses of crime statistics are flawed, and explain how he substantially overestimates risks of victimhood and underestimates costs of false convictions. I also explain why his formula is mistaken, and illuminate consequences Laudan neglects. I conclude that, even if consequences determine the appropriate standard of proof, Laudan's arguments fail to show the standard is too high. I conclude by suggesting that the inadequacies of Laudan's reasoning might be good news for consequence-based justifications of the standard of proof.
Purposeful Epistemology, 2015
The teleological approach to an epistemic concept investigates it by asking questions such as 'wh... more The teleological approach to an epistemic concept investigates it by asking questions such as 'what is the purpose of the concept?', 'What role has it played in the past?', or 'If we imagine a society without the concept, why would they feel the need to invent it?' The idea behind the teleological approach is that examining the function of the concept illuminates the contours of the concept itself. This approach is a relatively new development in epistemology, and as yet there are few works examining it. This paper aims to fill this gap and engender further understanding of the teleological method. I first contrast the teleological method with more orthodox approaches in epistemology. I then draw a three-way taxonomy of different kinds of teleological approach and provide an example of each kind. The teleological approach is often presented as antithetical to the more orthodox approaches in epistemology, and so in competition with them. I demur. I argue that the methods can be fruitfully combined in epistemological theorising; in the final section I suggest specific ways the teleological approach can be incorporated alongside more orthodox methods in a general methodological reflective equilibrium. 1 Klemens Kappel has written a useful and insightful paper on teleologies in epistemology, see Kappel (2010). Kusch (2009) was also helpful in constructing my taxonomy. See also Craig (2007), Fricker (1998: esp. section three) for penetrating discussion about the method.
Episteme, 2013
Conciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that when an agent encounters peer disagreement she ... more Conciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that when an agent encounters peer disagreement she should conciliate by adjusting her doxastic attitude towards that of her peer. In this paper I distinguish different ways conciliation can be understood and argue that the way conciliationism is typically understood violates the principle of commutativity of evidence. Commutativity of evidence holds that the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what it is reasonable to believe based on that evidence. I argue that when an agent encounters more than one peer, and applies the process of conciliation serially, the order she encounters the peers influences the resulting credence. I argue this is a problem for conciliatory views of disagreement, and suggest some responses available to advocates of conciliation.
Acta Analytica, 2012
Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as kno... more Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as knowledge and true belief. I explain the value of understanding via a seemingly unrelated topic, the implausibility of veritism. Veritism holds that true belief is the sole ultimate epistemic good and all other epistemic goods derive their value from the epistemic value of true belief. Veritism entails that if you have a true belief that p, you have all the epistemic good qua p. Veritism is a plausible and widely held view; I argue that it is untenable. I argue that integration among beliefs possesses epistemic value independent from the good of true belief, and so has value veritism cannot account for. I argue further that this integration among beliefs comprises the distinctive epistemic value of understanding.
Understanding consists in integration and coherence amongst beliefs, the individual's grasping of... more Understanding consists in integration and coherence amongst beliefs, the individual's grasping of these connections, and the explanatory power of the individual's representations of the world. Understanding is under-theorised in contemporary epistemology. Most epistemological research focuses on knowledge, and related epistemic kinds such as knowledge-relevant justification. This dissertation begins by motivating the value of thinking about understanding in epistemology. This is the aim of section A, 'Understanding and Value'.
An account of the nature of knowledge must explain the value of knowledge. I argue that modal con... more An account of the nature of knowledge must explain the value of knowledge. I argue that modal conditions, such as safety and sensitivity, do not confer value on a belief and so any account of knowledge that posits a modal condition as a fundamental constituent cannot vindicate widely held claims about the value of knowledge. I explain the implications of this for epistemology: We must either eschew modal conditions as a fundamental constituent of knowledge, or retain the modal conditions but concede that knowledge is not more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge. This second horn—concluding that knowledge has no distinctive value—is unappealing since it renders puzzling why so much epistemological theorising focuses on knowledge, and why knowledge seems so important. Introduction Epistemology sometimes aims to understand the nature of knowledge by finding the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions which capture our judgements about the extension of kno...
Many jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict the use of evidence about a defendant’s characte... more Many jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict the use of evidence about a defendant’s character to prove legal culpability. Situationists, who argue that conduct is largely determined by situational features rather than character, can easily defend this prohibition. According to situationism, character evidence is misleading or paltry evidence. But proscriptions on character evidence seem harder to justify on virtue ethical accounts. It appears that excluding character evidence either denies the centrality of character for explaining conduct—the situationist position—or omits probative evidence. Situationism, after all, is antithetical to virtue ethics. This essay provides a virtue ethical defense of character evidence exclusion rules. We show that existing virtue ethical rebuttals to situationism themselves support prohibitions on character evidence; even if behavior arises from stable character traits, character evidence should be prohibited. In building our case, we provide a ...
The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials
Midwest Studies in Philosophy
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European Journal of Philosophy
Philosophy
Many theorists hold that outright verdicts based on bare statistical evidence are unwarranted. Ba... more Many theorists hold that outright verdicts based on bare statistical evidence are unwarranted. Bare statistical evidence may support high credence, on these views, but does not support outright belief or legal verdicts of culpability. The vignettes that constitute the lottery paradox and the proof paradox are marshalled to support this claim. Some theorists argue, furthermore, that examples of profiling also indicate that bare statistical evidence is insufficient for warranting outright verdicts.I examine Pritchard's and Buchak's treatments of these three kinds of case. Pritchard argues that his safety condition explains the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts in each of the three cases, while Buchak argues that her treatment of the distinction between credence and belief explains this. In these discussions the three kinds of cases – lottery, proof paradox, and profiling – are treated alike. The cases are taken to exhibit the same epistemic featu...
Philosophy
Legal practice is up to its neck in epistemology. Legal practice involves proof, evidence, doubt,... more Legal practice is up to its neck in epistemology. Legal practice involves proof, evidence, doubt, testimony, arguments, witnesses, experts, and so on. The epistemology of legal practice, often referred to as legal epistemology, examines epistemological questions raised by legal practice. It can also apply legal insights to illuminating perennial epistemological problems. Legal epistemology investigates whether standards of proof, such as “beyond reasonable doubt” or “preponderance of evidence,” are best understood as credences, statistical likelihoods, or as qualitative standards. It asks what, if anything, legitimates these standards and in what ways legal standards of proof should be sensitive to practical factors. Legal epistemology examines when and why evidence has a probative value; that is, it investigates how evidence makes a litigated claim more likely. It illuminates what reasons—moral, political, economic, practical, epistemic—justify excluding probative evidence. It ques...
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Papers by Georgi Gardiner