Books by Sean McConnell
Extensively trained as a philosopher, Cicero was also a working politician with a keen awareness ... more Extensively trained as a philosopher, Cicero was also a working politician with a keen awareness of the distance between pure intellectual endeavor and effective strategies of persuasion. This volume explores a series of interrelated problems in his works, from the use of emotion, self-correction, and even fiction in intellectual inquiry, to the motives of political agents and the morality of political arguments, to the means of justifying the use of force in international relations. It features close readings of works from all periods of Cicero's philosophical career, from the threshold of Rome's civil war to the year following the assassination of Julius Caesar. For a richer body of evidence, the volume also makes use of material from Cicero's personal letters and political speeches. Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy will be essential reading not only in Roman philosophy but also for the political and rhetorical culture of the Roman Republic.
Cicero's letters are saturated with learned philosophical allusions and arguments. This innovativ... more Cicero's letters are saturated with learned philosophical allusions and arguments. This innovative study shows just how fundamental these are for understanding Cicero's philosophical activities and for explaining the enduring interest of his ethical and political thought. Dr McConnell draws particular attention to Cicero's treatment of Plato's Seventh Letter and his views on the relationship between philosophy and politics. He also illustrates the various ways in which Cicero finds philosophy an appealing and effective mode of self-presentation and a congenial, pointed medium for talking to his peers about ethical and political concerns. The book offers a range of fresh insights into the impressive scope and sophistication of Cicero's epistolary and philosophical practice and the vibrancy of the philosophical environment of the first century BC. A new picture emerges of Cicero the philosopher and philosophy's place in Roman political culture.
Papers by Sean McConnell
Polis: The journal for Greek and Roman political thought, 2023
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a la... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a law that votes are to be known by the best citizens (the optimates) but free to the common people (the plebs) (3.10). This law, Cicero claims, grants ‘the appearance of liberty’ (libertatis species), preserves the authority (auctoritas) of the optimates, and promotes harmony between the classes (3.39). The law and the precise meaning of libertatis species remain opaque even with the lengthy commentary (3.33–9), and much scholarly debate and discussion has arisen as a result—most of it very critical of Cicero’s proposal and the arguments supporting it. This paper offers a fresh analysis of the voting law that is more charitable to Cicero. It unpacks the full details of the voting system that is developed in De legibus and sheds new light on developments in Cicero’s thinking about the best state.
Mnemosyne, 2023
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
The manuscripts of De officiis all record something ... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
The manuscripts of De officiis all record something strange at 1.148: Cicero says that the philosophers Socrates and Aristippus had exceptional licence to flout social custom and convention owing to their “great and divine good qualities” (magna et divina bona). There are no worries about Socrates, but the example of Aristippus seems preposterous. This paper makes the following argument: (1) elsewhere Cicero defines divina bona in such a way to exclude hedonists; this should rule out crediting Aristippus with magna et divina bona alongside Socrates; (2) all scholarly efforts to account for the presence of Aristippus at 1.148 fail to convince; (3) the name Aristippus at 1.148 should, therefore, be remedied; (4) there are excellent philosophical reasons to think that Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates who is credited with setting in motion the Cynic philosophical tradition, is the name that Cicero wrote or should have written in the original.
Antichthon, 2022
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In his letters to Lucius Papirius Paetus from 46 BC ... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In his letters to Lucius Papirius Paetus from 46 BC Cicero provides striking reports on his thoughts and activities as he seeks to accommodate himself to the new political realities following Caesar’s decisive victory over the republican forces in Africa. In these letters Cicero also engages in a kind of performative role-playing: he casts himself variously as a teacher of oratory to two of Caesar’s close associates (Hirtius and Dolabella), as a bon vivant immersed in the Caesarian social scene, and as a man of moral principle who measures himself against the model of the wise man. Philosophical jokes, allusions, and arguments all figure prominently: Cicero is evidently drawing on a rich range of philosophical material to frame his actions and how he should be judged. This paper brings out the full significance of these underlying philosophical frameworks and makes clear the ways in which Cicero exploits the resources of the Greek philosophical tradition in his self-fashioning in the letters to Paetus.
Mnemosyne, 2019
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
This paper examines two letters between Cicero and Gai... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
This paper examines two letters between Cicero and Gaius Cassius Longinus in which they critically discuss and denigrate the translation of Epicurus’ term εἴδωλον as spectrum by an Epicurean named Catius. It first offers a new positive account for why Catius made his choice of translation, and it then outlines the full reasons for why Cicero and Cassius found the translation unsatisfying.
Antichthon, 2018
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
This paper outlines the full details of Lucretius’ t... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
This paper outlines the full details of Lucretius’ treatment of parental love. It shows that Lucretius is faithful to Epicurus’ notorious claim that parental love is not natural: in addition to orthodox Epicurean hedonist concerns, Lucretius asserts that children do not “belong to” their parents by nature; as such, even though parental love is now ubiquitous and indeed a cultural norm, there is no basis for the naturalness of parental love. This model of the relationship between parents and children does not, however, apply in the case of certain animals, who do have natural parental love for their offspring. Focusing on two famous scenes, the sacrifice of Iphigenia and the forlorn heifer seeking her sacrificed calf, the paper argues that by highlighting the fragility of human parental love in comparison to that of the animals Lucretius brings to his Roman readers’ attention the relative weakness of the familial ties that bond human beings together, and at the same time he emphasizes the need to maintain them if social and political concord, with all its benefits, is to continue. It transpires that unlocking the details of Lucretius’ treatment of parental love brings a key lesson of the poem into clearer focus.
The Classical Journal, 2017
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
This paper offers a fresh interpretation of the role... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
This paper offers a fresh interpretation of the role played by the Dream of Scipio in Cicero’s De re publica. It explores Cicero’s key distinction between the cosmic and the local levels of statesmanship and the problems he sees with localism, and it details fully for the first time the importance that Cicero attached to the virtue of magnitudo animi (“greatness of soul”). The paper makes the case that in De re publica Cicero promotes his own innovative cosmic model of politics, in which magnitudo animi is developed through an educational process situated in the traditional Roman mos maiorum.
The Classical Quarterly, 2017
Classical Quarterly 67: 149-162. This is an uncorrected pre-proof version
Epicurus denies that... more Classical Quarterly 67: 149-162. This is an uncorrected pre-proof version
Epicurus denies that human beings have natural parental love for their children, and his account of the development of justice and human political community does not involve any natural affinity between human beings in general, but rather a form of the social contract. The Stoics to the contrary assert that parental love is natural; and, moreover, they maintain that natural parental love is the first principle of social οἰκείωσις, which provides the basis for the naturalness of justice and human political community. The Stoics are, therefore, obliged to refute Epicurus’ denial of the naturalness of parental love in order to support their own theory of social οἰκείωσις; and we have good evidence for the arguments that they employed against the Epicureans on this account. Likewise the Epicureans are obliged not only to defend their own position but also to undermine the competing Stoic theory of social οἰκείωσις; and the foundational premise of a natural bond between parent and child is an obvious target. However, beyond dogmatically restating Epicurus’ denial of natural parental love, the evidence for the Epicurean line of attack against the Stoics is currently unclear. In this paper I argue that we can go some way to uncovering it via an analysis of some fragmentary passages from an unidentified work of the Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia (c. 150–75 B.C.) that contain a puzzling discussion of Epicurus’ stance on parental love.
Classical Philology, 2017
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία or greatness of soul is prom... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία or greatness of soul is prominent in the works of Aristotle as well as in the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions. However, mention of μεγαλοψυχία is extremely rare in our surviving evidence for the Epicurean school. In this paper I reconstruct a viable Epicurean position on μεγαλοψυχία. I argue that the Epicureans have a distinctive account of the virtue that is compatible with their hedonist ethics, and that can also be seen as a reaction to Aristotle. I also demonstrate that the Epicurean account relates closely to their critical engagement with the Cynics and their emphasis on the importance of friendship and generosity in the good life.
Acta Classica, 2015
There has been a large amount of scholarly controversy over the precise nature of the motivations... more There has been a large amount of scholarly controversy over the precise nature of the motivations at play in the Epicurean accounts of justice and friendship, and whether any form of altruism or other-concern is compatible with Epicurean hedonist ethics. This paper addresses this tension between self- and other-concern from a novel angle, by examining the motivations behind Epicurean educational practice. What emerges is a rather complex motivational picture that reaffirms the Epicureans' philosophical commitment to egoism but at the same time shows it to be more nuanced and sensitive than one might expect given their theoretical postulates and the reaction of ancient critics such as Cicero.
Attached is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Ancient Philosophy, 2015
The anonymous anti-hedonists (οἱ δυσχερεῖς) at Philebus 44a–53c make three bold claims: (1) there... more The anonymous anti-hedonists (οἱ δυσχερεῖς) at Philebus 44a–53c make three bold claims: (1) there are in fact no such things as pleasures; (2) what the hedonist followers of Philebus call pleasure is really nothing but escape from pain; (3) there is nothing healthy in pleasure (pleasure is never a good). The δυσχερεῖς are commonly identified with Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and his successor as head of the Academy. In this paper I first argue that this widely favoured view should be rejected. I then make the case that the δυσχερεῖς should instead be identified with the Socratic philosopher Antisthenes, a famous contemporary rival of Plato whose distinctive views on pleasure and the best life form the basis for the later Cynic and Stoic traditions. This identification helps us understand better certain aspects of the argument in the Philebus, in particular the character Socrates’ focus on philosophical method when critiquing the anti-hedonist position of the δυσχερεῖς.
Attached is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2012
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Cicero's general interest in Dicaearchus’ ethical an... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Cicero's general interest in Dicaearchus’ ethical and political thought can be detected in his letters to Atticus and De legibus. One can also infer from De divinatione that Dicaearchus was a source for Cicero’s De republica. At present, however, we do not possess a clear and detailed picture of Dicaearchus’ influence on Cicero’s own ethical and political thought. Scholars have been hindered by a lack of explicit evidence concerning the nature of Dicaearchus’ philosophical arguments as well as Cicero’s failure to mention Dicaearchus by name in the extant parts of De republica. In this paper I argue that, despite these obstacles, we can construct a positive account of the nature and extent of Dicaearchus’ influence that offers new insights into key aspects of Cicero’s philosophical thought and practice.
Phoenix, 2012
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
I reconstruct the Epicurean philosophical position o... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
I reconstruct the Epicurean philosophical position on civil strife and examine Lucretius’ engagement with the topic against it. I challenge the scholarly consensus and argue that there is in fact no compulsion to explain Lucretius’ concern with civil strife by appeal to a preoccupation with contemporary events.
Je reconstruis la position e ́picurienne contre la guerre civile et j’analyse l’opinion de Lucre`ce a` ce sujet. Je conteste le consensus universitaire en soutenant qu’il n’y a en fait aucune ne ́cessite ́ de recourir aux e ́ve`nements contemporains pour expliquer l’inte ́reˆt de Lucre`ce pour la guerre civile.
Cambridge Classical Journal, 2010
Diogenes Laertius lists in his catalogue of Epicurus' works (10.28) a treatise On Kingship, whi... more Diogenes Laertius lists in his catalogue of Epicurus' works (10.28) a treatise On Kingship, which is unfortunately no longer extant. Owing to the Epicureans' antipathy to politics, such a work might be viewed with surprise and presumed to be virulently negative in outlook. Indeed, Plutarch reports that the Epicureans wrote on kingship only to ward people away from living in the company of kings (.Adv. Col. 1127a) and that they maintained that to be king oneselfwas a terrible mistake [Adv. Col. ii25c-d). However, the scattered evidence that remains suggests the Epicurean views on kingship were both nuanced and sophisticated. In this paper I seek to reconstruct a viable account of the Epicurean position on kingship.
British Journal of Aesthetics, 2008
A number of recent studies have claimed to explain how Kant can or cannot ac- commodate pure judg... more A number of recent studies have claimed to explain how Kant can or cannot ac- commodate pure judgements of ugliness in his aesthetic theory. In this paper I critically review the arguments on each side of the debate and then develop a new account of how Kant might explain the pure judgement of the ugly, name- ly, by appeal to the ‘more or less’ harmonious free play of the faculties. Some implications and applications of such an explanation are then explored, including a rethink of the nature of beauty and ugliness.
Book Chapters by Sean McConnell
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In his philosophical works Cicero addresses a number... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In his philosophical works Cicero addresses a number of questions concerning the role of old men in politics, most obviously in his dialogue De senectute of 44 BCE. How best should the old participate in politics and the wider community—what, if anything, do the old have to offer that is special or unique? How should the generations fit together in the body politic, and should age be a factor in the structural organisation of states? Should the old rule? Through a close reading of De senectute, I argue: (1) Cicero develops a coherent line on the special political role of old men, which can be seen as a call to arms in the contemporary Roman political context; and (2) this line is not just a restatement of traditional Roman ideals: Cicero draws on and adapts some of the most important arguments from Plato’s Republic and his earlier De re publica when addressing these questions regarding the role of old men in politics.
This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In his discussion of decorum Cicero supposes that mo... more This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
In his discussion of decorum Cicero supposes that most people would agree to the general principle that in our speech, bodily deportment, and actions we should avoid giving offense to others and should avoid generating feelings of disgust or revulsion. This is because we possess a sense of shame or verecundia. The particular details are very culture-specific: customs and conventions largely set the parameters of verecundia, and we do well to follow them. Cicero also admits that philosophical figures often flout established customs and conventions: he points to Socrates, who is justified in doing so owing to his great and godlike virtue, and the Cynics, who are not justified in doing so at all (1.148). He then sets out a bold thesis: ‘Indeed the reasoning of the Cynics must be rejected absolutely; for it is inimical to a sense of shame (verecundia), without which nothing can be upright (rectum), nothing honourable (honestum)’. For the Cynics, verecundia is not natural; hence we are justified in flouting customs and conventions. Cicero develops a counter-argument: the source of shame or verecundia is indeed natural. I explore his argument for this thesis (which appears at 1.126ff.) and assess his critique of the Cynics.
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Books by Sean McConnell
Papers by Sean McConnell
In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a law that votes are to be known by the best citizens (the optimates) but free to the common people (the plebs) (3.10). This law, Cicero claims, grants ‘the appearance of liberty’ (libertatis species), preserves the authority (auctoritas) of the optimates, and promotes harmony between the classes (3.39). The law and the precise meaning of libertatis species remain opaque even with the lengthy commentary (3.33–9), and much scholarly debate and discussion has arisen as a result—most of it very critical of Cicero’s proposal and the arguments supporting it. This paper offers a fresh analysis of the voting law that is more charitable to Cicero. It unpacks the full details of the voting system that is developed in De legibus and sheds new light on developments in Cicero’s thinking about the best state.
The manuscripts of De officiis all record something strange at 1.148: Cicero says that the philosophers Socrates and Aristippus had exceptional licence to flout social custom and convention owing to their “great and divine good qualities” (magna et divina bona). There are no worries about Socrates, but the example of Aristippus seems preposterous. This paper makes the following argument: (1) elsewhere Cicero defines divina bona in such a way to exclude hedonists; this should rule out crediting Aristippus with magna et divina bona alongside Socrates; (2) all scholarly efforts to account for the presence of Aristippus at 1.148 fail to convince; (3) the name Aristippus at 1.148 should, therefore, be remedied; (4) there are excellent philosophical reasons to think that Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates who is credited with setting in motion the Cynic philosophical tradition, is the name that Cicero wrote or should have written in the original.
In his letters to Lucius Papirius Paetus from 46 BC Cicero provides striking reports on his thoughts and activities as he seeks to accommodate himself to the new political realities following Caesar’s decisive victory over the republican forces in Africa. In these letters Cicero also engages in a kind of performative role-playing: he casts himself variously as a teacher of oratory to two of Caesar’s close associates (Hirtius and Dolabella), as a bon vivant immersed in the Caesarian social scene, and as a man of moral principle who measures himself against the model of the wise man. Philosophical jokes, allusions, and arguments all figure prominently: Cicero is evidently drawing on a rich range of philosophical material to frame his actions and how he should be judged. This paper brings out the full significance of these underlying philosophical frameworks and makes clear the ways in which Cicero exploits the resources of the Greek philosophical tradition in his self-fashioning in the letters to Paetus.
This paper examines two letters between Cicero and Gaius Cassius Longinus in which they critically discuss and denigrate the translation of Epicurus’ term εἴδωλον as spectrum by an Epicurean named Catius. It first offers a new positive account for why Catius made his choice of translation, and it then outlines the full reasons for why Cicero and Cassius found the translation unsatisfying.
This paper outlines the full details of Lucretius’ treatment of parental love. It shows that Lucretius is faithful to Epicurus’ notorious claim that parental love is not natural: in addition to orthodox Epicurean hedonist concerns, Lucretius asserts that children do not “belong to” their parents by nature; as such, even though parental love is now ubiquitous and indeed a cultural norm, there is no basis for the naturalness of parental love. This model of the relationship between parents and children does not, however, apply in the case of certain animals, who do have natural parental love for their offspring. Focusing on two famous scenes, the sacrifice of Iphigenia and the forlorn heifer seeking her sacrificed calf, the paper argues that by highlighting the fragility of human parental love in comparison to that of the animals Lucretius brings to his Roman readers’ attention the relative weakness of the familial ties that bond human beings together, and at the same time he emphasizes the need to maintain them if social and political concord, with all its benefits, is to continue. It transpires that unlocking the details of Lucretius’ treatment of parental love brings a key lesson of the poem into clearer focus.
This paper offers a fresh interpretation of the role played by the Dream of Scipio in Cicero’s De re publica. It explores Cicero’s key distinction between the cosmic and the local levels of statesmanship and the problems he sees with localism, and it details fully for the first time the importance that Cicero attached to the virtue of magnitudo animi (“greatness of soul”). The paper makes the case that in De re publica Cicero promotes his own innovative cosmic model of politics, in which magnitudo animi is developed through an educational process situated in the traditional Roman mos maiorum.
Epicurus denies that human beings have natural parental love for their children, and his account of the development of justice and human political community does not involve any natural affinity between human beings in general, but rather a form of the social contract. The Stoics to the contrary assert that parental love is natural; and, moreover, they maintain that natural parental love is the first principle of social οἰκείωσις, which provides the basis for the naturalness of justice and human political community. The Stoics are, therefore, obliged to refute Epicurus’ denial of the naturalness of parental love in order to support their own theory of social οἰκείωσις; and we have good evidence for the arguments that they employed against the Epicureans on this account. Likewise the Epicureans are obliged not only to defend their own position but also to undermine the competing Stoic theory of social οἰκείωσις; and the foundational premise of a natural bond between parent and child is an obvious target. However, beyond dogmatically restating Epicurus’ denial of natural parental love, the evidence for the Epicurean line of attack against the Stoics is currently unclear. In this paper I argue that we can go some way to uncovering it via an analysis of some fragmentary passages from an unidentified work of the Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia (c. 150–75 B.C.) that contain a puzzling discussion of Epicurus’ stance on parental love.
The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία or greatness of soul is prominent in the works of Aristotle as well as in the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions. However, mention of μεγαλοψυχία is extremely rare in our surviving evidence for the Epicurean school. In this paper I reconstruct a viable Epicurean position on μεγαλοψυχία. I argue that the Epicureans have a distinctive account of the virtue that is compatible with their hedonist ethics, and that can also be seen as a reaction to Aristotle. I also demonstrate that the Epicurean account relates closely to their critical engagement with the Cynics and their emphasis on the importance of friendship and generosity in the good life.
Attached is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Attached is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Cicero's general interest in Dicaearchus’ ethical and political thought can be detected in his letters to Atticus and De legibus. One can also infer from De divinatione that Dicaearchus was a source for Cicero’s De republica. At present, however, we do not possess a clear and detailed picture of Dicaearchus’ influence on Cicero’s own ethical and political thought. Scholars have been hindered by a lack of explicit evidence concerning the nature of Dicaearchus’ philosophical arguments as well as Cicero’s failure to mention Dicaearchus by name in the extant parts of De republica. In this paper I argue that, despite these obstacles, we can construct a positive account of the nature and extent of Dicaearchus’ influence that offers new insights into key aspects of Cicero’s philosophical thought and practice.
I reconstruct the Epicurean philosophical position on civil strife and examine Lucretius’ engagement with the topic against it. I challenge the scholarly consensus and argue that there is in fact no compulsion to explain Lucretius’ concern with civil strife by appeal to a preoccupation with contemporary events.
Je reconstruis la position e ́picurienne contre la guerre civile et j’analyse l’opinion de Lucre`ce a` ce sujet. Je conteste le consensus universitaire en soutenant qu’il n’y a en fait aucune ne ́cessite ́ de recourir aux e ́ve`nements contemporains pour expliquer l’inte ́reˆt de Lucre`ce pour la guerre civile.
Book Chapters by Sean McConnell
In his philosophical works Cicero addresses a number of questions concerning the role of old men in politics, most obviously in his dialogue De senectute of 44 BCE. How best should the old participate in politics and the wider community—what, if anything, do the old have to offer that is special or unique? How should the generations fit together in the body politic, and should age be a factor in the structural organisation of states? Should the old rule? Through a close reading of De senectute, I argue: (1) Cicero develops a coherent line on the special political role of old men, which can be seen as a call to arms in the contemporary Roman political context; and (2) this line is not just a restatement of traditional Roman ideals: Cicero draws on and adapts some of the most important arguments from Plato’s Republic and his earlier De re publica when addressing these questions regarding the role of old men in politics.
In his discussion of decorum Cicero supposes that most people would agree to the general principle that in our speech, bodily deportment, and actions we should avoid giving offense to others and should avoid generating feelings of disgust or revulsion. This is because we possess a sense of shame or verecundia. The particular details are very culture-specific: customs and conventions largely set the parameters of verecundia, and we do well to follow them. Cicero also admits that philosophical figures often flout established customs and conventions: he points to Socrates, who is justified in doing so owing to his great and godlike virtue, and the Cynics, who are not justified in doing so at all (1.148). He then sets out a bold thesis: ‘Indeed the reasoning of the Cynics must be rejected absolutely; for it is inimical to a sense of shame (verecundia), without which nothing can be upright (rectum), nothing honourable (honestum)’. For the Cynics, verecundia is not natural; hence we are justified in flouting customs and conventions. Cicero develops a counter-argument: the source of shame or verecundia is indeed natural. I explore his argument for this thesis (which appears at 1.126ff.) and assess his critique of the Cynics.
In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a law that votes are to be known by the best citizens (the optimates) but free to the common people (the plebs) (3.10). This law, Cicero claims, grants ‘the appearance of liberty’ (libertatis species), preserves the authority (auctoritas) of the optimates, and promotes harmony between the classes (3.39). The law and the precise meaning of libertatis species remain opaque even with the lengthy commentary (3.33–9), and much scholarly debate and discussion has arisen as a result—most of it very critical of Cicero’s proposal and the arguments supporting it. This paper offers a fresh analysis of the voting law that is more charitable to Cicero. It unpacks the full details of the voting system that is developed in De legibus and sheds new light on developments in Cicero’s thinking about the best state.
The manuscripts of De officiis all record something strange at 1.148: Cicero says that the philosophers Socrates and Aristippus had exceptional licence to flout social custom and convention owing to their “great and divine good qualities” (magna et divina bona). There are no worries about Socrates, but the example of Aristippus seems preposterous. This paper makes the following argument: (1) elsewhere Cicero defines divina bona in such a way to exclude hedonists; this should rule out crediting Aristippus with magna et divina bona alongside Socrates; (2) all scholarly efforts to account for the presence of Aristippus at 1.148 fail to convince; (3) the name Aristippus at 1.148 should, therefore, be remedied; (4) there are excellent philosophical reasons to think that Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates who is credited with setting in motion the Cynic philosophical tradition, is the name that Cicero wrote or should have written in the original.
In his letters to Lucius Papirius Paetus from 46 BC Cicero provides striking reports on his thoughts and activities as he seeks to accommodate himself to the new political realities following Caesar’s decisive victory over the republican forces in Africa. In these letters Cicero also engages in a kind of performative role-playing: he casts himself variously as a teacher of oratory to two of Caesar’s close associates (Hirtius and Dolabella), as a bon vivant immersed in the Caesarian social scene, and as a man of moral principle who measures himself against the model of the wise man. Philosophical jokes, allusions, and arguments all figure prominently: Cicero is evidently drawing on a rich range of philosophical material to frame his actions and how he should be judged. This paper brings out the full significance of these underlying philosophical frameworks and makes clear the ways in which Cicero exploits the resources of the Greek philosophical tradition in his self-fashioning in the letters to Paetus.
This paper examines two letters between Cicero and Gaius Cassius Longinus in which they critically discuss and denigrate the translation of Epicurus’ term εἴδωλον as spectrum by an Epicurean named Catius. It first offers a new positive account for why Catius made his choice of translation, and it then outlines the full reasons for why Cicero and Cassius found the translation unsatisfying.
This paper outlines the full details of Lucretius’ treatment of parental love. It shows that Lucretius is faithful to Epicurus’ notorious claim that parental love is not natural: in addition to orthodox Epicurean hedonist concerns, Lucretius asserts that children do not “belong to” their parents by nature; as such, even though parental love is now ubiquitous and indeed a cultural norm, there is no basis for the naturalness of parental love. This model of the relationship between parents and children does not, however, apply in the case of certain animals, who do have natural parental love for their offspring. Focusing on two famous scenes, the sacrifice of Iphigenia and the forlorn heifer seeking her sacrificed calf, the paper argues that by highlighting the fragility of human parental love in comparison to that of the animals Lucretius brings to his Roman readers’ attention the relative weakness of the familial ties that bond human beings together, and at the same time he emphasizes the need to maintain them if social and political concord, with all its benefits, is to continue. It transpires that unlocking the details of Lucretius’ treatment of parental love brings a key lesson of the poem into clearer focus.
This paper offers a fresh interpretation of the role played by the Dream of Scipio in Cicero’s De re publica. It explores Cicero’s key distinction between the cosmic and the local levels of statesmanship and the problems he sees with localism, and it details fully for the first time the importance that Cicero attached to the virtue of magnitudo animi (“greatness of soul”). The paper makes the case that in De re publica Cicero promotes his own innovative cosmic model of politics, in which magnitudo animi is developed through an educational process situated in the traditional Roman mos maiorum.
Epicurus denies that human beings have natural parental love for their children, and his account of the development of justice and human political community does not involve any natural affinity between human beings in general, but rather a form of the social contract. The Stoics to the contrary assert that parental love is natural; and, moreover, they maintain that natural parental love is the first principle of social οἰκείωσις, which provides the basis for the naturalness of justice and human political community. The Stoics are, therefore, obliged to refute Epicurus’ denial of the naturalness of parental love in order to support their own theory of social οἰκείωσις; and we have good evidence for the arguments that they employed against the Epicureans on this account. Likewise the Epicureans are obliged not only to defend their own position but also to undermine the competing Stoic theory of social οἰκείωσις; and the foundational premise of a natural bond between parent and child is an obvious target. However, beyond dogmatically restating Epicurus’ denial of natural parental love, the evidence for the Epicurean line of attack against the Stoics is currently unclear. In this paper I argue that we can go some way to uncovering it via an analysis of some fragmentary passages from an unidentified work of the Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia (c. 150–75 B.C.) that contain a puzzling discussion of Epicurus’ stance on parental love.
The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία or greatness of soul is prominent in the works of Aristotle as well as in the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions. However, mention of μεγαλοψυχία is extremely rare in our surviving evidence for the Epicurean school. In this paper I reconstruct a viable Epicurean position on μεγαλοψυχία. I argue that the Epicureans have a distinctive account of the virtue that is compatible with their hedonist ethics, and that can also be seen as a reaction to Aristotle. I also demonstrate that the Epicurean account relates closely to their critical engagement with the Cynics and their emphasis on the importance of friendship and generosity in the good life.
Attached is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Attached is an uncorrected pre-proof version.
Cicero's general interest in Dicaearchus’ ethical and political thought can be detected in his letters to Atticus and De legibus. One can also infer from De divinatione that Dicaearchus was a source for Cicero’s De republica. At present, however, we do not possess a clear and detailed picture of Dicaearchus’ influence on Cicero’s own ethical and political thought. Scholars have been hindered by a lack of explicit evidence concerning the nature of Dicaearchus’ philosophical arguments as well as Cicero’s failure to mention Dicaearchus by name in the extant parts of De republica. In this paper I argue that, despite these obstacles, we can construct a positive account of the nature and extent of Dicaearchus’ influence that offers new insights into key aspects of Cicero’s philosophical thought and practice.
I reconstruct the Epicurean philosophical position on civil strife and examine Lucretius’ engagement with the topic against it. I challenge the scholarly consensus and argue that there is in fact no compulsion to explain Lucretius’ concern with civil strife by appeal to a preoccupation with contemporary events.
Je reconstruis la position e ́picurienne contre la guerre civile et j’analyse l’opinion de Lucre`ce a` ce sujet. Je conteste le consensus universitaire en soutenant qu’il n’y a en fait aucune ne ́cessite ́ de recourir aux e ́ve`nements contemporains pour expliquer l’inte ́reˆt de Lucre`ce pour la guerre civile.
In his philosophical works Cicero addresses a number of questions concerning the role of old men in politics, most obviously in his dialogue De senectute of 44 BCE. How best should the old participate in politics and the wider community—what, if anything, do the old have to offer that is special or unique? How should the generations fit together in the body politic, and should age be a factor in the structural organisation of states? Should the old rule? Through a close reading of De senectute, I argue: (1) Cicero develops a coherent line on the special political role of old men, which can be seen as a call to arms in the contemporary Roman political context; and (2) this line is not just a restatement of traditional Roman ideals: Cicero draws on and adapts some of the most important arguments from Plato’s Republic and his earlier De re publica when addressing these questions regarding the role of old men in politics.
In his discussion of decorum Cicero supposes that most people would agree to the general principle that in our speech, bodily deportment, and actions we should avoid giving offense to others and should avoid generating feelings of disgust or revulsion. This is because we possess a sense of shame or verecundia. The particular details are very culture-specific: customs and conventions largely set the parameters of verecundia, and we do well to follow them. Cicero also admits that philosophical figures often flout established customs and conventions: he points to Socrates, who is justified in doing so owing to his great and godlike virtue, and the Cynics, who are not justified in doing so at all (1.148). He then sets out a bold thesis: ‘Indeed the reasoning of the Cynics must be rejected absolutely; for it is inimical to a sense of shame (verecundia), without which nothing can be upright (rectum), nothing honourable (honestum)’. For the Cynics, verecundia is not natural; hence we are justified in flouting customs and conventions. Cicero develops a counter-argument: the source of shame or verecundia is indeed natural. I explore his argument for this thesis (which appears at 1.126ff.) and assess his critique of the Cynics.
This paper examines Cicero’s engagement with the golden age tradition of utopian thinking, which is prominent not only in Greek literature but also in Plato and the Peripatetic and Stoic philosophical traditions. It makes the case that in De re publica and later philosophical works such as the Tusculan Disputations Cicero draws on philosophical accounts of the golden age—most significantly that of the Peripatetic Dicaearchus of Messana (c.350–c.285 BC)—in his analysis of the Roman res publica and the nature of Roman political virtue. In particular, Cicero identifies the characteristics of Dicaearchus’ golden race with the native qualities of the Romans themselves. By emphasising the intrinsic virtues of the Roman people, and the need to ensure the conditions that allow them to find proper expression in political life, he offers an achievable means for the Roman res publica to attain its best state, exemplified by its glorious past: rather than advocate an unworkable and problematic top-down imposition of a utopian model of an ideal state, Cicero has faith that the best state will come to be from the bottom-up, if the superior nature of the Roman people is simply allowed its full natural expression.
This chapter provides a critical account of Cicero’s discussion of the nature of the soul and the emotions in the Tusculan Disputations. The first two sections trace the key steps of Cicero’s argumentation, as he critically evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of various competing views in the Greek philosophical tradition. Cicero ultimately purports to favor Plato’s position on the immortality of the soul and the Stoics’ cognitivist account of the emotions. The final section draws attention to the ways in which Cicero employs and evaluates these philosophical resources in the realm of therapeutic practice, as he reflects on his own experience of suffering and loss. Cicero showcases the practical utility of a flexible therapeutic model that focuses on the transformation of beliefs: while he clearly favors the Stoic explanation of the emotions, he does not feel compelled to recommend only the therapy in agreement with that explanation. This pragmatic approach can be seen as a distinctive aspect of Cicero’s own philosophical practice.