Eric LaRock

Oakland University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I'm a philosopher and a musician (Azlan Rising) based in Michigan. Officially, I'm Associate Professor Philosophy at Oakland University and Affiliate Faculty Member of the Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan. I wrote my doctoral dissertation on a central problem in neuroscience called the binding problem. My current research focuses mainly on problems at the intersection of philosophy of mind and neuroscience, such as neural binding and the unity of consciousness, the hard problem of consciousness, the relationship between persons and brains, neuroplasticity and the nature of agent causation, neural timing and free will, working memory and consciousness, the neural correlates of consciousness and unconsciousness, and the philosophical implications of anesthesia awareness. Below you'll find some of my work in the philosophy of neuroscience on neural binding, attention, memory systems, and consciousness. For a more complete list of my published or forthcoming work, see my site: https://sites.google.com/site/larockconsciousness/home

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Papers by Eric LaRock

An Empirical Case against Central State Materialism

Philosophia Christi, 2012

A Strong Emergence Hypothesis of Conscious Integration and Neural Rewiring in advance

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2020

In this paper we discuss the two-system framework, examine its strengths, point out a fundamental... more In this paper we discuss the two-system framework, examine its strengths, point out a fundamental weakness concerning the unity of conscious experience, and then propose a new hypothesis that avoids that weakness and other related concerns. According to our strong emergence hypothesis, what emerges are not merely mental properties in specialized, distributed neural areas, but also a new, irreducibly singular entity (i.e., an emergent self) that functions in a recurrent (or top-down) manner to integrate its mental properties and to rewire its brain. We argue that the former function is suggested, in part, by the effects of anesthetics on sensory integration, and that the latter function is suggested by evidence garnered from the neuroscience of mindfulness, constraint-induced movement therapy for stroke, and neuroimaging data surrounding mental illness. We then discuss how our strong emergence hypothesis relates to the description and treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders. Finally,...

How Subjects Can Emerge from Neurons

Process Studies, 2019

We pose a foundational problem for those who claim that subjects are ontologically irreducible, b... more We pose a foundational problem for those who claim that subjects are ontologically irreducible, but causally reducible (weak emergence). This problem is neuroscience’s notorious binding problem, which concerns how distributed neural areas produce unified mental objects (such as perceptions) and the unified subject that experiences them. Synchrony, synapses, and other mechanisms cannot explain this. We argue that this problem seriously threatens popular claims that mental causality is reducible to neural causality. Weak emergence additionally raises evolutionary worries about how we have survived the perils of nature. Our emergent subject hypothesis (ESH) avoids these shortcomings. Here, a singular, unified subject acts back on the neurons it emerges from and binds sensory features into unified mental objects. Serving as the mind’s controlling center, this subject is ontologically and causally irreducible (strong emergence). Our ESH draws on recent experimental evidence, including th...

Cognition and Emotion

Theory & Psychology, 2005

In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion, Aristotl... more In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion, Aristotle’s theory is taken to support a functionalist, cognition-first account. This brand of functionalism emphasizes functional role over occupant, or supervenient over physiochemical, the so-called ‘software vs hardware’ distinction. We argue, instead, that this functionalist reading misrepresents Aristotle because it downgrades the significance of his ideas about the biological bases of emotions and, in particular, affect-first processes in emotions. In addition to presenting a detailed critique of this functionalist interpretation of Aristotelian psychology, we offer an alternative reading of Aristotle’s theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with contempora...

Cognition and Consciousness: Kantian Affinities with Contemporary Vision Research

Kant-Studien, 2010

After providing a critique of Andreas Engel's neural mechanistic approach to object feature bindi... more After providing a critique of Andreas Engel's neural mechanistic approach to object feature binding (OFB), I develop a Kantian approach to OFB that bears affinity with recent findings in cognitive psychology. I also address the diachronic object unity (DOU) problem and discuss the shortcomings of a purely neural mechanistic approach to this problem. Finally, I motivate a Kantian approach to DOU which suggests that DOU requires the persisting character of the cognizing subject. If plausible, the cognizing subject could make an explanatory contribution to our theory of unified consciousness and thus could not be eliminated on parsimonious grounds alone.

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Philosophical implications of awareness during general anesthesia

Consciousness, Awareness, and Anesthesia

Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process?

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2008

I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process... more I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.

Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness

Consciousness and Cognition, 2008

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Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness

Behavior and Philosophy, 2006

A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. Th... more A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object’s stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So how do unified objects arise in visual consciousness? Some neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object’s features into a unity (e.g., see Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, 2003; Roelfsema, 1998; Singer, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999). I argue, on both empirical and philosophical grounds, that neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness.

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Disambiguation, Binding, and the Unity of Visual Consciousness

Theory & Psychology, 2007

Recent findings in neuroscience strongly suggest that an object’s features (e.g., its color, text... more Recent findings in neuroscience strongly suggest that an object’s features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) are represented in separate areas of the visual cortex. Although represented in separate neuronal areas, somehow the feature representations are brought together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness. This raises a question of binding: how do neural activities in separate areas of the visual cortex function to produce a feature-unified object of visual consciousness? Several prominent neuroscientists have adopted neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to explain object feature binding. I argue that although neural synchrony and attentional mechanisms might function to disambiguate an object’s features, it is difficult to see how either of these mechanisms could fully explain the unity of an object’s features at the level of visual consciousness. After presenting a detailed critique of neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to object feature binding, I propose interactive hierarchical structuralism (IHS). This view suggests that a unified percept (i.e., a feature-unified object of visual consciousness) is not reducible to the activity of any cognitive capacity or to any localized neural area, but emerges out of the interaction of visual information organized by spatial structuring capacities correlated with lower, higher, and intermediate levels of the visual hierarchy. After clarifying different notions of emergence and elaborating evidence for IHS, I discuss how IHS can be tested through transcranial magnetic stimulation and backward masking. In the final section I present some further implications and advantages of IHS.

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Working memory and consciousness: The current state of play

by Jacob Berger and Eric LaRock

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2018

Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and mani... more Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. Working memory has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system – that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious working memory. In this paper, we focus on visual working memory and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious working memory. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious working memory store, though we offer independent reasons to think that working memory may operate on unconsciously perceived information.

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An Empirical Case against Central State Materialism

Philosophia Christi, 2012

A Strong Emergence Hypothesis of Conscious Integration and Neural Rewiring in advance

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2020