Papers by Allison Stewart
Planning Perspectives, 2015
The rhetoric employed when cities bid for the right to host mega-events like the Olympic Games su... more The rhetoric employed when cities bid for the right to host mega-events like the Olympic Games suggests that benefits will include improved infrastructure, investment in city infrastructure and regeneration of neglected urban areas. However, the legacy of megaevents has historically been mixed; while some cities have been recognised for their development efforts, many others have been vilified for their subsequent actions, or lack thereof. The term legacy itself is, however, problematic; it presents a one-sided view of positive effects, without adequate consideration of downside risk in bidding. This research draws on interviews from people involved in six different mega-events, and illustrates the challenges of addressing legacy with a variety of examples, including a detailed look at the London 2012 Olympic Games' legacy negotiations regarding the use of the Olympic Stadium to gain insight into how legacy opportunities are developed. Using the concept of uncomfortable knowledge, the dispute over the legacy use of the Olympic Stadium is used to examine the mixed perspectives of the different parties involved in decisions over mega-event legacies. We conclude by suggesting that unacknowledged interests, which remain constructively ambiguous during the bidding phase, create the opportunity for uncomfortable knowledge to arise in the planning process. The use of uncomfortable knowledge as a theoretical lens provides a useful construct to focus on the boundaries and limitations of knowledge in planning mega-events.
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2019
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2018
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
Given that Olympic Games held over the past decade each have cost USD 8.9 billion on average, the... more Given that Olympic Games held over the past decade each have cost USD 8.9 billion on average, the size and financial risks of the Games warrant study. The objectives of the Oxford Olympics study are to (1) establish the actual outturn costs of previous Olympic Games in a manner where cost can consistently be compared across Games; (2) establish cost overruns for previous Games, i.e., the degree to which final outturn costs reflect projected budgets at the bid stage, again in a way that allows comparison across Games; (3) test whether the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program has reduced cost risk for the Games, and, finally, (4) benchmark cost and cost overrun for the Rio 2016 Olympics against previous Games. The main contribution of the Oxford study is to establish a phenomenology of cost and cost overrun at the Olympics, which allows consistent and systematic comparison across Games. This has not been done before. Main findings of the study are, first, that average actual outturn cost for Summer Games is USD 5.2 billion (2015 level), and USD 3.1 billion for Winter Games. The most costly Summer Games to date are London 2012 at USD 15 billion; the most costly Winter Games Sochi 2014 at USD 21.9 billion. The numbers cover the period 1960-2016 and include only sports-related costs, i.e., wider capital costs for general infrastructure, which are often larger than sports-related costs, have been excluded. Second, at 156 percent in real terms, the Olympics have the highest average cost overrun of any type of megaproject. Moreover, cost overrun is found in all Games, without exception; for no other type of megaproject is this the case. 47 percent of Games have cost overruns above 100 percent. The largest cost overrun for Summer Games was found for Montreal 1976 at 720 percent, followed by Barcelona 1992 at 266 percent. For Winter Games the largest cost overrun was 324 percent for Lake Placid 1980, followed by Sochi 2014 at 289 percent. Third, the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program appears to be successful in reducing cost risk for the Games. The difference in cost overrun before (166 percent) and after (51 percent) the program began is statistically significant. Fourth, and finally, the Rio 2016 Games, at a cost of USD 4.6 billion, appear to be on track to reverse the high expenditures of London 2012 and Sochi 2014 and deliver a Summer Games at the median cost for such Games. The cost overrun for Rio-at 51 percent in real terms, or USD 1.6 billion-is the same as the median cost overrun for other Games since 1999. Given the above results, for a city and nation to decide to stage the Olympic Games is to decide to take on one of the most costly and financially most risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril.
This paper gives an overview of good and bad practice for understanding and curbing cost overrun ... more This paper gives an overview of good and bad practice for understanding and curbing cost overrun in large capital investment projects, with a critique of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018) as point of departure. Good practice entails: (a) Consistent definition and measurement of overrun; in contrast to mixing inconsistent baselines, price levels, etc. (b) Data collection that includes all valid and reliable data; as opposed to including idiosyncratically sampled data, data with removed outliers, non-valid data from consultancies, etc. (c) Recognition that cost overrun is systemically fat-tailed; in contrast to understanding overrun in terms of error and randomness. (d) Acknowledgment that the root cause of cost overrun is behavioral bias; in contrast to explanations in terms of scope changes, complexity, etc. (e) De-biasing cost estimates with reference class forecasting or similar methods based in behavioral science; as opposed to conventional methods of estimation, with their century-long track record of inaccuracy and systemic bias. Bad practice is characterized by violating at least one of these five points. Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui violate all five. In so doing, they produce an exceptionally useful and comprehensive catalog of the many pitfalls that exist, and must be avoided, for properly understanding and curbing cost overrun.
Ssrn Electronic Journal, Jun 1, 2012
Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question ... more Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question ... more Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT Recent studies have suggested that temporary geographical proximity in the form of face-... more ABSTRACT Recent studies have suggested that temporary geographical proximity in the form of face-to-face contact enhances learning. On the basis of a sample of individuals (n= 294) involved in knowledge transfer activities in the Olympic Games, this paper specifies regression models to predict learning. It finds that temporary geographical proximity acts as a rather weak predictor, although its explanatory value improves when coupled with organised proximity. Even then, it is only associated with tacit, not with explicit, mechanisms of learning and the effect disappears when controlling for other predictors. The paper concludes, however, that temporary geographical proximity might have an effect on learning that is mediated through other variables.
International Journal of Project Management, 2013
This paper proposes that projects and programmes can be empirically distinguished by the way in w... more This paper proposes that projects and programmes can be empirically distinguished by the way in which they are associated with expectations and evaluations of success and failure. Support for the proposition is grounded in analysis of over sixteen hundred examples of occurrences of the terms 'project' and 'programme' with 'success' and 'failure' derived from the Oxford English Corpus (OEC). The OEC is a structured and coded database of over two billion words of naturally occurring English collected from the World Wide Web. The analysis highlights that project and programme are each modified by the terms 'success' and 'failure' in significantly different ways, indicating that they are conceptually distinct phenomena. These findings imply that academics must be cautious in their use of language in investigations of project and programme evaluations, and that practitioners should consider the implications of considering programmes as 'scaled-up' projects, given their propensity to different evaluation outcomes.
- At an average cost overrun of 156% in real terms, the Olympics have the highest cost overrun of... more - At an average cost overrun of 156% in real terms, the Olympics have the highest cost overrun of any type of megaproject in the world.
- The Games are the only type of megaproject where delivery has never been on budget.
- Nearly half (47%) of all Games exceed their budget by more than 100%.
- The average sports-related cost of hosting the Games over the past decade has been $8.9 billion.
- The most expensive Summer Games to date was London 2012 at $15 billion; the most expensive Winter Games was Sochi 2014 at $22 billion.
- Host governments and the IOC have not been transparent about the true cost and cost overrun of the Games. For example, the UK government claimed that the London Games came in under budget, but the real cost overrun for London was 76% or $6.5 billion.
- The Rio 2016 Games, at a cost of USD 4.6 billion, appear to be on track to reverse the high expenditures of London 2012 and Sochi 2014 and deliver a Summer Games at the median cost for such Games. The cost overrun for Rio – at 51 percent in real terms, or USD 1.6 billion – is the same as the median cost overrun for other Games since 1999.
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Papers by Allison Stewart
- The Games are the only type of megaproject where delivery has never been on budget.
- Nearly half (47%) of all Games exceed their budget by more than 100%.
- The average sports-related cost of hosting the Games over the past decade has been $8.9 billion.
- The most expensive Summer Games to date was London 2012 at $15 billion; the most expensive Winter Games was Sochi 2014 at $22 billion.
- Host governments and the IOC have not been transparent about the true cost and cost overrun of the Games. For example, the UK government claimed that the London Games came in under budget, but the real cost overrun for London was 76% or $6.5 billion.
- The Rio 2016 Games, at a cost of USD 4.6 billion, appear to be on track to reverse the high expenditures of London 2012 and Sochi 2014 and deliver a Summer Games at the median cost for such Games. The cost overrun for Rio – at 51 percent in real terms, or USD 1.6 billion – is the same as the median cost overrun for other Games since 1999.
- The Games are the only type of megaproject where delivery has never been on budget.
- Nearly half (47%) of all Games exceed their budget by more than 100%.
- The average sports-related cost of hosting the Games over the past decade has been $8.9 billion.
- The most expensive Summer Games to date was London 2012 at $15 billion; the most expensive Winter Games was Sochi 2014 at $22 billion.
- Host governments and the IOC have not been transparent about the true cost and cost overrun of the Games. For example, the UK government claimed that the London Games came in under budget, but the real cost overrun for London was 76% or $6.5 billion.
- The Rio 2016 Games, at a cost of USD 4.6 billion, appear to be on track to reverse the high expenditures of London 2012 and Sochi 2014 and deliver a Summer Games at the median cost for such Games. The cost overrun for Rio – at 51 percent in real terms, or USD 1.6 billion – is the same as the median cost overrun for other Games since 1999.