Heraclitus was clearly interested in opposites. 1 He was also interested in explaining the cosmos... more Heraclitus was clearly interested in opposites. 1 He was also interested in explaining the cosmos and its constituents. 2 In B1 he promises to explain the nature of each thing (ἐγὼ 1 Heraclitus was famous in antiquity for claiming that opposites were identical. See Aristotle who claims that Heraclitus-or at least followers of Heraclitus-transgressed the Law of Non-Contradiction by claiming that opposites are identical: Topics, 159b30-3; Physics, 185b19-25; Metaphysics, 1012a24ff. It should be noted that Aristotle calls this the 'Heraclitean account' (τὸν Ἡρακλείτου λόγον) in the Physics passage. Elsewhere he shows sensitivity to the fact that Heraclitus may have meant something different than what he appears to say about the identity of opposites (Metaphysics, 1005b17-20). Some modern scholars have also argued that Heraclitus thought that opposites were identical. See K. Popper, 'Back to the Presocratics',
Are there any metaphysically basic (i.e., absolutely fundamental) entities in the cosmos on which... more Are there any metaphysically basic (i.e., absolutely fundamental) entities in the cosmos on which all the other entities in the cosmos depend? If not, how are the various entities in the cosmos related to each other in terms of relative fundamentality? These questions have been of interest since the birth of philosophy. In this paper I argue that, for the early Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, there are no metaphysically basic entities. Rather, 1) the various entities in the cosmos are metaphysically interdependent and 2) the cosmos itself and its parts are metaphysically interdependent. I call this view cosmic interdependence. I demonstrate its distinctiveness and argue for its contemporary significance with respect to the grounding structure of quantum entanglement.
It is well known that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were interested in exploring the nature of g... more It is well known that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were interested in exploring the nature of goodness. Famously, Plato portrays Socrates asking, 'Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?' (Euthyphro 10a). Many scholars have taken this question to be an important moment in the development of theories concerning goodness. But we would be wrong to think that this was the first Greek exploration into the nature of goodness. I hope to show that Heraclitus, writing a century before Plato, explored the nature of goodness. While scholars have recognized that Heraclitus was interested in goodness, I wish to defend the bolder claim that Heraclitus held a theory of value. Value theory, as I see it, is concerned with answering questions concerning goodness: what does it mean for a thing to be good? What does it mean for a thing to be good for someone? Is anything good simpliciter? That is, is there any good thing whose goodness exists independently of any respondent?
In this paper, I discuss the various characteristics of Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transform... more In this paper, I discuss the various characteristics of Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation that can reasonably be gleaned from the extant fragments. While there has been some recent work on Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation, there has been a lack of discussion concerning the properties of the particular elements and their relation to the cardinal opposites. In this paper I argue that fragment B126 (“Cold things warm up, warm things cool off; wet things dry up and dry things moisten”) is an explanandum for Heraclitus. It is meant to invoke certain questions in his readers’ minds: How is it that cold things come to hold an opposing property (i.e. “hot”)? What type of change occurs such that a wet thing can become dry? How is it that things hold these properties in the first place? I argue that Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation (B31, B36 and B76) is the explanans for B126 and is capable of answering these questions. That is, the observable change evident in B126 is explained by a set of transformations between elemental stuffs. Because of this connection between B126 and his theory of elements, Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation is rightly understood as a ‘unity of opposites’ thesis. However, I argue that the transformation of opposites can only be one opposites thesis among several opposites theses.
The earliest recorded philosophical use of the term 'phusis' occurs in the fragments of Heraclitu... more The earliest recorded philosophical use of the term 'phusis' occurs in the fragments of Heraclitus (most notably at B1 and B123). Phusis, in the non-philosophical writings relevant to Heraclitus’s time (e.g. from Homer to Aeschylus and Pindar), was generally used to characterize the external physical appearance of something. Heraclitus, on the other hand, seems to have used the term in the completely opposite manner: an object’s phusis is hidden (kruptesthai) and greater (kreissōn) than the external appearance (B123 and B54). Despite this difference, Heraclitus’s use has an affinity with the common use in his time: phusis is used to characterize things. In B1, for example, Heraclitus makes it clear that he is interested in explaining the nature of each thing as opposed to some cosmic principle of Nature. By examining various fragments, I make the case that the phusis of a thing, for Heraclitus, can be defined as the set of opposites necessarily inherent in an object upon which all objects of that kind depend for their existence. The interesting result is that Heraclitus’s novel use of phusis happens to be the foundation for one of the ways in which opposites form a unity. This particular thesis states that there are essential properties inherent in objects which are pairs of opposites sufficient to determine the unity of the object in question. If this is right, then we can read some fragments which contain descriptions of worldly objects (e.g. bows, lyres, rivers, barley drinks etc.) in a new light. These descriptions of worldly objects might not be meant to stand as metaphoric symbols for cosmic principles, as is often thought; rather, they can be read as instances of Heraclitus attempting to do a metaphysics of objects.
Heraclitus was clearly interested in opposites. 1 He was also interested in explaining the cosmos... more Heraclitus was clearly interested in opposites. 1 He was also interested in explaining the cosmos and its constituents. 2 In B1 he promises to explain the nature of each thing (ἐγὼ 1 Heraclitus was famous in antiquity for claiming that opposites were identical. See Aristotle who claims that Heraclitus-or at least followers of Heraclitus-transgressed the Law of Non-Contradiction by claiming that opposites are identical: Topics, 159b30-3; Physics, 185b19-25; Metaphysics, 1012a24ff. It should be noted that Aristotle calls this the 'Heraclitean account' (τὸν Ἡρακλείτου λόγον) in the Physics passage. Elsewhere he shows sensitivity to the fact that Heraclitus may have meant something different than what he appears to say about the identity of opposites (Metaphysics, 1005b17-20). Some modern scholars have also argued that Heraclitus thought that opposites were identical. See K. Popper, 'Back to the Presocratics',
Are there any metaphysically basic (i.e., absolutely fundamental) entities in the cosmos on which... more Are there any metaphysically basic (i.e., absolutely fundamental) entities in the cosmos on which all the other entities in the cosmos depend? If not, how are the various entities in the cosmos related to each other in terms of relative fundamentality? These questions have been of interest since the birth of philosophy. In this paper I argue that, for the early Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, there are no metaphysically basic entities. Rather, 1) the various entities in the cosmos are metaphysically interdependent and 2) the cosmos itself and its parts are metaphysically interdependent. I call this view cosmic interdependence. I demonstrate its distinctiveness and argue for its contemporary significance with respect to the grounding structure of quantum entanglement.
It is well known that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were interested in exploring the nature of g... more It is well known that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were interested in exploring the nature of goodness. Famously, Plato portrays Socrates asking, 'Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?' (Euthyphro 10a). Many scholars have taken this question to be an important moment in the development of theories concerning goodness. But we would be wrong to think that this was the first Greek exploration into the nature of goodness. I hope to show that Heraclitus, writing a century before Plato, explored the nature of goodness. While scholars have recognized that Heraclitus was interested in goodness, I wish to defend the bolder claim that Heraclitus held a theory of value. Value theory, as I see it, is concerned with answering questions concerning goodness: what does it mean for a thing to be good? What does it mean for a thing to be good for someone? Is anything good simpliciter? That is, is there any good thing whose goodness exists independently of any respondent?
In this paper, I discuss the various characteristics of Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transform... more In this paper, I discuss the various characteristics of Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation that can reasonably be gleaned from the extant fragments. While there has been some recent work on Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation, there has been a lack of discussion concerning the properties of the particular elements and their relation to the cardinal opposites. In this paper I argue that fragment B126 (“Cold things warm up, warm things cool off; wet things dry up and dry things moisten”) is an explanandum for Heraclitus. It is meant to invoke certain questions in his readers’ minds: How is it that cold things come to hold an opposing property (i.e. “hot”)? What type of change occurs such that a wet thing can become dry? How is it that things hold these properties in the first place? I argue that Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation (B31, B36 and B76) is the explanans for B126 and is capable of answering these questions. That is, the observable change evident in B126 is explained by a set of transformations between elemental stuffs. Because of this connection between B126 and his theory of elements, Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation is rightly understood as a ‘unity of opposites’ thesis. However, I argue that the transformation of opposites can only be one opposites thesis among several opposites theses.
The earliest recorded philosophical use of the term 'phusis' occurs in the fragments of Heraclitu... more The earliest recorded philosophical use of the term 'phusis' occurs in the fragments of Heraclitus (most notably at B1 and B123). Phusis, in the non-philosophical writings relevant to Heraclitus’s time (e.g. from Homer to Aeschylus and Pindar), was generally used to characterize the external physical appearance of something. Heraclitus, on the other hand, seems to have used the term in the completely opposite manner: an object’s phusis is hidden (kruptesthai) and greater (kreissōn) than the external appearance (B123 and B54). Despite this difference, Heraclitus’s use has an affinity with the common use in his time: phusis is used to characterize things. In B1, for example, Heraclitus makes it clear that he is interested in explaining the nature of each thing as opposed to some cosmic principle of Nature. By examining various fragments, I make the case that the phusis of a thing, for Heraclitus, can be defined as the set of opposites necessarily inherent in an object upon which all objects of that kind depend for their existence. The interesting result is that Heraclitus’s novel use of phusis happens to be the foundation for one of the ways in which opposites form a unity. This particular thesis states that there are essential properties inherent in objects which are pairs of opposites sufficient to determine the unity of the object in question. If this is right, then we can read some fragments which contain descriptions of worldly objects (e.g. bows, lyres, rivers, barley drinks etc.) in a new light. These descriptions of worldly objects might not be meant to stand as metaphoric symbols for cosmic principles, as is often thought; rather, they can be read as instances of Heraclitus attempting to do a metaphysics of objects.
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