, ORCID: 0000-0002-3400-4494. Dziękuję Przemkowi Palecznemu za pożyteczne uwagi, które pozwoliły ... more , ORCID: 0000-0002-3400-4494. Dziękuję Przemkowi Palecznemu za pożyteczne uwagi, które pozwoliły mi nieco poprawić pierwotną wersję tego tekstu.
Kuhn’s radical meaning variance thesis implies that scientists, who work in different paradigms c... more Kuhn’s radical meaning variance thesis implies that scientists, who work in different paradigms cannot understand each other. This, however, seems incredible. The air of paradox can be dispersed once the role of presuppositions in constituting a paradigm is acknowledged. Presuppositions function in the way of the Wittgensteinian ungrounded hinges and often are only implicitly assumed. In the face of recalcitrant puzzles some presuppositions can be made explicit and revised. The mechanism of possible revisions of presuppositions can be accounted for in terms of Hintikka’s interrogative model of scientific inquiry with some amendments. The model includes three possible reactions to an anomaly: (i) a conservative offer of an auxiliary hypothesis within the current paradigm, (ii) a reinterpretation of puzzling experimental results and non-revolutionary enrichment of the current paradigm with a novel hypothesis, and (iii) a revision of presuppositions that amounts to a full-fledged scien...
Hinge epistemology" is the term coined by Annalisa to refer to the diverse philosophical movement... more Hinge epistemology" is the term coined by Annalisa to refer to the diverse philosophical movement that draws upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas from On Certainty. Apart from herself, Coliva includes Michael Williams, Crispin Wright and Duncan Pritchard in that camp. My sandwich theory of knowledge (2016, 2019) can be also subsumed under this rubric. Wittgenstein writes: 341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted. 343. … If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. George E. Moore's (1939) attempted rejection of skepticism-"I know I have two hands"-is countered by Wittgenstein:
In the article, I respond to the objections and comments to my book Epistemologia. Sandwiczowa te... more In the article, I respond to the objections and comments to my book Epistemologia. Sandwiczowa teoria wiedzy
In this paper, I raise a problem for the widely accepted view that knowledge is degettierized jus... more In this paper, I raise a problem for the widely accepted view that knowledge is degettierized justified true belief. The problem is that one can acquire degettierized justified true beliefs even if one is unable to apply those beliefs in practice or use them in the formation of further justified beliefs. Such beliefs, even though degettierized, justified and true, hardly amount to knowledge. So a fifth part of the definition of knowledge is called for. As a solution, I suggest that beliefs count as knowledge only when they are structured in such a way that they can be employed in the process of belief-or knowledge-formation. This required structure can be explicated in terms of Wiśniewski"s logic of questions. In order for a belief to count as knowledge, I will argue, it is necessary for it to be liable to figure in an erotetic argument.
Rewolucje naukowe według Sadego a dzisiejsza epistemologia * Sady's account of scientifi c revolu... more Rewolucje naukowe według Sadego a dzisiejsza epistemologia * Sady's account of scientifi c revolutions and today's epistemology Abstract: W. Sady's book Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce [The Structure of the Relativist and Quantum Revolutions in Physics] is discussed. In his analysis of the history of physics of XIX and early XX centuries the Author argues, contrary to Kuhn, that grand discoveries result as conclusions from certain assumptions and suitably selected pieces of background knowledge. I point to major Sady's inspirations-Wittgenstein, Wiśniewski and Fleck-and the kinship of his account to hinge epistemology and my sandwich theory of knowledge. His view on the social nature of knowledge and the role of mathematics is commented upon. In conclusion I suggest that the tension between Sady's antirealism and traditional truth requirement for knowledge can be resolved by a suitable modifi cation of Ajdukiewicz's radical conventionalism.
Well-known paradoxes of confirmation put the validity of inductive reasoning of any kind into que... more Well-known paradoxes of confirmation put the validity of inductive reasoning of any kind into question. Nevertheless, the proponents of hypothetical-deductive or abductive method make some use of inductivist motifs. If Popper is careful enough to distinguish between corroboration and confirmation, Lakatos quite straightforwardly maintains that falsification of one hypothesis is a confirmation of another. Next, Harman's reintroduction of abductivism long after Peirce's invention is, in fact, an attempt at grounding the inductive method in the principle of inference to the best explanation. In the paper, I claim that paradoxes of confirmation arise because of excessively formal analysis of scientific reasoning. It is commonly neglected that scientific hypotheses inevitably assume the ceteris paribus clause. Taking this into account gives the required solution to the paradoxes and sheds new light on the nature of inductive reasoning and its place in the scientific method.
It is claimed that Kuipers’ approach to explanation opens the possibility for a further refinemen... more It is claimed that Kuipers’ approach to explanation opens the possibility for a further refinement of his own refined HD method for the evaluation of theories. One severe problem for the HD method, refined or not, is theory-ladeness. Given that experimental results are theory-laden, the comparative evaluation of alternative hypotheses is always relative to background knowledge. This difficulty can be avoided by supplementing HD considerations with the principle of inference to the best explanation. The authors sketch a program for doing this. The general idea plays on some similarities between Kuipers’ account of explanation and Lipton’s. The former, however, is considered more flexible than the latter, which makes it even more attractive for the purpose under consideration.
, ORCID: 0000-0002-3400-4494. Dziękuję Przemkowi Palecznemu za pożyteczne uwagi, które pozwoliły ... more , ORCID: 0000-0002-3400-4494. Dziękuję Przemkowi Palecznemu za pożyteczne uwagi, które pozwoliły mi nieco poprawić pierwotną wersję tego tekstu.
Kuhn’s radical meaning variance thesis implies that scientists, who work in different paradigms c... more Kuhn’s radical meaning variance thesis implies that scientists, who work in different paradigms cannot understand each other. This, however, seems incredible. The air of paradox can be dispersed once the role of presuppositions in constituting a paradigm is acknowledged. Presuppositions function in the way of the Wittgensteinian ungrounded hinges and often are only implicitly assumed. In the face of recalcitrant puzzles some presuppositions can be made explicit and revised. The mechanism of possible revisions of presuppositions can be accounted for in terms of Hintikka’s interrogative model of scientific inquiry with some amendments. The model includes three possible reactions to an anomaly: (i) a conservative offer of an auxiliary hypothesis within the current paradigm, (ii) a reinterpretation of puzzling experimental results and non-revolutionary enrichment of the current paradigm with a novel hypothesis, and (iii) a revision of presuppositions that amounts to a full-fledged scien...
Hinge epistemology" is the term coined by Annalisa to refer to the diverse philosophical movement... more Hinge epistemology" is the term coined by Annalisa to refer to the diverse philosophical movement that draws upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas from On Certainty. Apart from herself, Coliva includes Michael Williams, Crispin Wright and Duncan Pritchard in that camp. My sandwich theory of knowledge (2016, 2019) can be also subsumed under this rubric. Wittgenstein writes: 341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted. 343. … If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. George E. Moore's (1939) attempted rejection of skepticism-"I know I have two hands"-is countered by Wittgenstein:
In the article, I respond to the objections and comments to my book Epistemologia. Sandwiczowa te... more In the article, I respond to the objections and comments to my book Epistemologia. Sandwiczowa teoria wiedzy
In this paper, I raise a problem for the widely accepted view that knowledge is degettierized jus... more In this paper, I raise a problem for the widely accepted view that knowledge is degettierized justified true belief. The problem is that one can acquire degettierized justified true beliefs even if one is unable to apply those beliefs in practice or use them in the formation of further justified beliefs. Such beliefs, even though degettierized, justified and true, hardly amount to knowledge. So a fifth part of the definition of knowledge is called for. As a solution, I suggest that beliefs count as knowledge only when they are structured in such a way that they can be employed in the process of belief-or knowledge-formation. This required structure can be explicated in terms of Wiśniewski"s logic of questions. In order for a belief to count as knowledge, I will argue, it is necessary for it to be liable to figure in an erotetic argument.
Rewolucje naukowe według Sadego a dzisiejsza epistemologia * Sady's account of scientifi c revolu... more Rewolucje naukowe według Sadego a dzisiejsza epistemologia * Sady's account of scientifi c revolutions and today's epistemology Abstract: W. Sady's book Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce [The Structure of the Relativist and Quantum Revolutions in Physics] is discussed. In his analysis of the history of physics of XIX and early XX centuries the Author argues, contrary to Kuhn, that grand discoveries result as conclusions from certain assumptions and suitably selected pieces of background knowledge. I point to major Sady's inspirations-Wittgenstein, Wiśniewski and Fleck-and the kinship of his account to hinge epistemology and my sandwich theory of knowledge. His view on the social nature of knowledge and the role of mathematics is commented upon. In conclusion I suggest that the tension between Sady's antirealism and traditional truth requirement for knowledge can be resolved by a suitable modifi cation of Ajdukiewicz's radical conventionalism.
Well-known paradoxes of confirmation put the validity of inductive reasoning of any kind into que... more Well-known paradoxes of confirmation put the validity of inductive reasoning of any kind into question. Nevertheless, the proponents of hypothetical-deductive or abductive method make some use of inductivist motifs. If Popper is careful enough to distinguish between corroboration and confirmation, Lakatos quite straightforwardly maintains that falsification of one hypothesis is a confirmation of another. Next, Harman's reintroduction of abductivism long after Peirce's invention is, in fact, an attempt at grounding the inductive method in the principle of inference to the best explanation. In the paper, I claim that paradoxes of confirmation arise because of excessively formal analysis of scientific reasoning. It is commonly neglected that scientific hypotheses inevitably assume the ceteris paribus clause. Taking this into account gives the required solution to the paradoxes and sheds new light on the nature of inductive reasoning and its place in the scientific method.
It is claimed that Kuipers’ approach to explanation opens the possibility for a further refinemen... more It is claimed that Kuipers’ approach to explanation opens the possibility for a further refinement of his own refined HD method for the evaluation of theories. One severe problem for the HD method, refined or not, is theory-ladeness. Given that experimental results are theory-laden, the comparative evaluation of alternative hypotheses is always relative to background knowledge. This difficulty can be avoided by supplementing HD considerations with the principle of inference to the best explanation. The authors sketch a program for doing this. The general idea plays on some similarities between Kuipers’ account of explanation and Lipton’s. The former, however, is considered more flexible than the latter, which makes it even more attractive for the purpose under consideration.
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